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Great Britain’s (GB) electricity sector is transitioning to low carbon futures in response to various 
pressures including legally binding carbon emission targets while ensuring security of supply. Such 
transitions are likely to focus on a mix of inflexible low carbon generation and new sources of energy 
flexibility, e.g. demand side flexibility, storage and/or interconnection. Existing studies recognise 
that transitions are uncertain with actors across the whole sector playing a role. However, they 
suggest tidy and clearly delineated futures and fail to fully capture the messiness emerging from 
actor interactions. Drawing on transitions research concepts including the Multi-level Perspective, 
whole system analysis, architectural innovation, power and discourses, this study critically 
investigates whole system transitions to low carbon futures and new sources of energy flexibility in 
GB’s electricity sector. Data were collected via semi-structured interviews with 28 senior figures 
across the sector and analysed using thematic coding and discourse analysis.  
This study shows that five futures are articulated representing five discourse coalitions (1) ‘Market-
based’, (2) ‘Network-focussed’, (3) ‘Policy-driven’, (4) ‘Consumer-centric’; and (5) ‘Prosumer-led’. 
These futures are messy because actors hold a plurality of views and cannot be simply marshalled 
into discourse coalitions. This underscores the complexity of electricity sector transitions and 
reveals important issues such as different ontologies and framings of energy flexibility. By 
investigating contemporary energy transition discourses, the study argues that a system level 
understanding of transitions and changes in future making practices currently dominated by 
quantitative modelling analyses and fixed transition frameworks are essential to effectively manage 
transitions. Further research is needed to investigate and find ways to better attend to the 
messiness and multiplicity of energy transitions from a whole systems perspective. This exploratory 
study is situated in a broader landscape of transitions research about energy futures and provides 
useful recommendations for both industry and academic communities. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the general background of the study, explains its importance, and sets out 
the overarching research aim and objectives, research scope, the researcher motivations and the 
thesis structure. 
1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Over the 100 years since Thomas Edison invented the first commercial light bulb in 1879 (Everett 
et al., 2012), electricity has become an essential utility and involved in almost every aspect of 
human life, especially in developed countries such as Great Britain (GB). Electricity is widely used 
not only for essential needs such as lighting, cooking and heating, but also for telecommunications, 
computers, transportation and in the manufacturing industry (Everett et al., 2012).  
In Britain, the electricity sector has been developed with large and centralised fossil fuel power 
stations. However, many international and national binding agreements (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC, 1997), the Climate Change Act (UK Government, 2008), the Net Zero target (BEIS, 2019b)) 
and increasing concerns about climate change in general (i.e. decarbonisation) have gradually 
influenced its development and potentially changed the generation mix from fossil fuels to low 
carbon sources such as nuclear power and renewables. Although contributing to the reduction of 
carbon emissions, these low carbon sources are characterised by inflexibility and intermittency. 
Nuclear power is inflexible because it needs 24-36 hours to reach its full efficient capacity from 
starting up and are difficult to turn off (Everett et al., 2012). Renewables including wind and solar 
power are intermittent in the sense that wind does not blow when we need it and the sun shines 
more in summer than in winter, while we, conventionally, need more electricity in winter than in 
summer. In other words, wind and solar power make “time-variable” contributions to “time-
variable” demand (Boyle, 2012). Such inflexibility and intermittency threaten the current level of 
flexibility in the electricity system and affect electricity security of supply. In a future dominated by 
low carbon sources of electricity, sources and levels of flexibility are a key concern as rapid and 
responsive start-up of the existing fossil-fuel generators are phased out. 
In addition to decarbonisation, changes in the sector have been shaped by decentralisation, 
digitisation and democratisation (the so-called 4Ds). Low carbon sources are located nearer the 
point of consumption and connect directly to distribution grids instead of being transmitted to the 
point of consumption from a centralised generation location (Watson and Devine-Wright, 2011). 
Many new digitised technologies have been developed such as smart meters and smart grids which 
enable effective management in domestic home and at grid level (Wolfe, 2008). These changes 
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towards decentralisation and digitisation facilitate democratisation where consumers may become 
prosumers and get involved in both electricity generation and consumption (The European 
Federation of Renewable Energy Cooperatives - REScoop, 2015; Morris and Jungjohann, 2016). 
The UK Government frames changes to low carbon electricity systems as a “transition” (BEIS, 2017). 
This transition does not happen easily because of lock-in to existing infrastructure (e.g. the national 
grid, existing fossil fuel power stations) or to the way that the sector is operating as a centralised 
top-down network management (Unruh, 2000; Rydin et al., 2012). Therefore, many aspects of the 
electricity sector will need to change in a transition towards a low carbon future. Transitions are 
likely to involve not only technologies but also “socio-technical” (Geels, 2002) (i.e. changes in 
markets, user practices, policy and cultural meanings). However, much research on transitions steer 
the focus of transitions towards changes in technologies such as solar PVs (Smith et al., 2014), off-
shore winds (Kern et al., 2014), nuclear power (Sepulveda, 2016) and electric vehicles (Energy 
Systems Catapult, 2020) rather than societal aspects and consequently overlook how transitions to 
low carbon futures and new sources of energy flexibility in GB’s electricity may unfold in practice.  
Actors with their interests and motivations play an important role in engendering transitions (Geels 
and Verhees, 2011; Foxon, 2013; McMeekin et al., 2019; Geels et al., 2020; Rogge et al., 2020). 
Different interests frame energy transitions differently leading to different future pathways or 
scenarios. Actors with conflicting interests also enter discursive struggles to influence political and 
economic contexts of transitions.  
Moreover, GB’s electricity sectors forms “one large, integrated socio-technical system” (McMeekin 
et al., 2019, p.1217). For example, changes in generation (increases in low carbon generation) and 
changes in consumptions (increases in electricity demand) may threaten transmission/distribution 
or the need to be in balance of the electricity grid. Therefore, transitions to low carbon futures of 
the sector require changes along the entire generation, distribution and consumption sub-systems, 
i.e. of the whole system. This study sits in this broader context of transitions research which 
focusses on actors’ interests and whole system analysis to investigate transitions to low carbon 
futures and energy flexibility in GB’s electricity sector.  
1.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Understanding how transitions in GB’s electricity sector may unfold and consequently realising 
different futures of the sector are increasingly important. These understandings about futures are 
needed for almost all organisations and societies to “guide what to do in the present” (Urry, 2016, 
p.1). However, research on transitions of the sector in academia mainly focusses on historical 
 
3 
transitions via documentary analysis, often with little recourse to industry (e.g. Geels et al., 2016; 
McMeekin et al., 2019). Such an approach to studying transitions while contributing to the 
understanding of transitions does not account for prevailing discussions and current changes in 
electricity sectors and consequently, provides limited insights on low carbon futures. In contrast, 
this study is funded and supported by the Open University and CGI - an international business 
management consultant firm, and an industrial supervisor who helps the researcher access to 
senior figures from GB’s electricity sector (e.g. policy makers, senior executives, leaders and 
advisors). Access to the upper echelons of the electricity sector enabled the researcher to gain 
valuable insights of the industry and to develop an understanding of how transitions to low carbon 
futures actually unfold. This study, therefore, focusses on transitions to low carbon futures with 
discussions and commentaries from senior figures, and significantly addresses the needs to further 
understand whole system transitions and the attainment of lower carbon futures.  
This study also plays an important role in rethinking future making practices in the electricity sector. 
Within the sector, many future scenarios are published by varieties of industrial actors (ENA, 2018; 
National Grid, 2018; 2019b; Energy UK, 2019). For example, National Grid, publishes Energy Future 
Scenarios every year to “help the industry to focus on how we could efficiently transition to a low 
carbon economy” (2018) and to “continue supporting the development of the energy system that is 
robust against different outcomes” (2019b). However, these industrial publications predominantly 
develop futures by modelling tasks with pre-defined timeframes, dominant technologies and fixed 
planning objectives. These may undermine the actual processes of transitions which involve power 
and discursive struggles of actors, i.e. which ultimately be uncertain and messy. Deviating from such 
dominant future making practice, this study constructs futures using the notion of discourse 
coalitions. In this study, discourse coalition is a group of actors who share similar sets of 
assumptions about how transitions to futures come about but hold different interests and 
motivation (Hajer, 1993). Futures articulated from discourse coalitions are able to reflect the actual 
transition processes and capture the uncertainty and messiness of futures emerging from 
interactions of actors. Hence, this study not only reflects how transitions actually unfold but also 
facilitates the industry and the government in developing appropriate transition management 
strategies and energy policy.  
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
To understand whole system transitions to low carbon futures and to rethink future making 
practices of the sector, the literature will be reviewed to detail gaps in knowledge and research 
approaches (see details in Chapter 2). Research aim and objectives will then be articulated. The 
final set are as follows: 
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Research aim: To critically investigate whole system transitions to low carbon futures and new 
sources of energy flexibility in GB’s electricity sector. 
Research objectives: 
• To identify dominant energy discourse coalitions within GB’s electricity sector. 
• To identify futures of GB’s electricity sector, focussing on whole system analysis. 
• To identify how transitions to new sources of energy flexibility may be achieved in each 
future. 
1.4 RESEARCH SCOPE 
Many future scenarios focus on the whole system analysis which comprises of electricity, gas, heat 
and transport (e.g. Energy UK, 2016; National Grid, 2019b) However, this study focusses on the 
electricity sector itself. It is relevant in the sense that the electrification of heat and transport to 
reduce carbon emissions in these areas, will increase the demand for electricity (CCC, 2017). There 
is a need to change the whole electricity sector (spanning from generation, distribution and 
consumption) to accommodate increased electricity demand and ensure electricity security of 
supply.  
This study focuses on Great Britain’s (GB) electricity sector, rather than the whole of the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) electricity sector (which includes Great Britain and Northern Ireland). At the 
moment, the electricity sector is regulated by Ofgem which is GB Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem, 2020a). Therefore, from a regulatory perspective, Great Britain’s electricity sector 
is the relevant unit of analysis. 
Transitions of the sector emerge through the interactions of industrial actors discussing and 
negotiating futures. Seen in this way, the industry has considerable power to accelerate transitions 
to a low carbon future. Therefore, this study pays attention to various key industrial actors such as 
Ofgem, National Grid, Distributions Network Operators (DNOs), suppliers and generators.  
This study investigates transitions to different futures of the sector. The term “futures” is used, 
instead of future pathways or scenarios. Future pathways and scenarios seem to imply the common 
future making practices by quantitative modelling analyses. As this study uses qualitative methods, 
the researcher avoids such connotations.  
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The researcher does not set a specific time horizon for this study because futures are open-ended 
and contingent. This will open a chance for interviewees to comment on appropriate timescales for 
transitions to unfold.  
1.5 THE RESEARCHER 
Subjectivity cannot be avoided in qualitative research. As such, the researcher forms an important 
part of the research process and it is useful to describe the researcher’s background and 
motivations.  
The researcher was born and lived in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam before coming to the UK to 
pursue further education. Hanoi is a crowded city where the Government, many embassies, 
universities and companies are located. However, electricity has been cut regularly in each district. 
The researcher has experienced heat at 36 Celsius without any electricity many times. Therefore, 
the researcher is, in the long term beyond this PhD, motivated to explore how transitions to low 
carbon futures of GB’s electricity sector can be adapted in Vietnam context to assist Vietnam 
moving towards a sustainable energy system in the future.  
Before pursing this PhD, the researcher obtained a Bachelor Degree in International Relations, 
major in International Economics at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2009 and a Master of 
Science in Management at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom in 2010. These degrees 
facilitated her with knowledge in economics, sociology, organisational culture, academic writing 
and so on.  These experiences and studies ‘set the stage’ for the PhD.  
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This introduction chapter is followed by six chapters. 
Chapter 2 – Literature review 
This chapter reviews literature on the development of GB’s electricity sector where the objectives 
of ensuring electricity security of supply and decarbonisation at lowest cost are embedded. Key 
landmarks of the development from the establishment of the Grid to the so-called 4Ds 
(Decarbonisation, decentralisation, digitisation and democratisation) are highlighted. Within this 
context, three gaps in knowledge are identified.  
The change of GB’s electricity sector to low carbon future is conceptualised as a transition. Hence, 
this chapter also reviews a number of approaches in transitions research to address the gaps in 
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knowledge. They are the MLP, architectural innovation, power and discourses in transitions. 
Research aim and objectives are then articulated. Finally, an analytical framework for energy 
discourse analysis and some contemporary energy discourses to be used for data analysis are 
identified.  
Chapter 3 - Methods 
This chapter sets out the methods chosen to conduct the study. It is divided into two sections. The 
first section identifies and reviews methods to meet the research aim and objectives. The second 
section articulates how the chosen methods were actually used.  
This study follows a flexible design where theoretical frameworks are not fixed. The study was 
developed via an iterative process where the tasks of reviewing literature, collecting data and 
analysing qualitative data are intertwined and gradually refined during the process of the study. 
This research process is conceptualised as a ‘progressive funnel’ through which the study gradually 
became increasingly focussed. 
Chapter 4 – Making sense of transitions of GB’s electricity sector: a thematic analysis 
This chapter focuses on interviewees’ assumptions about transitions of GB’s electricity sector, 
including five main themes: (1) Change, (2) Timeframe and nature of change, (3) Stability, (4) 
Regulation and policy and (5) Goals of transition. 
At the end of this chapter, seven dominant discourse coalitions are set out, adapted from the above 
themes and contemporary energy discourses identified from literature. They are: (1) Economic 
rationalism, (2) Administrative rationalism, (3) Ecological modernisation, (4) Consumer sovereignty, 
(5) Energy democracy, (6) Technology focus and (7) Energy flexibility.  
Chapter 5 – Futures of GB’s electricity sector 
This chapter identifies different futures of GB’s electricity sector, each of which is rhetorically 
constructed by discourse coalitions identified in Chapter 4.  
(1) Economic rationalism:  a ‘Market-based’ future.  
(2) Administrative rationalism: a ‘Network-focussed’ future.  
(3) Ecological modernisation: a ‘Policy-driven’ future.  
(4) Consumer sovereignty:  a ‘Consumer-centric’ future; and  
(5) Energy democracy: a ‘Prosumer-led’ future. 
The last two discourse coalitions, technology focus and energy flexibility discourses are accepted 
among almost all interviewees and are embedded in all futures. 
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Each future is described in terms of (1) System components, (2) System relationships, (3) Power, 
and (4) The metaphor of energy flexibility. 
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
This chapter compares and contrasts the findings from the empirical data from interviews with the 
literature. Firstly, a critical reflection on futures of GB’s electricity sector, how these futures may be 
realised and the feasibility of these futures are provided. A discussion on ontology and rethinking 
future making practices are also presented. Next, the chapter provides some theoretical critical 
reflections on the MLP, architectural innovation, whole system analysis, discourse and power in 
transitions. Finally, the chapter discusses how to realise energy flexibility.  
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter reviews the aim and objectives set out in chapter 1 and 2. It then provides a 
methodological reflection. After that, it presents the key findings and conclusions of the study. This 
chapter also identifies the limitation of this study. This chapter ends by providing implications for 
the industry and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the transitions of GB’s electricity sector to tackle climate changes while 
ensuring electricity security of supply and examines the role of energy flexibility in these transitions. 
Three gaps in knowledge relating to the whole sector’s transitions to low carbon futures and new 
sources of energy flexibility (demand side flexibility, storage and interconnection) are identified. In 
order to address these research gaps, a number of approaches are justified including the MLP, 
architectural innovation, power and discourses in transitions. The main concepts from these 
approaches are found useful in enriching the understanding of whole system transitions of the 
sector. Taking into account these identified research gaps and research approaches, the research 
aim and objectives of the study are clearly articulated. Analytical frameworks to be used in data 
analysis are then set out to address these research aim and objectives.   
2.2 GREAT BRITAIN’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
In June 2019, the Government passed legislation to bind the UK to Net Zero emissions by 2050 from 
the 1990s level (BEIS, 2019b). In 2019, Great Britain also recorded the first coal-free generation 
week (National Grid, 2019a). Government statistics on 2019 also acknowledged increases in 
renewables’ share of electricity generation to 33% in 2018, from 2.6% in 2000 (BEIS, 2020a). This 
change can also be seen in GB’s landscape, where large cooling towers have been replaced by wind 
farms and solar panels. It is therefore important to understand a full picture of what and how GB’s 
electricity sector has changed and the implications for the future. This section focuses on two main 
themes: (1) ensuring electricity security of supply and (2) the historical and current background of 
GB’s electricity sector with key landmarks in policy: from the decision to construct the national grid, 
to nationalisation, to privatisation and to the current context with the focus on decarbonisation, 
decentralisation, digitisation and democratisation.  
2.2.1 Ensuring electricity security of supply 
Ensuring electricity security of supply to ‘keep Britain’s lights on’ has always been one of the key 
objectives of the electricity sector. Balancing supply and demand is a prerequisite to meet this 
objective. This section firstly looks at the role of balancing supply and demand of the sector and 
how supply and demand is conventionally balanced.  
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Looking ahead, balancing supply and demand is challenged by the development of low carbon 
generation following the UK’s legally binding target for decarbonisation (Strbac et al., 2016a). 
Therefore, secondly, this section considers inflexibility and intermittency – characteristics of low 
carbon generation. In order to deal with such inflexibility and intermittency, new sources of energy 
flexibility are needed. This section ends with a closer look at energy flexibility. 
2.2.1.1 The role of balancing supply and demand 
Since the beginning of the World War I, many factories in Britain were rapidly built and electricity 
became the “national choice” to power them (Everett et al., 2012). Therefore, one of the key 
concerns for GB’s electricity sector was to produce sufficient electricity to meet total demand. 
Electricity was mainly generated from small and inefficient coal fired power stations (Everett et al., 
2012). Because coal was cheap, abundant and indigenous to Britain, there was enough electricity 
to meet total demand (Helm, 2004).  
However, GB’s electricity sector needs to ensure that electricity supply balances with demand at all 
times, otherwise the system fails (Boyle, 2007). Historically, systems did collapse and caused 
blackouts over a wide area for many hours. On Christmas Day 1960, for example, widespread grid 
failures were described as “politically embarrassing” (Everett et al., 2012). Recently, on 9 August 
2019, the blackout across different regions in the UK including London caused “a lot of disruption 
to a lot of people” (National Grid, 2020). These blackouts were caused by a failure to supply 
sufficient electricity to meet peak demand. Therefore, this section focuses firstly on describing how 
the sector balances supply and demand, conventionally by ensuring supply meets demand at all 
times. 
Meeting demand at all times is not easy to achieve. In practice, the demand (or load, technically) 
for electricity varies widely according to the season and the time of day. Figure 2.1 shows the 
differences between the electricity demands of winter and summer on a typical week day (NIC, 
2016). It can be seen that the electricity demand at night in summer was 35GW, while a peak in 
demand at night in winter could go up to 55GW. 35GW could thus be used as a “base load” (Everett 
et al., 2012). Electricity generation for variable demand would be added ‘on top’ of this “based 
load”.   
Demand may also change hourly because of changes in human activities, such as when computers 
are turned on in the morning at work, when there is a popular TV show or a football match or when 
people cook their evening meals. Moreover, demand at peak time (usually from 4pm to 7pm) may 
also increase due to the development of Electric Vehicles (EVs). According to the National 
Infrastructure Commission (2018), energy demand from increasing population and the uptake of 
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electric vehicles may rise from 9-26% by 2030. This increase in demand may impact the task of 
balancing supply and demand of the network. 
Since demand for electricity is not constant in the short term, GB’s electricity sector has needed to 
ensure that sufficient spare generation capacity was available, over and above that needed to meet 
the maximum peak load demand. The sector also needed to ensure that spare capacity was 
available in case of unexpected events such as a breakdown of a power plant (Boyle, 2007). Such 
spare capacity is often called margin capacity. The Winter Outlook published by National Grid 
(National Grid, 2019d) forecasted that the margin capacity was 12.9% in the 2019/2020 winter.  
National Grid is the organisation in charge of balancing supply and demand, i.e. managing the 
system. This is achieved through the use of different power plants which can be started up quickly 
(i.e. quick start-up power plants). These power plants include:  
• A small “open cycle” gas-turbine: It can be run up to full power in minutes. However, it 
provides a low capacity and a low efficiency (Everett et al., 2012).  
• A pumped-storage hydro power plant: It can get to full power very quickly by diverting 
water flow onto turbines such as Dinorwig. 
• A large combined cycle gas turbine operating at part-load: It may need 8 hours to reach 
full power but it can operate and provide outputs within an hour. This type of power 
 




source can also be run at part-load (producing half of the full capacity), but there is a 
trade-off for this flexibility from lower efficiency and higher carbon emissions (Boyle, 
2012). 
These power plants that ensure margin capacity provide energy flexibility for the system. Here, the 
electricity system always needs to maintain a level of flexibility. Energy flexibility of a system, 
conventionally, refers to the ability to “respond rapidly to large fluctuations in demand and supply, 
both scheduled and unforeseen variations and events, ramping down production when demand 
decreases, and upwards when it increases” (IEA, 2008). In accordance with this definition, energy 
flexibility is essential for the supply of the system to meet with changes in demand. In this context, 
energy flexibility in the electricity sector is achieved by the characteristics of the generation mix in 
the system, e.g. quick start-up power plants.  
However, with the UK legally binding target of Net Zero emissions by 2050 (BEIS, 2019b), the 
generation mix is likely to change and favours low carbon generation including nuclear power, solar 
and wind power. Such changes in the generation mix, together with the increased demand from 
the uptake of electric vehicles and increasing population (mentioned above) may reduce the ability 
of the system to balance supply and demand or the flexibility of the system using the above quick 
start-up power plants to meet changes in demand conventionally. This potentially becomes a major 
policy and operational challenge for the sector. The following section describes the main 
characteristics of low carbon generation and shows that low carbon generation is unable to provide 
the needed capacity margin as quick start-up power plants. 
2.2.1.2 Inflexibility and intermittency – characteristics of low carbon generation 
Nuclear power and renewables can be classified as low carbon generation, which means that they 
produce zero or lower carbon emissions than extant, conventional power plants. Nuclear power 
plants need 24-36 hours to reach full efficient capacity from start-up and are harder to turn off 
compared to coal and gas power plants (Everett et al., 2012). Nuclear power plants therefore have 
very limited flexibility (i.e. are inflexible) and are mainly used to supply the base load (Boyle, 2012). 
Renewable energy is the “energy obtained from the continuous or repetitive currents of energy 
recurring in the natural environment” (Twidell and Weir, 1986). In the UK, renewables are 
generated from mainly wind power (onshore and offshore wind) and solar photovoltaic.  Wind and 
solar power are intermittent because they can make “time-variable” contributions to “time-
variable” demand (Boyle, 2012). The output of wind power depends on the random nature of wind. 
When the wind is calm, electricity cannot be produced. When the wind blows to a certain speed 
(the ‘cut-in’ wind speed), the turbines operate to generate electricity. When the wind blows more 
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than a certain speed (the ‘shut-down’ wind speed), the turbines stop to avoid damage. Even at 
modest wind speeds,  outputs from wind turbines vary considerably from minute to minute (Everett 
et al., 2012). The variability of wind power can also be calculated by a capacity factor. If the turbines 
operate at full rate throughout the year, the capacity factor is 100%. However, typically, wind power 
only has a capacity factor of 25% (Everett et al., 2012).  
In Britain, solar energy is in the form of solar PV installed on the roof of a building, a house or on 
agricultural land. Solar PV is intermittent because output can reduce if there are passing clouds. 
Additionally, PVs only produce electricity during the day-time and the output is higher in summer 
than in winter. In contrast, demand in winter is certainly higher than in summer (Boyle, 2012). 
Hence, there is often a mismatch between supply and demand, which could be overcome partly by 
combining solar PV with energy storage, such as batteries. 
With the intermittency of renewables and inflexibility of nuclear power, the change in generation 
mix towards low carbon generation challenges the electricity system’s ability to maintain sufficient 
flexibility to meet demand at all times (Strbac et al., 2016a). However, such challenges are expected 
to be resolved with new sources of energy flexibility as explored in the next section. 
2.2.1.3 Energy flexibility 
If low carbon sources continue to make an increased contribution to electricity generation, 
according to Boyle (2012), the question needs to be considered is to what extent will these existing 
energy systems need to be modified and supplemented? This section (1) defines energy flexibility 
and (2) describes new sources of energy flexibility and (3) explores the attractiveness of these new 
sources. 
2.2.1.3.1 Definition of energy flexibility 
Conventionally, as identified in section 2.2.1.1, energy flexibility of the system refers to its ability to 
turn on ‘quick start-up’ power plants in response to increases in demand. EURELECTRIC (2014) look 
beyond this definition of energy flexibility and state: “On an individual level flexibility is the 
modification of generation injection and/or consumption patterns in reaction to an external signal 
(price signal or activation) in order to provide a service within the energy system”. This definition 
deviates from conventional energy flexibility in which supply changes to meet increases or 
decreases in demand. Rather, demand can also change to match supply in order to provide the 
necessary supply and demand balancing, and consequently, ensure electricity security of supply. 
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) in “Upgrading our Energy System – 
smart systems and flexibility plan” (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017) favours a more market-oriented 
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approach for the definition of flexibility. This plan is based on two broad types of flexibility which 
are (1) price flexibility (occurring when any party varies its demand or generation in response to the 
price of energy, and network use at a particular time and/or location); and (2) contracted flexibility 
(where parties trade and directly contract with one another to procure flexibility). This approach is 
relevant to new sources of energy flexibility explored in the following section. 
2.2.1.3.2 New sources of energy flexibility 
Writing over a decade ago, Boyle et al (2007) considered the impact of renewables on the electricity 
grid in the future, especially the impact of intermittency, and suggested some possible solutions 
such as energy storage and demand-side management, to maintain energy flexibility on the system. 
In the current system of fossil fuels, flexibility can be taken from gas power plants which can be 
quickly started up (IEA, 2008; Bertsch et al., 2012). If the system moves towards low carbon 
generation, which are inflexible and intermittent, some new sources of flexibility will need to be 
deployed, including: 
• Demand side flexibility, to change patterns of demand  
• Storage, to store energy and use when needed, it means to increase demand when 
there is insufficient demand on the system or meet demand when there is insufficient 
supply available. 
• Interconnection, to import electricity at times of peak demand and sell export 
electricity at time of surplus supply from/to other parts of the world via transmission 
grid (NIC, 2016). 
These new sources of flexibility are looked at in more detail to understand their role in GB’s current 
electricity system. 
Demand side flexibility:  
Demand side flexibility can potentially help consumers save money by switching their demand to 
times of low demand relative to the available supply. This value has been realised by industrial and 
commercial consumers to an extent. Domestic consumers can also reduce their bills, for example, 
by avoiding turning on the washing machine at the time when people cook their evening meals, 
instead turning it on at night when people are asleep. Recently, demand side flexibility is underused 
in the UK because of the failure in communicating its benefits (for both consumers and electricity 
network) to consumers (NIC, 2016). However, with the planned roll out of smart meters, this could 
change in the future. More and more consumers will receive transparent information about their 




Historically, it has been difficult and expensive to store electricity (Everett et al., 2012). Currently, 
there are many storage innovations driven by the use of mobile phones and electric vehicles (NIC, 
2016). Regarding electric vehicles (EV), the global number has increased 40% annually (IEA, 2020). 
In line with this trend, the government has improved the EV charging infrastructure and announced 
an end to the sale of all new conventional cars and vans using petrol or diesel by 2040 to support 
the uptake of EVs in 2017 (BEIS, 2017). Recently, the government brings this forward from 2040 to 
2030 (DfT and BEIS, 2020). 
Storage technologies are increasingly attracting investment as the cost of, for example, lithium ion 
batteries has reduced from $3000/kWh in 1990 (NIC, 2016) to $176/kWh in 2018 (Goldie-Scot, 
2019). This drop in price makes the economics of combining solar energy and battery more 
attractive than solar energy alone. This may fundamentally disrupt the energy system as it provides 
an opportunity for consumers to actively engage in electricity generation and consumption.  The 
UK Government has also announced investment of £246 million in battery technology (BEIS, 2017), 
which increases the value of not only storage technology but also new sources of flexibility in 
general. 
Interconnection:  
Historically, Britain has had a low level of interconnection because subsea cables need to be built 
to allow the electricity to be imported and exported between continental countries. Today, there 
are five interconnectors – one to Republic of Ireland, one to Northern Ireland, one to France, one 
to the Netherlands, and one to Belgium which constitute 5GW of interconnection capacity (Ofgem, 
2020b). It is expected that new connections will be built to Norway, Ireland, France and Denmark 
in the coming years (expected delivery date 2020-2022) (NIC, 2016). However, this source may be 
less attractive to investors because of uncertainty associated with Brexit. 
2.2.1.3.3 The attractiveness of new sources of energy flexibility 
These new sources are expected to help the sector to not only decarbonise but also balance supply 
and demand at all times. In coping with decarbonisation, the sector needs to integrate low carbon 
generation which means that the system will be significantly affected by intermittent sources of 
renewables. National Grid (2017) has suggested that the total amount of renewable generating 
capacity could increase to 60% of installed capacity by 2050, nearly doubling the capacity in 2016. 
A research project from Imperial College London (Strbac et al., 2015) shows that deploying 
renewables with new sources of flexibility is the most cost effective way to a low carbon future, 
with a potential to save consumers £2.9 billion to £8.1 billion per year by 2030 (NIC, 2016). The 
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government and Ofgem are also collaborating to support the sector in a move towards a flexible 
electricity system by investing £246 million in battery technologies as mentioned in section 
2.2.1.3.2 (Ambrose, 2017; BEIS and Ofgem, 2016; 2017). The new sources of flexibility detailed 
above may therefore be the energy flexibility choice for a low carbon future. The attractiveness of 
new sources of energy flexibility is further discussed in section 2.2.2.4.2. 
In summary, this section identified the main objective of GB’s electricity sector which is balancing 
supply and demand at all times. GB’s electricity sector already has a level of energy flexibility. This 
flexibility is maintained by the ‘quick start-up’ characteristics of extant gas power plants. However, 
in the context of decarbonisation with the integration of inflexible and intermittent low carbon 
generation, GB’s electricity sector is facing challenges to maintain such level of energy flexibility. 
New sources of energy flexibility such as demand side flexibility, storage or interconnection might 
be obtained to help the sector compensate for the inflexibility and intermittency of low carbon 
generation while coping with decarbonisation. The following section moves from describing the 
properties of the system to looking at the development of the grid and the sector. Some key 
landmarks of GB’s electricity sector are set out. 
2.2.2 Historical and current context 
During the post-World War I period, most power stations were operating inefficiently with the 
efficiency of only 10% in 1920 (Everett et al., 2012). The UK government reviewed the national 
problem of electricity supply and created the Central Electricity Board (CEB) which was charged 
with connecting up fragmented privately owned generation plants to form the basis of a networked 
supply. A decision to build a transmission network, the National Grid, was confirmed in 1926 to 
fulfil this task (Everett et al., 2012). This section reviews five key landmarks (1) 1930s – the Grid, (2) 
1947 – Nationalisation, (3) 1990s – Privatisation, (4) 2000s – Environmental concern and (5) The 
changes – Decarbonisation, decentralisation, democratisation and digitisation. These key 
landmarks reveal the important role of energy policy and three key objectives of GB’s electricity 
sector (1) to ensure electricity security of supply, (2) to reduce carbon and (3) at lowest costs. 
2.2.2.1 1930s – The Grid 
In 1934, the first National Grid was completed and has since been expanded and upgraded to cope 
with increases in demand (Everett et al., 2012). During the 1930s, the system was owned by the 
government while the stations and distribution companies were privately owned (Everett et al., 
2012). Initially, electricity generation within regions of the UK could be linked to transmit and 
distribute electricity to end consumers, allowing the sector to use electricity from different places 
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to cover peak demand (Boyle, 2012). In 1938, the network was developed to connect all regions 
within the UK, which made the task of meeting peak demand easier (Everett et al., 2012). However, 
electricity in particular and energy in general became so important after World War II that the UK 
Government sought to control the production and distribution of energy (Helm, 2004), which led 
to nationalisation in 1947. 
2.2.2.2 1947 - Nationalisation 
Nationalisation in 1947 paved the way for larger power plants to be developed and operated at 
higher efficiencies, under the state owned monopoly – the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) (Everett et al., 2012). CEGB sold electricity to state owned Area Boards, each of which has a 
monopoly relationship with its customers (ibid). Investment decisions in the nationalisation period 
were not made as in a normal competitive market but agreed by the government and industry 
managers. Bills were then paid by consumers and taxpayers. Investments in larger units were 
favoured over smaller ones (Helm, 2004). Coal was burned in large power stations and far from end 
consumers.  
From nationalisation in 1947 to privatisation in the 1990s, the share of primary electricity sources 
varied. Coal was dominant in electricity generation and accounted for 98% of the UK’s electricity in 
1950 (Everett et al., 2012). After 1950, coal usage was challenged by oil as the decline in oil price 
made burning oil to generate electricity cheaper than burning coal. However, increases in the oil 
price during the 1970s reduced the use of oil as a major generation source (ibid). During the 1950s 
the first nuclear plants were opened and supplied electricity to the grid (ibid). In the 1970s, the 
Government assumed that the oil price would continually grow and threaten energy security, so 
they backed coal and supported nuclear power. Such support was given in light of sunk investment 
in large scale power stations built in the nationalisation period. Another rationale behind this 
support was energy self-sufficiency. Coal and nuclear power were produced in Britain, helping the 
country move away from the energy imports (Helm, 2004). At a similar time, natural gas discovered 
in the North Sea, started to generate small amounts of electricity using simple gas turbines (Everett 
et al., 2012).  
The CEGB used ‘merit order’ to control the operation of power plants. Nuclear power stations and 
the largest and most efficient coal power plants having the lowest running cost supplied the base 
load. Then, coal power plants with lower efficiency were the next in the merit order, but usually did 
not run in summer when demands were low. Simple gas turbines were then operated only to meet 
peak demand in winter (Everett et al., 2012). 
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During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the nationalised status of the electricity sector was 
unchallenged by Conservative governments because the key objective was to build as many power 
stations as possible to cope with increases in demand (Helm, 2004). The government believed that 
energy demand would increase because energy was increasingly important, not only for 
manufacturing goods, but also for transporting goods and in service sectors (Helm, 2004). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the focus of the government moved to security of supply. The 
government imposed higher gas prices, built more nuclear power stations and sustained the coal 
industry. An added political dimension was the coal miners’ strikes in 1981 affecting security of 
supply. However, at this stage, there was no recognition that the threat of miners’ strikes on energy 
security could be solved by privatising the electricity sector (Helm, 2004).   
In the context of the world economic recession in the 1980s, the British economy became unstable, 
with the rise of unemployment and the drop in the value of sterling, which caused the public sector 
to face tight budget constraints (Helm, 2004). This influenced the electricity sector: electricity prices 
had to increase in order to create revenue for the government and investments were curtailed due 
to lack of funds. However, the recession led to an excess in supply of electricity as a result of the 
power station construction programme through the 1950s to 1970s and a fall in demand through 
reduced economic activity. The operation of the electricity sector thus became inefficient. 
Electricity price, therefore, reduced although the government wanted to push prices up, which 
threatened the nationalised status of the industry and ultimately paved the way for private sector 
led initiatives, mainly to finance investment (Helm, 2004). Nigel Lawson, who became Secretary of 
State for Energy in 1981, argued that energy should be treated as a market commodity and the job 
of balancing demand and supply should be left to the market, changing the history of the sector by 
turning to a new page: privatisation. 
2.2.2.3 1990s – Privatisation 
In the 1990s, the UK energy sector was privatised (Helm, 2004). Privatisation opened up an 
opportunity for competition, for gas and green niches (such as wind and solar power) to enter the 
electricity market. At the beginning of the 1990s, the share of GB’s electricity generation included 
75% coal, 20% nuclear and 5% other (e.g. oil) (Helm, 2004). By 1992, when the technology of 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) was well developed, gas rapidly displaced coal for several 
reasons (Everett et al., 2012). First, CCGT was cheaper and quicker to build than coal and nuclear 
stations. Second, Area Boards became Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) which were allowed 
to build their own power stations. Initially, they were monopoly suppliers to a number of loyal 
customers and were able to sign a fixed-price contract for 15 years’ future supply of gas. Therefore, 
investment in CCGT was relatively risk-free which turned on the so called “Dash for Gas” period. 
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Third, the battle between the Conservatives and the miners (mentioned in section 2.2.2.2), 
representative by NUM (National Union of Mineworkers), gave rise to the government’s approval 
for natural gas to be used in power plants. Last but not least, burning gas produced less CO2 than 
burning coal (Everett et al., 2012). 
Under privatisation, the system is operated quite similar as now. Most power stations are privately 
owned and required to compete with each other. The system operates under a competitive 
wholesale market, regulated by Ofgem (Office of gas and electricity market). Ofgem, through 
trading arrangements, administers how the electricity is traded, who gets paid, who is given licenses 
to generate, sell or distribute electricity. The old trading arrangement, known as the Pooling and 
Settlement Agreement (PSA) allowed market participants to offer non-binding bids into the whole 
sale market (Office of Electricity Regulation, 1998). PSA also allowed bilateral trading between 
generators (ibid). The New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) was introduced into the 
electricity sector in 2001, legally binding market participants to their bids (Ofgem, 2002). NETA was 
operated in England and Wales, then extended to Scotland under the name British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) in 2005 (Ofgem and DTI, 2005). Now, under 
BETTA, there is one whole-sale electricity market for Great Britain and one system operator 
(National Grid) (Elexon, [no date]).  
The day-to-day running of the wholesale market is carried out by the National Grid Company who 
owns the grid (Everett et al., 2012). In Apr 2019, National Grid was separated into National Grid 
Electricity Transmission (who owns the grid) and the Electricity System Operator (ESO) (National 
Grid, 2019c). At any given time, the ESO uses its computer model to estimate the next few hours 
demand and invites bids for electricity supply. Power station owners respond using their computer 
systems. The lowest bids are then taken first to supply electricity. Renewables such as wind power 
with the lowest running costs are selected first to supply the base load, then come the nuclear 
power plants with low fuel costs. After that, coal and gas power plants are chosen. Lastly, due to 
their high flexibility, hydro power plants (although with zero fuel costs) are drawn in (Boyle, 2012).  
The ESO ensures electricity supply and demand is balanced second by second. The ESO does this 
using its Balancing Mechanism. Market participants (traditionally they are mainly generators) can 
bid into this Balancing Mechanism market at very short notice. If market participants fail to fulfil 
their bids, they need to pay an imbalance price (Ofgem, 2013). This imbalance price is calculated by 
Elexon who administrates the Balancing and Settlement Codes defining the rules for the Balancing 
Mechanism market (Elexon, [no date]). 
The 1990s was also the decade in which the impact of using fossil fuels as energy sources on climate 
change was recognised in policy making circles (Helm, 2004). The Non-Fossil Fuels Obligation 
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(NFFO) was introduced in 1990. This obligation required electricity suppliers to buy a certain 
amount of nuclear power from the wholesale market (Geels et al., 2016). In 1997, the Kyoto 
protocol (UNFCCC, 1997) on Climate Change was signed by 37 industrialised countries, among 
which the UK set its target to reduce carbon emissions by 12.5% below the 1990 levels by 2012 
(DECC, 2015c). This commitment has fundamentally influenced GB’s electricity industry and energy 
policy in particular (Geels et al., 2016). In the next section, climate change and the development of 
policies to address it are discussed. 
2.2.2.4 2000s – present 
2.2.2.4.1 Environmental concern 
Environmental concerns have forced the government to participate in actions to mitigate climate 
change. In 1990, when gas was dominant, gas helped the UK to reach UK’s national early climate 
change commitments (Helm, 2004). Turning to the first half of the 21st century, there was a concern 
that carbon emissions would increase if the UK government does not change its energy policy 
(Helm, 2004). Renewables were then included in NFFO (Geels et al., 2016). NFFO was replaced by 
Renewables Obligation in 2002, which supported large-scale renewables. In 2000s, climate change 
received far more attention from the public. The 2003 White Paper Our Energy Future (DTI, 2003) 
with an aim of creating a low-carbon economy advocated renewables, whereas the 2007 White 
Paper Meeting the Energy Challenge (DTI, 2007) focused on renewables, nuclear and coal with 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). However, the renewable policies had several flaws including lack 
of incentives, long-term commitments and innovations, although electricity generated from 
renewables increased from 3% in 2002 to 5.8% in 2008 (Geels et al., 2016). 
Perhaps the most radical change in energy policy by the UK Government was in response to the 
Climate Change Act 2008, in which the UK legally committed to reduce 80% carbon emission by 
2050, from 1990 levels (Geels et al., 2016). This created momentum for the government to deliver 
requisite policies to support low carbon transitions (Geels et al., 2016). These policies included UK 
Low Carbon Transition Plan in 2009, an amended version of the Renewables Obligation in 2009, the 
UK Renewable Energy Strategy in 2009, the Carbon Plan in 2011, the Energy Bill in 2012 and so on 
(Geels et al., 2016). The most recent incentive of the government is the Electricity Market Reform 
(2013) with the Feed-in-tariff Contract for Difference. It is a long-term contract between an 
electricity generator and a contract counterparty which enables electricity generators to receive a 
fixed price for their electricity generation capacity over the duration of the contract (DECC, 2011). 
This incentive gives greater certainty and stability of revenues to electricity generators by reducing 
their exposure to volatile wholesale prices (DECC, 2015b). 
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The most recent global commitment of the UK Government to carbon reduction was the Paris 
Agreement 2015, which was signed by the European Union on behalf of the UK and other EU 
countries. These countries committed to reduce the rise of global temperature to well below 2oC 
(CCC, 2015b). The UK government was looking to legitimate this commitment in the UK legislation 
(The UK Parliament, 2016). In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) 
published a report to call for urgent action of countries in the globe to tackle climate change as 
global average temperature has already risen 1oC compared to pre-industrial level. Following this, 
the Committee on Climate Change (2019) provided the UK government with some practical 
recommendations to keep on track with Net Zero in May 2019. One month after this, the 
government passed the legislation to bind the UK to NetZero emissions by 2050 (BEIS, 2019b). 
2.2.2.4.2 Meeting decarbonisation targets 
Meeting decarbonisation targets goes alongside ensuring electricity security of supply. In coping 
with both decarbonisation and matching supply to demand, one possible option is to take the base 
load from existing fossil fuel plants and then add carbon capture and storage (CCS) to these fossil 
fuel plants. Another possible option is to further integrate low carbon generation to the power 
system and use new sources of flexibility to compensate their inflexibility and intermittency as 
identified in section 2.2.1.3.2. 
With CCS, most of the carbon emissions emitted from fossil fuel plants is separated and sequestered 
underground (Boyle, 2012). With the decarbonisation target set in 2008 when 91.5% of electricity 
demand was met by fossil fuels, CCS had a potential to support GB in meeting this target (Smith, 
2011). CCS can capture about 90% of the carbon emissions, but it causes the efficiency of the power 
plants to reduce by 20-25% by requiring more fossil fuel to produce the same amount of electricity 
(Boyle, 2012; Everett et al., 2012; Smith, 2011). It is also likely to increase the cost of supply 
associated with infrastructure to transport the carbon emissions through pipelines to storage 
locations (Smith, 2011). Moreover, going with CCS means that the future of GB’s security of supply 
would be less secure due to the global political and economic uncertainties of fossil fuel supply, 
particularly coal which is imported mainly from Russia, South Africa, and Columbia (Smith, 2011). 
From 2005 to 2010, the government allocated £45 million to innovation in CCS technologies. 
Subsequently, it committed £1 billion to develop CCS technologies but stopped investment in 2015 
(Gosden, 2015). 
In the National Infrastructure Assessment (2018), the National Infrastructure Commission 
concluded that CCS is rarely the most cost effective option for reducing carbon emission in the 
power sector whereas energy flexibility may reduce total energy system costs by between £1 - £7 
billion per year. Moreover, Great Britain has aged power stations. About two thirds of them will 
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retire by 2030 (NIC, 2016). Given these retirements, the CCS option cannot take advantage of 
existing infrastructure and spread investment costs over multiple units, which means new sources 
of flexibility route become more attractive. 
In the context of meeting the UK Government’s Net Zero emissions target instead of 80% 
decarbonisation, the CCS option has recently been brought back in with a new term - CCUS (Carbon 
capture, usage and storage). New CCUS technology can potentially capture 100% of carbon 
emissions with a cost similar to that of CCGT (BEIS, 2017). In the Clean Growth Strategy (2017), BEIS 
confirmed an investment of up to £100 million is needed for innovations in CCUS and an associated 
demonstration programme. CCUS is deployed to reduce carbon emissions from heavy industry 
(Energy Transitions Commission, 2018) rather than being used in the electricity sector. This 
curtailment of investment would suggest the government no longer supports the option of CCS for 
electricity generation. 
With the objectives of ensuring electricity security of supply and meeting decarbonisation targets 
at lowest cost to GB’s electricity sector, the following section investigates further developments in 
the sector. Many of these can be accounted for by the so-called 4Ds – Decarbonisation, 
Decentralisation, Democratisation and Digitisation. 
2.2.2.5 Sector developments - Decarbonisation, Decentralisation, Democratisation and 
Digitisation (the 4Ds) 
The previous sections have introduced the historical background of GB’s electricity sector and 
indicated how system energy flexibility are embedded in the development of the sector with the 
objectives of ensuring electricity security of supply and meeting decarbonisation at lowest costs. 
This development would potentially affect future changes the electricity sector; therefore, this 
section examines the current changes of the sector with decarbonisation, decentralisation 
democratisation, and digitisation (the 4Ds). These 4Ds are interrelated and it is unclear which one 
is the main driver; hence, the order of the 4Ds set out below do no imply any order of importance 
or priority. 
2.2.2.5.1 Decarbonisation 
The UK has officially entered a decarbonisation period after committing to reducing carbon 
emissions by 80% by 2050 from the 1990s level in the Climate Change Act 2008. In 2019, the UK 
Government committed to Net Zero carbon emissions by 2050, following recommendations from 
the Committee and Climate Change as mentioned in section 2.2.2.4.1. The most attractive option 
to meet the decarbonisation target while ensuring system flexibility is to use new sources of 
flexibility as identified in section 2.2.1.3.2 and 2.2.1.3.3. Currently, the UK government is in the 
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process of developing another set of Greening Government Commitment targets covering the 
period of 2020-2025 which was stated in the closing letter from the Minster of State for Business, 
Energy and Clean Growth for the Net Zero government inquiry (BEIS, 2019a).  
Meeting Net Zero is “necessary, feasible and cost-effective” (CCC, 2019, p.8). The cost for achieving 
Net Zero is estimated to be less than 1% of the GDP while helping the UK achieve its national and 
international (Paris Agreement 2015) targets. Net Zero carbon emissions can also bring benefits to 
wider society including increases in human health. It is argued that “benefits could partially or fully 
offset costs” of tackling climate change (CCC, 2019, p.213).  
The Committee on Climate Change looked at the progress of decarbonisation in the COVID-19 
outbreak and reported this to Parliament in June (2020). In this progress report, 54% of carbon 
emissions reduction in 2019 is from the power sector. These reductions are expected to accelerate 
because the price of off-shore wind was recorded at a lower price than before and lower than gas 
power plants (Evans, 2019). The benefits of new sources of energy flexibility are also expected to 
contribute to the Net Zero target. It is suggested that The Energy White Paper due later in 2020 
should set out how the sector can realise the economic benefits of energy flexibility (CCC, 2020). 
The following section continues reviewing the remaining Ds – Decentralisation, Democratisation 
and Digitisation and associated changes in the sector.  
2.2.2.5.2 Decentralisation  
Decentralisation is defined in terms of location and connection. Decentralised energy/ distributed 
energy is generation and distribution of energy which is located near to, or directly connected to, a 
point of consumption including buildings or communities (Woodman and Baker, 2008; Watson and 
Devine-Wright, 2011), or to the distribution network (IEA, 2002). In most cases, location and 
connection approaches are similar because almost all generation from consumers’ location is 
connected to the distribution grid (Pepermans et al., 2005).  
The current electricity system is locked-in to centralisation (Rydin et al., 2012). Decentralisation 
emerged as a possible solution to reduce carbon emissions, while the current centralised system is 
of concern, given security of supply (ageing infrastructure, generation failure) and fuel poverty 
(Rydin et al., 2012). Decentralised or distributed energy includes smaller scale local generation such 
as solar panels and wind power (Ofgem, 2007). Here, decentralisation increase the share of 
intermittent renewables in the generation mix (Chmutina and Goodier, 2014) and push the sector 
towards the new sources of energy flexibility option.  
Considering decentralised energy as resources connected to the distribution network (IEA, 2002), 
electric vehicles become a decentralised resource. The take-up of electric vehicles may increase the 
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energy flow via distribution grids at one time (e.g. when the owner charges their vehicles), which 
then may lead to distribution grid constraints and consequently, threaten the security of electricity 
supply.  
In terms of governance, decentralisation is considered as the process of transferring the decision 
making from an upper hierarchy level to a lower one, from central government to subnational units 
of the government (World Bank, 1998; Alanne and Saari, 2006). With this consideration, 
decentralisation provides opportunities for democratisation.  
2.2.2.5.3 Democratisation 
Natural and human-caused disasters cause disruptions in the operation of the energy systems 
which consequently drive the transformation of the energy sector (Tomain, 2015). Such 
transformation is likely to involve more consumers participation and democratisation (ibid). Morris 
and Jungjohann (2016) explore transitions of Germany to Renewables (Germany’s Energiewende) 
to argue that with democratisation of energy, the future would be cleaner, more competitive and 
more democratic.  
Democratisation is the process of building democracy (Modelski and Perry, 1991). In terms of 
energy, democratisation has been approached from different perspectives. Trade Unions define 
energy democratisation as a process of moving from fossil fuel to renewables, moving from 
privatisation to public ownership to strengthen the power of workers and trade union (Sweeney, 
2013; Weinrub, 2014). Those with a citizen perspective think of democratisation as a means to 
support moving from fossil fuel to renewables and moving the power from a few large energy 
companies to prosumers - consumers that both consume and produce energy (The European 
Federation of Renewable Energy Cooperatives - REScoop, 2015; Morris and Jungjohann, 2016). The 
central goal of democracy is to give a greater voice to people by promoting participation in political 
and economic institutions (Tomain, 2015). Thus, democratisation can be thought of as the 
decentralisation of decision making.  
Regardless of these different definitions and approaches to democratisation, they reflect a move 
of GB’s electricity sector towards renewable generation and empowering consumers by providing 
them with an opportunity to participate in decision making within the sector. The following section 
looks at digitisation which closely relates to decentralisation and democratisation.  
2.2.2.5.4 Digitisation 
The International Energy Agency (2017) defines digitisation as the increasing use of information and 
communication technology. Digitisation not only supports more interaction between consumption 
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and production (Midttun and Piccini, 2017) but also actively helps the system to manage energy 
flows on electricity networks using technologies such as smart meters (Wolfe, 2008). Funcke and 
Bauknecht (2016) also support this argument by stating that using information and communication 
technology (ICT) to manage electricity loads is an option to increase energy flexibility at distribution 
grid. As such, digitisation enables effective management of an increasingly complex system and, it 
is claimed, facilitates democratisation and decentralisation.  
In summary, section 2.2.2 reviewed the historical and current context of GB’s electricity sector in 
which transitions to low carbon futures are proceeding. The sector is attempting to meet Net Zero 
target set out in 2019 while concerning about energy security and affordability. Within this context, 
four changes can be observed and associated with the 4Ds – Decarbonisation, Decentralisation, 
Democratisation and Digitisation. Changes in sources of energy flexibility to new ones including 
demand side flexibility, storage and interconnection (identified in section 2.2.1.3.2) are supported 
by the 4Ds and potentially become the most attractive option for low carbon futures. The following 
section looks at existing research in the changes of GB’s electricity sector which is conceptualised 
as “transitions”.  
2.3 TRANSITIONS TO LOW CARBON FUTURES OF GB’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
The change of the electricity sector in response to climate change has been conceptualised as a 
“transition to a low carbon future” by the Stern review (2007). Since this publication, research has 
been undertaken to explore transitions to low carbon futures for the sector which can be 
conceptualised as socio-technical transitions to sustainability. This conceptualisation and some 
main characteristics of sustainability transitions are firstly considered. As this transition is future-
oriented, futures play an important role in transitions research and are reviewed, including a whole 
system analysis. Finally, energy flexibility in transitions to low carbon futures are also reviewed. The 
section ends with a number of research gaps in knowledge. 
2.3.1 Socio-technical transitions to sustainability 
This section considers the literature on socio-technical transitions to understand how transitions to 
a low carbon future of GB’s electricity sector can be conceptualised as socio-technical transitions 
to sustainability. After that, some main characteristics of sustainability transitions which are 
relevant to the GB’s electricity sector are identified. 
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2.3.1.1 Transitions of GB’s electricity sector 
The transition literature initially focused on technological transitions (TT). Geels (2002) defined TT 
as “major technological transformations in the way societal functions are fulfilled”. Technology, 
however, can only fulfil functions in association with human agency (Geels, 2002). Thus, TT not only 
consist of changes in technology but also in other elements such as user practices, regulations, 
industrial networks, infrastructures and culture. Socio-technical systems, in a functional sense, are 
the linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions (Geels, 2004).  
The electricity sector has been conceptualised as a socio-technical system (Geels, 2002) as it forms 
links between elements of the sector necessary to supply electricity. These elements include actors 
(individuals, firms, organisations) and institutions (societal and technical norms, regulations, 
standards of good practice) and material artefacts and knowledge (Geels, 2004). These elements of 
a socio-technical system are tightly inter-related and dependent on each other (Markard et al., 
2012). The GB’s electricity system includes electricity generation, electricity network and electricity 
consumption (McMeekin et al., 2019). These sub-systems are distinctive regarding technologies, 
actors and institutions (ibid). One representation of the system is presented in the systems map 
(Figure 2.2). 
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, beside a combination of technologies, GB’s electricity sector also 
accommodates a wide range of actors including the government (includes governmental 
organisations), Ofgem – the regulator, power generator, National Grid – system operator, 
 
Figure 2.2: Current systems map of GB’s electricity sector – adapted from McMeekin et al (2019) 
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Transmission network operators (TNOs), Distribution network operator (DNOs), investors, energy 
traders, energy suppliers (both incumbents and new entrants), trade association, aggregators for 
demand side flexibility, consumers and so on. 
Many researchers argue that solving climate change requires a transition to more sustainable socio-
technical systems (Raven and Verbong, 2009; Lachman, 2013). Hence, a transition to a low carbon 
future to mitigate climate change of GB’s electricity sector is classified as the transition to 
sustainability, which is defined as long-term, multi-dimensional, and a fundamental transformation 
processes through which established socio-technical systems shift to more sustainable modes of 
production and consumption (Markard et al., 2012). The following section looks at some main 
characteristics of sustainability transitions in the literature. 
2.3.1.2 Main characteristics of sustainability transitions 
This section investigates three main characteristics of sustainability transitions in literature (Köhler 
et al., 2019) which are relevant to GB’s electricity sector. 
2.3.1.2.1 Multi-dimensional and multi-actor processes 
Transitions to sustainability are non-linear, underpinning by contested processes with multi-
dimensions and multi-actors (Köhler et al., 2019; Geels, 2020). As mentioned above, a socio-
technical system consists of many elements, including not only technologies but also user practices, 
regulation, networks, infrastructure, markets and so on (Geels, 2004). These elements are linked 
together and also aligned with existing technology, which creates difficulties for radical 
technological breakthrough (Geels, 2002).  
In socio-technical systems, the role of human actors is emphasised. Socio-technical systems “do not 
function autonomously, but are the outcome of the activities of human actors” (Geels, 2004, p.900). 
Activities of actors can (re)produce the elements and linkages in the socio-technical systems (Geels, 
2004; 2005c). Human actors are embedded in social groups, which include firms, industries, users, 
societal groups, public authorities, research institutes. They share some characteristics such as 
similar roles, responsibilities, norms and perceptions (Geels, 2004). However, human actors and 
social groups are not free to act. Their activities are shaped, guided and modulated by rules which 
coordinate and structure activities. There are three kinds of rules (1) regulative rules referring to 
formal rules such as government regulations; (2) normative rules referring to social obligation such 
as values, norms, role expectations, duties, rights, responsibilities; and (3) cognitive rules  referring 
to social groups’ cultural rules which are taken for granted such as beliefs and jargon. Actors carry 
and reproduce the rules in their activities (Geels, 2004).  
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2.3.1.2.2 Stability and change 
Stability and change are core issues in sustainability transitions research (Köhler et al., 2019). For 
example, GB’s electricity sector changes due to the development of many green innovations such 
as PVs, wind energy, electric vehicles, heat pumps and so on while it experiences stable path-
dependencies related to fossil fuel power plants, petrol car use and so on (Unruh, 2000). Transitions 
in the electricity sector does not come easily because of incumbents working with government to 
maintain institutional status quo (McMeekin et al., 2019). The stability here comes from the 
alliances of incumbents and policy makers (i.e. interactions of actors) (Geels et al., 2014). Literature 
on stability and change is further reviewed in section 2.4.1.1.  
2.3.1.2.3 Open-endedness and uncertainty 
Sustainability transitions are open-ended and uncertain (Köhler et al., 2019; Geels et al., 2019; 
Geels, 2020). Open-endedness and uncertainty characterise GB’s electricity transition because 
transitions in the sector involve the interactions of many different actors as identified in section 
2.3.1.1. Moreover, there are many potential innovations in the future and it is difficult to know 
which one(s) will become mainstream, which means that multiple pathways to futures are possible 
(Köhler et al., 2019; Geels et al., 2019). These multiple pathways lead to open-ended futures (Geels, 
2020). Such open-endedness implies that the outcome of these pathways (i.e. futures) are complex 
and messy. “A mess” refers to complex problems that decision makers need to face and is defined 
as a system of problems that produces dissatisfaction (Ackoff, 1974, p.5). The term “mess” is used 
in the sense that reality is messy (Law, 2004). A future which contains a tidy arrangement of future 
elements should not be expected. 
Open-endedness and uncertainty also relates to the non-linear nature of innovations which might 
face technical failures or social resistances (Berkhout, 2002; Berkhout et al., 2004; Shove and 
Walker, 2007; Köhler et al., 2019). The non-linear process of innovations is relevant to the context 
of GB’s electricity sector (Mitchell, 2008). Innovation is not a “predicted known outcome from 
policies” (Mitchell, 2008, p.42). It means that transitions to a future are not simply planned (Hajer 
et al., 2015; Geels et al., 2019). Rather, transitions require policy makers to deviate from a simple 
economic viewpoint which embraces irrational behaviour of consumers to a complex view of 
transition management for innovations to flourish (Mitchell, 2008; Kern and Smith, 2008). However, 
it is argued that the current GB’s electricity sector does not embrace the non-linear characteristic 
of innovations (Mitchell, 2008). In other words, the sector does not recognise the open-endedness 
and uncertainty of transitions which might hinder the effectiveness of transition management of 
the sector (ibid).  
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Acknowledging the open-endedness and uncertainty of transition, transition management 
literature – a strand of transitions research which focussed on targeted transitions (Silveira, 2016) 
to steer transitions in a more sustainable way (Loorbach, 2010) also recognises that: “the transition 
objective is an important element of transition management but does not have to be set in stone” 
(Rotmans et al., 2001, p.9). It means that transition objectives/ goals can change overtime as 
transitions unfold. 
2.3.2 Futures in transitions research 
This section identifies the role of futures in transitions and reviews literature on identifying futures/ 
futures pathways/ future scenarios in GB’s electricity sector. A gap in knowledge about how futures 
come about capturing the mess from the interaction of actors in the sector is then identified.  
Transitions of GB’s electricity sector to sustainability are future-oriented; hence, futures play a key 
role in transitions. Within research about transitions, anticipating the future is essential for almost 
all organisations and societies, many of which “hold the future to be a better guide to what to do in 
the present” (Urry, 2016, p.1; Shell, 2018). As such, “the future” in transitions research serves as a 
goal for organisations and societies to work towards.  
A popular way to anticipate the future is developing scenarios, i.e.   illustrations and interpretations 
of futures (Urry, 2016). Scenarios are developed by a number of well-known organisations such as 
Shell or National Grid (Shell, 2018; National Grid, 2019b). According to Rydin (2012), they are 
plausible snapshots of the future rather than just predictions and forecasts. Developing future 
scenarios involves developing detailed images of futures together with processes that need to 
unfold in order for these futures to be realised within a specific time period (Urry, 2016). Scenarios 
also detail choices that help people prepare for various futures.  
In transitions research, these scenarios are usually called socio-technical scenarios or transition 
pathways. Transition pathways are defined as “patterns of changes in socio-technical systems 
unfolding over time that lead to new ways of achieving specific societal functions” (Turnheim et al., 
2015, p.240).  Similar to scenarios, these pathways comprise unfolding processes to futures which 
creates opportunities for intervention (ibid). Pathways are also used as a framing for challenges for 
transitions to low carbon futures in energy policy (Wiseman et al., 2013; Wise et al., 2014; 
Rosenbloom, 2017).  
Given the key role of future scenarios and transition pathways in transitions research and the 
industry, many typologies for these scenarios and pathway are proposed. For example, Smith et al 
(2005) elaborate four pathways: endogenous renewal, re-orientation of trajectories, emergent 
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transformation and purposive transitions based on regime pressures and the coordination of 
resources available to adapt to these pressures. Geels and Schot (2007) also develop a typology of 
four pathways: transformation, reconfiguration, technological substitution, and de-alignment and 
re-alignment which will be looked at in detail in section 2.4.1.2 below. Empirically, multiple 
scenarios and transition pathways to low carbon future have also been developed, such as in 
electricity sector (Shackley and Green, 2007; Verbong and Geels, 2010; Foxon, 2013; Geels et al., 
2016; Roby and Dibb, 2019; Rogge et al., 2020) or in mobility sector (Marletto, 2014; Geels, 2018b; 
Köhler et al., 2020), many of which are in the UK context.  
Conventionally, future scenarios are criticised for not including “actor-based approaches” (Hughes, 
2013). In other words, most UK future scenarios or transition pathways in the industry have 
concentrated on the adoption rates of low-carbon technologies or the cost of technologies added 
to the system and pay less attention to the role of actors with their interests and motivations in 
transitions (Foxon, 2013). The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (2000) published a 
report on Energy – The Changing Climate with four possible scenarios for carbon emissions. In 2012, 
the Challenging Lock-in through Urban Energy System (CLUE) project identified two future scenarios 
based on drivers, barriers and capacities relevant to deploy local initiatives (Rydin et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the UK Energy Research Centre (2013) published a range of future scenarios based on 
carbon emission trajectories, with emission reductions ranging from 40% to 90% by 2050. Also 
creating possible carbon future scenarios based on the rate of carbon emissions by 2050, the 
Committee on Climate Change recommended carbon budgets for five-year periods. The latest was 
the 5th carbon budget covering the period  2028-2032 (CCC, 2015a). The 6th carbon budget is 
scheduled to be published in Dec 2020. Shell International (2018) considered future scenarios over 
longer timeframes – 2070 in which the global warming target of well below 2oC is met. The 
importance of gas, oil and CCS is emphasised in these future scenarios. Energy Networks 
Association (2018) developed five future worlds for network companies to understand the 
development of smart grid technology initiative and investigated the infrastructure needed for 
these worlds. National Grid also made a significant contribution to future scenarios. For example, 
four future scenarios based on the three key objectives of energy policy (clean, reliability and 
affordability), which reflected possible sources of and demands for gas and electricity in order to 
drive debate and decision making in the wider energy industry (National Grid, 2019b).  
Other research considers the regulatory and policy implications for transition to a low carbon future 
in the electricity sector. For example, research about futures of the sector conducted by Energy UK 
(2019) identified the challenges it is likely to encounter in transition to low carbon futures and set 
out potential solutions for the regulator and policy makers. These future scenarios from the 
industry and government bodies are predominantly made by modelling tasks with pre-defined 
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timeframes, dominant technologies and fixed planning objectives. These futures are thus tidy and 
do not reflect real-life activities with social interactions, leading to a call for a more nuanced future 
making practices taking into account these interactions (Knappe et al., 2019). 
Recently, there is more and more research focusing on actors and their roles in transition (e.g. 
Foxon, 2013; Geels et al., 2020; Rogge et al., 2020). Foxon (2013) suggested that different key actors 
have different logics for key energy challenges which frame choices and dominate future pathways. 
This research neatly framed the motivation and interests of different actor constituencies into 
specific future pathways, abstracted the findings and reduced complexity. The “Market Rulers” 
pathway speaks to the interests of energy incumbents who want the government to set out policy 
and then let the market play its role in order to achieve the development of large-scale energy 
technologies such as CCS, nuclear power, and offshore wind power. The “Central Co-ordination” 
pathway represents the interests of central government with heavy intervention to support the 
development of the same types of large-scale energy technologies as “Market Rulers” pathway. The 
“Thousand Flowers” pathway, in contrast, rests on the interests of new entrants, existing 
incumbents who are able to shift their strategies and local communities who prefer small scale 
renewables such as wind power, solar PV. Hence, although pay attention to the roles of actors in 
transition, each future in this Foxon’s (2013) research speaks to the mutual interests of a specific 
actor group, and as a consequence, does not include the interaction of actors involved in the 
transition in each future.  
Similarly, two studies from Geels et al (2020) and Rogge et al (2020) explored how interactions of 
actors can generate dynamics overcoming the “transition bottlenecks” (i.e. historical and present 
contradictions between findings from quantitative model and qualitative analysis) and developed 
storylines to elaborate two pathways from 2010 to 2050 for the UK and Germany electricity sector, 
respectively. In both studies, pathway A is led by incumbents with incumbent large-scale low carbon 
technologies while Pathway B is led by new entrants with smaller-scale technologies. These two 
studies draw out the interactions between actors for the recent past and present, rather than in 
the future. As such, future pathways in these two studies are tidy and clearly delineated. Here, the 
tensions/ contractions/ interactions of actors are assumed to not appear in the future. However, 
transitions of GB’s electricity sector is uncertain and open-ended, in the sense that they are messy 
in not only their processes but also their outcomes, i.e. futures (also see section 2.3.1.2).  Hence, 
there is a gap in knowledge of how transitions to futures come about, capturing the messiness 




2.3.3 A call towards whole system transitions 
Transitions in GB’s electricity sector are understood to involve multiple changes in the sub-systems 
of the system, including for instance generation, distribution, consumption and the architecture, 
institutions and behaviour of actors, in which these reside (McMeekin et al., 2019). Transitions as 
such should not be considered as removing technological and non-technological barriers (Mazur et 
al., 2019; Guy and Shove, 2000) or occurring by adding technologies or knowledge (Guy and Shove, 
2000; Langendahl, 2012). In other words, transitions are systemic in nature (Gorissen et al., 2018; 
Schot et al., 2018; Geels, 2018b; Geels et al., 2019; McMeekin et al., 2019). However, current 
research in transitions tends to emphasise technologies added in separate parts of the electricity 
sector. For example, in the electricity generation with the breakthrough of solar PVs (Smith et al., 
2014), off-shore wind (Kern et al., 2014), nuclear power (Sepulveda, 2016), carbon capture and 
storage (Shell, 2018). In the above research, each sub-system of the GB’s electricity sector is the 
unit of analysis, rather than the whole of GB’s electricity sector.  
Notwithstanding, some industrial and policy documents also call for a whole system analysis of the 
sector. Such whole system analysis approach rejects the idea that a technology can bring about 
transition to low carbon futures and pays attention to all technologies and their linkages in the 
system (Energy Technologies Institute, 2017). Whole system analysis also spans the boundary of 
the electricity system to include transport and heat systems and calls for a more holistic approach 
to energy policy (Energy UK, 2016), or for the sharing of data across these systems (National Grid, 
2019b), or for integrating electric vehicles to the system (Energy Systems Catapult, 2020). 
Nevertheless, these documents approach the whole system analysis by focusing mainly on 
technologies and continue to pay limited attention to the role of actors (McMeekin et al., 2019).  
In response to the above criticism towards the whole system analysis, McMeekin et al (2019) 
considered GB’s electricity sector as a unit of analysis to study transition of the sector and 
developed a whole-system analysis of the sector from 1990-2015. This unit of analysis was set so 
as to encompass national generation, distribution and consumption of GB’s electricity sector. This 
research also paid attention to techno-economic elements (e.g. technologies) and socio-institution 
elements (e.g. actors) of the sector. However, while this research provided a whole system 
approach to the analysis of transitions, it has been used to study historical developments rather 
than studying futures. Therefore, given the needs to further exploring futures of GB’s electricity 
sector in transitions and to capture the messiness emerging from interaction of actors identified in 
previous section, another research gap emerges: to make a whole system analysis of these 
transitions to futures.  
 
32 
2.3.4 Energy flexibility in transitions of GB’s electricity sector to a low carbon future 
In line with the development of studying low carbon electricity sector futures, the International 
Energy Agency (2008) realised that researching about energy flexibility has not yet been a common 
practice. However, with the increase in the percentage of renewables in the generation mix and 
the need for the electricity system to operate in a stable and secure way, especially in Europe, some 
further investigation about energy flexibility has been started (Jones, 2014; Expert Group 3 - Smart 
grid task force, 2015). 
GB’s electricity sector followed Europe in investigating energy flexibility. The first radical project to 
develop a strategy to enhance the deployment of new sources of energy flexibility was launched by 
Ofgem (2015b; 2015c). Their reports outlined some key roles of flexibility in electricity systems: 
• Shift consumption to a different period of time  
• Reduce demand at key times 
• Increase consumption when needed.  
With these key roles, energy flexibility could bring benefits to wider society, the electricity system 
and consumers. Ofgem (2015c) emphasised that measures to increase energy flexibility would not 
only help to deliver sustainable, reliable and affordable electricity but would also enable consumers 
to play an active role in the electricity system. The Committee on Climate Change (2015a) also 
emphasised the importance of energy flexibility in accommodating  low carbon generation. Energy 
flexibility would be used as back-up for wind and solar energy and reduce the risk of excess 
generation at times of low demand and the need for additional infrastructure to transmit power 
generated in more remote locations. Moreover, some reports argued that energy flexibility would 
reduce system integration costs of low carbon generation and thus benefits to the whole economy 
(Strbac et al., 2015; NIC, 2016; Shakoor et al., 2017). Other reports argued that energy flexibility 
can reduce costs for the economy, the sector and electricity for consumers (NIC, 2016; 2018; BEIS 
and Ofgem, 2016). However, these benefits mainly relate to choices made about the use of various 
low carbon technologies and sources of energy flexibility. 
Moving beyond technologies, many studies focused on the importance of the policy implications 
and transparent market arrangements for energy flexibility. The Committee on Climate Change 
(2015a) called for the UK Government’s to clarify the direction of future policy. Druce et al. (2015) 
considered the prevailing regulatory and market arrangements in the electricity market and 
suggested that the government should pay attention to all system integration costs when delivering 
the policy in order to keep the costs to the consumer as low as possible. The National Infrastructure 
Commission (2016) and Strbac et al (2016b) emphasised the leading role of the government, system 
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operators and Ofgem in creating fair and transparent market arrangements and policies for the 
uptake of energy flexibility. Poyry and Imperial College London (2017) also called for the leading 
role of the government, Ofgem and system operators in deploying energy flexibility. The needs for 
regulatory policy and market arrangement have gained public attention through a joint project 
between BEIS and Ofgem (2016). BEIS and Ofgem (2017; 2018) developed a plan to support the 
sector to move towards a smart and flexible electricity system. The Committee on Climate Change 
(2020) also realised the economic benefits of energy flexibility and suggests that a more detailed 
plan for achieving such benefits should be set out in The Energy White Paper due in late 2020. 
However, comparatively little work has been conducted on how transitions to new sources of 
energy flexibility (demand side flexibility, storage and interconnection) comes about.  
The changing sources of energy flexibility in the electricity sector is a subject of growing interest. 
Realising the potential opportunities and risks associated with the development of new entrants 
and new business models in transforming the sector, Ofgem (2015a) consulted key stakeholders 
from the wider industry and has received responses related to the installation and use of 
generation, storage and demand side response. CGI, in association with Utility Week (2016) 
conducted a survey with key actors from the sector which indicated that the wider industry agreed 
about the strategic importance of energy flexibility. Survey respondents rated the opportunities for 
these key actors’ businesses arising from energy flexibility deployment differently depending on 
their role in the value chain of the sector. However, despite these important contributions, it is fair 
to say that transitions research has paid limited attention to how the actual processes to new 
sources of energy flexibility may be developed and unfold. Given the growing interest of energy 
flexibility in political agendas and the industry, further understanding of the changing sources of 
energy flexibility in transitions to low carbon futures is needed. Knowledge about transitions to new 
sources of energy flexibility of GB’s electricity sector emerges as a third gap: to understand how 
transition to new sources of energy flexibility may be achieved.  
In summary, section 2.3 identified three gaps in knowledge which are used to articulate the 
research aim and objectives. They are: 
• Research gap 1: How transitions to futures come about, capturing the mess emerging 
from the interaction of sector actor constituencies; 
• Research gap 2: Whole system analysis of transitions to futures of the sector; 
• Research gap 3: How transitions to new sources of energy flexibility of GB’s electricity 
sector may be achieved. 
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In order to address these three gaps of knowledge, a research approach is needed to develop 
futures which focus on the role of actors. The following sections review various theoretical 
frameworks which may form the basis of an approach to the research. 
2.4 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This section looks at the theoretical frameworks to study transitions of the GB’s electricity sector 
to futures, focusing on the interaction of actors. Embedded in transitions research, this section 
firstly reviews some established transitions theoretical framework, focusing on the usefulness of 
Multi-level perspective (MLP) in understanding futures and capturing interaction of actors. The 
notion of architectural innovation and power in transitions research are reviewed to enrich the 
understanding of whole system transitions. Finally, the rationale for using discourse analytic 
approaches in general and discourse coalitions in particular in transitions research is explored. 
2.4.1 Transition theoretical frameworks 
There are several theoretical frameworks available to study transitions. Markard et al (2012) 
consider Strategic Niche Management (SNM), Transition Management, Multi-Level Perspective 
(MLP), and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) to be apposite approaches to study and manage 
transitions. According to Markard et al (2012), the reason for this selection is because such 
approaches adopt systemic views of long term socio-technical transformation processes. Lachman 
(2013) reviews the above approaches and adds Techno-Economic Paradigm (TEP) and Socio-
Metabolic Transitions. They are the most notable approaches, which were used often in the field 
(ibid). Silveira (2016) reviews Techno-Economic, Technological Innovation Systems, Socio-Ecological 
Transitions, Multi-Level Perspective, Strategic Niche Management, Transition Management, the 
Reflexive approach, Socio-Practice and Human Geography approaches (see Table A.1 in Appendix 
A) as the most relevant to study sustainability transitions to a low carbon economy. Among them, 
the MLP emerges as the core framework to study transitions (Köhler et al., 2019; Geels, 2020). The 
following section takes a closer look at the Multi-level Perspective and the rationale for using 
concepts from the MLP to study transitions of GB’s electricity sector to low carbon futures.  
2.4.1.1 The Multi-level perspective 
The MLP is a framework to understand sustainability transitions (Geels, 2010). According to the 
MLP, transitions come about through the alignment and interaction of dynamics at three different 
levels: technological niche, socio-technical regime and socio-technical landscape (Rip et al., 1998; 
Geels, 2002; 2005c; 2011). These different levels form a nested hierarchy including a macro level 
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endogenous landscape, a meso level regime and micro level niches (Geels, 2002). These levels are 
nested to account for the embedded nature of regimes within landscape and niches within regimes 
(Figure 2.3) (Geels, 2002). The logic of the three levels is that they provide different kinds of 
coordination and structuration of activities (Geels, 2005a). The work at the niche level is often 
geared to the problems of existing regimes (hence the arrows up in Figure 2.3). However, it is not 
easy for niche novelties to replace the regime because the elements within the regime are linked 
(hence the connection between regime’s elements in Figure 2.3). A closer look at each level begins 
with the meso level in which transitions happen. 
The meso-level: Socio-technical regime 
One of the core concepts of socio-technical systems is the socio-technical regime. This is built on 
the notion of the technological regime developed by Nelson and Winter (1982), who claim that 
technological regimes comprise cognitive routines (e.g. search heuristics) of engineers that guide 
their Research & Development activities. In a community of engineers, these cognitive routines 
arise from the coordination of activities. When engineers share the same routines, they tend to 
search for new ideas in the same direction. Rip and Kemp (1998) widened the notion of regimes to 
encompass sociological aspects and define regimes as a “rule-set”, which means that the regime 
includes not only engineering communities but also other social groups such as users, scientist, 
policy makers and societal groups (Geels, 2002; 2005c). Such group activities are guided by rules 
and are thus, aligned to each other: the alignments of activities create a socio-technical regime 
(Geels, 2002).   
As socio technical regimes are based on rules, they are characterised by stability (Geels, 2002; Geels 
and Schot, 2010). The stability refers to the “lock-in” to the existing energy system because of “sunk 
investments, behavioural patterns, vested interests, infrastructure, favourable subsidies and 
regulations” (Unruh, 2000). For example, because of sunk investment, firms want to stick with 
 
Figure 2.3: Multi-level as a nested hierarchy (Geels, 2002) 
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established technology paths. However, this stability is dynamic, which means that innovations can 
occur incrementally in the regime, leading to particular paths or trajectories (Geels, 2005a; Geels 
and Schot, 2010). These trajectories can occur in not only technology, but also in other sub-systems 
such as cultural, politic, scientific, market and industrial dimensions (Geels, 2011). Different 
trajectories are carried and used by different social groups (Geels, 2005a). These groups are 
interdependent and interacting with each other (Geels, 2005a) which makes different trajectories 
coevolve (Figure 2.4) (Geels and Schot, 2010). Changes in one trajectory may dampen the linkages 
between them, resulting in tensions and create windows of opportunity for transitions (Geels and 
Schot, 2010). 
The micro-level: Technological niches 
Another important aspect of sociotechnical transitions is technological niches. Niches are defined 
as protected spaces or incumbent rooms for radical innovations to develop and protect them from 
selection pressures emanating from the regime (Kemp et al., 1998; Markard et al., 2012) . Niches 
are important because they provide spaces for learning and enable networks supporting 
innovations to be built (Geels, 2002). As such, they provide the “seeds” for transitions (Geels, 2011). 
However, niche innovations do not replace the regime easily because (1) the regime is stabilised by 
lock-in mechanisms and (2) niche innovations are not closely aligned (lack of infrastructure, 
regulations, users practices) with existing regimes (Geels, 2011). 
The macro-level: Socio-technical landscapes 
Socio-technical landscape refers to the “exogenous environment” which impacts socio technical 
development but it is not directly impacted by the regimes and the niches (Geels and Schot, 2010; 
Geels, 2005a). Socio-technical landscapes include heterogeneous factors such as oil price, wars, 
environmental problems (Geels, 2002). There might be multiple landscape pressures, such as in the 
 
Figure 2.4: Co-evolution between multiple trajectories in a socio-technical regime - 
adapted from (Geels, 2004)  
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UK mobility sector (Geels, 2018b) where these landscape pressures are “endogenised through 
political struggles” of actors (Rosenbloom et al., 2016, p.12). 
A number of the above characteristics can be summarised to highlight the differences in these three 
levels: 
• The regime refers to rules while the landscape refers to wider external factors (Geels, 
2002). 
• The regime generates incremental innovations while the niche generates radical 
innovations (Geels, 2002). 
• The landscape is more stable than the regime and the regime is more stable than the 
niches in terms of number of actors and degrees of alignment between the elements 
(Geels, 2011). 
The interplay between these three levels which bring about transitions have been described in four 
phases (see Figure 2.5) (Geels, 2005a).  
Phase 1: Emergence of novelty 
 
Figure 2.5: Multi-Level Perspective on transitions (Geels, 2002) 
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Novelties emerge in the niches and compete with each other. No novelty is dominant in the niche 
yet.  
Phase 2: Development in small market niches 
Engineers at the niche level direct their activities towards a specific novelty. They develop new rules 
which create a technical trajectory for the novelty. Then, the novelty can explore new 
functionalities through learning process and networks, which result in the stabilisation of rules, e.g. 
dominant design.   
Phase 3: Breakthrough of the new technology, wide diffusion, competition with the regime. 
The novelty, which has gained momentum in Phase 2, has a chance to breakthrough to the regime. 
The breakthrough happens because of the landscape pressure, creating tensions in the regime and 
opening windows of opportunity and creating internal pressure for breakthrough such as 
price/performance improvement. After breaking through to the regime, the novelty can compete 
directly with the existing regime. 
Phase 4: Gradual replacement of the regime 
This phase involves the replacement of the old regime by a new technology, which is accompanied 
by changes on other sub-regimes of the socio-technical regime such as society, policy, culture, 
market and user practices.  
2.4.1.2 Developing futures using the MLP 
Futures or transition pathways arise from the interaction between the internal dynamics of regime, 
the wider landscape and niche novelties, which destabilises the incumbent regime and may 
engender a new one  (Foxon et al., 2010). Drawing on the MLP, Geels and Schot (2007) have 
developed a typology of socio-technical transition pathways based on the timing and nature of the 
multi-level interactions and types of landscape change. In terms of the nature of interactions, 
landscape pressures may reinforce or disrupt interactions with the regime; niche innovations may 
have a competitive relationship or symbiotic relationship with the regime. The nature of 
interactions can either replace or enhance the regime (Geels and Schot, 2010). Niche innovations 
are ready to breakthrough to the regime only if some of the following phenomena arise (Geels and 
Schot, 2010): 
• Learning process stabilised in a dominated design 
• Powerful actors joined the supporting network 
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• Price/performance improvements have occurred and there are strong expectations of 
further improvement 
• The innovation is used in market niches, which cumulatively amount to more than 5% 
(this percentage is only an approximate figure). 
As well as timing, different types of the pressure from the exogenous landscape may also create 
different outcomes. They include regular (low intensity and gradual change), hyper turbulence (a 
high frequency of high-speed change in one dimension), specific shock (rapid and high in intensity), 
disruptive (high intensity effect on one dimensions), avalanche (infrequently, high intensity, high 
speed and on multiple dimensions) (Figure 2.6) (Suarez and Oliva, 2005; Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Based on the timing and nature of the multi-level interactions and types of landscape change, four 
transition pathways are described as below (Geels and Schot, 2007): 
Transformation pathway: This pathway features a disruptive landscape pressure on the regime, but 
niche innovations are not well established. Regime insiders tend to neglect the pressure while 
regime outsiders translate it and draw insiders’ attention to the negative aspects of the regime. 
Outsiders could be firms who develop alternative practices. Outsiders can also be engineers who 
criticise the current technology or pressure groups who protest and mobilise public opinions. 
Gradually, the perception of insiders’ changes and new regimes grow out of the old one through 
cumulative adjustments and reorientations. In this pathway, regime actors survive as they only 
need to change the direction of innovation activities (Geels and Schot, 2007).  
De-alignment and re-alignment pathway: If the landscape creates pressure in multiple dimensions 
(avalanche pressure), regime actors may lose faith in the existing regime, which brings about the 
de-alignment of the existing regime. However, niche-innovations are not fully developed to take 
 
Figure 2.6: Types of environmental change (Suarez and Oliva, 2005) 
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advantage of this window of opportunity. At the niche level, niche innovations co-exist and 
compete. Then, one niche level innovation becomes dominant, is ready to breakthrough to the 
regime, and causes re-alignment of the new regime (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Technological substitution pathway: The niche innovations in this pathway have been sufficiently 
developed in niches. However, the regimes are so stable that niche innovations remain stuck in 
niches. This pathway occurs when there is a combination of landscape pressure including specific 
shock, avalanche and disruptive change, which create major tensions in the regime. Niche 
innovations then have an opportunity to breakthrough to compete with existing regime and cause 
a wider regime change (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Reconfiguration pathway: The disruptive pressure from the landscape urge regimes to change. At 
this time, multiple niche innovations are well established but they are symbiotic innovations. Thus, 
they are easily adopted by regimes to resolve regime problems. Acting at the regime level, these 
novelties trigger more adjustments and lead to the regime transitions (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
These future pathways have been used to demonstrate historical transitions (Geels, 2002; 2005c; 
Berkers and Geels, 2011; Geels et al., 2016; McMeekin et al., 2019). They have also been used by 
some scholars to identify future transition pathways (Shackley and Green, 2007; Verbong and 
Geels, 2010; Geels et al., 2020; Rogge et al., 2020). However, Geels et al (2016) realised that these 
pathways pay limited attention to the actors and suggested a reformulation of these pathways to 
focus on actors.  
In the transformation pathway, incumbent actors may re-orient towards radical niche-innovations 
including not only new technologies but also new beliefs, missions, and business models. In the de-
alignment and re-alignment pathway, incumbents are collapsed due to the landscape pressure 
which creates a chance for new entrants to replace incumbents. In the substitution pathway, radical 
new entrants struggle against incumbents and substitute the regime. New entrants here can be 
community energy or incumbents from different sectors. In the reconfiguration pathway, new 
alliances between incumbents and new entrants are formed. This typology of transition pathways 
suggests that the concepts from the MLP open up space for analysing the interaction of actors in 
futures. In the next section, the rationale for using the concepts from the MLP in this study is 
described in detail. 
2.4.1.3 Rationale for using concepts from the MLP 
The ideas and concepts from the MLP are useful in this study firstly because the MLP is the most 
widely-used framework to anticipate futures and to study transitions in GB’s electricity sector to 
low carbon futures.  There is a considerable amount of empirical research which has used the MLP. 
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In Google Scholar, there are 5352 citations for the foundational paper of the MLP (Geels, 2002) by 
August 2020. Foxon et al (2010) used the MLP to approach three different future pathways of GB’s 
electricity sector to 2030. Verbong and Geels (2010) used the MLP to develop infrastructure 
transition pathways of the UK electricity systems. Geels et al (2020) elaborated two future 
pathways of the UK electricity sector from 2010 to 2050 which bridge the gaps between modelling 
and socio-technical analysis. The latest paper looking at whole system analysis of transitions of GB’s 
electricity sector is also drawn on the MLP framework (McMeekin et al., 2019).  
Moreover, the MLP has started to be used to inform policy. The UK Government Cabinet Office for 
COP26 (The 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference) has planned their actions based on 
transitions research frameworks, in particular the MLP (Victor et al., 2019). The European 
Environment Agency explores how the governments within European and regional countries can 
respond to the challenges of transitions to sustainability, with insights from the MLP (Geels et al., 
2019). Rogge et al (2020) identified transformative policy mixes to inform the German government 
of transition governance.   
Most importantly, although this study aims to address the gap of motivations of actors or agency 
(the capacities of actors to take actions (Giddens, 1984; Smith et al., 2005; Geels, 2020)), agency 
should always be “agency towards somethings” (Geels, 2020). In other words, transitions should 
focus on actors in relationship with a particular context or structure. As such, the ideas and concepts 
of the MLP, which not only focuses on landscape/regime/niche structure but also open up a space 
to focus on the role of actors, is relevant to the research objectives of developing futures where 
the actors play an important role. In the MLP, both niches and regimes have the character of a 
“community of interacting groups” (Geels and Schot, 2007). Both niche and regime communities 
share certain rules. The difference is that rules in regimes are more stable than rules in niches. 
Underlying these rules are actors who are not only guided by rules but also use and make rules (as 
described in 2.3.1.1). The ideas and concepts of the MLP are useful to explore the interactions of 
actors in transitions to a low carbon future of GB’s electricity sector.  
2.4.1.4 Transitions research ontology and epistemology 
Research ontology and epistemology refers to the underlying assumptions of transitions research 
about “nature of the world” and “nature of knowledge” (Stainton-Rogers, 2006). Studying these 
assumptions are important because they impact how knowledge about futures of the sector is 
understood. This section reviews research ontologies and epistemologies of transitions research, in 
particular the MLP (see section 3.2.2 for further discussion and the chosen ontologies and 
epistemologies of this study). 
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The MLP is rooted in several theoretical foundations on socio-technical transitions including Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT), evolutionary economics and neo-institutional theory (Geels, 
2020). These theories conceptualise transitions and agency differently, depending their ontological 
assumptions underlying these theories (Table A.2 in Appendix A demonstrates these differences) 
(Geels, 2020). In summary: 
• Neo-institutional theory tends to be based on structuralism (actors enact taken-for-
granted belief systems and deep structures) (Geels, 2020). 
• SCOT tends to be based on interpretivism (sense-making, social construction of 
meaning) 
• Evolutionary economics tends to be based on conflict and power struggle (collective 
groups struggle over material interests) and rational choice (individualist). 
The MLP is “not a theory of everything” (Geels, 2020, p.12) but a middle-range theory combining a 
limited set of interrelated propositions to understand delimited aspects of social phenomena at 
empirical level (Geels, 2007). Hence, making crossovers between different theories and ontologies 
is possible. There are some attempts to do so (Geels, 2010; 2020). The MLP makes crossovers to 
interpretivism/constructionism, structuralism and power, but not rational choice (Geels, 2010). 
These ontologies are considered below. 
Genus and Coles (2008) suggested that the MLP incorporates SCOT; hence, interpretivism/ 
constructionism should always be part of the MLP (Geels, 2010). Constructionism is more agency-
oriented than structuralism. According to constructionism, actors have various ideas and they are 
continuously engaged in sense-making and interact with each other through debates, negotiations, 
conversations and learning processes (Geels, 2010). Such interactions are ongoing-processes and 
engender transitions. As this study pays attention to addressing a gap in knowledge about the role 
and interactions of human actors, a “future of GB’s electricity sector” is a social product. A “future” 
is produced through the interaction of human actors arguing and defining the possible futures of 
the sector in particular ways. In other words, futures are socially constructed. A social 
constructionism ontological foundation of the MLP is hence relevant in this study.  
The MLP always accommodates structuralism because the MLP emphasises the structure of 
landscape, regime and niches which interact and give rise to transitions. According to structuralism, 
actors are part of social collectives and share “cognitive deep structures” or belief systems (Geels, 
2010). It means that actors’ capacities to act (i.e. agency) are guided by rules (Geels, 2004). These 
rules influence how transitions are shaped and define what are desirable and acceptable 
transitions. However, rooting from structuralism, the MLP has been criticised for lacking the focus 
on agency and further analysis on agency are emphasised (Smith et al., 2005). Here, the MLP should 
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be enriched by the constructionism perspective of discourse theory (Geels, 2010; Geels and 
Verhees, 2011). Discourses not only contain “deep structure elements” but also an ongoing process 
of actors’ sense-making. Discourses in transitions research are looked at in section 2.4.4.  
Avelino (2011) argued that power should not be considered as an ontology separated from other 
ontologies in social science. Rather, power is embedded in other ontologies in different ways. 
Power is considered in section 2.4.3. 
Geels (2010) suggested that the MLP makes no any crossovers to rational choice. In economics, 
rational actors are assumed to be “well-informed” and “seek to maximise their personal satisfaction 
or utility” (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2015, p.281). Actors are self-interested and “try to calculate which 
actions will be best achieve their goals” (Geels and Schot, 2007, p.403). Rational choice is well 
established in economic theory to understand individual decision making from a realist view (Lipsey 
and Chrystal, 2015). In addition to rational choice assumption, realism considers transitions and 
innovation journeys towards transitions as linear processes to a pre-defined goal (e.g. 
sustainability) and can be easily achieved by removing non-technological barriers (Guy and Shove, 
2000; Langendahl, 2012). These assumptions are used in literature from both academia and the 
industry in order to provide policy makers with a steer of transition management (Foxon et al., 
2005; CCC, 2015b; Engelken et al., 2016; Ofgem, 2016; Shakoor et al., 2017; Energy UK, 2019; CCC, 
2019). For example, the Committee on Climate change – Net Zero report (2019, p.16) recommends 
that “Policies must be designed with businesses and consumers in mind. They must be stable, long-
term and investable. The public must be engaged, and other key barriers such as low availability of 
necessary skills must be addressed”. These realist assumptions overlook the actual processes in 
which innovations and ultimately transitions might occur because innovations is “a messy process 
in which arrangements are built between actors to support the innovation in very specific time and 
space contexts” (Beveridge and Guy, 2005, p.675). Innovations and transitions are considered as 
messy, complex, non-linear processes emerging through the multi-dimensional and multi-actor 
interaction (see section 2.3.1.2). Therefore, realism provides limited insights into transitions 
research agenda.  
Sorrell (2018) criticised the MLP because it is not compatible with realism, including critical realism 
ontology because of the “ambiguous and unhelpful distinction between systems and regimes” 
(Sorrell, 2018, p.14). System includes tangible elements while regime combines of intangible and 
underlying deep structures (Geels, 2011). However, the MLP does not “deny the possibility of 
rational choice” (Geels, 2010). One of the theoretical foundations of the MLP which is evolutionary 
theory is based on rational choice assumption (Geels, 2020). Rational choice can reflect the 
assumptions of regime actors during stable periods, e.g. with stable regulation and dominant design 
of technologies, investment can be based on cost-benefit analysis (Geels, 2010). As such, rational 
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choice offers little insights into the interactions of actors at regime and niche but should not be 
excluded from the MLP. Therefore, while realism does not contribute to transitions research as 
much as structuralism and constructionism, the MLP can accommodate realism. 
Although the ideas and concepts from the MLP are relevant to help address the lacunae highlighted 
in this study (e.g. explore transitions of the sector focusing on the roles of actors), they 
conventionally are used to explore the development of radical innovations in generation or 
consumption subsystem (e.g. Kern et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Geels et al., 2016). As such, the 
conventional approach of the MLP seems to be insufficient and fails to explore the transitions of 
the sector as a whole, especially the interactions of the variety of actors in GB’s electricity sector, 
spanning across all sub-system comparing the sector: generation, distribution and consumption. 
The following section looks at the notion of architectural innovation which is also useful in 
approaching the whole system analysis in transitions research. 
2.4.2 Architectural innovation 
Transitions of GB’s electricity sector to low carbon futures involve major changes in not only 
technologies, but also its architecture, institution and the behaviour of actors (Geels, 2004). 
However, current research in transitions only focus on innovations in some separate parts of the 
sector as identified in section 2.2.3. As such, further investigation into whole system analysis is 
required. This section explores the usefulness of the concepts of architectural innovation in whole 
system transitions research. 
Transitions at societal functions such as electricity sector are conceptualised as “a change from a 
socio-technical system to another” or “system innovations” (Geels, 2005a; 2005b, p.2). System 
approaches to innovations focus on the architecture of the system or the linkages between 
elements (including social networks involved in innovations) rather than just technology (Geels, 
2005b). In other words, these linkages present not only the relationship between technological 
elements but also between technologies and users.  
Several typologies of innovations exist to show how different types of innovations may affect these 
linkages and engender changes. For example, Anderson and Clark (1985) developed the typology 
based on two dimensions (1) the linkages between customers and firms and (2) technology and 
firms. In their typology, architectural innovation comprises of changes in both technology and the 
firms’ linkages with customers, leading to disruptive changes in firms.  
Henderson and Clark (1990) also showed a typology in which four types of innovations are identified 
at firm level (Table 2.1). According to this typology, each type of innovations is defined as below: 
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• Incremental innovation is technological innovation which involves small technological 
improvements but does not impact the dominant design or architecture of the 
technology. 
• Radical innovation involves large changes which impact both the core concept of a 
technology and the linkages between different components of a technology. 
• Modular innovation involves change in a core component of a technology but does not 
impact the linkages between different components of a product, e.g. the replacement 
of analog with digital telephones. 
• Architectural innovation involves changes in the linkages of components, but the core 
design concept of each component remains the same. However, it does not mean that 
the components themselves do not change. Architectural innovation is often triggered 
by a change in a component, for example in size, but not in the core design concept.    
However, GB’s electricity sector is also argued to experience multiple innovations rather than a 
single radical niche innovation as in Henderson and Clark’s typology (Geels, 2018a; McMeekin et 
al., 2019). Moreover, although these typologies are useful in terms of system linkages and 
architecture, they are limited to an organisation focus. At societal function level, transitions/system 
innovations occur at much wider scale, i.e. involve changes in linkages between technology and 
technological users but also among network infrastructure, policies and regulation and so on (see 
section 2.3.1.1). Therefore, transitions/ system innovations can be deemed as “architectural 
innovations writ large” (Geels, 2005b, p.6). Here, architectural innovation plays a key role in giving 
rise to socio-technical transitions at societal function level including transitions of GB’s electricity 
sector. 
GB’s electricity sector is defined as a loosely coupled system of sub-systems (conventionally 
generation, distribution and consumption), which loosely link with other sub-systems and maintain 
“a high degree of distinctiveness in terms of technologies, actors and institutions” (McMeekin et al., 
2019, p.1217). This loose coupling allows modular innovations (in Henderson and Clark’s typology) 
to develop in each sub-system and maintain the architecture of the system (Simon, 1977). As such, 
GB’s electricity sector was reconfigured from modular incrementalism (1990-2002) to modular 
substitution (2003-2009) to architectural stretching (2010-2014) and is expected to experience 
Table 2.1: A typology for defining innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990) 
Linkages between Core 




Unchanged Incremental innovation Modular innovation 
Changed Architectural innovation Radical innovation 
 
46 
architectural reshaping from 2015 (McMeekin et al., 2019). These elements are shown in a typology 
(Table 2.2) adapted from Henderson and Clark’s typology and defined below: 
• Modular incrementalism: Incremental innovations with existing technologies such as 
home appliances are innovated with more efficiency. 
• Modular substitution: Innovations in parts of the whole system, for example changes 
from coal to gas in generation 
• Architectural stretching: Incremental changes to the logics of system linkages such as 
network expansion to accommodate new electricity demand. 
• Architectural reshaping: Fundamental changes to the logics of system linkages such as 
smart grids, storage, demand side response. 
This typology together with the definition of GB’s electricity sector as a loosely coupled system goes 
beyond the conventional approach of regimes overthrown by radical niche innovations and is 
relevant to system reconfiguration pathway of Geels and Schot (2007) (see this typology in section 
2.4.1.2) (McMeekin et al., 2019). In reconfiguration processes, linkages between sub-systems may 
change, leading to a “new whole-system architecture” (McMeekin et al., 2019, p.1218). Although 
reconfiguration pathway and architectural innovation have received increasingly attention recently 
(Berkers and Geels, 2011; Geels et al., 2015; Geels, 2018a; 2018b; McMeekin et al., 2019), most of 
research paid comparatively little attention to architectural innovation in GB context. Therefore, 
there is a need to further explore innovations impacting system linkages, i.e. architectural 
innovation in whole system analysis in GB’s electricity sector in its transitions to low carbon futures. 
Having considered architectural innovation as important elements for whole-system transitions 
research, the following section considers the notion of power to understand whole system 
transitions in terms of the interaction of actors. 
 









Incremental innovations with existing 
technologies 
Modular substitution 




Incremental changes to system 
linkages 
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2.4.3 Power in transitions research 
It is evident that actors do not have equal power which leaves room for power struggles, i.e. politics 
(Geels, 2004). Thus, exploring power in transition is needed to understand how transitions come 
about in terms of the interaction of actors. This section explores how power is conceptualised in 
transitions research and its contribution to understand whole system transitions. 
The conceptualisation of power is contested among transition scholars (Cashmore, 2018). As such, 
Cashmore (2018) summarised three main types of power conceptualisation. They are (1) power 
“to” and power “over”, (2) power as coercion and consensus and (3) power as productive force. 
Each is examined in turn. 
Traditionally, power is defined as “capacity” (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009; Cashmore, 2018) 
following Parson (1967). Seen in this way, power exists “to” achieve a goal (Avelino, 2017; 
Cashmore, 2018). This way of thinking emphases the conventional approach in power of actors in 
transition where regime actors have more power than niche actors; hence, can mobilise more 
resources to harness power “to”. Avelino and Rotmans (2009) deviated from power “to” and 
suggested regimes might not have more power over niches because niches mobilise different 
resources from regimes. Seen in this way, power is constructed relationally and is referred as power 
“over”. However, power “over” does not go beyond “the ability of actors” (Avelino and Rotmans, 
2009). As such, both power “to” and power “over” are about capacities of actors or agency. 
The second way of conceptualising power is considering power as coercion and consensus. This 
school of thought relates to the debate about whether power is collective or distributive (Avelino 
and Rotmans, 2009). Coercive power goes in line with the belief that outcomes can be achieved 
through some forms of threat (Cashmore, 2018). Conversely, power is consensus in the sense that 
power can only be exercised when it is legitimated through consents from society (Cashmore, 
2018). As such, consensus power depends on shared norms, values and beliefs of actors (ibid).  
However, by conceptualising power as power of actors without relating the notion of power to the 
structure of the system, i.e. system architecture, transitions research may fail to understand the 
whole system transitions of GB’s electricity sector. Actors and their capacities to act (i.e. agency) 
are shaped by structural contexts such as cultural context, social context, economic context and 
regulatory context (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Geels, 2020). Transitions as such involve not only 
agency but also agency in the relationship with other actors and structure (Geels, 2020). Here, the 
third school of thought in power offers insights by defining power as a productive force. This way 
of thinking follows Foucault (2002) in which power is exercised rather than possessed by actors. 
Power is a “social dynamic that is both enabling and impeding, revealing and obscuring” (Cashmore, 
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2018, p.23). Reality can only be produced or reproduced through power of structuring actions 
around particular norms, aspirations and beliefs to gain legitimacy. Seen in this way, actors rather 
than just resources can be mobilised. This approach aligns with STS (Science, Technology and 
Society) research in advocating the co-production and interactions between humans, technology 
and nature (Ahlborg, 2017). This approach of power is built on constructivist ontology which is 
relevant to this study (see section 3.2.2). Therefore, considering power as a productive force in 
transitions broadens the understanding of whole system transitions.  
Power of discourses is also important in enriching knowledge on energy transitions. The following 
section considers the use of discourses in transitions research. 
2.4.4 Discourses in transitions research 
Actors relate to power while “power becomes a question of the representation of problems (and 
solutions) and competition over which representations (discourses) constitute reality, or viable 
alternative realities” (Hajer, 1995). Studying discourses and their power then becomes useful to 
understand the interaction of actors in transitions of GB’s electricity sector to future. This section 
firstly identifies the role of discourses in transitions research. Secondly, the argumentative turn of 
using discourses and the concept of discourse coalition are reviewed in exploring the interaction of 
different actors with different arguments about transitions to futures.  
2.4.4.1 The role of discourses in transitions research 
Discourse represents a “shared way of apprehending the world” (Dryzek, 1997, p.8). Different 
actors’ perspectives or assumptions, which refers to different understandings of a regime, influence 
actors’ recognition of regime change and consequently shape the way they form coalitions and 
“agree over the best course of action for the regime” (Smith et al., 2005, p.1503). Hence, in order 
to understand the changes needed to bring about a regime’s transition, different discourses 
associated with regime change and different visions and expectations about regime futures should 
be considered (ibid). For example, in case of UK Carbon Trust policy initiative (Kern, 2012), business 
actors and civil servants formed a coalition and complemented the dominant market efficiency 
discourse, which both enabled and constrained new policy initiatives. 
Geels (2011) also considered the significance of discourses and suggested that cultural sociology 
and discourse analysis are useful in studying transitions (in the historical case of nuclear energy in 
the Netherlands) by addressing cultural interactions which mediate niche, regime and landscape 
interactions. From a structuralist point of view, culture is “a cognitive deep structure that consists 
of people’s perception of reality and provides a frame of meaning within which people act” (Geels 
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and Verhees, 2011, p.912). Adding sociological dimensions, discourses focus on collective meanings 
and sense-making of actors around specific issues (ibid). Collective sense making is an ongoing 
process involving multiple actors debating issues, e.g. the development of technologies, the 
changes of an industry. Meanings, which are produced, provide the context for the next round of 
collective sense making processes (ibid). Discourses are defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts 
and categorizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, and 
which is produced and reproduces in an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008, 
p.7). A discursive approach to studying cultural interactions in transitions is described in Figure 2.7. 
This approach emphasised the interactions of structure and actors in power of discourses and as 
such, is relevant to the conceptualisation of power as a productive force described in section 2.4.3. 
Discourses contain deep structural elements which are framed by actors (Geels, 2010). Actors draw 
on and frame discourses to suit their interests. Actors engage in discursive struggles because 
discourses can influence how audiences think and talk about the issues at hand, which may also 
influence politics and economics such as political support and financial resources (Geels, 2010). 
Scholars have argued for the role of discourses in environmental issues such as acid rain (Hajer, 
1995), global ozone layer (Litfin, 1994), climate change (Urry, 2016) as well as in a bigger picture of 
dominant environmental discourses such as Dryzek (1997), Everett et al (2012), Urry (2016). Other 
scholars used discourses to enrich analysis of transitions in general and sustainable transitions in 
particular. Walker and Cook (2009) considered the struggle between different competing  
discourses which shape sustainable aviation policy. Geels and Verhees (2011) developed a cultural 
perspective using discourse analysis to analyse transitions to nuclear power in the Netherlands in 
the period 1945-1986. Scrase and Ockwell (2010) used a discourse perspective to analyse the 
central goals of UK energy policy: access, security, efficiency and environmental acceptability and 
argue for a reframing of energy policy in order to override the powerful discourses which dominate 
the sector. Leipprand et al (2017) described discourses of energy policy in Germany parliament.  
Understanding different discourses and their power to affect regime change therefore should be 
considered when studying transitions to low carbon futures. This knowledge acquisition process is 
 
Figure 2.7: Discursive approach to cultural interactions in transitions (Geels and Verhees, 2011) 
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suitable to apply into GB’s electricity sector as the sector has many actors (from both regime and 
niche levels) who frame transition discourses and join discursive struggles in order to gain political 
and economic influence. Historically, actors within GB’s electricity sector used discourses to shape 
what is being discussed and how issues are discussed to resist change (Geels et al., 2014). However, 
these discourses are mainly used to analyse energy policies in transitions at national level (Isoaho 
and Karhunmaa, 2019), rather than to understand transitions to futures. Therefore, although 
discourses have been increasingly used in transitions research to emphasise the role of agency, 
transitions research paid limited attention to using discourses in enriching the knowledge of the 
sector about transitions.  
The following section looks at the argumentative turns in using discourses which is relevant to use 
in the context of transitions of GB’s electricity sector. 
2.4.4.2 The argumentative turn of using discourses – Discourse coalition 
Discourse “enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together 
into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek, 1997, p.8). Coherent stories refer to transitions to 
futures of GB’s electricity sector in this study. Stories or narratives are told by actors (Harré et al., 
1999) which means that these stories or narratives can be a “device for actors to be positioned” 
(Hajer, 1995). In the example of acid rain Hajer (1995) investigated, through narratives, actors were 
positioned as victims of pollution, as problem solvers, as perpetrators, as top scientists, or as 
scaremongers. Different actors may have different ideas on regime development and thus, adapt 
different degrees of influence in building visions of futures. “Guiding visions” or “codified 
representations of technological expectations” are able to frame problems and mobilise actors to 
seek solution to resolve them (Brown et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2005). Expectations are “real time 
representations of future technical situations and capabilities” and are “insightful enactments of 
desired future” (Hubble, 2015) which represent not only “statements about the future” (van Lente, 
2012) but also “key drivers” for technological change (van Lente, 1993). As such, stories told by a 
group of actors with the same “position” or “interest” in GB’s electricity sector not only reveal what 
the futures are but also how these futures are constructed. 
However, Hajer (1993) suggested an argumentative turn of discourses and argues that it would be 
misleading to understand a story which contains many complex different arguments (i.e. in an 
argumentative context) by identifying only one position without understanding counter-positions. 
GB’s electricity sector as highlighted in previous sections comprises many elements and actors. 
These actors, with many positions and interests, form an argumentative context and can contribute 
differently to the visions of futures of the sector. These actors might seek to enrol different actors 
in the coalition of change (Soutar and Mitchell, 2018) as hardly anybody can understand all the 
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details of the futures, as in the case of acid rain (Hajer, 1995). A notion of discourse coalition is 
useful in applying discourse theories in such context of GB’s electricity sector. 
A discourse coalition is defined as a “group of actors who share a social construct” (Hajer, 1993, 
p.43). These actors may hold different arguments but have a similar way of conceptualising the 
world (ibid). This discourse coalition approach suggests that some actors in GB’s electricity sector 
share a similar way of conceptualising transitions to futures of the sector (i.e. assumptions about 
how transitions may occur), although holding different arguments to support these assumptions. 
These actors are from various backgrounds, i.e. may hold different positions or interests. Here, 
transitions and futures of the sector contain various actors’ interests and interactions of these 
actors who “try to impose their view of reality on others” and “criticise alternative social 
arrangements” (Hajer, 1993, p.47). A discourse coalition approach is thus useful in capturing the 
mess emerging from the interactions of actors who do not necessarily have shared interests in 
transitions of the sector.   
This section justified the role of discourses and discourse coalition in enriching the understandings 
of transitions research and capturing the mess from the interaction of actors. Some contemporary 
energy discourses which potentially form discourse coalitions in the electricity sector have been 
identified from the literature (section 2.6.2). Identifying contemporary energy discourses in 
literature will assist discourse analysis of data in this study. 
The following section concludes and restates the research aim and objectives. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
2.5.1 Some key findings from the literature 
This literature review explores the historical development of GB’s electricity sector starting from 
the initial objective of ensuring electricity security of supply to ‘keep the lights on’ by balancing 
supply and variable demand and the challenge of meeting this objective as part of transitions to 
local carbon futures. The challenge is shaped by the reduction in the quick start-up fossil fuel power 
plants and the increase in intermittent renewables and inflexible nuclear power. Maintaining the 
level of energy flexibility is expected from new sources of flexibility such as demand side flexibility, 
storage and interconnection. Together with the development of the current 4Ds context 
(decarbonisation, decentralisation, digitisation and democratisation), the changes to new sources 
of energy flexibility become attractive. 
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In response to climate change, GB’s electricity sector, formed of three sub-systems: generation, 
distribution and consumption, needs to transition to a low carbon future. Conceptualised as socio-
technical transitions to sustainability, several relevant characteristics of sustainability transitions 
are identified, including (1) involve multi-dimensional and multi-actor processes, (2) involve both 
changes and stability and (3) are open-ended and uncertain. Such transitions involve multiple 
pathways leading to messy futures. The term “mess” is used in the sense that reality is messy 
(Ackoff, 1974; Law, 2004). Hence, transition is not a linear process to a pre-defined goal and might 
not be simply ‘planned’.  
Futures play a key role in transitions. A popular way to anticipate futures is developing socio-
technical scenarios or transition pathways, which comprise of unfolding processes to futures which 
creates opportunities for intervention (Turnheim et al., 2015). Scenarios or pathways are also used 
as a framing for challenges for transitions to low carbon futures in energy policy (Wiseman et al., 
2013; Wise et al., 2014; Rosenbloom, 2017). Given the key role of these socio-technical scenarios 
or transition pathways, many studies in transitions research and the industry identify typologies for 
transition pathways as well as develop empirical futures. Most of the UK research on futures have 
concentrated on the adoption rates of low-carbon technologies needed, the cost added to the total 
system cost or the regulatory and policy implications with relatively little discussion of the 
motivations of actors involved (Hughes, 2013; Foxon, 2013). Some studies started to steer the focus 
on actors with their different interests and motivations (e.g. Foxon, 2013; Geels et al., 2020; Rogge 
et al., 2020). However, these studies pay attention to the interactions of actors in the past and 
present to elaborate tidy futures. In other words, these studies fail to capture the mess of futures 
emerging from the interactions of these actors in futures. As such, there is a gap in knowledge 
(research gap 1) of how futures come about, capturing the mess of futures emerging through the 
interaction of sector actor constituencies.  
Transitions of GB’s electricity sector can be understood as changes spanning generation, 
distribution and consumption sub-systems. Current academic research in transitions only pays 
attention to the changes in technologies in a single sub-system while industrial and policy 
documents call for whole system analysis of the sector. However, there is comparatively little 
research adopting a whole system analysis of GB’s electricity sector which does not neglect the role 
of actors (McMeekin et al., 2019). This study will address this gap in knowledge (research gap 2) 
and explore transitions of the whole sector to futures. 
Within studies about electricity sector futures, researching energy flexibility is not a common 
practice (IEA, 2008). However, there was a significant increase in research on energy flexibility in 
GB following the trend in Europe. The first milestone was the open letter from Ofgem (2015b) to 
facilitate the use of new sources of energy flexibility in GB’s electricity sector. Since then, many 
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reports have been conducted featuring the benefits of energy flexibility, not only for the electricity 
system, but also for consumers and the wider society. However, these reports mainly focus on the 
technological aspects or policy implications of energy flexibility, while how transitions to new 
sources of energy flexibility may be achieved has received less attention. This study therefore looks 
at this gap in knowledge (research gap 3). This study will investigate transitions to low carbon 
futures and new sources of energy flexibility in GB’s electricity sector. 
The MLP is the most widely used analytical framework for studying transitions of the electricity 
sector. There is a considerable amount of empirical research has been conducted using the MLP, 
most recently analysing the transitions of the whole GB’s electricity sector (McMeekin et al., 2019). 
Moreover, the MLP has started to be used in policy research (Victor et al., 2019; Geels et al., 2019; 
Rogge et al., 2020). In addition, it can open a space for emphasising the role of actors in transitions 
(Geels, 2004; 2011; 2020). Therefore, the concepts from the MLP are useful to study different low 
carbon energy futures, which focus on the role of actors and actor constituencies. 
Understanding the underlying ontologies and epistemologies of the MLP is important because they 
impact how knowledge about futures of the sector is understood. The MLP is rooted in some 
theoretical foundations on socio-technical transitions including Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT), evolutionary economics and neo-institutional theory (Geels, 2020). The MLP is not a theory 
of everything (ibid) but a middle range theory which can make crossovers with interpretivism/ 
constructionism and structuralism (Geels, 2010). “Future” is produced through the interactions of 
human actors arguing and defining the futures of the sector in particular ways. In other words, 
futures are socially constructed. Moreover, actors’ capacities to act (i.e. agency) are guided by rules 
(Geels, 2004) or deep structures (i.e. discourses). 
Although concepts of transitions research, in particular the MLP, are useful in this study, 
conventionally they are used to explore the development of a radical innovation in generation or 
consumption subsystems (e.g. Kern et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Geels et al., 2016). As such, the 
conventional approach of the MLP seems to be insufficient and fails to explore the transitions of 
the sector as a whole, especially the interactions of the variety of actors in GB’s electricity sector, 
spanning across all sub-systems comprising the sector: generation, distribution and consumption. 
GB’s electricity sector is experiencing multiple innovations rather than a single niche innovation. 
Transitions to futures of the sector require the development of innovations which fundamentally 
changes the logic of system linkages (i.e. architectural innovation) (McMeekin et al., 2019). Here, 
the literature on architectural innovation appears to be a useful approach to understand the 
changes in system linkages which brings about transitions of the whole sector.  
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To explore how transitions come about, considering the role of power is important. As noted above, 
actors do not have equal power. Indeed, the conceptualisation of power is itself contested among 
transition scholars (Cashmore, 2018). Power is dominantly conceptualised as power of actors in 
transitions research (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009). However, by conceptualising power as power of 
actors without relating the notion of power to the structure of the system, i.e. system architecture, 
transitions research may fail to understand the whole system transitions of GB’s electricity sector. 
Transitions involve not only agency but also agency in the relationship with other actors and 
structure (Geels, 2020). It is relevant to consider power as a productive force which emerges from 
both the interactions of actors and interactions between actors and structure. Here, the notion of 
power is useful in contributing to enrich the understanding of the whole system.  
Power is a question of the representation expressed as discourses (Hajer, 1995). Some scholars 
have already used discourse approach to enrich their analysis of transitions (Walker and Cook, 
2009; Scrase and Ockwell, 2010; Geels and Verhees, 2011). Discourses focus on collective meaning 
and sense-making of actors around specific issues (Geels and Verhees, 2011). Discourses also 
contain deep structural elements which are framed by actors (Geels, 2010). Discursive approach to 
transition; hence, also emphasised the interactions of structure and actors. Discourse “enables 
those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories 
or accounts” (Dryzek, 1997, p.8). Stories can be a device for actors to express their interests and to 
be positioned (Hajer, 1995). Recognising the diversity of positions, discourse coalition, understood 
as a “group of actors who share a social construct” (Hajer, 1993, p.43) offer insights. Within a 
coalition, actors may hold different arguments but have a similar way of conceptualising the world 
(ibid), i.e. assumptions about the transitions of the sector. The notion of discourse coalition can 
help capture the mess emerging from the interactions of actors in transitions to low carbon futures 
and energy flexibility.  
Based on three gaps in knowledge identified above and the research approaches to address these 
gaps, the following research aim and objectives which has been stated in Chapter 1 are articulated.  
2.5.2 Aims 
To critically investigate whole system transitions to low carbon futures and new sources of energy 





As identified above, future pathways and socio-technical scenarios in literature are largely tidy and 
fail to capture the messiness of futures emerging from the interactions of actors. Discourse 
coalitions are useful in capturing this messiness as each discourse coalition comprises of actors with 
different interests. Here, the first objective is: 
• To identify dominant energy discourse coalitions within GB’s electricity sector. 
These discourse coalitions inform futures of the sector while futures play a key role in transitions. 
Hence, the second objective is: 
• To identify futures of GB’s electricity sector, focussing on the whole system analysis. 
Within these futures of GB’s electricity sector, transitions to new sources of energy flexibility need 
to be understood. Therefore, the third objective is: 
• To identify how transitions to new sources of energy flexibility may be achieved in each 
future. 
The following section sets out some analytical frameworks to meet these aims and objectives.  
2.6 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS  
As argued in section 2.4.4, analysis of transitions can be enriched by discourses and discourse 
coalitions. This section identifies the discourse analysis framework and some contemporary energy 
discourses which will be used subsequently to analyse data in order to achieve the research aim 
and objectives. These discourses could shape transitions of GB’s electricity sector to low carbon 
futures. Hence, this section forms a key part of the start of the ‘progressive funnel’ (see section 
3.2.3 for the details of this progressive funnel).  
2.6.1 Discourse analytical framework 
The concept of discourse analysis is contested because there are many “versions” or “at least 57 
varieties” of discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2003; Gill, 2000, p.173). Among them, there are two well-
known approaches to discourse analysis which are Critical Discourse Analysis (non-Foucauldian 
perspective) and Foucauldian approach (Feindt and Oels, 2005).  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) focuses on languages and texts. Some key authors advocating this 
type of discourse analysis are Fairclough, Wodak, Van Dijk (Fairclough, 1992; 2003; Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Van Dijk, 2005; Parker, 1992). Rooted in linguistics, it 
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plays an important role in social sciences (Given, 2008; Breeze, 2011). Text, through meaning-
making, can bring about changes (Fairclough, 2003). CDA refers to the analysis of texts in order to 
identify their processes of meaning making, which may cause social changes. According to CDA, 
once a social world is textually constructed, it becomes reality and limits the textual construction 
of the social world. Here, CDA follows realist point of view while as argued in section 2.4.1.4, realism 
does not provide much insights into transitions research. Therefore, CDA is not useful in this study. 
In contrast, Foucauldian discourse analysis concentrates on knowledge and the relationship of 
knowledge and power rather than language itself  (Feindt and Oels, 2005). According to Foucaudian 
approach, a discourse is “constitutive of reality in that it physically shapes reality”, i.e. is constructed 
through “being engaged with the world and of being related to it” (Ibid, pp.165). Power relations 
are present in these social engagement/interactions and as a productive force (ibid). Seen in this 
way, Foucauldian discourse analysis has a constructionist ontology in accord with the ontological 
root of the MLP (section 2.4.1.4) and the conceptualisation of power (section 2.4.3). Hence, 
Foucauldian discourse analysis is chosen for this study. 
Drawing on a Foucauldian approach to discourse, Dryzek (1997) and Hajer (1995) offer useful 
analytical frameworks and concepts to analyse discourses to transitions.  
Dryzek (1997) developed a framework with four elements to analyse several contemporary 
environmental discourses  (Table 2.3). These elements are: 
• Basic entities: Discourse recognises the existence of different elements.  
• Assumptions about natural relationships: Each discourse not only recognises the 
existence of basic entities but also the relationships between these basic entities. 
• Agents and their motives: Each discourse not only recognises of “things” and 
relationships of “things” but also human. Things and human can have power and 
agency which are assumed in each discourse. 
• Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices: Discourse uses languages including 
metaphors or other rhetorical devices to convince listeners or readers. 
This environmental discourse analytical framework is useful in analysing electricity/energy 
discourses because decarbonisation is driving electricity debates as reviewed in section 2.2.2. In 
Table 2.3: Environmental discourses analytical framework (Dryzek, 1997) 
1. Basic entities 
2. Assumptions about natural relationships 
3. Agents and their motives 
4. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
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order to meet research objectives 2 and 3, the four elements of this analytical framework are 
adapted to develop an energy discourse analytical framework (Table 2.4), as follows: 
• The first two elements ‘basic entities’ and ‘assumptions about natural relationships’ are 
changed to ‘system components’ and ‘system relationships’ in order to address the 
whole system analysis in research objective 2. A whole system transition of GB’s 
electricity sector is considered as changing in not only socio-technical system 
components but also in the architecture of the system, i.e. system relationships. Here, 
system components comprise of any technologies, innovations, infrastructures, 
institutions or actors in futures following the visions of interviewees. System 
relationships focus on the linkages between system components.  
• The third element ‘agents and their motives’ is changed to ‘power’ to understand the 
conceptualisation of power in whole system transitions and assist in meeting research 
objective 2. 
• The last element about key metaphors only focuses on the metaphor of energy 
flexibility to understand how transitions may unfold according to interviewees’ vision 
and to meet research objective 3. 
Dryzek’s analytical approach to discourse analysis (Table 2.3) using four elements (basic entities, 
assumptions about the natural relationships, agents and their motives, and key metaphors) was 
translated into a new and more appropriate approach for this study (Table 2.4) and used 
subsequently in Chapter 5. The four translated elements in this new approach are system 
components, system relationships, power, and the metaphor of energy flexibility.   
This translation was needed because although the Dryzek’s approach was found useful (as 
explained above), it is too ‘broad brushed’ to investigate developments in GB’s electricity sector. 
The translation was also needed to ensure that the research aim and objectives identified in 
sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 were achieved and specifically, enabled analysis of “the whole system”, 
consisting of both components and their relationships. 
In order to meet research objective 1, Hajer’s (1995) Argumentative Discourse Analysis which focus 
on discourse coalitions as analytical concepts is useful (also see section 2.4.4.2). The following 
sections look at some contemporary energy discourses which are dominant in energy sector now. 
Table 2.4: Energy discourse analytical framework – adapted from Dryzek (1997)  
1. System components 
2. System relationships 
3. Power 
4. The metaphor of energy flexibility 
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2.6.2 Contemporary energy discourses 
A discourse coalition can be considered to be dominant when it fulfils two requirements (1) 
Discourse structuration and (2) Discourse institutionalisation. Discourse structuration “occurs when 
a discourse starts to dominate the way a society conceptualises the world” (Hajer, 1993, p.46). 
Discourse institutionalisation occurs when a discourse “solidifies into an institution, sometimes as 
organisational practices, sometimes as traditional ways of reasoning” (ibid). For example, 
Leipprand et al (2017) considered energy transition as a discourse coalition on Germany energy 
future which is structuralised and institutionalised in German parliament.  
Firstly, this section is based on some contemporary environmental discourses from Dryzek (1997). 
Complete discontinuity of these environmental discourses is rare (Dryzek, 1997). Three of them (1) 
economic rationalism, (2) administrative rationalism and (3) ecological modernisation are 
dominating discourses in the energy sector as arguing below. Secondly, this section reviews two 
other recent contemporary discourses which are (4) consumer sovereignty and (5) energy 
democracy. These five discourses can potentially become dominant energy discourse coalitions 
because they all fulfil two conditions of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation 
as summarised in Table 2.5. These five discourses are looked at in turn below, following Dryzek’s 
(1997) analytical framework (Table 2.3) mentioned in section 2.6.1. These discourses are then used 
as a baseline to identify dominant energy discourse coalitions in Chapter 4, i.e. to group actors into 
discourse coalitions. 
2.6.2.1 Economic rationalism  
Economic rationalism advocates the role of a market where a market mechanism is intelligently 
deployed to achieve public ends (Dryzek, 1997, p.102). In economic rationalism, market and prices 
are basic entities. This discourse assumes that the basic relationship between actors (individual and 
collective) is competitive. Actors in economic rationalism hence are motivated by material self-
interest, and pursuing it rationally” (Dryzek, 1997, p.113). In other words, actors act economic 
Table 2.5: Potential dominant energy discourse coalitions from literature 
Discourses/ Conditions Discourse structuration (in GB’s 
electricity sector) 
Discourse institutionalisation (in GB’s 
electricity sector) 
Economic rationalism Has dominated since 1990s Electricity privatisation 
Administrative rationalism Most recently Net Zero target 
Ecological modernisation Has dominated since Stern 
review (2007) 
The Clean Growth Strategy (2017) 
Consumerism Most recently In energy economic community (2018) 
Energy democratisation Most recently Trade Union, non-governmental 




rationally. The metaphors mainly used in this discourse is “free” which implies a free market with 
less government intervention.  
Economic rationalism has been introduced into the energy sector since liberalisation. The 
liberalisation of GB’s electricity sector started in 1990s with the privatisation of power plants and 
electricity grids (Everett et al., 2012). The task of liberalisation “was largely to get the government 
out of the way, and stamp out all residual traces of the old planned CEGB world” (Helm, 2014). The 
free (laissez faire) market approach advocates the freedom of contracting in electricity market 
(Helm, 2014). Economic rationalism discourse was developed in contrast with a “market discourse 
with regulation”. Market regulation, in the electricity sector (Ofgem), beginning when Margaret 
Thatcher became Prime Minster in 1979, is “subject to public power” i.e. regulation represents the 
power of the public sector (Mitchell, 2008, p.26). As a consequence, “top down micro-management 
continued” (ibid) and constrained the development of the free (laissez faire) market in the energy 
sector. Economic rationalism as such does not fully gain discourse institutionalisation, i.e. 
regulation always presented in the electricity sector. Hence, in this case, economic rationalism 
discourse is based on the belief that the market with lighter government intervention (rather than 
without government intervention) can deliver the best outcome. 
2.6.2.2 Administrative rationalism 
Administrative rationalism is defined as “the problem-solving discourse which emphasises the role 
of experts rather than citizen or producer/consumers in social problem solving, and which stresses 
social relationships of hierarchy rather than equality or competition” (Dryzek, 1997, p.63). The basic 
entities in this discourse are administrative state (government), experts and managers. They are 
the one who are subordinated. Governing is about “rational management in the service of a clearly-
defined public interest, informed by the best available expertise” (Dryzek, 1997, p.74). It means that 
the final decision is in the hand of the government who acts rationally. Governmental policy is 
informed by experts with their cost-analysis and risk-analysis. Governments, experts and managers 
are all motivated by public interests. These public interests reflect the “administrative mind” of 
those following this discourse. 
This discourse has dominated decision making of the UK government in variety of areas including 
environment, public health, energy and so on. Since the 1960s, solutions for environmental issues 
are associated with public policy which traditionally is based on scientific expertise (ibid). For 
example, in the current COVID-19 outbreak, governmental public policy and decision are based on 
variety of research and recommendations from science and health experts. 
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Recent publications have recognised this approach in energy policy. For example, BEIS in 
combination with Ofgem has consulted actors in energy sector about the need to have a smart and 
flexible system in a call for evidence document (2016) before designing a plan (2017). Most recently, 
in June 2019, the UK committed to Net Zero carbon emission (BEIS, 2019b) after receiving 
recommendations with evidence from Committee on Climate Change (2019) in May. 
2.6.2.3 Ecological modernisation 
Ecologic modernisation is defined as “a restructuring of the capitalist political economy along more 
environmentally sound lines” (Dryzek, 1997, p.141). Basic entities in this discourse are complex 
system with things and actors such as capitalist economy or the state. Hence, this discourse 
embraces the relationship between them, especially “environmental protection and economic 
prosperity go together” (Dryzek, 1997, p.146). Here, actors are motivated by public goods e.g. 
environmental protection. The word “modernisation” of this discourse means “development” 
which implies progress of both environment and economic development. This is the discourse of 
reassurance.  
Ecological modernisation was identified in 1980s (Ibid). Ecological modernisation is more 
recognised in GB’s electricity sector after Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 
2007). This review emphasised the collaboration in economic growth and environmental 
degradation. This perspective is given a national push from the governmental Clean Growth 
Strategy (BEIS, 2017).  
This discourse recognises that the uncertainty of scientific reports should not be used to delay 
environmental actions. This view is at odds with administrative rationalism which advocates the 
certainty of scientific reports. 
2.6.2.4 Consumer sovereignty 
The consumer sovereignty discourse in the energy sector has become very popular. It takes into 
account social interactions of consumers with the industry. Consumer culture or consumerism is 
emphasised and consumers’ identities are formed by the way they consume products and services 
(Urry, 2016). Manufacturing of products should therefore be based on consumers’ preferences 
(Hutt, 1943; Menges, 2003). Consumer sovereignty “rests on the reasonable premise that economic 
activities must ultimately be aimed at satisfying consumers” (Gordon and Olson, 2000, p.2). Here, 
this discourse emphasises the relationship between consumers and the industry. 
Since the 1990s, the development of Internet and Information and Communication technology (ICT) 
brings about different experiences for consumers. For example, E-business model such as E-bay 
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seemingly departed from existing business models by providing free services to consumers (Boons 
et al., 2013). Also during this time, GB’s electricity sector was privatised and operated under the 
regulator – Ofgem whose first remit is to protect the interest of consumers. However, the focus on 
consumers has not been emphasised until recently. Consumers are now expected to contribute 
significantly to the transitions of the sector through the development of some provisions which 
might need the engagement of consumers such as energy flexibility or the concern that consumers 
might be left behind (Sustainability First, 2019). Consumer sovereignty emerges and places 
consumers at the heart of the energy system. For example, actors in the energy sector embraced 
consumer sovereignty and discussed “Consumers at the Heart of the Energy system?” in a research 
conference with the attendance of government, industrial actors, energy analysts and so on (British 
Institute of Energy Economics, 2018).  
2.6.2.5 Energy democracy – the last “D” of the 4Ds 
As identified in section 2.2.2.5, energy democratisation is one of the elements of the 4Ds used to 
describe the current changes of GB’s electricity sector. Energy democratisation is added to the 
original 3Ds (Decarbonisation – Decentralisation and Digitisation) with the involvement of 
consumers in generating electricity. Also paying attention to consumers and their agency in the 
future, energy democracy is another dominant discourse in energy field. This discourse reflects the 
move from fossil fuel to renewables and from large companies to prosumers. Prosumers are 
empowered and have power in this discourse. This also means that energy democracy supports 
decentralisation of decision making.  
In summary, this chapter reviewed literatures focussing on ensuring electricity security of supply to 
the development of GB’s electricity sector with the changes/ transitions to low carbon future and 
new sources of energy flexibility. Several key gaps in knowledge were identified and research 
approaches to address these gaps were explored, leading to formulation of research aim and 
objectives. Finally, analytical frameworks with some dominant energy discourses to be used in data 
analysis were set out. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The findings of the literature review were presented in the previous chapter.  A number of gaps in 
knowledge were identified and the research aim and objectives of the study were set out to address 
these. This chapter focuses on the methods selected and adopted to meet these aim and objectives. 
Following a number of authors such as Robson and McCartan (2016), Marshall and Rossman (2016), 
Bryman and Bell (2011), this chapter firstly identifies the selection of a flexible design. Other 
selections for key aspects within this flexible design included (1) research purposes, (2) research 
ontology, (3) theories or conceptual frameworks, (4) research strategy, (5) type of data collected, 
(6) data-collection techniques, (7) sampling strategy, and (8) data analysis techniques. Research 
quality and research ethics are also discussed below. 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design is an essential part of a research project (Robson and McCartan, 2016) because it 
“deals with aims, purposes, intentions and plans within the practical constraints of location, time, 
money and availability of staff” (Hakim, 2000).  
In real world research, there are three major types of research design (1) fixed design, (2) flexible 
design and (3) multi strategy design which is a combination of fixed and flexible design. A fixed 
design requires a “tight pre-specification” before coming to the main stage of data collection 
(Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.75). This design refers to a one-way process of articulating aim and 
objectives and choosing methods to meet these aim and objectives. For example, research 
purposes and a conceptual framework help the researcher to develop research questions or 
identify research aim and objectives. When the researcher identifies the aim of the research, 
he/she can decide which methods and sampling strategy are appropriate. As such, fixed design is 
theory-driven (ibid. p.101). In other words, the researcher must have a “substantial amount of 
conceptual understanding” about a phenomenon which he/she is studying and a “clear idea” of 
what he/she needs to do.  The research using this design usually concentrates on the outcomes. 
Moreover, this research design is appropriate with descriptive or explanatory studies and usually 
adopts experimental or non-experimental studies. Additionally, fixed design is often considered as 
a quantitative design because data are usually in the forms of numbers (Robson and McCartan, 
2016, p.75).  
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A flexible design has some contrasting characteristics with a fixed design (see Figure 3.1). A flexible 
design emerges during data collection and represents a two-way relationship between the 
components. As the research project progresses, all the components of the research design need 
to be revisited. With a flexible design, the researcher may not have a clear idea of “which theoretical 
framework is going to be the most helpful” (Robson and McCartan, 2016, pp.76 and 146). This 
design often focuses on processes and is suitable for a descriptive and exploratory study. The main 
strategies used in this design are case studies, ethnography and grounded theory studies. Data in 
this design is usually in the form of words; hence, this design is often referred to as a qualitative 
strategy. Table 3.1 summarises the key features of fixed and flexible research design. 
Flexible design was selected for this study as it gives the researcher the flexibility to revisit every 
component of the research design during the studies. Flexible design is also appropriate because 
the theoretical framework to study futures of an electricity sector is not fully developed. The Multi-
level Perspective, which is rooted in among others, Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, is initially 
chosen to guide the research. However, there was not a definitive, fixed idea at the beginning of 
the research whether MLP theory would work. The process of how the researcher identifies the 
conceptual framework is described in section 3.2.3.  Another reason for the suitability of a flexible 
Table 3.1: Fixed design vs Flexible design - adapted from Robson and McCartan (2016) 
 Fixed design Flexible design 
Main features Components are fixed Components can be revisited 
Theoretical framework Is developed from the outset Is under-developed at the outset 
Focus on Outcomes  Processes 
Research purposes Descriptive or explanatory Exploratory and descriptive 
Research strategy Experimental or non-
experimental strategy 
Case-studies; ethnography or 
grounded theory 
Type of data collected Quantitative data in 
numerous form 
Qualitative data usually in the form 
of words 
 
Figure 3.1: Framework for research design - adapted from Robson and McCartan (2016) 
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design is that this study does not only concentrate on the futures, but on transitions (the processes 
of the changes) to futures of GB’s electricity sector. In other words, the study looks at how futures 
are constructed and how transitions to a low carbon future come about, which involve the process 
of changing from one socio-technical system to a more sustainable socio-technical system (Geels, 
2011) which is a low carbon system in this study.  The following sections describe and justify the 
research purposes, research strategy and type of data collected within the chosen flexible research 
design. 
3.2.1 Research purposes 
There are three common research purposes: (1) Explanatory, (2) Descriptive and (3) Exploratory 
(Robson and McCartan, 2016; Marshall and Rossman, 2016). Explanatory research “seeks” to 
provide explanation for or to understand a situation which focus on causal relationships, i.e. shows 
relationship between events (Marshall and Rossman, 2016). Descriptive research provides a clear 
description of a characteristic of something. Exploratory research focuses on a poorly understood 
situation by exploring what is happening in this situation (Robson and McCartan, 2016). This study 
does not explain why transitions occur in the sector or describe these transitions. Rather, the 
purpose of this study is exploratory because transitions to low carbon futures and new sources of 
energy flexibility in GB’s electricity sector contain uncertainty and are poorly understood. This study 
hence will focus on exploring how such transitions come about.  
Before looking at the chosen conceptual framework, the next section sets out the research ontology 
and epistemology and logics of enquiry. The importance of these concepts in the choice of 
conceptual frameworks selected to meet the aim and objectives is also discussed. 
3.2.2 Research ontology and epistemology 
Research ontology and epistemology relate to different views of the world and knowledge 
underpinning research aim and objectives. Ontologies and epistemologies underpinning research 
transitions (the MLP) have been identified in section 2.4.1.4. This section considers ontologies and 
epistemologies of this study. 
There is not a single definition of knowledge. “What knowledge is” depends on “the questions that 
you are asking” and “your standpoint from which you are asking” (Stainton-Rogers, 2006). Hence 
before making a “significant contribution to knowledge”, there is a need to explicate the 
assumptions that lie behind the choices of research questions and conceptual frameworks. These 
assumptions include ontological assumptions about the “nature of the world” (Ibid). Positivist 
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ontology considers the world as an objective, totally separate from human meaning-making (Ibid). 
On the other hand, constructionist ontology sees the world subjectively as humans make sense of 
the world through their activities (Ibid). Respectively, there are two main types of epistemology (1) 
positivist and (2) constructionist. Epistemology is the “study of the nature of knowledge” (Ibid). It 
concerns about what is acceptable knowledge in a field (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.15). A positivist 
approach gains knowledge through observing the world in an objective manner (Stainton-Rogers, 
2006). In contrast, a constructionist approach sees the world in the relationship with humans. 
Constructionists hold to three principles (1) knowledge is constructed rather than discovered, (2) 
knowledge has multiple rather than singular meanings and (3) knowledge is a means by which 
power is exercised (Stainton-Rogers, 2006). Table 3.2 compares three types of epistemology, 
inspired from Robson and McCartan (2016), Stainton-Rogers (2006), Bryman and Bell (2011).  
In between these two main ontological approaches, realism lends itself well to real world research. 
However, it is not relevant to follow realism in this study. It recognises both the natural and physical 
world as well as the social world (Robson and McCartan, 2016). It pays attention to the social reality 
and purports that knowledge is both constructed and based on the social reality. It is a pragmatic 
approach focussed on theory building to explain the real world (Ibid) and thus used in explanatory 
research. As this study is exploratory and does not focus on theory building, this study is not 
founded from realism. The following arguments provide justification of a constructionist 
perspective in this study. 
The constructionist ontology and epistemology is appropriate in this study for a number of reasons. 
First, constructionist ontology and epistemology allows for findings that can be surprising (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011) or represent many uncertainties (Valentine et al., 2017). This study explores 
transitions of GB’s electricity sector to futures which are uncertain. As noted in section 2.3.1.2.3, 
these transitions are uncertain because involve different actors’ interactions and non-linear nature 
of innovations. There is considerable uncertainty in the nature and content of the transition process 
and future. 
Second, constructionism considers “categories” which people use to help them understand the 
world. These are “social products” through which meanings are constructed from interactions of 
human actors, rather than being “pre-given” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.22). These categories can 
be an organisation, a culture or a future. For example, a “future of GB’s electricity sector” is a social 
product because meanings of “future” are produced through the interactions of human actors in 
the sector arguing and defining the futures of the sector in particular ways. In other words, futures 
are socially constructed. 
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Third, according to constructionism, “those who create knowledge” will “gain power” (Stainton-
Rogers, 2006). Seen in this way, knowledge is considered as a means through which power is 
exercised. In this study, actors in the sector use discourses to attach meanings to futures, create 
legitimate knowledge to these futures and gain power. As such, knowledgeable actors exercise 
power of discourses to shape futures of the sector. Hence, this study adopts a constructionist 
approach. 
Finally, a constructionist approach underpins and conforms to the flexible design with qualitative 
methods chosen in previous sections (Robson and McCartan, 2016; Bryman and Bell, 2011). The 
Table 3.2: Positivism, critical realism and constructionism - adapted from Robson and McCartan (2016), Stainton-
Rogers (2006), Bryman and Bell (2011)  
Positivism Realism Constructionism 
Follows natural science such as 
physics, chemistry, biology 
Follows both natural and social 
science 
Follows social science which focus 
on researching human beings in 
social situation. Social science 
focus on human language and 
interactions between people in 
social situations. 
Human is not an object of 
research but is the objects of 
natural world 
Human is an object of research. 
Human beings are purposive 
actors who have ideas about the 
world and attach meanings 
around what happens.  
Human act rationally 
Human is an object of research. 
Human beings are purposive 
actors who have ideas about the 
world and attach meanings 
around what happens. 
Facts are the truth and can be 
observed. Scientists looking at the 
same bit of reality see the same 
thing. Main task of doing research 
is to observe 
Facts are theory-laden. Main task 
of doing research is to invent 
theories to explain the real world.  
Facts are meaningful story telling. 
Main task of doing research is to 
interpret and understand the 
social constructions of meaning 
and knowledge 
The researchers see human 
behaviours from his/her point of 
view 
The researchers see human 
behaviours from that person’s 
point of view and seeks to 
theorise human behaviours. 
Human behaviours depend mainly 
on their belief and meanings they 
attach to action. The researchers 
see human behaviours from that 
person’s point of view 
Knowledge is an object which 
does not relate to social actors 
Knowledge is both constructed 
and based on the social reality 
Knowledge is social constructed 
from the perceptions and actions 
of social actors. 
Social phenomena and their 
meanings are external facts that 
are beyond our reach or influence 
Mechanisms and structures 
producing phenomena and events 
are concerned than phenomena 
and events themselves 
Social phenomena and their 
meanings are socially constructed 
by human actors as they interact 
and engage in interpretation. 
Organisations have rules, 
regulations and cultures which 
constraint the ways that their 
employees act.  
The ways that rules, regulation 
and cultures constraining the 
ways that organisational 
employees act are concerned. 
Rules, regulations and cultures of 
organisations are not too 
command, but much more like 
general understandings. 
Employees’ share understandings 
can form such rules, regulations 
and cultures.  
Follow quantitative paradigm and 
deductive logics of enquiry 
Follow both quantitative 
paradigm and qualitative 
paradigm, follow inductive and 
abductive logics of enquiry. 
Follow qualitative paradigm; and 




flexible design is useful in situations where theory is underdeveloped and provides little guidance 
for the researcher as mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.2. The role of theory and conceptual 
frameworks in flexible design is discussed in the next section. 
3.2.3 The role of theory in flexible design 
This section looks at what theory is, the role of theory in research, the chosen logics of enquiry and 
the research process as a “progressive funnel” which becomes more focussed during the course of 
this study. The end of this section describes reflexivity as an important element in research. 
Theory is “an explanation of what is going on in the situation, phenomenon or whatever we are 
investigating” (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.66). Theory helps researchers to understand about 
the world because it not only provides a framework to “critically understand phenomena” but also 
supports the consideration of how the unknown might be organised (Silverman and Marvasti, 2008, 
p.133). Given the importance of theory in real world research, Bryman and Bell (2011) consider two 
issues for linking theory with research: (1) there is a matter of what type of theory that researcher 
should use and (2) whether data are collected to test or to build theories. 
Firstly, there are two types of theory: (1) grand theories such as structuration theory of Giddens 
(1984) which operate at a more abstract and general level and (2) middle-range theories such as 
the MLP which operate at a more empirical level. Merton (1967) argued that the abstract nature of 
grand theories are not useful in guiding researchers how they can find empirical evidence. In 
contrast, Bryman and Bell (2011) gave an example from Bresnen et al (2004) to prove the usefulness 
of grand theory, using Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory to understand the influence of the 
interplay between structure and agency on diffusion and enactment of managerial knowledge. 
Besides, middle-range theories only represent a limited aspect of social life although it brings the 
researcher near to empirical research. Overall, theory means “little more than the background 
literature in an area of social enquiry” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.10). 
Secondly, there are two contrasting perspectives about the role of theory in research: (1) research 
questions are theoretically informed (Silverman and Marvasti, 2008, p.141) and (2) theories are 
sought after data collection and analysis. These two perspectives reflect two common approaches 
to logics of enquiry which are (1) deductive and (2) inductive, respectively. The researcher with 
deductive logic develops hypothesis from a theory, then collect and analyse data to test this theory 
(Stainton-Rogers, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Robson and McCartan, 2016). Conversely, induction 
draws interferences from observations to make generalisation and to build theory (Stainton-
Rogers, 2006; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Robson and McCartan, 2016). Deductive logic is normally 
used in quantitative approach while inductive logic is usually used in qualitative approach.  
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Deduction and induction logics of enquiry are popular in social research but they are not 
appropriate to use in this study. First, deductive logic is a linear process while research about 
futures contains uncertainty and the researcher may not know if the data set is relevant to use 
before data collection phase (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The linear process of such logic does not 
allow the researcher to alter the chosen theory to fit within the research, hence, does not fit with 
“real world” research and flexible design (Robson and McCartan, 2016). In terms of inductive logic, 
although it is useful in qualitative approach, it is not suitable for transitions research because the 
transition of the whole sector is a complex process involving many aspects, organisations and 
people which requires guidance from a theory to manage properly. In this study, concepts from 
some established frameworks or theories in transitions research including the MLP, architectural 
innovation, power and discourses are argued to be useful (see section 2.4.1). More importantly, 
both deductive and inductive logics usually share the approach of “reductionism” when dealing with 
complexity and are associated with positivism (Stainton-Rogers, 2006, p.84). As such, they do not 
fit the constructionist ontology of this study.  
Abductive logic of enquiry fits with the exploratory purpose of this study although it is a much less 
familiar term than deduction and induction (Stainton-Rogers, 2006). Abduction contains theory 
construction to gain insights and understandings on how the world operates, rather than theory 
testing (deductive) or theory building (inductive) (Ibid). It identifies and creates naturally occurring 
surprises (Stainton-Rogers, 2006). With the complexity of research of futures and transitions, this 
logic seeks to unfold the unexplained phenomena of the transitions of GB’s electricity sector to 
futures by focusing on “the unexplained” rather than “trying to get round complexity by fitting 
phenomena in an existing theoretical framework” (Stainton-Rogers, 2006, p.85). Furthermore, with 
abduction logic, research questions are theoretically informed (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Stainton-
Rogers, 2006) but research hypotheses are not formally set (Shank, 1998), which allows the 
researcher to modify research theory and questions if needed. This feature of an abductive logic of 
enquiry is in line with the chosen flexible design. This logic of enquiry also conforms to constructivist 
approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011). An abductive logic of enquiry is therefore also used in planning 
for the study. It helps the researcher to gain insights into the complexity of a changing electricity 
sector as it adapts to accommodate more low carbon technologies and develops new sources of 
flexibility.  
As the purpose of this study is to explore and gain insights on how the world operates (abductive), 
the concept of “progressive funnel” of Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) and Marshall and Rossman 
(2016) is useful in this study. As a funnel, the research is being “progressively focused over its 
course” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.160). This progressive funnel is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
The funnel starts when the gaps in knowledge from are identified in literature. As shown in Chapter 
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2, these gaps in knowledge are whole system analysis of transitions of GB’s electricity sector and 
new sources of energy flexibility to low carbon futures which are quite broad initially. In order to 
address these gaps, the concepts and ideas of some general theoretical frameworks were found 
useful, including the MLP, architectural innovation, power and discourses in transitions research. 
These concepts instead of the theory were adopted in this study to guide data collection and 
analysis. As this study will become gradually focussed, the research aim and objectives were 
identified. After that, the analytical framework of discourse analysis following Dryzek (1997) and 
some contemporary dominant energy discourses were identified from literature. These analytical 
framework and energy discourses are then used subsequently in data analysis.  
This “progressive funnel” follows an iterative process where the tasks of reviewing literature, 
collecting data and analysing data are intertwined and gradually refined during the process of the 
study. The insights from literature informs data collection and analysis. Subsequently, new insights 
from data collection and analysis stimulates further literature review, data collection and analysis. 
As such, this funnel can be used to demonstrate the process of unfolding the transitions of GB’s 
electricity sector. The objectives of the study are also refined along this iterative process through 
data collection and analysis in light of the theoretical framework. This iterative process is ongoing 
until this study is completed. This study is completed when the aim and objectives are met. By 
conceptualising this study process as a funnel following iterative process, this study is relevant with 
flexible design identified above.  
This “progressive funnel” also reflects a process of reflexivity of the researcher (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). Reflexivity “acknowledge the central position of the researcher in the construction 
    
 
Figure 3.2: An illustration of the research process as a progressive funnel of this study  
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of knowledge” (Finlay, 1998, p.1). Reflexivity plays an important role in research (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1997) and rejects the idea that social research and its findings can be unaffected by “the 
biography of the researcher”, i.e. researcher’s subjectivity (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.15). 
However, subjectivity does not mean bias. According to social constructionism, reality is socially 
constructed, and meanings are negotiated in particular contexts and subject to multiple subjective 
interpretations (Finlay, 1998). Here, reflexivity should be embraced which enable rich 
understandings of the research, rather than to dismiss it as bias (ibid). In this study, the researchers’ 
subjective interpretation is not a problem because it was reflected by the “progressive funnel” or 
the process of gradually refining literature, data collection and data analysis. Data were collected 
and analysed in light of the literature (concepts from transitions research and analytical 
frameworks) and literature was further reviewed during the process of data collection and analysis.  
Following the chosen research purposes and research funnel, research methods are considered. 
These methods consist of a research strategy, type of data collected and data collection techniques.   
3.2.4 Research strategy 
There are three widely used flexible design research strategies including: (1) ethnographic studies; 
(2) grounded theory studies; and (3) case study (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.146). The main 
characteristics of these strategies are described and the justification for the selection of a case study 
is described below. 
An ethnographic study focuses on a specific social group and normally involves observing the group 
in their natural environment over an extended period of time (Robson and McCartan, 2016). 
Conducting an ethnographic study means that the researcher needs to spend an appropriate length 
of time to observe a group in its natural environment in order to describe and interpret its culture 
and social structure. Ethnography has an advantage of generating “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 
1973) of a group’s culture and behaviour (Robson and McCartan, 2016). However, it requires the 
researcher to get involved in a cultural setting for “two or more years” (Robson and McCartan, 
2016). This study requires the researcher to understand different perspectives of different actor 
groups; hence, it is not realistic for the researcher to conduct an ethnography study with many 
different groups within the PhD duration. 
A grounded theory study focuses on developing a theory of a particular social situation forming the 
basis of the study. Although this study is grounded on the MLP, architectural innovation, discourse 
analysis and power literature, it does not seek to generate any theory. Thus, grounded theory 
studies are not suitable for the research. 
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Case study research is “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) 
stressing developmental factors in relation to environment” (Flyvberg, 2011, p.301). Similarly, case 
study is an “empirical inquiry” which is used to “investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p.18). These two definitions of a case study strategy both agree that 
case study of a phenomenon is appropriate when it is impossible to separate the phenomenon from 
its context. In this study, energy flexibility and transitions of GB’s electricity sector are both 
contemporary phenomena that need to be understood in depth in the context of GB’s electricity 
sector. Moreover, case study research is concerned with “complexity and particular nature of the 
case in question” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.59) which is useful in investigating uncertain and messy 
futures. Using a case study is also consistent with this study’s research purpose which is exploratory. 
Hence, the case study research strategy is selected. 
Case study research is an established strategy used for studying transitions in electricity sectors. 
Geels et al (2016) and McMeekin et al (2019) used a case study of the UK (and Germany’s electricity 
sector) to examine historical low carbon transitions. Foxon (2013) and Geels et al (2020) conducted 
several case studies to explore transition pathways to a GB low carbon future. Geels and Verhees 
(2011) and Rogge et al (2020) applied their research in a case study of the historical Dutch nuclear 
energy and of the future Germany electricity sector, respectively. 
In practice, the researcher can choose to conduct a single case or multiple cases. Figure 3.3 shows 
different types of case study. A case can be a situation, an individual, an organisation, a group under 
its context (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.149). Multiple cases are multiple situations, individuals, 
organisations, groups under many contexts such as different sectors in a country or different 
countries.  
A case study with multiple cases has many advantages. A multiple case study strategy can be 
pursued to allow the researcher to compare and contrast cases and key findings(Bryman and Bell, 
2011, p.63). However, a multiple case study approach is not relevant to this study because it “tends 
to mean that the researcher pays less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in 
which the cases can be contrasted” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.67).   
A single case study is selected because it is relevant to the aim of this study which focus on 
transitions of the sector as a whole, i.e. whole system analysis. GB’s electricity sector can be seen 
as a single system with elements providing societal functions including electricity generation, 
distribution and consumption, in other words: “a bounded situation or system, an entity with a 
purpose and functioning parts” (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.60).  
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Deciding on the unit of analysis’ boundaries is the most important element of a case study strategy 
(Flyvberg, 2011). Single case study strategies are differentiated on the basis of the level of unit of 
analysis (Yin, 2009; Robson and McCartan, 2016). A study where the focus is on “a single, global 
level” is regarded as “holistic” (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.153). The single case study provides 
singular unit of analysis which is the whole GB’s electricity sector with the boundary spanning three 
main societal functions: generation, distribution (network) and consumption. Focussing on the 
whole or GB level of the electricity sector allows an understanding of the system level outcomes 
arising from the interrelationships between different components of the system. Using a holistic, 
single case study enables a focus on transitions as a whole, rather than sub-system transitions.  
Although a holistic case study might be useful in this study, it raises a question of how it can be 
generalised. In other words, how the findings from only one single case study can be representative 
and apply generally (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Although some researchers claim the generalisation 
of a single case study (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.61), this is consistent with a positivist approach 
which is not in line with this study (Flyvberg, 2011; Robson and McCartan, 2016). In qualitative 
 
Figure 3.3: Different types of case study strategy (Yin, 2009, p.46) 
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research, generalisability does not mean “the extent to which the findings of the enquiry are more 
generally applicable outside the specifics of the situation studied” as in quantitative research 
(Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.78).  Instead, the goal of a case study is more about developing a 
deep understanding of a research phenomenon (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Hence, the uniqueness of 
a case study is more important than its representativeness. In this study, transitions of GB’s 
electricity sector are unique, but this does not represent other sectors in Britain or other electricity 
sectors in other countries. This issue is considered in more details in section 3.2.9 which discusses 
research quality. The type of data needed in such case study to meet the aim and objectives of the 
research is identified in the following section. 
3.2.5 Type of data collected 
There are three common types of data collected including 1) quantitative 2) some combination of 
quantitative and qualitative 3) qualitative. Collection of quantitative data or some combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data was not part of the research design for several reasons. First, 
quantitative data is normally collected in a fixed design research. Second, quantitative data is in 
numerical form, which is not appropriate to explore actors’ visions and expectations about futures.  
In contrast, as mentioned at the beginning of section 3.2, flexible design usually uses qualitative 
data. Moreover, qualitative data are generally linked with social constructionism (Robson and 
McCartan, 2016). Social constructionism argues that society does not exist separately from human 
actions but is constructed through the interactions between people. The language, form of words 
and discourses which arise provide “thick descriptions”, which means rich accounts of the details of 
culture (Geertz, 1973). This type of qualitative data is relevant to this study where the description 
of different discourses needs to be rich and based on actors’ perspectives, culture and context. In 
this study, qualitative data takes the form of discourses or other collections of words of different 
actors in the electricity sector to understand the current situation and futures. 
3.2.6 Data collection techniques 
Selecting a technique to collect qualitative data depends on what kind of data is sought, from whom 
and under what circumstances (Robson and McCartan, 2016). In a flexible design, the techniques 
can be added during the data collection period but it is essential to have an initial plan of how to 
collect data (ibid). The main techniques to collect qualitative data in flexible design are interviews, 
observations, focus group and content analysis of documents. The strengths and weaknesses of 
these techniques are summarised in Table 3.3. This section then provides the justification for the 




Interviews are widely used to collect data in social science research and involve the researcher 
asking questions and receiving informative answers from interviewees (Robson and McCartan, 
2016). As such, key actors can be questioned directly to explore and understand their perspectives 
and dominant discourses. 
There are three types of interview (1) fully-structured, (2) semi-structured, and (3) unstructured 
according to Robson and McCartan (2016). The fully-structured interview has pre-determined 
questions with fixed wording, usually in a pre-set order (ibid). This type of interview is usually 
suitable for a research with clearly defined theories and conceptual frameworks (Bryman and Bell, 
2011) and is less applicable in a flexible design (Robson and McCartan, 2016).  
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews are both widely used in a flexible design. 
Unstructured interviews refer to “open-ended” and “in-depth” interviews without any prepared 
questions (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Through conversation, data are unfolded. Unstructured 
interviews are useful in situations where theory is absent and the purpose of the study is to produce 
theory. However, unstructured interviews can be time consuming for busy interviewees (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011) and there is a risk of not collecting enough data due to the lack of control over the 
interview structure and topics. For these reasons, unstructured interviews are not suitable in this 
study. 
Table 3.3: Summary of strengths and weakness of data collection techniques in flexible design - adapted from 
Robson and McCartan (2016)  
 Definition Strength Weakness 
Interview The researcher asks 





- Data are in the forms of 
words and rich. 
- Bias of the interviewees. 
 
Observation The researcher observes 
human behaviours in their 
social settings.  
- Data are contrasting. 
- Good for sense-making. 
- Closed access 




The researcher searches 
for relevant documents 
and collect data from 
these documents 
- Provide context for 
analysis. 
- Bias from a specific 
remit. 
- Bias of publication (what 
is not published?) 
Focus group The researcher asks 
questions in a group and 
receives responses from 
interviewees in this group. 
- Quick. 
- Encourage participants. 
- Stimulate debates. 
- Time consuming to 
organise! 
- Need to be well-
managed. 
- Confidential issues - 
unwilling to be open to 
discussion. 
- Conflicts can arise 
- Not suitable for time-
poor senior figures 
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Semi-structured interviews are based on a checklist of themes (i.e. interview guide) to be discussed, 
but the wording and question order depends on the flow of the interview. This data collection 
technique is useful in situations where the researcher is interested in exploring a particular 
phenomenon without having an identified theoretical framework to account for this phenomenon. 
An interview guide which covers relevant themes and topics to ask interviewees is required in semi-
structured interview. Interview guides are “the brief list of memory prompts of areas to be covered” 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). The task of the researcher is to identify a number of general topics which 
can help explore participants’ perspectives but equally respect how participants response (Marshall 
and Rossman, 2016). Section 3.3 will discuss the development of this interview guide in detail. 
3.2.6.2 Observation 
Observation is usually undertaken to find out what is happening in a situation and often in an 
exploratory phase of research (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Participant observation was chosen 
and undertaken when attending industry-based workshops and conferences. However, it 
transpired that almost all of the workshops and conferences that the researcher attended were 
organised under the Chatham House Rule which states “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held 
under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither 
the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.” 
(Chatham House, 2002). Hence, in this study, observation is useful to gather views and discourses 
from different actors about futures and energy flexibility for the researcher’s personal sense-
making and interpretation.  
3.2.6.3 Documentary content analysis 
In flexible design, documentary content analysis can be used “at an early exploratory phase of the 
study where research questions are not fully developed” (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.353). 
Documents analysed could include books, reports, journal papers and media (articles in newspapers 
and TV and radio broadcasts). Documents on futures and energy flexibility published by the UK 
Government, National Grid, Ofgem and institutions are usually available via open access. At an early 
stage of this study, these documents helped to develop a deeper understanding about the context 
of the research phenomena and are valuable in understanding different dominant discourses for 
sense-making prior to semi-structure interviews. Documentary content analysis was used for 
reviewing literature, rather than for collecting data in this study.  
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3.2.6.4 Focus group 
Focus group is  used “by political parties seeking to assess the likely response to proposed policies” 
and is now widely used in social research (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.298). It is one of the 
quickest methods to gather a large amount of data from different people (Robson and McCartan, 
2016). It can helps the researcher easily “assess the extent to which there is a consistent or shared 
view” but also creates a situation for participants to “make comments on their own words while 
being stimulated by thoughts and comments by others” (Robson and McCartan, 2016, p.299). As 
such, it stimulates debate and discussions which may contain some interesting narratives and 
reveal power struggles between groups of actors. However, the researcher needs to manage the 
power relations in focus groups, otherwise, participants in focus group may hesitate to talk in depth 
about their views or organisational strategy which may prevent the researcher from collecting rich 
data. It is not either appropriate for time-poor senior figures in the industry. Hence, focus group is 
not chosen in this study.  
Overall, in this study, data were primarily collected from semi-structured interviews. Observation 
is chosen to help the researcher with personal sense-making. The next section discusses sampling 
strategy which is an essential step before data collection. 
3.2.7 Sampling strategy 
Sampling is an important aspect of social research. A sample is defined as a selection of a population 
(Robson and McCartan, 2016). There are two sampling strategies (1) probability and (2) non-
probability.  Probability sampling involves the random selection of units of population (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). Probability sampling is not relevant because this study is founded in logical 
constructionist ontology, which means knowledge is not attained through an objective manner. 
Non-probability sampling is therefore more suitable for the research. 
In non-probability sampling, common sampling strategies include: (1) quota sampling; (2) 
dimensional sampling; (3) theoretical sampling, (4) convenience sampling; (5) purposive sampling 
and (6) snowball sampling. Of these, 5 and 6 were most relevant. Quota sampling is defined as “a 
strategy to obtain representatives across different elements of the population” (Robson and 
McCartan, 2016, p.80). Similarly, dimensional sampling is an “extension” of quota sampling in which 
“at least one representative of every possible combination of dimensions is included” (ibid). 
Obtaining representatives was not the goal of the research and thus quota and dimensional 
sampling are not selected. Theoretical sampling is also not relevant because it is mainly used in 
grounded theory research, not case study research. Convenience sampling strategy, as its name 
suggests, is adopted when participants are simply available to the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 
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2011, p.190). Although it can be used for the pilot of the primary data collection phase to provide 
the researcher with a “feeling” for the phenomena being investigated (Robson and McCartan, 2016, 
p.281), this study targets experts in the electricity sector, rather than from any convenient people.   
Purposive sampling strategy enables the researcher to judge the selection and develop samples to 
meet the research aim and objectives (Robson and McCartan, 2016). In terms of this study, the 
researcher intended to choose samples from different groups of organisations across the supply 
chain of the industry, who play an important role in the current operation of the sector such as 
policy maker, Ofgem, National Grid, DNOs and suppliers. By doing so, the researcher is able to 
gather as many different perspectives about futures of the sector as possible. This sampling strategy 
may be criticised for the subjectivity of the researchers’ selection (Marshall and Rossman, 2016). 
However, as identified in section 3.2.3, subjectivity should be embraced in social research and not 
be deemed as bias. In this study, the researcher identifies interviewees who are experts at high-
level in an organisation (i.e. senior figures) who are able to provide the researcher with a deeper 
and rich insights into the phenomena than other general interviewees from the industry. This 
sampling strategy is in line with constructionism because it considers the subjectivity of participants 
willing to speak out their opinions and to talk about their organisations’ strategies.   
Snowball sampling strategy is viewed as “a particular type of purposive sample” (Robson and 
McCartan, 2016, p.281). Snowball sampling allows the researcher to identify one or two 
interviewees, then on the basis of information provided identify further interviewees (Robson and 
McCartan, 2016). This approach offers considerable utility in a highly flexible design and is suitable 
for qualitative research. As some actors are difficult-to-identify actors in the electricity industry, a 
snowball sample strategy will be useful. 
One issue with this chosen snowball sampling strategy is that the researcher will not know in 
advance how many people are to be interviewed  (Bryman and Bell, 2011). However, as the 
researcher collects qualitative data to generate a thick description of the phenomena from different 
perspectives, the number of interviews depends on the richness of the data collected. A natural 
end point arises when nothing new arises in further interviews or in other words, the research 
saturation point is reached (ibid). After adopting purposive sampling with some elements of 
snowball sampling strategy, data will be collected by semi-structured interviews. Data will then be 
analysed using techniques chosen in the following sections. 
3.2.8 Data analysis techniques 
There are three most common approaches to qualitative data analysis 1) quasi-statistical and 2) 
thematic coding technique and (3) grounded theory (Robson and McCartan, 2016). The choice of 
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data analysis techniques is made based on the research design and aim and objectives of the study. 
Grounded theory which is used to build a theory in the grounded data is not selected because the 
research does not follow grounded theory research strategy. Quasi-statistical approach is not either 
chosen. It assumes that words and phrases which are frequently used are relatively important and 
normally used in content analysis (Marshall and Rossman, 2016). Such approach reduces qualitative 
data to quantitative data which is not relevant to the research where the interpretation of actors’ 
discourses is much more important than the frequency of words. Besides, as this study is not based 
on data from content analysis, other techniques for data analysis are considered. This section sets 
out and justifies a thematic coding approach and how this works with discourse analysis. 
3.2.8.1 Thematic coding analysis 
The focus of qualitative data analysis in flexible research design is interpreting the situation the 
study is going to explore. Thematic coding analysis is a generic approach to analyse qualitative data 
in exploratory research (Robson and McCartan, 2016). It can be linked to different theoretical 
perspectives and be used from a constructivist perspective (Ibid).  
Thematic coding analysis use codes to define what the analysed data are about. In semi-structured 
interviews, different groups of key actors may talk about the same topics relating to futures and 
energy flexibility, which can be coded with the same label. Data with the same label share the same 
interpretation. Codes are then grouped to make up themes which relate to the research aim and 
objectives. In this process of thematic coding analysis, data are interpreted rather than purely 
described. Moreover, in this process, codes can be identified from both data and the literature 
review. The process of thematic coding analysis allows the researcher to engage in an iterative 
process where the literature review informed data collection and data analysis. Data collection and 
analysis then stimulate further literature review, data collection and analysis.  
Thematic coding analysis usually follows six phases (Braun and Clarke, 2006): 
1. Familiarising with data:  Data transcription, reading and re-reading data and jot down initial ideas 
2. Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across 
entire dataset, collating data relevant to each code 
3. Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each 
potential theme 
4. Reviewing themes: Checking if themes work in relation to the coded extracts (phase 1) and the 
entire data set (phase 2), generating a thematic map of the analysis 
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5. Defining and naming themes: Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme and the 
overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme 
6. Producing the report: Final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid extract sampling, final 
analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to research question and literature, 
producing a scholarly report of the analysis. 
These phases are looked at in details in section 3.3.2.1.  
One of the challenges that the researcher faces during the process of data analysis is “data 
overload” which limits the ability of the researcher to process and analyse all data (Sadler, 1981).  
To support data analysis tasks the widely recommended and used NVivo 11 - a computer package 
specialised for analysing qualitative data was employed. Using NVivo provides increased flexibility 
in data analysis such as changes to the coding and analysis as new insights emerge. 
3.2.8.2 Discourse analysis 
Practically, analysing discourse can then be adopted after thematic coding analysis (Gill, 2000). 
Discourse analysis is based on the detailed examination of language (Robson and McCartan, 2016). 
It shows how language works within power relations or discursive power struggle between actors 
(Graham, 2011; Taylor, 2004). Discourse analysis following a Foucauldian approach is adopted in 
order to determine (1) some of the dominant energy discourse coalitions (research objective 1) and 
(2) futures of the sectors (research objective 2) (see section 2.6).  
Each dominant energy discourse coalition hold different sets of assumptions about transitions to 
futures of the sector which then build a connection to deeper discourse analysis using energy 
discourse analytical framework (Table 2.4 described in section 2.6.1).  
In summary, the data collected from this study will be analysed by thematic coding analysis and 
discourse analysis. The next section explores the issue of research quality. 
3.2.9 Research quality 
Criteria to evaluate trustworthiness of a flexible design research are contested. There are three 
positions regarding this matter (Steinke, 2004). The first position looks at transferring quantitative 
criteria to qualitative research. The second position denies the needs of having criteria to evaluate 
the quality of qualitative research. The third position calls for the needs to formulate quality criteria 
taking into account research aim and objectives, methods, specific features of the research field 
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and the object of the investigation (Steinke, 2004, p.186). The section below justifies the use of the 
third position and selects quality criteria for this study. 
The first position considers using quantitative criteria in qualitative research. Validity and reliability 
are two established terms to assess research quality following a fixed design or quantitative 
research. Validity of the research is “being accurate, or correct or true” (Robson and McCartan, 
2016, p.169). Reliability is a degree of consistency in the research findings (Silverman and Marvasti, 
2008) from a particular data collection methods (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Morse (1999) 
advocates using validity and reliability arguing that qualitative research is science and in science, 
good research should be reliable and valid. Popular quality criteria for qualitative research following 
this position transferred from quantitative criteria are internal validity, external validity, reliability 
and objectivity (Yin, 2009). Conversely, some researchers deny the use of these criteria (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Marshall and Rossman, 2016; Robson and McCartan, 2016) because they are used to 
evaluate quality of a fixed design research. Here, using validity and reliability is problematic because 
there is no consensus on whether these criteria are relevant to qualitative research (ibid). 
Moreover, quantitative criteria are developed from different methods, based on different ontology 
and epistemology such as positivism. While this study follows constructionism, using the 
quantitative criteria with different basic assumptions is incompatible (Steinke, 2004).  
The second position goes against the establishment of qualitative research quality criteria (Wolcott, 
1994). Researchers “write their text in the first person singular”; and overcome “the division 
between the observer and observed reality”; hence, these researchers do not need to care about 
reliability and validity (Steinke, 2004). However, this position is not useful in this study because it 
risks randomness and arbitrariness. As such, this position can limit the study in a “scientific 
community” and put the researcher in the difficult situation of convincing others of the value and 
quality of their studies (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
The third position offers some alternative qualitative criteria:  
• Credibility through documenting the research process (Steinke, 2004) 
• Transferability in terms of analytical generalisation rather than statistical generalisation 
(Yin, 2009) 
Credibility is about whether the story developed by the study is trusted. Trust can be established 
via an open and transparent research process. According to Padgett (1998), credibility can be 
obtained from a “prolonged involvement” and by providing an audit trail.  
Transferability is concerned with the generalisation of the study. As mentioned in section 3.2.4, 
generalisability (i.e. statistical generalisation) is not an issue for this study because this study follows 
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a case study strategy where deep understanding of the focal phenomena is more important than 
generalising the outcome to other contexts. However, analytical generalisation (of qualitative 
research) which differs from statistical generalisation (of quantitative research) can be replaced. 
Analytical generation refers to the application of theoretical propositions or conceptual perspective 
in other cases with similar characteristics (Yin, 2009). 
Triangulation is needed to counter the threats to the trustworthiness of the study (Robson and 
McCartan, 2016, p.171). Triangulation is defined as “the use of more than one method or source of 
data in the study of social phenomenon so that findings may be cross-checked” (Bryman and Bell, 
2011, p.720). In this study, triangulation was achieved by collecting data from more than one source 
(as detailed in section 3.3.1), including: 
• Semi-structured interviews with 28 senior figures in GB’s electricity sector. 
Interviewees were purposively selected from different organisations across the sector’s 
value chain spanning generation, distribution and consumption of electricity; and 
• Observations of 27 industrial-based conferences such as the Westminster Energy 
Forum (WEF), conferences hosted by Energy UK (a trade association for the energy 
industry) or by British Institute of Energy Economics (BIEE), gathering organisations and 
individuals from various backgrounds and with concerns about energy and its 
transitions; and 
• Grey literature including white papers, government and industry reports, working 
papers, press releases and newspaper articles published by the UK government, Ofgem, 
National Grid, DNOs, energy suppliers, independent research institutes, energy trade 
associations and so on.  
Data collected via the semi-structured interviews were analysed using a thematic approach and 
thus triangulation was achieved within this dataset. Further, observations in the form of notes 
taken at the industrial-based conferences and the use of grey literature were cross-checked with 
data collected via semi-structured interviews, enabling data to be further triangulated and 
contextualised. 
3.2.10 Research ethics 
As this study seeks to explore futures with human participants, research ethics were considered. 
Bryman and Bell (2011) summarised four key areas where ethical concerns are able to arise. These 
are (1) Harms to participants (2) informed consent (3) invasion of privacy and (4) deception.  
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3.2.10.1 Harm to participants 
Harm can be physical harm, mental harm or even harm to future employment (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). The research was conducted in accord with the Open University Code of Practice for research 
involving the collection of data from human participants.  Ethics review by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) provides a mechanism for assuring the ethical integrity of research. The 
risks to human were assessed by HREC on the basis of a risk checklist fulfilled by the researcher and 
checked by supervisors. By doing so, the researcher identified that there is no risk of harm to 
participants arising from the study. Some main highlights are as below: 
• The study does not involve any vulnerable people 
• There is no necessity for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge 
and consent 
• The study does not involve discussion of sensitive topics. 
• The study does not involve the sharing of data or confidential information beyond the 
initial consent given. 
• The study does not induce any psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative 
consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life. 
• The study does not take place outside the UK 
• The study does not involve participants responding via internet or visual methods 
where participants may be identified.  
An information sheet and consent form for participants were attached together with the 
mentioned checklist of risks to HREC to assess. Ethics approval for the research was obtained (Ref: 
HREC/2018/2761/Nguyen).  
3.2.10.2 Informed consent 
Consents of participants need to be sought before conducting interviews to avoid harm to 
participants. Informed consent entails that even when people know they are being asked to 
participate in research, they should be fully informed about the research process (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Before conducting interviews, the researcher sent participant information sheets to describe 
the study, the researcher and information in relation to the research process. A consent form with 
signatures from both participant and the researcher were obtained before collecting data from 
interviews. This consent form highlighted (1) participants can withdraw from the research and can 
refuse to answer any questions (2) participants and their organisations are anonymised, (3) the 
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interview will be audio-recorded but interviewees can decline the recording and (4) data will be 
stored securely and will be destroyed after 10 years following the completion of the study which is 
estimated to be 31 Jan 2030. The information sheet and consent form for participants are found in 
Appendix B. 
3.2.10.3 Invasion of privacy 
Privacy can be linked to the concept of “informed consents” because by giving informed consents 
to the researcher, participants acknowledged that their privacy has been surrendered for that 
limited domain (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In the consent forms, the researcher allowed the 
participants to reserve the right to refuse to answer any question. By doing so, the researcher 
respected the privacy of participants. 
3.2.10.4 Deception 
Deception relates to the situation when the researcher present their research as something other 
than what it is (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In this study, the researcher collected data to explore the 
futures of GB’s electricity sector and stated this aim clearly with participants. Hence, deception is 
not relevant in this study. 
3.2.10.5 Other ethical issues 
One other ethical issue for this study is data protection in compliance with General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). Data collected were kept securely in a password-protected laptop and backed 
up on password-protected One Drive of the Open University. Only the researcher and supervisors 
have access to this. Any printed copies were kept securely in locked cabinets. 
3.2.11 Summary 
In summary, this section detailed methods selected for this study, which follows a flexible design 
based on a holistic case study of GB’s electricity sector. The study was developed via an iterative 
process following constructionism. The research process is conceptualised as a progressive funnel 
where the study is gradually focussed. Qualitative data will be collected in the form of words 
primarily via semi-structured interviews. Purposive sampling strategy with some elements of 
snowball sampling strategy will be followed by data analysed using thematic coding and discourse 
analysis. The researcher can ensure the criteria of this study by making sure that the study meet 
credibility and transferability. Research ethics can be ensured by having informed consents in place.   
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN APPLICATION 
The application of the flexible study design incorporating the above is described in the following 
section.  
3.3.1 Data collection 
Interviews were conducted throughout the study to collect data from 28 interviewees in GB’s 
electricity sector (Appendix D). Interviewees in this study were selected on the basis of expertise 
and insights into the sectors. Information regarding the research process were given to 
interviewees by the information sheet (Appendix B) and were reminded again before each 
interview.  
These interviews were carried out in two phases, reflecting the iterative processes that the 
researcher followed, as described below. 
3.3.1.1 Phase 1 of interview (from Feb 2018 to June 2018) 
In this phase, the interview guide prepared by the researcher was exploratory. Questions were used 
to prompt the interviewees who were then free to interpret the questions and respond. The 
researcher’s tasks here was to make sure that the flow of the conversation was smooth and key 
themes were explored within the time set, which was about one hour per interview. However, 
depending on the requirements from interviewees, the interviews could be within half an hour or 
up to two hours. The purpose of these exploratory semi-structured interviews was to gain insights 
into the themes that the researcher selected and to gain interviewing experience.  
The selected main themes for interview guides were (1) Current situation, (2) Changes and (3) 
Futures. The guide is shown in the Appendix C. 
Interviewees in this phase were selected purposively to provide the researcher with a big picture 
of GB’s electricity sector. These interviewees are experts with general insights about GB’s electricity 
sector in the development of the sector. At this stage, a list of interviewees was developed, which 
was gradually revised in line with the development of the study. This list includes following 
elements: 
• No: the identification number of the interviewee, this number is identical for each 
interviewee and would be used in Chapter 4 and 5 when extracting quotes 
• Actors/ Perspective: Perspectives of the interviewee 
• Proposed organisations: the organisation/ division that the interviewee is working in 
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• Proposed name: name of the interviewee 
• Justification:  
Phase 1: General insights of the sector 
Phase 2: Interviewees with different perspectives/ roles across the electricity value 
chain. 
• Interviewees suggested also to speak with: Snowballing sampling strategy was 
reflected here. 
• Contact details: Usually email address of the interviewee 
• Notes: The process of getting accessed is reflected here, whether the interviewee has 
been contacted, whether they have responded, etc. 
• Updated + date: The outcome of the interview arrangement is updated here, whether 
the interviewee is done, when is the appointment, whether the interviewee is 
prioritised to be interviewed. This column is colour-coded for the researcher to easily 
prioritise interviewing tasks.   
In this first phase, the researcher interviewed 7 interviewees. Anonymised details of are in 
Appendix D. These interviewees were informed about the interview and the study before taking 
part in the interviews to ensure that ethical issues were not violated. After these interviews, initial 
codes and themes which represent “interesting features” of the interviews were identified (see 
section 3.3.2.1.2), together with literature review in an iterative process, Phase 2 was conducted. 
3.3.1.2 Phase 2 of interview (from November 2018 to June 2019) 
In this phase, the interview guide was also exploratory. However, the themes in the interview guide 
changed following iterative processes through further reviewing the literature in line with analysing 
the data collected from Phase 1. The themes became more focused with the topics that the first 7 
interviewees mentioned and from further literature review. They are: 
• Changes 
• Innovations (Technology and Business model) 
• Stability 
• Policy, regulation and market 







The first theme that the research asked was “changes” due to identifying that actors in GB’s 
electricity sector usually start their responses with changes. After that, the order of the themes was 
not fixed. The researcher asked questions based on the flow of the conversations.  
Interviewees in this phase were selected purposively with some elements of snowball sampling 
strategy (i.e. one interview led to another). The researcher looked at the elements in the value 
chain of the GB’s electricity sector to identify organisations of interviewees. The value chain is 
defined as “set of activities that a firm operating in a specific industry performs in order to deliver a 
valuable product (good and/or service) for the market” (Porter, 2008). In GB’s electricity sector, the 
value chain consists of generation, distribution (and transmission) and consumption. These main 
elements can be made up of incumbents or new entrants. The operation of these elements is 
administrated by a system operator. The electricity market is also overseen by a regulator and the 
code of operation for this market is managed by some code administrators. The overall sector is 
governed by the policy from government. The value chain is identified from understanding the 
current sectors’ actor from data collected from Phase 1. Here, interviewees in Phase 2 represent 
different organisations which operate GB’s electricity sector. 
The process of identifying key organisations relevant to this study is reflected in the actor map 
(Figure 3.4). At this stage, the researcher did not confirm that representatives from all these 
organisations needed to be found and interviewed.   
After identifying the potential organisational types and organisations, interviewees were identified 
using either purposive or snowballing sampling strategy from interviewees’ suggestions. The list of 
interviewees was updated and revised as the study proceeded. The list in Phase 2 has 30 proposed 
interviewees who are senior figures of GB’s electricity sector. However, only another 21 interviews 
were conducted until the interviewing process reached the saturation point. Anonymised details of 
21 interviewees are in Appendix D. 
3.3.1.3 Observation 
During this research, the researcher has attended in person 27 industrial-based seminars and 
conferences before national lock-down (see Appendix E). For example, the Westminster Energy 
Forum (WEF) which contains more than 150 public and private organisations with concerns about 
energy transitions. Although notes taken from these seminars and conferences were not used for 
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data analysis specifically, these helped the researcher gain significant knowledge of the sector and 
pressures for change, identify key actors and make connections to them. 
3.3.2 Data analysis 
After data were collected, transcriptions were produced. Data from Phase 1 interviews were 
analysed manually using highlights and post-it notes. Then, data from both Phase 1 and Phase 2 
interviews were added to N-Vivo. Firstly, data were analysed using thematic coding analysis to 
interpret the transitions of GB’s electricity sector. Secondly, data were analysed using discourse 
analysis to identify actor constituencies and articulate futures of the sector. These processes are 
described below.  
3.3.2.1 Thematic coding analysis 
Thematic analysis goes beyond the mere description of the situation, rather it seeks to provide 
interpretation of the situation which emphasises the significance of themes, their meanings and 
 
Figure 3.4: Actor map – Developed in phase 1 of interviews  
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implications (Patton, 1990). The thematic approach to data analysis was developed to interpret the 
transition of GB’s electricity sector with different actor visions and expectations, i.e. assumptions. 
The themes were constructed from codes found in the literature and from data, following six phases 
(see section 3.2.8.1). However, following these six phases does not mean that analysis is a linear 
process where the researcher moves to a next phase after finishing a phase. These analytical phases 
are recursive as needed. This recursive process is relevant to the iterative process as this study 
follows. The first five phases are described in the following sections while the last phase (producing 
the report) is presented in Chapter 4.  
3.3.2.1.1 Phase 1: Familiarising with data 
The first phase of thematic coding analysis requires “immersing” in the collected data. Immersion 
involves the process of reading and “repeated reading” and searching for meanings and patterns 
and so on (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This process is time-consuming; thus, qualitative research 
usually uses smaller samples than, for example, quantitative research from questionnaires (ibid). If 
the data collected is verbal, for instance from semi-structure interviews, transcribing can contribute 
to immersing with the collected data (Riessman, 2005). Transcription of 28 interviews have been 
done after each interview. As such, the time spent in transcription was not wasted. Transcription 
could form this early phase of analysis. The researcher added some notes onto the transcripts when 
transcribing the interviews. The transcripts were then re-read during the process of analysis to 
increase the familiarity with data.  
3.3.2.1.2 Phase 2: Generating initial codes 
The second phase of thematic coding analysis involves organising data into meaningful groups 
(Tuckett, 2005). This phase can be started once the researcher was familiar with the data. The 
researcher worked through the entire data set and gave full and equal attention to each data item 
to identify interesting aspects in the data items that may form codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Seen 
in this way, codes represented an interesting feature of data. The researcher coded for the as many 
potential interesting features as possible.  
Coding can be done manually or through a software such as NVivo (Seale, 1999). In this study, the 
researcher performed analysis both by hand and through NVivo 11. Usually, qualitative analysis 
software is suitable when a predetermine coding structure is available (Auld et al., 2007). The 
process of coding at the beginning was data-driven. As such, it was not suitable to use software to 
code at this stage. Coding through NVivo was adopted after code structure has been determined 
and when the amount of data became larger. At the later stage, NVivo allows the researcher to 
better manage the large amount of data.  
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 At the manual coding stage, the researcher printed transcripts of the first 7 interviews, read the 
transcripts to identify “interesting features” of the text (Braun and Clarke, 2006). At this stage, 
following Braun and Clarke (2006), the researcher looked for as many potential themes/patterns as 
possible as these themes/patterns may become interesting later. Individual extracts of data can be 
coded in different themes/patterns and the surrounding data is kept to ensure that the context is 
not lost (Bryman and Bell, 2011). At this stage, notes were written on the printed-out copies of 
transcripts as illustrated in Figure 3.5. The blue boxes on this figure are redactions to protect 
confidentiality. 
After writing notes about codes on the printed-out transcript, the researcher summarised them 
onto a table with three columns: (1) Code; (2) Description of the code and (3) Direct quotes. This 
table is illustrated in Figure 3.6. With this table, the researcher could be clear about the meaning of 
each code which then contributed to the grouping codes to make themes. After a list of codes has 
been produced, the researcher started the third phase of thematic coding analysis which is 
searching for themes. 
     
Figure 3.5: Notes of codes on transcripts (Phase 2 of thematic coding analysis) 
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3.3.2.1.3 Phase 3: Searching for themes 
The third phase of thematic coding analysis involves considering different codes and grouping them 
into themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). A theme “captures something important about the data in 
relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within 
the data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.10). The researcher began this phase with all the codes 
identified above. Codes might form themes, sub-themes or be discarded. Codes were collated into 
“candidate themes” which means not-yet-final-themes. These candidate themes were to be 
reviewed and reworked in subsequent phases of thematic coding analysis. The researcher used 
post-it notes to map the codes into candidate themes as shown in Figure 3.7. 
These post-it notes were arranged and re-arranged into meaningful groups or discarded. These 
initial arrangements were firstly guided by the data and by the research aim. Candidate themes and 
subthemes were initial identified in Table 3.4. 
The output of this phase was predominantly descriptive. The process of thematic coding analysis in 
this study was an iterative process in the sense that while the candidate themes were data-driven 
in this phase, the researcher kept reviewing literature and collecting data. By doing so, the 
researcher realised that searching for themes should also be facilitated by some literature, 
especially from the Multi-level perspectives. Besides, these candidate themes were too 
complicated with many sub-themes and overlapped which may mean that lack of sufficient data to 
support them at later stage.  As such, the next phases of thematic coding analysis were conducted. 
3.3.2.1.4 Phase 4: Reviewing themes 
This phase involves the refinement of candidate themes. This phase is required to ensure that 
candidate themes are revised several times. Once a list of candidate themes is set, this researcher 
 




can begin this phase. This phase consists of two levels of reviewing. Firstly, all the coded extracts 
for each theme must be reviewed to make sure that they form a coherent pattern. Secondly, this 
process is conducted with the whole dataset (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In order to examine all the 
coded data extracts, the researcher started using NVivo 11. Figure 3.8 shows an example of data 
nodes in NVivo.  
  
Table 3.4: Initial candidate themes identified in Phase 3 of thematic coding analysis 
1. Consumers: Domestic consumers and Business consumers who consume energy.  
2. Disruption 
3. Flexibility: energy flexibility, the ability to keep the system in balance at all time 
4. Financial ability: the ability to finance electricity generation projects 
5. Optimal use of infrastructure: how to make the most of the current infrastructure? 
6. Consumer-centric business model  
7. Innovation 
8. Platform as a service 
9. Market 
10. Regulatory structure 
11. Time frame 
12. Culture 
 






By coding in NVivo, the researcher repeated Phase 2 and 3 of the thematic coding analysis. This 
repeating process is normal in thematic coding analysis, especially coding which is the on-going 
process in thematic coding analysis. NVivo allowed the researcher to deal with a large amount of 
data set. The structure of the nodes on NVivo could be changed to reflect the potential themes and 
sub-themes. Using reporting functions in NVivo, the researcher printed out the nodes structures to 
easily re-arranged the nodes. An example of a node structure was shown in Figure 3.9. 
  
      




More usefully, NVivo has a function of printing out all the data extracts of nodes. The researcher 
could easily use this function to check if the data extracts reflected the potential themes and formed 
a coherent pattern which was involved in the first level of this reviewing theme phase. An 
illustration of the data extracts printing out from NVivo is shown in Figure 3.10. The orange boxes 
on this figure are redactions to protect confidentiality. 
  
      




By reading these data extracts, the researcher reviewed candidate themes and sub-themes. This 
process was stopped when the researcher felt that further amendments did not add anything 
substantial. After this phase of thematic coding analysis, a new list of candidate themes was 
gathered, which is shown in Table 3.5. 
After the list of candidate themes was reviewed and no more substantial amendment was made, 
these themes were defined in the following section. 
      
Figure 3.10: Data extracts from N-Vivo (Phase 4 of thematic coding analysis) 
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3.3.2.1.5 Phase 5: Defining and naming themes 
The phase of defining and naming themes started when the satisfactory list of themes was 
produced. At this phase, an overarching narrative should begin to emerge, with the data telling a 
story in relation to the research aim. It is important to identify not only the story that each theme 
tells, but also how these individual story fits with the overall story about the collected data, in 
relation to the research aim. At this stage, the researcher needs to identify what is interesting about 
the data and why, rather than “just” paraphrase the content of the data extracts  (Braun and Clarke, 
2006, p.22).  
At the end of this phase, the researcher would be able to clearly define each theme and its scope. 
Names of each theme should be revised if needed in order to give reader a sense of what the theme 
is about. The names and definitions of final themes are shown in Table 3.6. 
The review of themes suggested that some developed themes did not require further exploration 
but belong to “broader” themes which facilitate the stories about transitions of GB’s electricity 
Table 3.5: Developed candidate themes, identified in Phase 4 of thematic coding analysis  
Themes Subthemes 
1. Consumers Consumers change behaviour 
Consumers' relationship 
Consumers Trust 
2. Culture Skill sets 
3. Flexibility Current flexibility 
Future of flexibility 
Value of flexibility 
4. Governmental policy Decarbonisation  
Goal of system 








Trial vs upscale 
Whole-sale market price 
7. Network Barriers for network flexibility 
Futures of network 
Network challenges 
8. Regulatory structure Purposes of regulation 
Regulatory criticism 
Future of regulation 
9. System Lock-in  
 
Lock-in due to - Naysayer 
Lock-in due to bias of centralisation 
Lock-in due to Lack of skills needed 
Lock-in due to regulator 
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sector. The final themes are change, timeframe and nature of change, stability, regulation and 
policy, and goals of transition (decarbonisation and energy flexibility) as shown in Table 3.6. These 
themes were defined and ready for the reporting phase (phase 6 of thematic coding analysis) which 
will be described in Chapter 4.  
This section describes the iterative process of thematic coding analysis that the researchers 
adopted in this study which reflected as a research funnel of this study. This thematic coding 
analysis was conducted to make sense of transitions of GB’s electricity sector. The findings from the 
Table 3.6: Final analytical themes with definitions 
Themes and definition Subthemes and sub-subthemes 
1. Change: current changes 
that are happening now and 
innovations (both 
technological and business 
model innovations) in each 
sub-system. Innovations are 
likely to be multiple, 
architectural and consumer-
centric. 
- Generation: low carbon technologies, more actors involving in 
generation, large-scale storage batteries connecting to transmission 
grids. 
- Consumption: further uptakes of EVs, market trials of technologies, 
more important role of consumers, different perspectives on consumer 
engagement, continued rollout of smart meter and smart home 
appliances, time-of-use tariff model supported by smart-phone apps, 
energy service companies, consortia. 
- Distribution: bilateral contracts in wholesale market, smart grids, 
flexibility platforms, technology platform. 
2. Timeframe and nature of 
change: differences in 
interviewees’ perspectives 
of timeframe of innovations 
and transitions which then 
reflect incremental nature of 
changes.  
- Timeframe of innovations: smart meters and EVs. 
- Timeframe of transitions: slow, quick or unknown. 
 
3. Stability: the “lock-in” to 
current systems and barriers 
which prevent transitions 
from occurring.  
- Stability is essential: fundamental physics of the system. 
- Stability is a barrier: different interviewees’ perspectives on different 
barriers.  
• Technological barriers: batteries in EVs, technologies to 
procure Black Start. 
• Financial barriers: cost of technology (EV batteries, reduction in 
cost), financial incentives (cost-savings from DSF, economic 
rational behaviour of consumers), subsidy (subsidy supports 
low carbon technologies, subsidy stifles innovations). 
• Organisational cultural barriers: traditional mindset 
(centralisation mindset of incumbents), skill sets (new skills, 
organisational leaders do not have new skills, the regulator 
does not have new skills). 
• Consumer barriers: consumer trust towards incumbents and 
new entrants. 
• Informational barriers: consumer data, network data. 
• Market design barriers: market design in terms of storage, 
complexity of regulatory licenses and codes. 
4. Regulation and policy: the 
role of regulation and policy 
in transitions 
- Regulatory structure: regulation is a barrier; the whole regulatory 
structure needs to change. 
- Energy policy: certainty from energy policy, direction of transitions from 
energy policy, energy policy is not needed. 
5. Goals of transitions: 
potential goals of transitions 
according to interviewees’ 
commentaries. 
- Decarbonisation: decarbonisation is a transition goal; decarbonisation 
is a challenge. 
- Energy flexibility: energy flexibility is a transition goal, energy flexibility 
is “problems and solutions” of the sector.  
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thematic coding analysis are described in Chapter 4. The following section explains how the 
different discourse coalitions were identified, as part of discourse analysis to identify different 
futures of GB’s electricity sector. 
3.3.2.2 Discourse analysis 
After thematic coding analysis, interpretations or assumptions of interviewees about transitions to 
futures of GB’s electricity sector were revealed. These different assumptions were compared with 
different sets of assumptions of contemporary energy discourses from literature identified in 
section 2.6.2 to divide actors into different coalitions. Some dominant energy discourse coalitions 
were identified and described at the end of Chapter 4. 
After that, deeper energy discourse analysis was undertaken to explore futures articulated by each 
of these discourse coalitions. This analysis followed the energy discourse analytical framework 
identified in Table 2.4. For pragmatic reason, each discourse coalition is assumed to articulate one 
future of the sector. The findings are described in Chapter 5. 
3.3.3 Difficulties 
The researcher encountered several difficulties in applying research design, including: 
Firstly, by interviewing senior figures in different organisations across the value chain of the 
electricity sector, the researcher is able to capture different perspectives of actors and explore their 
visions and expectations about the development of the sector. It is valuable for the researcher to 
gain industrial insights while most research in the field does not include data from senior figures. 
However, accessing senior figures in the industry was not easy and far slower than anticipated, even 
with the facilitation of the researcher’s industrial supervisor who is Vice President of CGI.  
Secondly, the researcher has thought about organising a couple of workshops with CGI – the 
industrial sponsor and other industrial actors to evaluate the collected data from semi-structured 
interviews. However, it became unfeasible due to Covid-19 with its associated lock-down and online 
working. 
This section detailed the application of the research design selected for this study. The following 




This chapter described and justified the chosen methods for this study and their application in line 
with the research aim and objectives. These chosen methods are summarised in section 3.2.11. 
Data collection and analysis follows an iterative process and constructivist approach as set out at 
the beginning of the chapter. Having described first five phases of thematic coding analysis, the 
following chapter reports the findings from thematic coding analysis and identifies dominant 
discourse coalitions which will then be used for discourse analysis in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 4 MAKING SENSE OF TRANSITIONS OF GB’S 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a thematic analysis of data collected from interviewees on the transitions of 
GB’s electricity sector to a low carbon future. Five main themes are identified:  
(1) Changes of the sector in electricity generation, consumption and distribution (network) 
(2) The timeframe and nature of change 
(3) How stability of the sector is described and whether stability should be overcome 
(4) The role of regulation and energy policy in transition 
(5) The goals of transition to low carbon energy futures including decarbonisation and 
flexibility. 
These themes reveal diverse assumptions of interviewees on how transitions may unfold. These 
assumptions are then used to group actors into different coalitions. This process forms a key part 
of discourse analysis and will be used to identify futures in Chapter 5. Therefore, at the end of this 
Chapter 4, some dominant energy discourse coalitions are set out.  
4.2 CHANGE 
Data collected from this study show that interviewees shared a view that the GB’s electricity sector 
is changing. These changes fell into the categories of (1) Electricity generation, (2) Electricity 
consumption and (3) Electricity distribution (network). 
4.2.1 Electricity generation 
On the generation side, low carbon energy technologies are gradually replacing incumbent fossil 
fuel generators such as coal and gas plants. These low carbon technologies include various 
centralised forms of generation, such as biomass plants, offshore wind farms and nuclear power, 
as well as multiple decentralised installations, including onshore wind farms and PVs on industrial 
and residential buildings. However, the interviewees did not agree on what is the most significant 
technology. Biomass plants are argued to be developed in fairly high volume due to the “move away 
from coal to coal biomass” (I7 – Energy supplier). Similarly, due to the windy coastline of the UK, 
offshore wind is highlighted as a “direction of travel” in GBs future generation mix (I7 – Energy 
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supplier). In terms of nuclear power, the majority of interviewees were ambivalent about its 
development. Some interviewees argued against nuclear power, one suggesting that there might 
be “…a sort of collapse in the sort of idea of large centralised, particularly nuclear power.” (I1 – 
Academia), whilst another suggesting that due to its inflexibility, it “…just won’t fit the rest of the 
system,” (I16 – Government). In terms of decentralised generation, there is a consensus among 
interviewees about the further development of solar power but uncertainty about the 
development of onshore wind, particularly with the lack of government funding.  
Several interviewees commented on how, with these new technologies, there is a significant 
increase in the number of actors involved in electricity generation, changing the way the electricity 
sector is managed. For example, an interviewee described, 
“It was previously an industry where we have some large central generation plants. …that 
has changed over the past 5-10 years, now we have thousands of different types of power 
plants.” (I3 – Industry commentator) 
According to this interviewee, the move from fossil fuels to multiple low carbon generation 
installations has meant that the system operator no longer manages a small number of large 
dispatchable power plants to meet the peak demand. Now, it manages multiple generators, some 
of which are non-dispatchable. These changes in generation creates challenges for the current 
system operator. The task of balancing supply and demand becomes increasingly difficult because 
the system is no longer able to turn on quick start-up power plants to meet peaks and troughs in 
demand. 
Within generation, further innovation in low carbon technologies such as renewables are likely to 
be needed. Decentralised renewables such as onshore wind and solar has been linked with various 
storage devices. Large-scale storage batteries connecting to transmission grids are expected to 
develop to not only provide reliability for the system and accommodate the development of 
renewables but also connect to EVs charging points to facilitate the further uptake of EVs on the 
consumption side. These innovations may play a role in the transition of the sector to a low carbon 
future where a variety of innovations in the consumption side and network side are emerging.  
4.2.2 Electricity consumption 
This section explores the changes in electricity consumption, arising from energy efficiency and 
further uptake of EVs, as well as the changes in the role of consumers. As a result, many 




4.2.2.1 Current changes 
On the consumption side, interviewees noted that energy efficiency has been enhanced by power 
saving innovations. However, future uptake of electric vehicles (EVs) among households may off-
set these reductions in household demand for electricity. Such increased demand may exceed the 
capacity of the grid at various times of the day. Interviewees highlighted that network constraints 
on distribution grids will be of particular concern here. As an interviewee from a network company 
argued,  
“So what's happening with electric vehicles is that we will use all the capacity we'd built for 
40, 50 years probably within 10, so that's what will happen and that's why electric vehicles 
at moment you say it's fine, yeah, connecting them isn't the problem. There will be a 
problem in the future because all of a sudden you know the industry, housing and stuff 
continue to grow, the capacity we have built in for that won't be there, it will have all been 
used by electric cars.” (I24 – Network company) 
Interviewees commented on the efforts to address this concern through a number of trials that 
have been initiated to test the utility of various new technologies, such as battery storage or 
demand side flexibility, to help overcome network constraints. These trials have mainly been 
conducted by network companies, as data shown from comments of interviewees from academia 
and network companies. Some research has also been conducted by independent research 
institutions. For example, an interviewee referred to a research from Aurora to argue that the 
industry needs to “implement electric vehicles in a flexible way” to avoid unnecessary spend on 
infrastructure (I12 – Energy supplier).  
Interviewees stated that changes on the consumption side may not only arise from the adoption of 
new technologies such as EVs and battery storage but also from changes in industry relations with 
consumers. Two opposing views emerged about consumers and their willingness to engage with 
the sector. These different views are further explored in section 4.2.2.2 below.  
More consistently, most interviewees argued that consumers are likely to be considered by industry 
actors as more important than before. Interviewees suggested consumers may also potentially 
provide demand side flexibility to help the system operator balance the grid and/or help 
distribution network operators manage network constraints. With the development of PVs and 
battery storage, interviewees stated more and more consumers may become “prosumers” in 
futures, i.e. generators and consumers of electricity. Prosumers might be governed by community 
energy and/or local authorities which is not usual in GB’s electricity sector. For example, an 
interviewee described a situation where a school generates their own electricity through solar 
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panel and sells their unused electricity during school holidays. This arrangement might be managed 
by a local authority or a community energy (I9 – Network company). These changes are deemed as 
a process of democratisation according to some interviewees. Democratisation is defined as 
“putting power in your and my hands as the end customers” (I26 – Code administrator). 
Democratisation may challenge current practices in the sector which assumes passive consumers.  
As consumers play a more important role in the sector, the industry will need to bring consumers 
to the fore and change their relationship with consumers, perhaps by conducting consumer-
focussed trials to better understand them or develop innovations which focus on consumers. 
Interviewees suggested that consumer-focussed innovations can be disruptive because they re-
develop the relationship between consumers and the industry. The following section looks at these 
innovations which interviewees termed consumer-centric innovations. 
4.2.2.2 Consumer-centric innovations 
Technological innovations are developing to enable domestic consumers to continue their daily 
routines and be delivered in such a way to help the sector overcome network challenges. For 
example, the further uptake of EVs among households with smart charging technology might meet 
consumer future demand for personal transport and help to balance the grid. As an interviewee 
described, 
“If … the consumers don't need the car at all for the whole of the next day, they [the 
consumers] can respond to the charging rate, to market conditions at the time, etc. And so 
certainly, electric vehicle charging seemed to me that it will be the real focal point of 
consumers’ flexibility.” (I7 – Energy supplier) 
Similarly, a number of interviewees suggested the continued rollout of smart meters and smart 
home appliances offer opportunities for the industry to develop a better understanding of 
consumers and consequently formulate more suitable business models. Smart meters can also 
influence consumer behaviours as they make consumers aware of their energy use and charges in 
real time, or in other words, have “a lot more visibility about what's going on [consumers’ energy 
use]” (I14 – Industry commentator). For example, households may restructure their activities to 
move to times of the day when the electricity charges are lower. Here, consumers are assumed to 
act rationally following economic incentives.  
With interviewees who assumed that consumers hold economically rational behaviour, time-of-use 
tariff business model is developing alongside the further uptake of EVs and the continued roll out 
of smart meter. Electricity suppliers recognise the potential benefits of households with EVs and 
smart meters for network management and offer them variable electricity pricing for different 
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times of the day. In one case, EVs time of day tariffs led to consumers/ EVs owners change their 
charging to “out of peak” (I18 – Energy supplier). Time of use tariff can potentially reduce energy 
consumption at peak times (usually between 4pm and 7pm). This reduction may assist the system 
and network operators to balance grids and overcome network constraints.  
“So hope that when we have smart meters and their roll out is completed, they [consumers] 
will be either more interested or there will be sort of tools so that other people can offer 
them [consumers] something in exchange for doing that job for them” (I3 – Industry 
commentator) 
This time-of-use tariff model is facilitated not only by EVs and smart meter technologies but also by 
apps on smart phones which allows consumers to easily access their electricity use data and charges 
(I18 – Energy supplier). These apps can also be linked to smart home appliances such as smart 
thermostats which enable consumers to operate the smart home appliances remotely. Consumers 
in this case have the ability to switch appliances on and off to reduce their energy bills and also 
manage their home effectively in the future. As an interviewee anticipated, “It [Smart home] will 
just be the easiest thing to do for your [consumers’] everyday life”, (I23 – Network company). Hence, 
EVs, smart meters and smart home technologies will create benefits for system operators, DNOs, 
energy suppliers, consumers or in other words, for the whole industry.  
Conversely, some interviewees did not agree that consumers are actively engaging in their energy 
consumption and changing their behaviour as a result of economic incentives, e.g. one interviewee 
argued, 
“the price of our tea is approximately the same probably or more than you've paid all day 
for the electricity in your house …he'll [a consumer will] spend 3.20 on a latte and not think 
about it, and then he'll [this consumer will] sit down and say my electricity bills too much. 
Right, really?” (I14 – Industry commentator) 
Interviewees suggested that a future response to such consumer behaviour can be that companies 
(energy service companies) not only offer energy services but also extend into multiple areas of 
consumer homes such as domestic heat, entertainment, transport and broadband to create “a 
bundling of products together with services” (I2 – Academia).  Such business models are considered 
as consumer-centric, in the sense that they provide consumers with choices and convenience. As 
an interviewee described, 
“I would like my house between 18 and 21 degree in these times of the day, it is up to you 
[energy service company] of how you deliver it” (I2 – Academia) 
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Another suggested approach to delivery of such consumer-centric business models may be in the 
penetration of many “consortia” which supply consumers with “electricity and gas and telecom and 
water” and “take away your [consumers’] waste and arrange your [consumers] baby sister” (I3 – 
Industry commentator with Investor perspective). These consortia business models are different 
from energy service companies described above. While a consumer can only be supplied with 
electricity from one energy service company, a consumer is able to buy electricity from many 
different consortia. These consortia may potentially offer consumers many products and electricity 
as a by-product. In return, they may have control over consumers’ home equipment such as fridge, 
washing machine, i.e. consumers demand side flexibility. For example, they may be able to remotely 
adjust consumers’ fridges power in response to system’s needs. Consumers may have an energy 
consortium for their food, another energy consortium for their electric cars and so on. This energy 
consortium model is similar to what is happening in the food industry where only some people “go 
to the bread shop to buy bread” while the majority of them “buy that [bread] from the supermarket 
while they buy everything else” (I3 – Investor perspective). These consortia are expected to exist 
alongside some traditional energy suppliers. Here, the future requires significant changes in market 
design because currently, consumers are only allowed to have one energy supplier. Similar to the 
energy service company model, consortia offer consumers with convenience and as such, are 
deemed to be consumer centric. 
The business model innovations of energy service companies and consortia may also potentially 
change the links between consumers and other parts of the sector such as energy suppliers and 
network. The links with energy suppliers will change because consumers may receive bills directly 
from these new business models, rather than their energy suppliers. The links with network changes 
because consumers can participate in demand side flexibility to help resolve network issues, 
although indirectly by authorising energy service companies or consortia to manage their demand.  
However, although technological innovations and business model innovations can potentially 
support demand side flexibility, the network is unable to utilise the advantages of demand side 
flexibility without the further development of innovations in networks. The following section looks 
at network innovations and their implications. 
4.2.3 Electricity distribution (Network) 
Currently, electricity generation and consumption are tied together via wholesale and retail 
markets. In the wholesale market, generators sell electricity to suppliers. In the retail market, 
suppliers sell electricity to consumers, e.g. households.  Both markets are currently dominated by 
a few industry actors whose firms are vertically integrated. Often, generators, suppliers and even 
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distributors are parts of one organisation. Generators can sell electricity via bilateral contracts to 
parts of their business that supply electricity. Interviewees stated that such contractual 
arrangements are reducing market liquidity. As an interviewee with expertise in regulation 
identified, 
“…there is very little trading that isn’t bilateral in one way or the other…we lost the ability 
to sort out things by prices in the whole sale market… we don’t really have a liquid market 
where we can sort this stuff [system operator system balancing] out in an open and 
transparent way.” (I2 – Regulator) 
This argument highlighted the issues with network balancing and the role of market and market 
liquidity in the current electricity sector.  
A number of interviewees with a network perspective argued that the development of smart grids 
will be the most important innovation on the network side. Smart grids allow the system operator 
and DNOs to visualise low voltage level activities. An interviewee described that with smart grid, 
network companies might be able to identify in which area they “need additional capacity” and “go 
to the market” for “flexible solutions” (I19 – Network company). Similarly, another interviewee also 
highlighted that without smart grids, traditional network reinforcement was an easier option. 
“…they [DNOs] don’t know enough about their networks to buy flexibility …if we [the GB] 
have a smart grid, and then it would work, because …we say that we have flexibility in [a 
location] or whatever that might be. At the moment, they [DNOs] don’t know that, so the 
easiest thing to do is just to do reinforcement” (I4 – Distributed asset business).  
Smart grids help the system operators and DNOs to not only make better decisions about which 
part of the network may benefit from demand side flexibility, but also to have vision of where 
demand side flexibility may be available. This would assist network companies to buy energy 
flexibility solutions from the market to balance grids and overcome local network constraints. An 
interviewee argued that smart grids will help “optimise that [infrastructures] investment cost” and 
ultimately “reduce consumer bills” (I19 – Network company). With smart grids’ potential to lowest 
cost in helping DNOs to overcome network constraints and the system operator to resolve future 
grid challenges, smart grids are likely to support the development of low carbon sources and 
accommodate the uptake of EVs. Here, smart grids can potentially change the relationship between 
generation, network and consumption sub-systems.  
Realising the benefits of demand side flexibility, both DNOs and other market players including 
technological new entrants are developing platforms for flexibility, so-called (1) flexibility platforms 
and (2) technology platform. For DNOs, flexibility platforms are where they can advertise 
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opportunities to participate for whoever can provide DNOs with demand side flexibility. For new 
entrants, a technology platform can be an opportunity for a number of players to compete and 
supply flexibility for not only DNOs but also whoever needs flexibility. Flexibility platforms only 
provide flexibility for DNOs while the technology platform offers flexibility for a wider range of 
actors. These different types of platforms are looked at below. 
The flexibility providers, called ‘energy service provider’ by DNOs, can aggregate flexibility from 
consumers and offer it to DNOs via their flexibility platforms. Such platforms and associated 
demand side flexibility are likely to change the relationship between DNOs and their consumers 
and indeed with other actors in the market. Instead of having direct control over their networks, 
DNOs move toward a relationship model where their operations may be based on the contracts 
between DNOs and providers of flexibility.  
“…that means when you depend on energy flexibility, if you start to move towards 
depending on the external agencies and companies on agreements with your customers, 
your major commercial customers or working through aggregators and intermediaries, you 
have less direct control and I think the challenge is that the company is actually used to 
having direct control rather than relationships” (I1 – Academia) 
On the other hand, an interviewee argued that a potentially disruptive innovation is the technology 
platform which creates real-time markets for “different sources of energy flexibility and different 
users of energy flexibility” (I27 – Aggregator). Therefore, flexibility may not only be useful to DNOs 
but also for other actors that require flexibility. By allowing a number of users who have or need 
flexibility to participate regardless of their type of organisation, such technology platform can 
potentially blur the conventional boundary between generation, network and consumption. 
Another innovation which potentially changes the boundary between traditional sub-systems is 
transmission grid level battery storage (see section 4.2.1). This battery storage is connected to both 
transmission grids, to help system operators with balancing the grids, and EVs charging points to 
reduce EVs driver range anxiety, as an interviewee argued, 
 “[the UK has] a potentially unstable system, so we see the use of storage …we see the 
transition of fossil fuels to electric vehicles as a further impact on the grid, and so by 
marrying the two [storage and EVs],  we have more control but we also have access to much 
larger volumes of power by going to the transmission system. So it really is that symbiotic 
relationship between the cars and the batteries, but access to bigger power than has been 
available before from distribution connection” (I21 – Investor). 
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Battery storage can potentially provide a large volume of power for EVs charging points due to 
being connected to large-scale generation via transmission grids. Battery storage at transmission 
grid can become intermediates for system balancing and EVs owners; thus, change the relationship 
between conventional network and consumption sub-systems.  
4.2.4 Summary 
In summary, this section highlighted some changes in generation, consumption and network of the 
sector. Among them, the most noticeable changes are in the mix of generation from fossil fuel to 
renewables, the increase in the number of actors, the adoption of new technologies in consumption 
side such as EVs or battery storage and the changing role of consumers. These changes bring about 
associated issues in the sector, such as network balancing and grid constraints management. Some 
trials and research were noticed to further understand the implications of these issues and to 
develop innovations. 
Innovations seem to play a key role in responding to these issues. Renewables and battery storage 
are likely to be further adopted on the generation side. The consumption side sees the development 
of EVs, smart home technologies and business models around these technologies, such as time of 
use tariff and energy service company models. On the network side, smart grids and platforms to 
offer flexibility are likely to dominate. Multiple innovations are likely to develop and supporting 
each other. For example, the development of time-of-use tariffs are likely to be alongside the 
further uptake of EVs, smart meters and smart home technologies. 
Moreover, innovations including EVs, energy service companies, smart grids, platforms for 
flexibility and transmission grid-battery storage connecting with EVs charging model not only 
influence a part of the sector where they are situated but also potentially transform the traditional 
linkages between various parts of the sector as described above. Such innovations constitute 
architectural innovation that restructures the sector. 
Furthermore, innovations in the future are likely to focus on consumer-centric innovations and 
include not only technologies such as EVs and smart appliances in home but also business model 
innovations such as energy service company or consortia models. This focus is in line with the 
increasingly important role of consumers in the sector.  
This section also noticed contradictory views of interviewees in terms of consumers. While some 
interviewees argued that consumers will continue to be passive and not engage in the sector, others 
believed that consumers would become more engaged, moving away from conventional imagined 
passive consumers. However, interviewees’ perspectives in terms of consumers’ engagement are 
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diverse. Consumers might be more active and become “prosumers” in the future, or change their 
behaviour rationally following economic incentives such as with the example of the time-of-use 
tariff model, or engage due to the choices and convenience they have in the example of energy 
service company. 
These innovations which are multiple, architectural and consumer-centric and the changing role of 
consumers can potentially change the structure of the sector and thus stimulate and enable 
transitions to a low carbon future. The following section looks at the timeframe and nature of these 
changes. 
4.3 TIMEFRAME AND NATURE OF CHANGE 
Although interviewees share an agreement about some potential innovations in the future, there 
is no consistent view of when these will become mainstream. In terms of smart meters, an 
interviewee was pessimistic about their roll-out, “now it is the middle of 2018, … we are nowhere 
near getting the roll out of smart meter to any level of density whatsoever” (I4 – Distributed asset 
business). Regardless of this opinion, the roll out of smart meters is expected to be completed by 
2022 by an industry commentator (I20) while an incumbent energy supplier anticipated the 
completion in 10 years, 2028 (I7). These various opinions on a timeframe of an innovation is similar 
to the further uptake of EVs. An interviewee argued that EVs are designed to suit personal needs 
which may not suit consumers who usually commute long-distances. Here, this interviewee 
expected the number of EVs will increase considerably by 2021 but may not outstrip the number of 
hybrid cars. Conversely, another interviewee anticipated that EVs are going to become mainstream 
in “5 years’ time” (2021) which is “the car cycle” (I15 – Network company). Regardless of timescale, 
some interviewees agreed that the EVs will become the main personal transportation (I5 – Industry 
commentator, I17 – Government) before 2040. This is the previous date of government ban on the 
sales of new conventional petrol and diesel vehicles (BEIS, 2017). This date has recently been moved 
forward to 2030 (DfT and BEIS, 2020). 
Interviewees also hold diverse views about the timeframes for transition. For example, a number 
of interviewees argued that there may be more rapid changes in retail than in network 
infrastructure. The logic behind this assertion appears to be that infrastructure requires large 
investments and hence, takes longer to change. As such, interviewees from network companies 
usually had in mind longer timeframes for transition than others. For them, the 2050 timeframe 
was a reasonable timeframe for changing the network while interviewees from other parts of the 
sector tended to focus upon 5 – 10-year timeframe, i.e. by 2030. The 2030 timeframe ensured 
enough time for the new regulatory framework to come into force. For interviewees from network 
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companies, the 2050 timeframe allowed sufficient time for development, testing and 
commercialisation of network technologies. As an interviewee with expertise on both network and 
retail argued, 
Electricity utility infrastructure is the one you don’t spend a lot of money on. So, in reality, 
the timeframe for it is longer than people sometimes expect” (I15 – Network company) 
A number of interviewees did not elude to an exact timeframe because according to them, time 
was a big unknown, sharing a consensus that there are many influencing factors which lead to 
uncertainty. Interviewees suggested that the timeframe can be influenced by disruptive events 
occurring on the supply or demand side. For example, the awareness of the industrial actors that 
building more nuclear power is the only option for future, but unaffordable or the increase in the 
number of EVs may create big impact on the system and “force some new thinking to come through 
in terms of the system for flexible management” (I1 – Academia). Rapid changes may also be 
achieved with consumers’ support, as an interviewee identified, 
“…once these innovations grip the consumer imagination, it's actually quite surprising how 
things can take off and the business models therefore have to change” (I5 – Industry 
commentator).  
With innovations being influenced by different factors, interviewees recognised that changes in the 
sector occurred at specific times and in specific spaces, i.e. they are shaped by context.  
In the context of the electricity sector, by looking at the internal issues of the sector and the 
development of innovations to resolve these, interviewees assumed that the sector would go 
through an unstable period. However, there is a tendency to prevent instability because electricity 
is so vital, i.e. maintain security of supply. Interviewees advocated incremental rather than radical 
changes. The following sector looks at how interviewees discuss stability.  
4.4 STABILITY 
Stability and change is the core issue of transitions research (Köhler et al., 2019). While the previous 
section discussed changes in the sector, this section focuses on stability. Some interviewees argued 





4.4.1 Stability is essential 
A number of interviewees argued that stability is essential for the sector to operate, even when it 
is in transition. Stability is founded upon the “fundamental physics” of the electricity network (I13 
– Government and I23 – Network company). Such “fundamental physics” requires electricity grids 
and networks supply and demand to remain in balance at all times. Otherwise, electricity supply 
will be disrupted which will affect, for example, households and commerce. Currently, the system 
operator oversees the network to ensure the reliability of electricity supply to households and 
industry. The reliability of electricity supply may be challenged by an increase in non-dispatchable 
renewables and reductions in system inertia (I5 – Industry commentator and I11 – Energy supplier). 
An interviewee explained that “System inertia is generally given by spinning turbines” of fossil fuel 
power stations (I11 – Energy supplier). In case a fossil fuel power station stops working, these 
turbines keep spinning to “keep the grid frequency stable” and ensure system reliability (I5 – 
Industry commentator). Although the sector is changing, reliability needs to be maintained. 
Transitions can only occur in such conditions. As an interviewee from the public sector noted, 
“I want National Grid to be there, keeping things working because the stuff that goes on in 
the grid edge [from consumers’ side) doesn't care about the physics really, somebody needs 
to watch the physics, so that to me is one thing that needs to be stable as there is 
somewhere somebody needs to be assuring the technical integrity of what's going on” (I13 
– Government). 
4.4.2 Stability is a barrier 
In contrast, several interviewees noted that obdurate elements need to be removed for low-carbon 
innovations to develop in particular and for the sector to transition in general. Interviewees 
identified various barriers which prevent the sector from changing, including (1) Technological 
barriers, (2) Financial barriers, (3) Organisational cultural barriers, (4) Consumer barriers, (5) 
Informational barriers, and (6) Market design barriers. This section considers these barriers and 
their role in transition to a low-carbon electricity sector. 
4.4.2.1 Technological barriers 
Although many innovations have been developing to resolve the sector’s internal issues such as 
those highlighted in section 4.1 above, interviewees noted some limitations of the technologies 
upon which these innovations are based, e.g. batteries in EVs. EVs can potentially support the 
development of demand side flexibility if consumers using EVs change their demand patterns to 
meet system needs. However, according to some industry commentators, by completing short-
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discharge cycles, EV owners may face the risk of reducing their battery life and ultimately may need 
to replace the battery in their vehicles sooner than usual, which is likely to be expensive. One 
interviewee drew upon the example of the battery in an Apple I-Phone to suggest how battery life 
is reduced, 
“You start off an iPhone, you can run two or three days, can't you? Pretty quickly within the 
first year you have to recharge that every single day, and sometimes twice a day, don't 
you?” (I5 – Industry commentator) 
Here, interviewees argued that one of the barriers for the development of demand side flexibility 
may arise from the limitations in battery technology and cost of replacement. In the future, by 
having batteries which are better suited to short-discharge cycles, it was assumed that consumers 
would act rationally and charge and discharge EVs in response to changes in electricity prices. As 
an industry commentator described, the situation with battery technology is uncertain, 
“Greatest thing that somebody can offer you is an intelligent way of using that [batteries in 
electric vehicles] for additional purposes which is effectively to soak up energy when it's 
cheap and then deliver it back to the… my home when it's expensive, providing that it 
doesn't impact my ability to drive the car, that sounds great. But has there been any 
research to look at the impact of short dip discharge on a vehicle battery you know?” (I5 – 
Industry commentator) 
Similarly, the absence of new technologies for the system operator to procure Black Start is 
considered by some interviewees as a key barrier for sector transition, especially in generation. 
Black Start is the service that the system operator buys to recover the electricity system in case of 
black-outs. Currently, fossil fuel power plants such as gas or coal are the only technology that can 
offer the system operator this service due to their ability to provide system inertia, as an 
interviewee identified, 
“…Now we can do that [Black Start] with gas fire power stations and coal-fired power 
stations, it's not so it's not very difficult. It basically comes down to large spinning bits of 
metal and then you plug everything in and you jump it off this big spinning bit of metal.” 
(I17 – Government). 
Transitioning to a future without gas power plants thus requires the development of new 
technologies which can help provide this Black Start service. These technologies do not currently 
exist “or at least we [the sector or more specifically the system operator] don't know how to do it 
yet” (I17 – Government).  
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However, new entrants in the sector argued that technological development will not be a barrier 
to transition as demonstrated by the development of disruptive technologies in other sectors such 
as smart phones in telecommunication. For example, no one thought of using smart phones as they 
were expensive while today, almost everybody carries smart phones.  
“… the rate of innovation and the pace of change in a technology sector that doesn't rely on 
hardware and manufacturing but relies on software and innovation happens unbelievably 
exponentially quickly … cost of the kit [smart phone] coming down hugely to the point where 
today you can get you know a $15 smartphone” (I18 – Energy supplier) 
For this interviewee, the cost of technology, rather than the technical aspects of technology itself 
matters. The cost of technology is considered in detail in the following section. 
4.4.2.2 Financial barriers 
There are three main financial barriers as identified by interviewees (1) Cost of technology, (2) 
Financial incentives and (3) Subsidy. 
4.4.2.2.1 Cost of technology 
As mentioned in the previous section, interviewees noted that batteries are expensive. Having to 
spend significant amounts of money to replace EV batteries may deter consumers from 
participating in vehicle to grid storage (demand side flexibility). As an interviewee highlighted, 
“…my most anxious point about buying a fully electric car is how long the battery will last 
and how much it is going to cost me to replace it you know… I've just spent you know thirty 
thousand pounds on a Nissan electric car and I find I'm facing a very significant bill to replace 
the battery and Nissan turned out and said it was because you did the short discharge 
cycles” (I5 – Industry commentator). 
The cost of replacing EV batteries is deemed to be a financial barrier to demand side flexibility. 
Some interviewees felt the initial cost of new technology could be a barrier because “there’s lack 
of economies of scale” (I10 – Energy supplier). 
However, the majority of interviewees believe there will be a significant reduction in the cost of 
technology. For example, in the case of smart technologies in home, they are “still expensive” now 
as noted by an interviewee but will reduce in three and four years (I23 – Network company). 
Another interviewee also highlighted,  
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“…costs are coming down sufficiently fast, technology to become sufficiently powerful” (I27 
– Aggregator).  
4.4.2.2.2 Financial incentives 
Interviewees who are industry commentators and working in network firms stated that the financial 
benefits of participating in demand side flexibility are often insufficient to motivate consumers to 
engage in such schemes. Seen in this way, finance may act as a barrier to demand side flexibility. 
According to these interviewees, consumers are unlikely to help balance grids or DNOs to manage 
network constraints if only a very small amount of money is offered, e.g., 30p per day (I4 – 
Distributed asset business), even less than the amount they spend for a cup of coffee at a coffee 
shop (I14 – Industry commentator). Similarly, an interviewee used evidence from research to argue 
for the low cost-savings of consumers in participating in demand side flexibility, which arguably is 
unable to incentivise consumers to participate, 
“…Vivid economics, they did the report with the WWF ... So, let's say it's [savings from 
demand side flexibility is] 100 pounds a year, it's two pounds a week, … as a customer, am 
I bothered by two pounds a week? Probably not. I would probably rather just plug my car in 
and know it's charged and ready for me in case of emergency” (I22 – Trade association). 
In these cases, interviewees assumed that consumers act rationally following financial incentives. 
However, interviewees from a range of organisational perspectives such as trade association, 
electricity new entrant supplier, consultant company disagree with the assumption that consumers 
act rationally. According to them, consumers do not act economically-rationally even when they 
are financially incentivised to behave in a particular way. They noted that consumers charge their 
EVs or phones as the need arises, rather than due to lower electricity bill emerging when the 
electricity system needs to overcome network constraints or be in balance. Reducing electricity bills 
is not consumers’ concern because the demand for electricity is taken for granted regardless of 
electricity price, as in interviewee noted,  
“…fundamentally energy prices are high but people are willing to pay” (I10 – Energy 
supplier). 
4.4.2.2.3 Subsidy 
Interviewees discussed whether subsidy is another financial barrier to innovation. Some 
interviewees argued that subsidy assists the development of local low carbon technologies. One 
interviewee from the investor community argued that the government feed-in-tariff programme (a 
form of subsidy) brought about huge increases in PV adoption among households.  
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“…when they [consumers] saw what was being offered for solar PVs [feed-in-tariff], they 
would see a good return on their investment, so they invested in that.” (I3 – Industry 
commentator) 
On the other hand, interviewees from both the industry and academia noted that subsidies may 
stifle innovation rather than stimulate it. An industry commentator did not totally deny the benefits 
of subsidising innovations, especially in the case of the Feed-in-tariff but suggested that subsidy 
should only be applied at the beginning of innovation diffusion and should not be provided on an 
on-going basis. This would avoid a situation in which a particular trajectory of innovations is 
established, and the industry fails to develop new ones. Moreover, subsidies stifle innovation in the 
sense that the industry is not going to innovate without receiving any price incentives from the 
government. An interviewee described the current situation in the sector as ‘awaiting to be 
subsidised before making any effort to build power plants or to innovate’ (I2 – Academia with 
regulatory perspective). Some interviewees argued that this has brought about an illiquid electricity 
market which should be avoided.  
Both proponents and opponents of subsidies apply economic theory to understanding sector 
transition. They again assume that the industry behaves rationally following price incentives. These 
interviewees are likely to pay less attention to other aspects such as organisational culture and 
consumers which may impact transitions. The following sections look at organisational cultural and 
consumer barriers.   
4.4.2.3  Organisational cultural barriers 
Interviewees highlighted that the electricity sector is experiencing some barriers relating to cultural 
aspects of the industry such as the traditional mindset and established skill sets.  
4.4.2.3.1 Traditional mindset 
Interviewees from both the electricity sector and incumbents of another sector moving into 
electricity sector argued that a key constraint to transition is a centralisation mindset. This mindset 
is adopted by sector incumbents who interviewees suggested are “naysayers” of change, 
“I think that fear [of a decentralised flexible market] is quite often driven by incumbents, 
who are basically saying oh well it won't work, the kind of naysayers of the future. Oh you 
can't do that, you can't do that and that kind of very low level kind of undermining of this 
future vision is there because to a certain extent, there are very few people out there going 
Yeah we can do a flexible market.” (I12 – Energy supplier) 
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This centralisation mindset also usually leads to the market design and framework supporting 
centralised assets rather than decentralised innovations. Several innovations which can potentially 
bring about transition in the sector such as storage or flexibility are at a disadvantage in the current 
market design. As long as this organisational cultural barrier remains, it is difficult for the sector to 
transition. Barriers associated with market design is further explored in the section 4.4.2.6 – Market 
design barriers.  
4.4.2.3.2 Skill sets 
This traditional mindset partly arises as a result of the absence of appropriate skill sets for the 
future. Interviewees who are industry commentators, new entrants and DNOs noted that the sector 
is dominated by traditional engineers while in the future, skills related to data analysis, developing 
relationship with consumers, project management, IT and software will be needed or more 
specifically, “they need to have more ability to look at more data” (I20 – Industry commentator). 
Organisational leaders may have these engineering focussed skill sets, especially incumbents. As 
organisational leaders, they might stifle innovation from within their organisations. However, it 
does not mean that innovations are not developed by incumbents, deficiencies in skill sets may be 
a challenge for innovation but not an insurmountable one. Interviewees highlighted two opposing 
ways of developing future innovations in sector incumbents. Incumbents may develop innovations 
internally or they may buy innovations from new entrants and integrate these innovations into 
organisational operations. Either may face cultural challenges, e.g. from sector leaders. An 
interviewee from an incumbent energy supplier described the cultural situation in his organisation 
as below, 
“Lots of people who are in maturing roles have got skill sets that may no longer be relevant 
to the future, and therefore when someone is challenged that their skill sets could become 
outdated, then they would reject change. And so the change character impacted by people 
is when we come up with something that's a disruptor, it starts off being considered 
ludicrous and then it moves to being considered dangerous, then it moves to being 
considered obvious and if we get stuck in the ludicrous and dangerous stage, then we stop 
putting all of our efforts into effective change but instead, we put our efforts into 
overcoming barriers.” (I11 – Incumbent energy supplier) 
An interviewee who does not want to be quoted stated that skill sets needed in the future might 
not only be absent in sector incumbents but also in Ofgem, the current regulatory body. This 
interviewee argued that Ofgem may not have the skills to design an appropriate market(s) when 
the UK exits the European Union. Currently, Ofgem’s decisions on any change in market design is in 
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accordance with European regulators such as the Agency for the Cooperation of European 
Regulators (ACER). Section 4.4.1 considers the regulatory structure further.  
4.4.2.4 Consumer barriers 
Consumers might act as barriers for the transitions of the sector. Interviewees agreed that the 
industry lacks consumer trust and it will create a massive problem for the sector when engaging 
consumers in transition.  An interviewee referred to the Competitive and Markets Authority (CMA) 
report and argued that low engagement of consumers in the industry is “part of the trust thing” 
because “You [consumers] realise you're paying three hundred pounds more for nothing different, 
for your gas and electricity provides” (I5 – Industry commentator).  
There is no consensus among interviewees about whom consumers may or may not trust. Industry 
commentators and sector new entrants argued that consumers do not trust incumbent energy 
suppliers because it is alleged that they have taken advantage of consumers and pursued large 
profits. Conversely, incumbents noted that consumers are unlikely to trust new entrants because 
they may not be reliable, with some going out of business. Seeing consumer trust as a barrier to 
transition, the sector is looking to build better relationships with consumers. However, such efforts 
are likely to be hampered by a paucity of consumer data in the sector. Informational barriers are 
considered next. 
4.4.2.5 Informational barriers 
As mentioned in section 4.3.2.3.2, skills related to data analysis might be needed in the future. 
Interviewees argued that the availability of data and access to data are two informational barriers 
to transition. Data needed for transition includes consumer and network data. Interviewees from 
both suppliers and network firms noted that consumers usage is currently understood in terms of 
profile classes. A profile class represents “the pattern of electricity usage for a customer segment 
of the electricity supply market” (Elexon, 2018). The sector also treats consumers according to their 
profile classes, not their real-time energy use. This limits the development of demand side flexibility 
from residential households. As an interviewee from a new entrant energy supplier argued, 
“… the main industry is based on the profile class-1, where there's a peak in the morning 
and there's a peak in the evening and every customer is treated exactly on this profile, where 
as you will see in the reality, we are seeing reality is that each home is different and trying 
to understand and trying to capture data to understand how people actually use their home 
energy is the place you have to start.” (I10 - new entrant energy supplier) 
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In order to overcome this informational barrier, many options were suggested by interviewees. 
First, some technologies to collect real-time data should be used such as smart meters, battery 
storage and via home appliances. Second, regulation needs to change so as to allow certain data to 
be accessed, for example in the case of smart meters. Smart meter data are “in theory” accessible 
by a regulated Smart Data Communications Company (DCC) but “it looks a little bit exclusive about 
who can access it [data]” (I2 – Regulatory perspective). Removing informational barriers may allow 
the sector to better understand consumers and develop demand side flexibility.  
Interviewees identified a lack of data in the relationship between transmission grids and 
distribution networks. This data gap may increase costs of managing network issues, i.e. “paying 
for things twice” (I2 – Academia). For example, an ancillary service requested by the system 
operator to solve an issue on a transmission grid may cause a distribution grid constraint. The 
system operator is then required to request a second ancillary service to resolve this distribution 
grid constraint which may in turn cancel out the first service. In such instances, both services are 
paid for. This informational barrier reflects a lack of transparency in the market design. How 
interviewees discuss market design is considered below.  
4.4.2.6 Market design barriers 
Interviewees argued that the design of the market can directly impact innovation. For example, 
battery storage can potentially support different parts of the sector at the same time. An 
organisation developing batteries can offer the system operator balancing and ancillary services, 
DNOs to reduce network constraints, support electricity suppliers in balancing their portfolio and 
so on. However, such value stacking is prohibited within current market arrangements. For 
example, the market rules specify that actors may develop specific, exclusive contracts. Here, once 
a firm offering battery storage is exclusively contracted with the system operator in the balancing 
and ancillary market, it cannot access other markets. Battery storage is therefore unable to “stack 
up” to its full value in the sector, as noted by an interviewee with a regulatory expertise. 
“If you take an example of something like the battery, it has got limited ability to access the 
value it could represent in the system. So, at the moment, the business case for commercial 
battery is together contracting to National Grid for frequency response, it is a short term 
contract, it is like 2 or 4 years, not too long, and that is basically the only thing you can raise 
finance against, that limits your certainty of future revenue. But actually, the value of the 
battery is multiple… But you cannot stack up all the values in order to make a good business 
case because it is very hard to get into different markets. So, there is the market architecture 
problem” (I2 – Regulatory perspective) 
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This interviewee also argued that this market design problem is deemed to be a result of 
“regulatory challenges” (I2 – Regulatory perspective) or in other words, is created by current 
regulation which is looked at in section 4.5.1. In futures, an interviewee expected that battery 
storage can participate in “wholesale market arbitrage which would be much more interesting” (I11 
– Energy supplier). Price arbitrage refers to the price differential between “buying power when it 
[price] is cheap, sticking it [power] into your battery and selling power when it [price] is expensive” 
(I8 – Network company). Such price arbitrage creates a liquid market which are advocated by many 
interviewees as argued by an industry commentator with a wholesale market perspective. Seen in 
this way, the market mechanism plays an important role in the future. As a consequence, removing 
any barriers for the market to work well is essential.  
Interviewees also noted that the operation of the electricity sector is administered by a large 
number of licences and industrial codes which are complex. The “complexity” of these licences and 
industrial codes means it is potentially difficult for new entrants to penetrate the electricity sector/ 
market (I5 – Industry commentator). The current market design here can be considered as a barrier 
to transition.  
On the other hand, it was stated that simply removing barriers is unlikely to automatically lead to 
transition as there are likely to be further complications created. For example, for the development 
of the consortia model discussed in section 4.1.2.2, consumers need to be allowed to have more 
than one supplier, which then requires the regulator to amend its current market design. However, 
non-traditional energy suppliers might be unable to deliver government schemes which is the task 
of current traditional suppliers. Consumers may also be unaware of dispute mechanism to whom 
their complaints may be addressed. As described by an interviewee with expertise about the 
electricity market, 
 “… who's delivering all those government schemes that we spoke about such as eco and 
warm home discount? I mean, is Samsung responsible also for the installing energy 
efficiency measures because they were also selling you electricity for your TV? I have no idea 
but I doubt Samsung want to get involved in delivering energy efficiency measures.” (I22 – 
Electricity market). 
In summary, this section highlighted many barriers to change. These barriers arise not only from 
technology but also from non-technological sources such as finance, culture, information and the 
market design. By highlighting different barriers to change, especially technological barriers and 
financial barriers, interviewees assume that actors in the sector, including consumers, act rationally 
following economic incentives. Interestingly, for many interviewees, transition is assumed to be a 
linear process of identifying barriers and removing barriers. This will be further discussed in Chapter 
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6. Nevertheless, transition may be more complex than just a linear process set out above. Multiple 
barriers seem to exist rather than a single barrier. Besides, removing a barrier may lead to other 
issues for the sector to resolve. Transition may come about via changes in regulation and policy. 
The following section discusses regulation and policy which may impact transitions in the sector. 
4.5 REGULATION AND POLICY 
Interviewees argued that regulation prevents the sector from addressing various barriers 
highlighted in sections 4.3.2.3.2 (regulator skills), 4.3.2.5 (data access regulation) and 4.3.2.6 
(market design issues created from regulation). Firstly, regulation was thought to prevent new 
entrants from entering the electricity market, mainly because the current market design and 
arrangements limit the value new entrants can bring. Secondly, interviewees stated that the market 
has a number of complex codes and licences which are not easy for new entrants to understand (I5 
– Regulation perspective). Thirdly, it was argued that the regulator does not have sufficient skills to 
design an appropriate market for a low carbon future. Finally, interviewees also noted that the 
regulator was not transparent about data access. Here, regulation is assumed to be a barrier to 
transition and needs to be reviewed. However, transition may not arise from simply removing 
regulatory barriers or adjusting market arrangements but from changing the whole regulatory 
structure. Transition may need a long-term goal to be embodied in a stable policy framework. This 
section considers regulation and policy, and their roles in transition. 
4.5.1 Regulatory structure 
Interviewees stated that the development of the electricity sector is constrained by the regulatory 
structure. Within the current regulatory structure, interviewees noted that the three functions of 
the electricity sector which are generation, network and consumption are treated as separate 
entities and managed as such. For example, generators are not allowed to take part in the operation 
of the network or consumption. This separation may be inappropriate for the development of 
innovation which may span generation, network and consumption such as transmission grid’s 
battery storage or demand side flexibility as highlighted in section 4.1.3. Here, transitions to a low 
carbon future may require the boundaries between the three separate functions to be blurred. In 
other words, transitions require a change of regulatory structure and a move to systemic 
management. 
“What you’ve got is a regulatory system which was developed around a particular model 
which separated those functions [generation, network and consumption]. Flexible energy 
system requires blurring the boundaries between those functions. And so, regulation makes 
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it difficult to move towards, so question in my mind is what will be the regulatory structure 
which actually works for a flexible and dispersed generating electricity system”. (I1 – 
Academia) 
Changing the current regulatory structure is not easy because the electricity sector is too important 
to be left unstable in transitions as mentioned in section 4.4.1. The change in regulatory structure 
may challenge the reliability of supply which is unacceptable in the sector. On the other hand, 
interviewees argued that changes need to come from policy, rather than regulatory structure 
because the sector is dominated by “lots of big energy companies [which] are separately [and 
privately] owned” (I11 – Energy supplier) which may resist changes or change in different ways that 
regulation may not foresee and be unable to manage. The following section discusses energy policy. 
4.5.2 Energy policy 
Energy policy has an important role in the sector as argued by the majority of interviewees. Energy 
policy together with regulation can create an environment for innovation to flourish and for 
changes to accelerate. Innovators need certainty from policy and regulation in order to manage the 
risks associated with innovation. For example, in the case of battery storage which is highlighted in 
section 4.4.2.6, an interviewee argued that if there are more and more battery storage are built, 
they will reach “flexibility saturation” (I8 – Network company). It is the point where price differential 
or price arbitrage, from buying electricity at cheap price to storage in a battery and selling electricity 
at higher price, is going to close. Here, investors in battery storage will face the risk of uncertain 
revenue stream in the future. In this instance, a “capacity market” from energy policy and 
regulation to ensure these battery storage investors secure stable revenue stream in futures might 
be needed. Interviewees also argued that the government and regulation are “sources to funding 
for various projects” (I9 – Network company) including research and demonstration projects. 
Research project allows “learnings to be taken” (I9 – Network company) while market 
demonstration projects are “real evidence” for the government and regulator to “bring pressure to 
bear on the industry to get them act together” (I4 – Distributed asset business). These projects, as 
a consequence, are arguably able to stimulate innovations.  
One interviewee from a network company stated that energy policy in the UK does not appear to 
have any long-term target which is needed to steer a transition to a low carbon future. This 
interviewee also argued that the government needs to provide direction in the long-term for the 
industry and also needs to take into account recommendations from scientific research. For 
example, the National Infrastructure Commission (2016) which provided good evidence and 
valuable recommendations of how the grids should be strategically upgraded. However, this 
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interviewee criticised that the government did not take into account this report’s recommendations 
and expected a governmental change. As such, it is assumed that transitions of the sector require 
an energy policy. Here, energy policy may or may not be written down (e.g. a signal from the 
government).  
On the other hand, some interviewees (especially those from the investor community) noted that 
the sector performs well in an uncertain environment, i.e. does not need the certainty created from 
policy and regulation. For example, the price of solar PVs reduced very quickly while government 
feed-in-tariff reduced gradually. The regulator and government often lag behind sector 
development (I3 – Industry commentator). Moreover, in the case of the Capacity Market which has 
been suspended, an interviewee noted that it was put on hold without any notice which 
demonstrated regulatory and policy uncertainty. Actors learned to get used to and work under 
condition of uncertainty (I21 – Investor).  
Change in regulatory structures necessary for transition to occur may or may not require energy 
policy. Energy policy such as decarbonisation and flexibility is further discussed in the following 
section - Goals of transitions.  
4.6 GOALS OF TRANSITION 
Transition to a different electricity system requires policy makers to set a long-term target as 
suggested in section 4.4.2 with a predefined goal (e.g. low carbon) to set direction and guide 
activities. This section discusses the two main potential goals of GB’s electricity sector transition: 
(1) Decarbonisation and (2) Flexibility. 
4.6.1 Decarbonisation 
The need to decarbonise has profound implications for GB’s electricity sector. Some interviewees 
argued that decarbonisation not only drives the change from fossil fuel to low carbon technologies 
but also motivates actors in the sector to invest in clean energy and to help resolve network 
problems arising from non-dispatchable low carbon generation technologies. Here, 
decarbonisation is deemed to be a transition goal. 
Interviewees highlighted that the decarbonisation goal could also drive the UK economy: the 
government is able to develop a strategy which is both clean and economically driven. An 
interviewee also noted that it might be easy to miss the decarbonisation target if the industrial 
strategy prioritises economic growth at the expense of environmental issues. Having a predefined 
goal of decarbonisation is essential for forward planning. 
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“…you wouldn't have an industrial strategy that was going to drive decarbonisation, but 
you could have a decarbonisation strategy which is going to drive industrial growth” (I13 – 
Government) 
Interviewees argued that the government and regulator are able to ensure that the decarbonisation 
goal is achieved. Government sets the target for decarbonisation and the regulator interprets 
government policy and develops regulations accordingly. Via some market arrangements, such as 
Feed-in-tariff, Contract-for-Difference and Capacity Market, the government and regulator can 
implicitly identify certain technologies or “pick winners” (I22 – Energy supplier), that may assist in 
transitions to low-carbon futures. However, the government and the regulator often engender 
uncertainty in the sector, as argued by an interviewee in investor community (I21).  
Although an interviewee noted that decarbonisation should be a transition goal, the government 
seems not to prioritise this in their decision-making processes. An energy supplier (I18) argued that 
the government and regulator prioritise consumer protection at the expense of decarbonisation. In 
other words, the government may prefer gas power plants over offshore wind due to the concern 
that decarbonisation activities may create a small increase in consumers’ energy bills. However, 
this interviewee argued that such concern may be invalid as the cost of clean technology may come 
down over the long-term and offset any price differences. Moreover, the long-term gain of 
decarbonisation may far outweigh modest increases in consumers’ bills at present. Therefore, 
decarbonisation should be brought to the fore in energy policy. This argument is noted below, 
“I think the main thing is just to keep a real focus on putting decarbonisation at the heart 
of every single decision made by government. A lot of decisions were made by government 
because of a misguided understanding of what impact they might have on consumers and 
that's unhelpful sometimes …in fact what you know if you're looking further out to the 
future, what we need is cleaner, you know, not devastating climate change and frankly you 
know a technology curve that brings down the cost of the energy that has a marginal, that 
has a very low marginal cost.” (I18 –Energy supplier). 
On the other hand, some interviewees seem to consider decarbonisation as a profound challenge 
faced by the sector, rather than a goal of transition. Because of decarbonisation and the binding 
carbon target that the UK commits to, the sector needs to change. Decarbonisation is hence an 
internal issue which forces the sector to change. The following section considers whether flexibility 
is a goal of the transition.  
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4.6.2 Energy flexibility 
Some interviewees considered energy flexibility to be a goal of transition. Flexibility in this instance 
broadly means network capacity which is able to cope with large changes in electricity demand, 
especially from new loads related to the further uptake of EVs. According to these interviewees, 
the government and regulator need to take a long-term view of the network assets likely to be 
needed in the future as highlighted in section 4.4.2. An interviewee from a network company 
argued that future networks need to be built strategically with a pre-defined goal of network 
flexibility embodied in a long-term energy policy. Following such energy policy rationale means that 
networks are likely to attract more investment not only to expand them but to change the quality, 
e.g. to accommodate two-way flows that may be digitally mediated. Here, investment is assumed 
to be the result of rational choices made by investors in response to energy policy signals.  
On the other hand, a number of interviewees thought of flexibility in terms of problems and 
solutions. The reduction of flexibility created by an increase in the use of non-dispatchable 
renewables and a decrease in the number of dispatchable fast-start fossil fuel plants may cause 
difficulties in managing networks, i.e. balancing supply and demand. Interviewees from network 
companies argued that such difficulties can be resolved by adopting different sources of flexibility, 
such as demand side flexibility. As a result, network companies are likely to enter into contracts 
with their customers to procure flexibility and/ or aggregators that can procure flexibility from a 
number of sources, rather than have “direct control” over their network (I1 – Academia). Here, such 
difficulties in managing networks may bring about opportunities for new entrants with different 
business model innovations to flourish, e.g. energy service providers who aggregate flexibility, 
consortia who manage consumer’s demand (section 4.1.2.2) or a digitised technological platform 
for flexibility providers and users to trade flexibility in real-time (section 4.1.3). An aggregator (I27) 
argued these opportunities emerge from the market forces of “crazy” volatility which are created 
by the changes in generation mix. In the future, the need to maintain and improve flexibility will 
require changes in relationships between key actors in the sector, i.e. architectural innovation.  
4.7 DOMINANT ENERGY DISCOURSE COALITIONS 
The findings from above sections show that interviewees have diverse assumptions about 
transitions of the sector along several themes including change (section 4.2), timeframe and nature 
of change (section 4.3), stability (section 4.4), the role of regulation and policy in transitions (section 
4.5) and the expected outcome of these transitions or goals of transition (section 4.6). This section 
firstly summarises interviewees’ diverse assumptions, compares these assumptions with 
contemporary energy discourses in literatures to reveal five groups of interviewees (i.e. five 
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discourse coalitions): (1) economic rationalism, (2) administrative rationalism, (3) ecological 
modernisation, (4) consumer sovereignty and (5) energy democracy. Secondly, some other 
discourse coalitions emerged solely from the data are identified. They are (6) technology focus and 
(7) energy flexibility.  
4.7.1 Dominant discourse coalitions with insights from literature 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.6.2), five contemporary energy discourses are identified from the literature 
(1) economic rationalism, (2) administrative rationalism, (3) ecological modernisation, (4) 
consumerism and (5) energy democracy. These discourses are dominant because they fulfil (1) 
Discourse structuration and (2) Discourse institutionalisation (Table 2.5). Interviewees with diverse 
assumptions about transitions identified in this chapter (section 4.2 to 4.6) broadly fit with main 
characteristic of these five contemporary energy discourses (Table 4.1) and form five dominant 
discourse coalitions within GB’s electricity sector. This section shows how each discourse coalition 
is adapted from literature. 
4.7.1.1 Economic rationalism 
Economic rationalism is one of the discourse coalitions identified from the assumptions of 
interviewees in previous sections. This discourse coalition shares the following three main 
assumptions which match the characteristics of economic rationalism in literature.  
First, a majority of interviewees assumed that both utilities and consumers in the industry act 
rationally following economic choices. They will be incentivised by economic benefits and act to 
maximise this. For example, consumers will change their demand patterns following their 
subscribed time-of-use tariff or the owners of battery storage will participate in wholesale market 
arbitrage to realise price benefits (see section 4.4.2.6 – Market design barriers). Actors in economic 
rationalism are “motivated by material self-interest, and pursuing it rationally” (Dryzek, 1997, 
p.113). This rational behaviour in economics means maximising economic benefits.   
Second, by assuming that consumers and the industry act rationally, these interviewees advocate 
the roles of market and its dynamic pricing mechanisms and signals in delivering transitions (section 
4.4.2.6 – Market design barriers. Actors who are grouped in this discourse coalition emphasise 
market mechanisms ‘to knock customers into different behaviour” (I23 – Network company). This 
assumption is similar to the basic entities established in economic rationalism discourses which are 
markets and prices. Market and its mechanism (including prices) are able to achieve public ends 
and social welfare (Dryzek, 1997, pp.102, 104) 
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Third, the discussion (see section 4.5 – Regulation and policy) revealed the assumptions of some 
interviewees that regulation and regulatory structure may prevent the sector from addressing 
various existing barriers and also constrain the development of the sector, i.e. transition.  For these 
interviewees, a regulatory regime might not be appropriate because,  
Table 4.1: Discourse coalitions and their main characteristics from literature – adapted from Dryzek (1997), 
Hajer (1993; 1995) and Urry (2016) and main assumptions of interviewees. 
Discourse 
coalitions 
Main characteristics from literature Main assumption of interviewees 
Economic 
rationalism 
Definition: the intelligent deployment of 
market mechanisms to achieve public 
ends. 
- Basic entities: markets, prices 
- Relationships: competition 
- Agents: self-interested, i.e. act rationally 
- Metaphors: free 
- Both utilities and consumers in the 
industry act rationally following 
economic choices 
- Market with its dynamic pricing 
mechanisms and signals has an 
important role in delivering transitions 
- Regulation should apply lighter 
intervention into the market 
Administrative 
rationalism 
Definition: a problem-solving discourse 
which emphasizes the role of expert 
rather than the citizen or 
producer/consumer in social problem 
solving, Cost-benefit analysis and risk 
analysis are used to inform policy 
- Basic entities: administrative state 
(government), experts, managers 
- Relationships: people subordinate to 
state, experts and managers control state 
- Agents: experts and managers, 
motivated by public interest 
- Metaphors: the administrative mind 
- Both utilities and consumers in the 
industry act rationally following 
economic choices 
- Evidence from researches (e.g. cost-
benefit analysis) and market trials are 
important for state administration 
- Government and regulation should 
provide long term direction for the 
development of the industry 
Ecological 
modernisation 
Definition:  a restructuring of the capitalist 
political economy along more 
environmentally sound lines 
- Basic entities: complex systems, 
capitalist economy, the state 
- Relationships: environmental protection 
and economic prosperity go together 
- Agents: motivated by public goods 
- Metaphors: reassurance 
- Clean and economic development 
can be together in governmental policy 
- The government has an important 
role in driving transitions and should 
have decarbonisation at the centre of 
the energy policy 
Consumer 
sovereignty 
Definition: the manufacturing of products 
should be based on consumers’ 
preferences 
- Basic entities: consumers’ identities, the 
industry 
- Relationships: the industry subordinate 
consumers, economic activities should 
satisfy consumers 
- Agents: consumers, the industry 
- Consumers’ identities such as their 
engagement and trust should be focus. 
- Innovations and operation in the 




Definition: the move from fossil fuel to 
renewables and from the power of large 
energy companies to prosumers 
- Basic entities: decentralised energy 
system, democratic decision making, 
prosumers 
- Relationships: prosumers and 
renewables, workers and trade union 
- Agents: prosumers 
- Consumers potentially become 
“prosumers” and lead the transition 
- These prosumers may be subjected 
to new ways of being governed. 
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“…the industry and investors need to acknowledge and embrace arguably that regulation 
will lag rather than lead the market” (I27 – Aggregator). 
This assumption matches one of the characteristics of economic rationalism which opposes 
administrative regulation (Dryzek, 1997, p.14). The market should be free, rather than being 
“command and control” by government intervention.  
Overall, as some interviewees’ assumptions about the futures ascribes to economic rationalism 
discourse, they are grouped in “economic rationalism discourse coalition”. This discourse coalition 
rests on a belief that market mechanisms will work in the future, based on economically rational 
behaviour of consumers and the industry. This discourse coalition expects lighter intervention of 
regulation into the market. 
4.7.1.2 Administrative rationalism 
In this discourse coalition, interviewees follow three main assumptions below which fit within 
administrative rationalism discourse in literature. 
Firstly, interviewees in this discourse also shared the assumption of consumers’ and industry 
economically rational behaviour. As identified in section 4.4.2.2.3, the majority of interviewees 
believes that the industry will invest in a specific type of generation technology when it is subsidised 
regardless of their perspectives towards subsidies (i.e. whether they are proponents of opponents 
of subsidies). This assumption fits within administrative rationalism in the sense that actors, 
including the State, act rationally, to achieve public interests (Dryzek, 1997, p.75) 
Secondly, some interviewees pay attention to the importance of research in the sector. Research 
plays an important role in innovations (e.g. in case of EVs in section 4.2.2.1 – Current changes). 
However, many publications in the field are used to provide information for consumers and the 
industry, not for government, e.g. CMA (section 4.4.2.4) or WWF/ Vivid economics (section 
4.4.2.2.2). These interviewees who consider the role of research only to inform consumers and the 
industry instead of the government are NOT grouped in this discourse coalition. Rather, this 
discourse coalition includes interviewees who consider research for state administration as in 
section 4.5.2 – Energy policy.  
This assumption accords with the main characteristics of administrative rationalism where the 
government is “informed by the best available expertise” of experts (Dryzek, 1997, p.74). In 
conventional administrative rationalism, cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis are salient to inform 
governmental policy (not to inform consumers or the industry). Going beyond this conventional 
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understanding of administrative rationalism, this discourse coalition proposed that market trails 
are also used to provide government with evidence.   
Interviewees highlighted that a number of trials of new technologies or consumer-focussed 
innovations have already been conducted to help the industry understand about the benefits of 
new technologies as well as consumers. Other interviewees emphasised the importance of these 
market trials for the government and regulator to “bring pressure to bear on the industry to get 
them act together” (I4 – Distributed asset business). Here, these two research and market trials are 
intertwined to provide real evidence for state administration. 
Even so, it does not mean that the role of market is emphasised. The final decision and/or power is 
in the hand of the government and regulation, others than market (Dryzek, 1997, p.72).  
Thirdly, interviewees who argued that the government and regulation need to provide long term 
direction for the development of the industry (i.e. emphasise the role of government in 
incentivising the industry) also subscribe to this discourse coalition.  As identified in section 4.5.2 – 
Energy policy, an interviewee criticised the government for not having any specific activities in 
response to good evidence and recommendation from National Infrastructure Commission (2016) 
for the grid strategic upgrade. This assumption is also drawn from the main characteristics of 
administrative rationalism where the final decision (power) is in the hand of the government and 
regulation (Dryzek, 1997) 
Interviewees who align with the above three main assumptions are grouped into administrative 
rationalism discourse coalition. Overall, administrative rationalism discourse coalition rests on the 
assumption that consumers behaviour is economically rational and that transitions are based on 
evidence from cost-benefit analysis and market trials. 
4.7.1.3 Ecological modernisation 
The ecological modernisation discourse coalition also emphasises the important role of the 
government in transition. However, it rests on two other assumptions which align to ecological 
modernisation in literature. 
Firstly, some interviewees as identified in section 4.6.1 - Decarbonisation argued that the 
government is able to have an energy policy which is both clean and economically driven (i.e. 
supports both decarbonisation and economic growth). This coalition also includes the one who 
shared the assumption that continuing tackling climate change does not need to be “at the expense 
of economic activity” (I28 – Government). Similarly, literature on economic rationalism also 
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emphasises that “environmental protection and economic prosperity go together” (Dryzek, 1997, 
p.146). 
Secondly, as also argued in section 4.6.1, decarbonisation should be a transition goal and as such, 
should be brought to the fore in energy policy. Here, ecological modernisation discourse coalition 
includes interviewees who emphasised the role of decarbonisation in energy policy, e.g. who 
highlighted that “the thing that drives all of this [change of the sector] is its decarbonisation” (I13 – 
Government). This assumption accords with ecological modernisation which is defined as a 
“restructuring of the capitalist economy along more environmentally sound lines” (Dryzek, 1997, 
p.141). In ecological modernisation, the goal of environmental protection such as decarbonisation 
is the most salient. 
Overall, in this context, ecological modernisation discourse coalition emphasises the important 
roles of government in focusing on decarbonisation agenda, based on the assumption that a nation 
can both decarbonise and grow the economy.  
4.7.1.4 Consumer sovereignty 
Consumer sovereignty is another broad discourse coalition identified from the findings in previous 
sections with insights from consumer sovereignty discourse in literature. This discourse coalition 
comprises of interviewees with two main assumptions about consumers and the development of 
the sector. 
Firstly, interviewees who focus on consumers’ identities and characteristics in the sector are 
grouped in this consumer sovereignty discourse coalition. In GB’s electricity sector, two main 
consumers’ characteristics are their engagement and trust. As identified in section 4.2.2 – Electricity 
consumption, these interviewees do not necessarily share views about consumers and their 
engagement in the sector. Some argued that consumers will never engage while others believed in 
the active role of consumers in the future. As also identified in section 4.4.2.4 - Consumer barriers, 
interviewees do not share views about consumers’ trust either. Some interviewees argued that 
consumers do not trust incumbents while others argued the reverse. Regardless of these 
contradictory views about consumer engagement and trust, interviewees shared the agreement 
that consumers always want to have control and hence, are going to play a more important central 
role in the future of the industry. As a result, interviewees agree that organisations need to bring 
consumers to the fore in their operation. This assumption is similar to consumer sovereignty 
discourse in literature where consumers’ identity is a central concern (Urry, 2016). 
Secondly, this discourse coalition includes interviewees who shared the perspectives that 
consumers should be at the forefront of industrial operation (section 4.2.2). In other words, 
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innovations and operation in the industry should take into account consumers’ preferences. For 
example, this discourse coalition is represented by the one who argued that “we were basically 
going to try and bring a consumer product to market that would help individuals make a choice on 
climate change” (I12 – energy supplier). This assumption also resonates with consumer sovereignty 
discourse in literature which emphasises the ultimate objective of the industry is to match 
consumers’ preferences (Hutt, 1943; Menges, 2003) and consequently, satisfy consumers (Gordon 
and Olson, 2000). 
Overall, consumer sovereignty discourse coalition takes into account consumers’ identity and 
preferences in businesses’ operation which match the main characteristics of consumer 
sovereignty.  
4.7.1.5 Energy democracy  
Beside consumer sovereignty, energy democracy is another energy discourse coalition which 
considers consumers and their role in the energy field. They are adapted from literature in energy 
democracy. 
Firstly, as highlighted in section 4.2.2.1 – Current changes, consumers may potentially become 
“prosumers”, i.e. generators and consumers of electricity in line with the development of 
renewables such as PVs. Hence, this discourse coalition includes interviewees who emphasise the 
ability of consumers becoming both generators and consumers in the future and a “very influential 
segment of society which leads to innovations occurring elsewhere” (I1 – Academia), rather than 
just paying attention to consumers’ identity (as in consumer sovereignty). The emphasis on 
“prosumers” accords with literature on energy democracy where the prosumers are empowered 
(Morris and Jungjohann, 2016). 
Secondly, as also highlighted in section 4.2.2.1, prosumers can potentially become a new political 
subject and are subjected to new ways of being governed. Here, this discourse coalition includes 
interviewees who suggested the involvement of community energy or local authorities or “a 
devolution of power within energy” (I17 – Government). Similarly, energy democracy literature also 
recognises the importance of democracy decision making (Tomain, 2015). 
Overall, interviewees who share the above two assumptions are grouped in energy democracy 
discourse coalition. This coalition emphasises the potential development of prosumers who both 
generate and consume electricity in the future. These prosumers may be subjected to new ways of 
being governed.  
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4.7.2 Other discourse coalitions 
Beside the above five discourse coalitions are two other dominant discourses which emerge from 
data and have been supported by almost all interviewees. They are explored in turn below. 
4.7.2.1 Technology focus 
Almost all interviewees expressed their views about technologies in the sector. Technologies or 
technological innovations are developing alongside the changes of all sub-systems (generation, 
consumption and distribution) of GB’s electricity sector (see section 4.2). Some interviewees raised 
the concern over the limitations of technical aspects of innovations which may hinder the further 
uptake of demand side flexibility while others argued for the disruptive characteristics of 
technologies with examples from other sectors (see section 4.4.2.1). Some other interviewees are 
interested in the reduction in cost of technologies which open opportunities for technologies to be 
adopted. Technologies are also important in collecting necessary data for industrial operation (e.g. 
consumers data). By expressing views about technologies in the sector, these interviewees share 
their belief on the power of technologies in transitions of the sector. Technology focus forms a 
dominant discourse coalition in the sector (i.e. fulfil both discourse structuration and 
institutionalism) in the sense that most of the UK publications on future scenarios from the industry 
and the government concentrate on technology (Foxon, 2013). 
4.7.2.2 Energy flexibility 
Energy flexibility appears in the discussions and comments of almost all interviewees across 
varieties of topics in Chapter 4. For example, interviewees highlighted that energy flexibility is part 
of the current changes of the sector. Within the consumption sub-system, many trials to test the 
utility of new sources of energy flexibility (e.g. battery storage and demand side flexibility) are 
initiated and many consumer-centric innovations to incentivise consumers to provide demand side 
flexibility are developed (see section 4.2.2). Innovations to realise the benefits of demand side 
flexibility are also developed within network sub-system (see section 4.2.3). Moreover, 
interviewees identified many different types of barriers preventing the development of energy 
flexibility (see section 4.4.2). Last but not least, some interviewees described energy flexibility as a 
goal of transitions while others considered energy flexibility as both problems and solutions for the 
current system (see section 4.6.2).  
Regardless of these diverse views of interviewees towards energy flexibility, interviewees shared 
their interest in energy flexibility. Here, energy flexibility starts to dominate the way interviewees 
conceptualise the transition (i.e. discourse structuration). Energy flexibility also starts to solidify 
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into an institution (i.e. discourse institutionalism) since the government and Ofgem published 
“Upgrading our energy system: smart systems and flexibility plan” (2017; 2018). 
It is noticeable that one interviewee has a plurality of assumptions and views which can fit into 
more than one discourse coalition. As such, that these discourse coalitions are not tidy and may 
have some overlaps, which will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
4.8 SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter made sense of transitions to low carbon futures of GB’s electricity sector 
through the discussion about change and stability, timeframe, regulation and policy, and goals of 
transition (section 4.2 to 4.6). This discussion reveals the main assumptions of interviewees about 
how transitions are conceptualised. Section 4.7 adapted these interviewees’ assumption and 
literature on dominant energy discourses (section 2.6.2) to identify five discourse coalitions (i.e. to 
group interviewees into five coalitions) and as a consequence, to understand how transitions to 
futures come about from each discourse coalition. It is noticeable that Discourses no 6 and 7 are 
popular among all interviewees; thus, are embedded in all futures. The other five discourses (no 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5) group interviewees into five actor constituencies articulating five different futures of GB’s 
electricity sector. These futures are not based on any pre-defined normative goal of transitions 
articulated for strategic planning purposes, but instead emerge from the discourse analysis 
focussed on the discursive utterances of interviewees in each discourse coalition. The following 




CHAPTER 5 FUTURES OF GREAT BRITAIN’S ELECTRICITY 
SECTOR 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4 made sense of the transitions of GB’s electricity sector by thematic analysis and the 
findings reveal seven different discourse coalitions: (1) Economic rationalism, (2) Administrative 
rationalism, (3) Ecological modernisation, (4) Consumer sovereignty, (5) Energy democracy, (6) 
Technology focus and (7) Energy flexibility. The main characteristics of these discourse coalitions 
are summarised in Table 5.1. This table also includes the interviewees grouped in each energy 
coalition.  
It is noticeable some interviewees fit in more than one discourse coalition because firstly, their 
comments articulate possible different futures of the sector and secondly, they do not have a 
sufficiently clear vision about a single future of the sector. As such, they hold a plurality of views 
Table 5.1: Discourse coalitions, main characteristics and main actors (interviewees) 
Discourse 
coalitions 
Main characteristics Main interviewees 
Economic 
rationalism 
- Both utilities and consumers in the industry act rationally 
following economic choices 
- Market with its dynamic pricing mechanisms and signals has 
an important role in delivering transitions 
- Regulation should apply lighter intervention into the market 
I3, I11, I15, I18, I20, 
I21, I23, I27 
Administrative 
rationalism 
- Both utilities and consumers in the industry act rationally 
following economic choices 
- Evidence from research (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) and 
market trials are important for state administration 
- Government and regulation should provide long term 
direction for the development of the industry 
I4, I9, I19, I24 
Ecological 
modernisation 
- Clean and economic development can be together in 
governmental policy 
- The government has an important role in driving transitions 
and should have decarbonisation at the centre of the energy 
policy 




- Consumers’ identities such as their engagement and trust 
should be focus. Regardless of their engagement, they want 
more control. 
- Innovations and operation in the industry should take into 
account consumers’ preferences. 
I2, I5, I6, I10, I12, 
I13, I14, I22, I23 
Energy 
democracy 
- Consumers potentially become “prosumers” and lead the 
transition 
- These prosumers may be subjected to new ways of being 
governed. 
I1, I9, I12, I16, I17 
Technology 
focus 
- Believe in the power of technology Almost all 
interviewees 




about futures and consequently, futures are sometimes messy. This ambiguity in the boundaries of 
discourse coalitions and messiness of futures will be further discussed in Chapter 6.  
These discourses coalitions form the basis of futures of the sector. Amongst these discourse 
coalitions, technology focus and energy flexibility discourses are accepted among almost all 
interviewees and are embedded in all futures. Therefore, they are not examined separately. The 
remaining five discourse coalitions with quite unique sets of assumptions about the transitions of 
the sector informs five different futures explored in this chapter:  
(1) Economic rationalism:  a ‘Market-based’ future.  
(2) Administrative rationalism: a ‘Network-focussed’ future.  
(3) Ecological modernisation: a ‘Policy-driven’ future.  
(4) Consumer sovereignty:  a ‘Consumer-centric’ future; and  
(5) Energy democracy: a ‘Prosumer-led’ future. 
This Chapter 5 introduction is followed by six sections. The first five sections describe these five 
futures in turn. Each future consists of four parts following  an amended energy discourse analysis 
framework based on Dryzek (1997) (Table 2.4): (1) System components, (2) System relationships, 
(3) Power and (4) The metaphor of energy flexibility. The last section summaries these futures. 
Each future is constructed from the interviewees’ sense of system components and their 
relationships. Collectively, these are used to develop a systems map for each future. The systems 
maps are the researcher’s interpretation developed with the aim to show, in diagrammatic form, 
what the futures look like based on a compilation of interviewees’ insights on each future.  It does 
not mean that all interviewees agree upon or have endorsed these system maps. For consistency 
of interpretation, in each systems map, the green line refers to GB’s electricity sector in the future, 
the red lines show sub-systems and the blue lines feature components of the system.  
5.2 FUTURE 1: MARKET-BASED FUTURE  
This future vision is advanced by interviewees subscribing to an economic rationalism discourse 
typified by the emphasis on the economic rational behaviour of actors and the central role of the 
markets in achieving outcomes. Market price volatility and data are the first two system 
components which drive changes in other systems components. These components create market 
forces for actors to develop technological innovations and change their businesses. 
Technological innovations and associated business model innovations is the third main system 
component which includes a technology platform or other home-related technologies. These 
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technologies and consequent changes in the market are described in detail below. These 
technologies are supported by market mechanism. However, sometimes, the market mechanism is 
undermined by regulation - the fourth key system component.  
These system components of this future are shown in the systems map in Figure 5.1. As this study 
focuses on whole system analysis, it is important to understand how the conventional system 
components of: generation, distribution and consumption of GB’s electricity sector (Figure 2.2) 
change. In this future, it is noticeable these conventional system components are not evident.  
5.2.1 System components 
This future has four main subsystems which can be described as (1) Market price volatility, (2) Data, 
(3) Technological innovations and associated business models and (4) Regulation.  Each sub-system 
has a range of elements. 
5.2.1.1 Market price volatility 
The volatility of the wholesale electricity market is expected to continue to increase in this future 
due to the reduction in traditional sources of flexibility of the system which “hold the system 
together” (I27 – Aggregator). System flexibility has and will change because of the increase of 
intermittent renewables’ deployment from “…two or three or four percent of the grid to 30, 40, 50 
percent of the grid” (I27 – Aggregator) and consequent reduction of dispatchable fossil fuel 
generation. But this has consequences for market (price) volatility: 
 
Figure 5.1:  Future 1 systems map 
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“…as flexible plant is being retired, so the need for flexibility, for system flexibility, is going 
up, but the source of system flexibility going down. And those two effects are driving you 
know, never seen levels of volatility in the system” (I27 – Aggregator).  
Not only is the level of volatility anticipated to increase but “the patterns of volatility” (I27 – 
Aggregator) have also changed and is expected to change further in this future.  Patterns of volatility 
refer to the differential day/night and winter/summer energy prices; higher in daytime and 
wintertime when demand is higher. However, “all of that is now gone” as “…quite often power 
prices are now higher in the nighttime rather than the daytime” (I27 – Aggregator). This shift is 
happening now and will continue in future. Two contributory factors might account for this 
argument: more home electricity equipment such as washing machines or EVs being operated or 
charged; and daytime and summer electricity capacity is fulfilled by solar power which has low or 
zero unit generating cost. Similarly, “…power prices sometimes are higher in the summer than in the 
winter or deeply negative in the summer” (I27 – Aggregator). Prices are higher in summer possibly 
because the system is served by solar power more in summer than in winter which does not cover 
the nighttime demand. The surplus in supply in summer may lead to the system operator paying 
for generation to be turned off or consumers to use more electricity, as a consequence, power 
prices become negative. However, there is no clear consensus of whether this market price 
volatility is materialised.  
5.2.1.2 Data 
The electricity wholesale market is not only anticipated to become more volatile but also more 
complex with “lots of different things going on” (I27 – Aggregator) such as the increase in renewable 
energy assets as described above, storage connected to the distribution network, more home 
appliances, more actors in the sector and, as a result, more data. With the increase in the amount 
of data, the shift is described as a change from “a centralised stable world to a very dynamic 
decentralised kind of green crazy world” and “you need technology to figure it out” (I27 – 
Aggregator).  
Interviewees shared an agreement that there would be much more data in the future and agreed 
that data are going to play a much more important role in such a complex future. Data allow actors 
to “be very agile to reflect the shifts in supply and demand” (I18 – New entrant energy supplier). It 
means that industrial actors are able to take advantages of these data to develop technologies or 
change their business models. For example, energy suppliers will soon have “data for every half an 
hour the day, so they’ll be able to work out that you [consumers] work at night and they might give 
you [consumers] a better rate for buying electricity” (I20 – Industry commentator). Here, consumers 
are expected to benefit from the availability of data. Energy suppliers also have benefits by 
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optimising their business portfolio, i.e. have a better view of the amount of electricity they need to 
buy to match their consumers’ demand.  
While market volatility and complexity might increase, it arises from and also creates market forces 
for technologies to be developed and businesses to change and to enter the market. The following 
sections identify a key sub-system of this future: technological innovations and associated business 
model innovations.  
5.2.1.3 Technological innovations and associated business model innovations 
Innovations are mentioned frequently by interviewees in this future but tend to be understood as 
technological innovations. These innovations are currently available on the market but are 
expected to be further developed and become mainstream in the future. These technologies 
imagined by interviewees are explored below. 
5.2.1.3.1 Technology platform 
The innovations envisaged include a “technology platform” – “a piece of infrastructure” (I27 – 
Aggregator) which connects and processes data about the available sources of flexibility (i.e. 
physical assets which can provide flexibility) and users of flexibility including the system operator 
who needs to buy ancillary services, DNOs who want to manage distribution network constraints 
or wholesale traders who look for volatility. According to one interviewee, this technology is also 
able to dispatch these physical assets and optimise value at a specific real-time (at present or in 
future). This technology platform is a response to deal with the increasing volume of data in this 
future which, even now it is “hopeless to deal with that with human beings” (I27 – Aggregator). The 
platform visualisations of these data allow actors from different traditional markets (wholesale, 
balancing market and network constraints) to compete. This means that, 
“It's [the technology platform is] trying to create a more dynamic real-time market for 
different sources of energy flexibility and different users of energy flexibility” (I27 – 
Aggregator). 
This technology platform opens an opportunity for two types of blending: (1) the blending of 
different traditional value pools and (2) the blending of different traditional business models. 
Firstly, this platform will potentially create an “interchange between historically different value 
pools” (I27 – Aggregator). There are some traditional markets/ value pools which generate 
separated value for actors including (1) National Grid system balancing ancillary market, (2) traders’ 
wholesales volatile market and suppliers’ tariff market and (3) DNOs local constraint management 
market. It is expected that “markets [real-time markets mentioned above] will emerge that allow 
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interoperability financially speaking between those different value pools” (I27 – Aggregator). It 
means that the economic value (money) will flow between these different traditional value pools/ 
markets. This would totally disrupt the current market designs, even “entirely destroying the need 
for certain market actors to exist at all” (I27 – Aggregators) such as traditional energy suppliers and 
traders because “a pure commodity buyer and seller is a road to destruction” (I27 – Aggregator).  
In order for this expectation of markets allowing the blending between different value pools to 
occur, it is argued that an efficient price discovery process (i.e. the process of determining the price) 
reflecting a real value of a service/ an activity in each traditional market described above needs to 
be established. Nevertheless, this expectation is unlikely to be met quickly: 
“…that's going to take some time … once the price discovery process has run its course and 
then the interoperability between those different markets is allowed and liquid enough to 
genuinely rely on the amount of volume that you need to fix the constraint or balance the 
system …, then you can let market forces rip entirely…then the allocation of electricity 
flexibility between these fundamental value pools will be driven by almost like an auction 
process who has the most expensive problem that needs fixing” (I27 – Aggregator). 
The sense of letting ‘market forces rip’ again emphasises the role of the market mechanism in this 
future. The “real-time” markets in this future are expected to secure liquidity in order for flexibility 
to be allocated to the users of flexibility who value it the most.  The value of flexibility will be 
‘stacked’ across the traditional markets where the same sources of flexibility (assets) can deliver 
flexibility services to different users (at different time or concurrently) as in the case of battery 
storage (see section 4.4.2.6) although this particular interviewee did not mention about this value 
stacking. 
On the other hand, an interviewee from a network company raised the concern that DNOs might 
be unable to get the flexibility that they need by depending on markets to procure needed flexibility 
services, which threatens the reliability of the network and “undermine the control that [DNOs] 
have” (I15 – Network company). This happens if the value for local constraint management of DNOs 
is smaller than that in the wholesale market. However, an interviewee from another network 
company argued that this concern does not potentially prevent DNOs from procuring flexibility 
from markets. This interviewee expected liquid markets and highlighted when the “liquidity 
increases”, there would be “enough resources essentially on the network at other specific locations 
to be able to help [reduce network constraints]” (I23 – Network company). In case the price signals 
that DNOs send is weaker than the price signals from the wholesale market and DNOs are unable 
to procure flexibility from markets, they can upgrade the network instead. Here, it is uncertain 
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whether the “blending of value pools” is realistic because interviewees with a network perspective 
expresses contradictory opinions. 
With regards to the second blending mentioned above, conventionally, asset owners and energy 
traders are operating separately. Asset owners usually generate revenue by building and operating 
assets. Using this platform, they are “building their own trading desk and their own route to market” 
(I27 – Aggregator). Such penetration of asset owners into the trading electricity operation reduces 
the role of traditional traders and suppliers. As a result, they are looking to build different routes 
to market. They and other new entrants can also come into the markets with new technologies, 
participating in the area of “assets (networks) or with trading or with constraint management” (I27 
– Aggregator). Examples of how new entrants or energy suppliers seek new routes to market via 
technologies is described in the following section – Home-related technologies 
5.2.1.3.2 Home-related technologies 
In domestic homes, many other technologies are also required as part of the new future system 
including technologies related to smart meters (e.g. a proprietary platform), autonomous 
technologies or EVs to grid with associated business models. The adoption of these technologies 
also reflects diverse views of industrial actors in terms of consumers’ behaviour.  
Smart metering is already available in some consumers’ homes. However, according to some 
interviewees, the benefits from smart meters are not fully harnessed. A potential mainstream 
technology in this future should be able to “genuinely record how much electricity people are using 
in particular in more or less real-time” (I18 – new entrant energy supplier). These electricity uses 
are expected to be translated into a time-of-use tariff by energy suppliers and provide “flexibility 
price signals” (I18 – new entrant energy supplier) for consumers to shift their demand to time of 
low prices. The technology is called a “proprietary platform” by this new entrant. With these 
flexibility price signals, consumers are, from energy suppliers’ perspective, expected to act 
rationally following economic benefits.  
Such rational behaviour of consumers also creates the expectation that smart phone apps for 
energy pricing and other consumers’ services will continue to evolve and energy suppliers will 
become “platforms for those [smartphone] apps” which connect with consumers (I18 – New 
entrant energy supplier). In this case, consumers are assumed to not only behave rationally and 
engage in consuming electricity in the most cost-effective way but also trust new entrant energy 
suppliers rather than incumbent energy suppliers because “there's been a lot of bad behaviour over 
the past 14 years of the Big 6 energy companies” (I18 – New entrant energy supplier). 
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Other interviewees with aggregator perspective or from an incumbent energy supplier company 
were less convinced of such rational behaviours, suggesting that consumers “probably won't spend 
any time at all worrying or doing anything about when or how they use energy” (I27 – Aggregator) 
because “ energy is not very interesting to the average person” (I11 – Incumbent energy supplier). 
Instead, “powerful autonomous technologies” will do the work with the support of market price 
signals.  For example,  
“…their car will automatically react to price signals about when it's more efficient to charge. 
Their washing machine will turn on and off dynamically responding to those price signals… 
They might get paid money for providing capacity from their heating or their car or 
whatever, but I don't think they'll think about it” (I27 – Aggregator). 
Assumptions of consumer rational behaviour will continue to shape the business models of other 
new entrants with EVs and battery storage technologies, especially EVs to grid (which assumes to 
include EVs smart charging). This model allows power stored in EVs batteries to be fed back to the 
grid when needed and vice versa to help with system balancing, as proved in California where 
electric vehicle batteries are used for “managing the gradient of the duck curve when the PV falls 
off in the evening” (I11 – Incumbent energy supplier). The Duck curve shows the imbalance between 
solar power generation and electricity demand during a 24-hour day. In this model, consumers are 
expected to participate and sign their cars up to a tariff because “there's a monetary value in doing 
that, bring their bills down” (I11 – Incumbent energy supplier).  
However, another interviewee did not agree that Vehicles to grid and smart charging technology of 
EVs would be feasible or attractive in this future because,  
“…Why would you [consumers] earn twenty pence to aid the grid that you are paying for 
already? ...People aren’t engaged, electricity is really cheap, no one knows who their 
suppliers are, really” (I21 – Investor). 
Instead, according to this interviewee, a business model with large scale battery storage connecting 
to a transmission grid and discharging this power for a chain of electric vehicle charging assets is 
more feasible in the future. This model not only helps the system to store excess power from 
renewables but also addresses the range anxiety of EVs’ users (by the increase of EV charging 
assets) and supports the further uptake of EVs.  
However, it is unclear whether these technologies including the technology platform or any home 
related technologies are supported by all actor constituencies because each technology is described 
and supported by an individual actor and/or without any shared commentaries from other 
interviewees. Despite this lack of common support, these technologies are argued to work with 
 
140 
market price signals. Nevertheless, regulation is argued for “damping down the price signal” (I27 – 
Aggregator). The following section looks at regulation. 
5.2.1.4 Regulation 
Interviewees ascribing to economic rationalism expect a future with less intervention from 
regulation into the market, compared to current market arrangements where the regulator defines 
rules for industry actors to operate. In this future, regulation is anticipated to “lag rather than lead 
the markets” (I27 – Aggregator). An interviewee with an investment perspective agreed and 
commented “I don’t think that they [the government and regulator] promote the change [of the 
electricity sector]. Actually, they are running quite hard to keep up with it” (I3 – Investor). Another 
interviewee highlighted that that the traditional structure of the market with generation, 
transmission and distribution, and supply (consumption) on which the regulatory rules are based 
on does not exist. Therefore, it is expected that: 
“the regulator needs to then acknowledge that a thousand different varieties of market are 
emerging, so rather than try to prescriptively define how each one of those new markets 
should work which is too complicated, you [the regulator] should agree some broad 
principles by which any of those new markets are emerging should operate…the regulator 
will shift from prescribing solutions to prescribing outcomes” (I27 – Aggregator). 
This expectation again emphasises the role of the market in the transition of the sector to future. 
The market is able to lead the transition while regulation should facilitate by proposing outcomes 
(e.g. smart and flexibility system) without direct intervention. For example, market actors who 
operate renewable assets (e.g. wind farms, solar farms) should not get paid as a compensation for 
their curtailment because such compensation "is destroying some price signals that would 
otherwise encourage innovations” (I27 – Aggregator). 
5.2.2 System relationships 
The above system and its components will require and bring forth new sets of relationships.  
Interviewees highlighted that the traditional, distinct boundary of generation, transmission and 
distribution and supply (consumption) will disappear,  
“the underlying market reality does not reflect the world of generation, transmission 
distribution supply… a thousand of flowers are blooming, not four” (I27 – Aggregator) 
Here, no energy company will be only operating in a market defined by single generation, 
distribution and consumption. Rather, with technologies, energy companies will open new 
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propositions or change the way they offer products to enter new markets in different sub-systems 
to seek profits. Similarly, new entrants will also look for more opportunities beyond the 
conventional business model of buying and selling electricity. This traditional boundary is blurred 
by the existence of the technology platform where sources of flexibility providers and users of 
flexibility can be connected such as the one described in section 5.2.1.3.1.  As such, the relationships 
between actors in the industry will be tighter, but perhaps more competition between different 
businesses.   
Interviewees noted an establishment of new relationships between new entrants and energy 
consumers. This new relationship will be enhanced because consumers will consider energy 
incumbents as non-trustworthy. Consumers are expected to realise that “there's been a lot of bad 
behaviour over the past 14 years of the Big 6 energy companies” (I18 – New entrant energy 
supplier). Some interviewees argued that this new relationship can be based on active consumer 
engagement who participate in nearer time-of-use tariff or EVs vehicle to grid model with a financial 
incentive. In contrast, others highlighted that this new relationship can only be on the basis of 
passive consumers engagement through autonomous appliances. However, this new relationship 
does not go outside the boundary of the consumption sub-system.  
The traditional relationship between the regulator and the industry is also likely to change as the 
regulator is expected to define outcomes rather than setting rules to manage the system (see 
section 5.2.1.4). This change in relationship is in line with economic rationalism which prefers 
market without much intervention.    
5.2.3 Power 
Power between actors might also be transferred, as assumed by interviewees. As the regulator is 
expected to apply lighter regulation to the market, market actors will have a chance to exercise 
power over the regulator. Among these market actors, competition is exercised and it is expected 
to lead to the future where new entrants with new technologies have power over incumbents. 
Moreover, the most powerful businesses in this future are the one which both “make money in 
today's market” and “plan to survive for 10, 20, 30, years in the future” (I27 – Aggregator). Such 
planning and designing of businesses for an uncertain future will help businesses to be successful.  
However, the power of actors is not as emphasised as the power of market and technologies in this 
future. Market mechanism is argued to force changes in human actors including organisations with 
new technologies and benefit seeking interests and as a consequence, engender transitions. 
Technologies are anticipated to emerge in response to market mechanism. 
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In this future, the possible changes in power relationships between consumers and technologies 
are evident. New entrants suggest that consumers will actively use their smart phone apps to check 
energy prices and as such, energy suppliers will offer a nearer to real-time time of use tariff to 
consumers and can also potentially become “platforms for smartphone apps” (I18 – New entrant 
energy supplier). Moreover, consumers do not trust electricity incumbents and could deliberately 
choose new entrants to the market. In contrast, in this future, some interviewees believe 
autonomous technologies could replace human power and encourage consumer passivity.   
5.2.4 The metaphor of energy flexibility 
Energy flexibility is a key metaphor in this future. Energy flexibility is explicitly described as a 
necessary component creating value for different traditional markets such as (1) the balancing 
market, (2) the wholesale market and (3) the network constraints management by an aggregator. 
Here, the interviewee considered energy flexibility as valuable and also proposed some new 
markets where the value of energy flexibility can be captured, e.g. real-time markets where these 
traditional markets/ value pools of flexibility are blended. As a result, value of energy flexibility 
might be able to be stacked in this future. Energy flexibility is able to constitute architectural 
innovation which involves changes in the relationships between traditional markets, i.e. the 
traditional market structure. With energy flexibility, the traditional market structure is totally 
replaced by a mass variety of markets, new entrants and technologies. 
On the other hand, a new entrant energy supplier referred energy flexibility to the time-of-use tariff 
model where consumers are incentivised by “flexibility price signals” to participate in demand side 
flexibility. Energy flexibility in this instance is considered as a market mechanism. By implying that 
the market has its mechanism, this interviewee considered the electricity system as a “machine” 
which performance and operations can be changed or fixed by adding or removing some 
components. As such, the electricity system in the future will work efficiently by adding energy 
flexibility component without the needs to change the traditional market structure. 
In this future, energy flexibility is framed differently from two different views of an aggregator and 
a new entrant energy supplier, architectural innovation which involves changes in system 
architecture and a technological system component which can be added, respectively. However, 
regardless of these different conceptualisations, energy flexibility is expected to bring about values 
to the future system.  
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5.3 FUTURE 2: NETWORK-FOCUSSED FUTURE 
Future 2 is based on an administrative rationalism discourse in which research and market trials are 
deemed vital in providing evidence for state administration. In this future, energy flexibility is 
explicitly supported by interviewees ascribing to administrative rationalism, i.e. administrative 
rationalism discourse coalition. Hence, the first key system component of this future is evidence-
based energy flexibility including research and market demonstration. These two forms of evidence 
are key in this future and used to support the changes in network. Hence, this future is named 
network-focus. Here, energy flexibility is “all about understanding network capacity and energy 
throughput rather than maximum demand” (I24 – Network company). This understanding is 
expected to come from evidence. Energy flexibility includes and is reliant on both “demand side 
flexibility” and “grid automation”. These are two key system components of this future. The final 
key system component in this future is regulation which is argued to support demand side flexibility 
than grid automation. 
The key components of this future are shown in Figure 5.2. Similar to Future 1 – Market-based 
future, the conventional components of the system (generation, distribution and consumption) do 
not feature in this future.  
5.3.1 System components 
From the discussion of interviewees, this section describes four main sub-systems identified in this 
future (1) Evidence-based energy flexibility, (2) Demand side flexibility, (3) Grid automation, and (4) 
 
Figure 5.2:  Future 2 systems map 
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Regulation towards demand side flexibility and grid automation. There are some overlaps between 
demand side flexibility and grid automation in terms of technologies as discussed below. 
5.3.1.1 Evidence-based energy flexibility 
The first sub-system is comprised of activities being conducted to prove the value of energy 
flexibility in this future. Interviewees consider two main forms of evidence used in regulation and 
policies including (1) research and (2) market demonstration. Research projects are “kind of 
feasibilities of studies and learnings to be taken” and market demonstration projects are where 
these learnings are put “in place to see how they work in real life” (I9 – Network company).  
An interviewee noted the important role of an Impact Assessment done by Baringa consultancy 
firm in Open Networks project which sets out five Worlds for enabling demand side flexibility 
(Askew and Sinclair, 2019). Basing mainly on quantitative cost-benefit analysis of Five Future Worlds 
identified in the Open Network project, this impact assessment concluded that World B where DNO 
and National Grid as a system operator cooperate to procure flexibility is “an overall optimal system 
solution” (I19 – Network Company).  
Also emphasising an important role of economic cost-benefit analysis, another interviewee 
mentioned about a report published by Strbac et al (2016a, p.16) which uses economic analysis to 
anticipate that “the deployment of flexibility technologies could save the UK energy system £17-40 
billion cumulative to 2050”. This value of flexibility (i.e. net benefit) flows towards consumers 
because “if it is true, customers can save between £17bn and £40bn a year” (I4 – Distributed 
business asset). Here, energy flexibility is attached a value and futures are achieved through 
economic cost-benefit analysis. Transitions, hence, can come about through governmental energy 
policies and regulation after carefully consulting scientists who proved their advices by cost-
benefit/ modelling analysis.  
However, interviewees argued that market trial would be more important in this case because 
nobody knows “which of the £17bn to £40bn is the right number?” (I4 – Distributed business asset). 
Market trials or demonstration is needed “to really try to test the kind of the assumption around 
how flexibility will work in future” (I4 – Distributed business asset).  
Such market trials could be considered as the second, demonstration phase of research modelling 
cost-benefits in “real-life” (I9 – Network company).  While market trials are expected to be 
conducted by industrial actors, including both energy suppliers and network companies, there are 
divergent views on who should lead. For example, an interviewee argued that network companies 




“Our view is ENA is the trade association for the DNOs…We don’t let the people who have 
the vested interest in this run the trial programme… we need to go faster” (I4 – Distributed 
business asset) 
In contrast, another interviewee expressed preference for the flexibility market in the 
demonstration project to be operated by DNOs but considered energy supplier-led market trials 
such as the Cornwall Local Energy Market, run by Centrica (an energy supplier) can “gets the same 
result ultimately” (I19 – Network company).  It means that regardless of these different views on 
leadership, market trials on energy flexibility are expected to prove the value of flexibility where  
network companies are either able to procure the service or to contract with whoever can reduce 
or increase the demand at specific times  (I19 – Network company). Interviewees also hope that 
from market trials, “a combination of solutions will come to market” (I9 – Network company). By 
emphasising the role of market demonstration, this future extends the boundaries of 
administrative rationalism and moves closer to economic rationalism.  
According to the interviewees, from analyses and market trials, three areas of energy flexibility are 
identified: alternative connections, demand side flexibility and grid automation (I24 – Network 
company). “Alternative connections” means “putting in a connection agreement with a customer 
on demand or generation side that [DNOs are] allowed to control [their demand or assets]…in return 
for a lower use of system charge or a cheaper connection cost” (I24 – Network company). While 
“alternative connections” are said to be widely used by DNOs at present, the demand side flexibility 
and grid automation are at trial phase and expected to become mainstream in the future. The 
following sections look at demand side flexibility and grid automation.  
5.3.1.2 Demand side flexibility 
The demand side flexibility sub-system arises as one of the solutions which DNOs could employ to 
resolve distribution network constraints instead of upgrading the distribution network. These 
solutions refer to market innovations where market actors, who have available flexibility, contract 
with DNOs to offer this flexibility to DNOs.  As an interviewee explained, 
“Rather than upgrading a substation or building a new distribution feeder in a certain area, 
we might be able to go to the market and say ‘Look, we need additional capacity in this 
area’… and take what flexible solutions are out there to help us sort of minimise that cost 
ultimately” (I19 – network company). 
By focusing on solutions available from the market, the development of demand side flexibility 
again goes beyond the traditional characteristics of administrative rationalism. In order for demand 
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side flexibility to work in this future, several elements need to be in place, including (1) 
Technologies, (2) Business model innovations (3) Contract terms (4) DNOs skills and (5) Regulation. 
5.3.1.2.1 Technologies 
Data and information are argued to play the most important role in demand side flexibility. Hence, 
most of the technologies mentioned below are for network companies to gather and distribute 
data. As an interviewee highlighted, 
“what I [a network company] need to have is the data available to be able to share it with 
any of those types of organisations or an individual customer if they wanted to do it 
themselves” (I24 – Network company). 
Low voltage monitoring (LV monitoring) and smart grids are network technologies which will be key 
to this  future  for DNOs to understand “how much energy is going through the system and it’s about 
moving bits of energy from a peak to a trough”, rather than simply understanding the maximum 
electricity demand (I24 - Network company). LV monitoring will be essential in developing smart 
grids which allow two-way flows of information about electricity consumption (Langendahl et al., 
2016) . The two-way flows of information enable the network companies to “understand what the 
network's really doing” (I24 – Network company) or visualise which part of the network needs 
intervention. As an interviewee highlighted, 
“If you can imagine the world where you have a smart gird here and monitoring down here, 
then flexibility will work” (I4 – Distributed asset business). 
Network companies are also active in developing technological flexibility platforms. One example 
mentioned by an interviewee from a network company is Piclo flex platform which an interviewee 
thought “all [DNOs] are using” and “was started by WPD [Western power distribution network]” 
(I19 – Network company). This platform can “highlight where the issues are on the network and 
then allow the platform to basically offer solutions to help remove that congestion or whatever it 
happens to be” (I19 – Network company). Via this platform, DNOs are able to see the available 
solutions, e.g. which market actors have energy flexibility that DNOs are able to have contracts 
with.  This kind of platform is expected to be further developed and more widespread in the future. 
Home-related technologies are also expected to take part in the changes to demand side flexibility. 
A smart meter is one key home-related technologies in the future but there are inconsistent views 
over their roles. The majority of interviewees argued that smart meters can “give [network 
companies] better visibility of the networks” (I19 – Network company). In contrast, others argued 
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that smart meters need to be placed in the connection with LV monitoring and smart grids at 
network level to provide network companies in general and DNOs in particular with such visibility. 
Other technologies include storage technologies, PVs on household roof tops, EVs, heat pumps, 
home energy management systems. These technologies are argued to help consumers to have 
“more control over when and how they use electricity” (I19 – Network company). In this future, the 
role of network companies is to: 
“understand how that's going to work, and … design a system that essentially supports 
consumers doing what they want with their technologies” (I19 – Network company)  
Networks companies not only need to change in response to changes in technologies in domestic 
homes but also to understand how they can take advantages of the changes in relationship between 
technologies and consumers to bring value to consumers. In this instance, consumers are the actors 
who control their technologies at home.  
However, another interviewee expressed the perspective that energy service providers are going 
to exert control over these technologies and provide demand side flexibility to network companies 
“as part of either a community energy project or as part of an aggregated portfolio or through the 
supplier” (I9 – Network company).  
The following section provides further discussion on consumers and providers of demand side 
flexibility.  
5.3.1.2.2 Providers of demand side flexibility 
Interviewees highlighted that “one of the big changes is the types of providers that are providing us 
with flexibility” (I9 – Network company), changing from traditional large to less “traditional 
technology types and smaller providers” (I9 – Network company). They include industrial and 
commercial consumers (I&C consumers), distributed generators, aggregators, suppliers, battery 
storage and domestic consumers. Some issues with these providers are raised.  
In terms of end consumers including both I&C consumers and domestic consumers, although value 
of flexibility is argued to flow to them (I9 – Network company), there are diverse views over whether 
they want to get involve in energy flexibility. Regarding I&C consumers, an interviewee from a 
distributed asset business expected I&C consumers will be active in getting involve in energy 
flexibility, following economic incentives. For example, 
“A massive car manufacture can save themselves £100 thousand pound by doing some stuff 
on the market [for a day], they gonna do it, aren’t they?” (I4 - Distributed energy business) 
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However, an interviewee from a network company, also share the same perspective that I&C will 
act rationally for which they will be rewarded, did not anticipate that they will get involved directly 
into energy flexibility. It was argued that although the benefits they gain from providing demand 
side flexibility are significant, it is “a small additional revenue stream” (I9 – Network company) 
which does not make them become an active provider. 
Similarly, domestic consumers will rely on market integrated technologies to do this for them and 
will not actively control or provide energy flexibility. For example, “our view is that the consumers 
won’t go on the platform and say you can shift my fridge or turn if off in this half hour to get [a very 
small amount of money]” (I4 – Distributed energy business). Also, from a network perspective, 
network companies do not expect to work directly with domestic consumers to procure their 
flexibility, because,  
 “…one household and one EVs, etc wouldn't provide a level of flexibility that we're looking 
for and I think it would still require somebody to aggregate or to pool together a whole 
street or whole town” (I9 – Network company) 
Interviewees agreed that third parties, aggregators and suppliers are expected to become 
intermediates between consumers and DNOs. They are called “energy service providers – a new 
breed of organisations who will manage those things [technologies] on your [consumers] behalf” 
(I24 – Network companies). Energy service providers on one hand will help consumers to manage 
their energy consumption, on the other hands offer demand side flexibility to network companies.  
There are diverse opinions around the roles of energy suppliers. An interviewee argued that 
supplier is able to become an energy service provider because it “has already have a relationship 
with the consumers” (I9 – Network companies). In contrast, another interviewee speaking of 
traditional energy suppliers noted that “they've got a terrible reputation” (I24 – Network company). 
As such, energy service providers might replace traditional roles of energy suppliers,  
“Whether you still have an energy supplier for the kilowatt hours consumed or whether 
ultimately that [service] becomes a kind of wholesale product that is billed to these energy 
service providers, I don't know and that really depends on how well the energy supply, 
energy retail businesses perform” (I24 – Network company). 
This comment suggested a new way of electricity supply and billing. However, it is uncertain 
whether this new way will be feasible in the future because it means that the regulator needs to 
amend its current design to allow multiple non-traditional energy suppliers, who may not be able 
to fulfil some essential tasks of traditional suppliers (e.g. deliver government schemes), as noted by 
an energy supplier (see section 4.4.2.6).  
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Community energy projects are also highlighted to be another type of energy flexibility provider 
which aggregates the energy flexibility from domestic household. Seen in this way, community 
energy project deviates from its traditional role of connecting local generation (e.g. solar farm of 
CHP).  
The following section looks at the changing business models of DNOs to DSOs.  
5.3.1.2.3 Distribution system operator (DSO) 
There is a consensus among interviewees that DNOs will transition to Distribution system operators 
(DSOs), especially when technologies such as LV monitoring, smart grids and smart meters are in 
place. An interviewee suggested that “we [the sector] will be in the position where the DSOs model 
is proved to work” (I4 – Distributed asset operator). A common view is that becoming a DSO, a DNO  
“needs to essentially transform their business so that they will be operating their network 
at a local level, and what I mean by that is they need to become a lot more commercial 
essentially, they're going to be enabling new flexibility markets, and procuring services from 
those” (I9 – Network company). 
However, an interviewee argued that buying energy flexibility from the market is “not the future, it 
is part of it, but not the whole thing” (I24 – Network company). This perspective undervalues 
demand side flexibility and will be explored further in section 5.3.1.3.  
Becoming a DSO may involve being a neutral market facilitator. In order to “neutrally facilitate a 
market” (I24 – Network company), DNOs will need to separate the tasks of operating the 
distribution system (being a DSO) and the tasks of owning and maintaining the distribution network 
(being a DNO). However, another interviewee believed that “You would only split it [the functions 
of DNO and DSO] if you can identify that it makes sense to split” (I19 – Network company). 
DNOs becoming DSOs will be a disruptive change to the system operator. An increase in providers 
of demand side flexibility (see section 5.3.1.2.2) coming into flexibility markets (i.e. National Grid’s 
balancing market in this case) brings about competition, a liquid market and as a result, reduce 
market prices and consumer’s bills. However, when DNOs become DSOs and trial more markets for 
flexibility,  
“…if more markets become available, I think you may start to see a dispersal of those 
providers, that’re perhaps offering into ourselves, may start to offer into other providers 
and other markets which then potentially could make the market less liquid and see those 
prices come up again”. 
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5.3.1.2.4 Organisational culture 
This section explores the organisational culture of network companies in response to the expected 
demand side flexibility.  
An interviewee highlighted that “engaging with team and trying to getting them on board to trial 
new approaches” is not easy (I9 – Network company). In their culture, the difficulties that they 
experienced are “the time and resource cost, priorities to implement something new” (I9 – Network 
company). In other words, applying something new into the business creates more workload for 
their employees and their employees may not be happy about it. However, another interviewee 
said that they do not experience this in their culture, for example,  
“It is funny with the other DNOs and they are having to talk about cultural change programs 
and winning hearts and minds, but here that's just alien. I just change policy and tell them 
to do it differently and they do it differently” (I24 – Network company) 
In terms of the new skills needed, some interviewees argued that new skills should not raise any 
issues for the development of demand side flexibility because through trials, any new skill can be 
learnt and is considered only “a slight change in a process” (I9 – Network company). However, 
another interviewee anticipated that network companies will need a business transformation of 
understanding both technical and commercial side of the network for effective and reliable demand 
side flexibility. Here, beside their traditional technological skills, they are expected to be also good 
at “procurement and tendering procurement and despatch exercises” (I19 – Network company). It 
means that they will need to think about how they procure demand side flexibility, “whether that's 
over procuring to ensure delivery or whether it's putting quite stringent contracts in place” (I19 – 
Network company).  
In particular, designing the contract is important in demand side flexibility because the security of 
supply will depend on “how good these contracts are and how well people respond to those 
contracts as well” (I19 – Network company). A “non-delivery fine” in the contract might be needed 
to ensure flexibility solutions are securely offered by contract holders (I19 – Network company) but 
it is unclear who will enforce the fine. Moreover, an “exclusivity contract” which prevents contract 
parties from participating in multiple markets should be avoided. Here, a provider should be 
allowed to “trade in the wholesale market, provide services to National Grid and provide services to 
local networks” (I19 – Network company). 
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5.3.1.3 Grid automation  
Beside demand side flexibility, grid automation is another energy flexibility option for DNOs. Hence, 
grid automation is the third sub-system in this future.  
Grid automation refers to the flexibility of the network available from the development of 
technology or more specifically automation technology. It involves technologies needed for 
demand side flexibility such as smart meters, LV monitoring and smart grids (described in section 
5.3.1.3). With grid automation, any network constraints are expected to be fixed automatically 
using technologies. As an interviewee from a network company noted of an outcome from a grid 
automation trial, 
“I could do it using one of my smart grid solutions because I've got all this automation, a 
grid automation that I've got self-healing grids. If the power goes off, it will trace through 
and automatically find alternatives to restore without any human intervention” (I24 – 
Network company).  
Grid automation flexibility is quite convenient to conduct because it does not involve any change in 
relationships. It is anticipated to be a better solution for energy flexibility than demand side 
flexibility because, “everyone stays on, everyone does what they were going to do before” (I24 – 
Network company). Demand side flexibility is only deemed as a short-term solution while DNOs 
need times to be digitised or to put sensors/ LV monitoring equipment into the network which is 
“five and a half times” the circumference of the globe (I24 – Network company). It is expected that 
by 2050, DNOs will do “sufficient digitisation on the grid” (I24 – Network company) and as a 
consequence, an optimised grid will be available. Being optimised means that, 
“…you want it [the grid] to be greenest it can be and which case I will prioritise all the 
renewables on and control all the demand side to make sure that renewables are fully 
utilized and every kilowatt hour going through is as green as possible… If you want it to be 
…charged as fast as possible, … I can configure it for that, I can build for that. So you tell me 
what mode you want me to operate the grid in and I'll program it in and it will do it. That's 
where this is going” (I24 – Network company). 
This vision is argued to be the future of energy flexibility over long-term, rather than demand side 
flexibility which is only used in short-term. However, developing grid automation seems to not have 
support from the government and the regulator. The following section discussed regulation in 




The regulatory framework plays an important role in incentivising DNOs to develop demand side 
flexibility. Currently, distribution and transmission are heavily regulated. An interviewee noted that 
the sector in general and DNOs in particular need to “work through a regulatory framework and 
drive the change [of energy flexibility]” (I4 – Distributed asset business). In the future, regulation is 
expected to not experience large changes because the current incentive mechanism – TOTEX - 
already works well according to interviewees. TOTEX is “the total expenditure” which incentivises 
the network companies to innovate and look for the most cost-effective way to deliver good 
connections for consumers by using either their operating expenditure of capital expenditure (I4 – 
Distributed asset business). As such, the most cost-effective way is argued to be demand side 
flexibility. An interviewee representing network companies noted the current network regulation 
to set out network revenue - the RIIO model (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs): 
“The RIIO regime which has a TOTEX type of model works quite well at the moment. It needs 
some tweaks but we think we should keep that as our investors [investors in network 
companies] are quite happy with that sort of model (I19 – Network company).  
However, although the current regulatory framework is argued to be quite good to incentivise 
network companies to develop demand side flexibility, an interviewee highlighted some issues 
within current regulatory frameworks that need to change in the future for grid automation to 
work. For example, the regulator is currently focusing on minimising electricity bill charges for 
consumers by reducing the level of revenues DNOs can receive currently from a consumer’s bill 
which is “27p per day” (I24 – Network company). Network companies are concerned that if the 
regulator keeps the revenue too low, the network “literally won't get the investment” (I24 – 
Network company). 
Rather, it is hoped that the regulators will take recommendations and evidence from National 
Infrastructure Commission (2016) and incentivise investment into network construction involving 
grid automation. This hope and expectation is based on the potential further uptake of EVs which 
may use up “all the capacity we'd [Great Britain] built for 40-50 years probably within 10” (I24 - 
Network company). 
5.3.2 System relationships 
The industry will be more reliant on cost-benefit analysis research in order to understand the most 
appropriate option for the future. Such research is likely to be done by experts from academia (e.g. 
Strbac), governmental organisations (e.g. National Infrastructure Commission), independent 
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consultancy (e.g. Baringa). In this future, experts and these research institutions will have tighter 
relationship with the industry.  
Beside cost-benefit analysis, the industry will also rely on market trials. In this case, most analysis 
and trials focussed on energy flexibility on the network. As such, the boundary of the system is 
drawn around network companies, which include DNOs and National Grid with its role as a system 
operator (ESO), rather than the conventional system boundary around generation, distribution and 
consumption. Interviewees formulating this future do not see outside this new drawn system 
boundary. In this new drawn system boundary, the relationship between DNOs and the system 
operator will be tighter as is already evident in the Cornwall Local Energy Market and other market 
trials, according to interviewees,  
“The Cornwall LEM is a project… essentially, it's looking at how does co-procurement of 
flexibility happen between a system operator and the DNO or the DSO. 
…There are other initiatives going on that are looking at that kind of coordinated DNO to 
DNO and ESO to DNO interaction. And I'm sure in time, a solution or a combination of 
solutions will come to market that allows that whole system to all be parts of an essential 
one” (I9 – Network company). 
Demand side flexibility and grid automation are two options for energy flexibility for network 
companies in the future. They are tied together by the development of technologies including smart 
meters, LV monitoring and smart grids.  
Demand side flexibility, it is argued, can bring about value to the network and ultimately “help 
reduce consumer bills” (I19 – Network company). This argument is supported by all interviewees 
ascribing to administrative rationalism. The further uptake of demand side flexibility within network 
companies in the future will not only bring about new sets of relationships but also alter existing 
relationships (also see section 5.3.1.2.2).  Firstly, relationships between new types of energy service 
providers such as aggregators, energy suppliers and community project with network companies 
are set up, as highlighted by interviewees. These energy service providers will become directly 
providing energy flexibility for network companies. Secondly, these energy service providers will 
have a close relationship with consumers and help consumers to manage their technologies (e.g. 
their cars, their electric appliances) together with their energy flexibility. This close relationship of 
consumers and energy service providers may threaten the traditional relationship between 
consumers and energy suppliers. Traditionally, energy suppliers who are considered as the only one 
having direct relationship with consumers connect with consumers via supply energy and billing. In 
this future, consumers may get energy bills directly from these (multiple) energy service providers. 
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These energy service providers are expected to be the bridge for network companies and domestic 
consumers’ relationship. Here, all interviewees in this future argued that network companies will 
have no direct relationship with domestic consumers. In terms of commercial and industrial 
consumers, whether they have direct relationship with network companies in the future depends 
on the economic incentives they will receive. 
Among all interviewees who argued for the importance of demand side flexibility in the future, one 
interviewee highlighted that demand side flexibility is only a short-term vision while grid 
automation is a long-term future to energy flexibility to DNOs. If grid automation becomes 
mainstream in this future, the relationships in the sector are unlikely to change. As noted above, 
grid automation and other technologies will be connected to the system and automatically help the 
network to resolve any network constraints without the need to change any interaction with 
consumers. As such, there will be limited opportunity for actors coming into the sector to link 
consumers and DNOs. 
Regardless of which option (demand side flexibility or grid automation) emerges in the future, the 
existing relationship between network companies and the regulator is unlikely to change. Network 
companies will continue to be monopolies and heavily regulated by the regulator.   
5.3.3 Power 
The key actors who have power in this future are the government, regulator, industrial actors (DNOs 
and energy suppliers) and experts. Experts conduct research on the value of energy flexibility. 
Market trials are then carried out by industrial actors, either by DNOs or by energy suppliers as 
argued by interviewees. Research together with market trials are then deemed as evidence to 
“make the government and the regulator bring pressure to bear on the industry to get their act 
together” (I4 – Distributed asset business). In other words, the government and regulator will use 
the evidence provided by industrial actors and experts to steer the industry towards this network-
focussed future. 
The system boundary in this future is drawn around network companies which comprises of the 
system operator and DNOs (see section 5.3.2). The system operator and DNOs have power in this 
future in the sense that they are able to re-draw the boundary of traditional electricity system. Both 
of them are expected to “operate it [the network] in a more efficient and effective manner which 
will ultimately help reduce customer bills” (I19 – Network company). Besides, it seems that the 
ultimate power of the operating system of the ESO will be shared by DNOs in this future. DNOs have 
more power when “trying to manage their networks more actively” and “beginning to trial markets 
for flexibility within their own networks” (I9 – Network company). 
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Energy service providers which are mainly represented by aggregators and energy suppliers also 
have power in this future, especially in terms of demand side flexibility. They are considered as 
having a power of managing consumer’s home technologies and providing energy flexibility for 
network companies. In contrast, domestic consumers do not have much power in this future. 
Consumers are mostly passive and power is given to energy service providers who actively not only 
help network companies to balance the transmission and distribution network but also enable 
economic benefits to consumers.   
Although domestic consumers may not directly have power in providing energy flexibility for 
network companies, they have power in driving the changes of network companies. Such power 
emerges together with the development of home related technologies (see section 5.3.1.2.1). 
Consumers are argued to have control over these technologies which make network companies 
change to help consumers gain more value out of these technologies. An interviewee from a DNO 
highlighted that “what we want to do is to keep customers happy”. As a result, DNOs need to keep 
changing when consumers change the way that they use home-related technologies, 
“When you've got an electric car…, your expectations on both the electricity system and the 
service you get from others are going to be very different. You're going to be so much more 
annoyed if you can't get to work with your car flat. And therefore, really, the challenge for 
us, is how do we keep really high customer satisfaction” (DNO) 
Interviewees did not mention the power of investors to any great degree. However, investors play 
an important role in ensuring the operation of DNOs and are sensitive to the power of the regulator 
(See section 5.3.1.4). Here, regulation is anticipated by some interviewees to actively resist the 
development of a grid automation future if it is oriented towards reducing consumers’ bills by 
reducing DNOs’ revenue, without a focus on strategic network upgrade. Conversely, other 
interviewees highlighted the power of the regulator who supports transitions while incentivises 
networks to innovate (I19 – Network company). 
The power of technologies is also salient in this future, including smart grid, 
“If you can image the world where you have a smart gird here and monitoring down here, 
then flexibility will work. If you haven’t, it will never work” (I4 – Distributed asset business). 
Here, smart grids are considered as a pre-requisite technology which give rise to other changes in 
energy flexibility.   
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5.3.4 The metaphor of energy flexibility 
Energy flexibility is a key metaphor of this future. Energy flexibility explicitly refers to technical 
issues of the network, i.e. transmission network balancing or local grid constraints management. 
Seen in this way, energy flexibility excludes some traditional key actors in a traditional electricity 
system who have historically provided energy flexibility such as generators. The metaphor of energy 
flexibility is framed around a whole system of network companies and providers of energy flexibility. 
Here, interviewees do not realise that the changes in energy flexibility involve changes in not only 
distribution, but also generation and consumption.  
Although there is a consensus among interviewees about such a whole system, two types of energy 
flexibility emerge in this future. Demand side flexibility is framed by the majority of interviewees 
ascribing to administrative rationalism as a market solution for network issues. Seen in this way, 
they see demand side flexibility can be achieved by some adds on such as the roll out of many 
technologies (see section 5.3.1.2.1), the market entrance of new actors such as energy service 
providers (see section 5.3.1.2.2), the change to DSO model of DNOs (see section 5.3.1.2.3) and the 
changes in skills and contract types (see section 5.3.1.2.4). However, demand side flexibility 
comprises not only changes in system components but also system relationships (see section 5.3.2). 
As such, it can be part of architectural innovation. The problem is that the majority of interviewees 
are not aware of these changes in many sets of system relationships.  
The second type of energy flexibility - grid automation is supported by an interviewee from a DNO. 
Grid automation does not involve any significant change in system relationships. Rather, it can be 
achieved by a range of (automation) technologies such as smart grids, LV monitoring and sensors. 
By supporting grid automation, this interviewee assumes that the future can be easily achieved by 
adding technologies.  
5.4 FUTURE 3: POLICY-DRIVEN FUTURE 
This future is articulated by interviewees ascribing to ecological modernisation. Interviewees in this 
future emphasised the important role of government and its decarbonised energy policy in driving 
transitions to the future of the sector. Government comprises the first sub-system of this future. 
With the lead of governmental energy policy, this future comprises of many innovations, 
technologies and actors spanning three other sub-systems of: generation, distribution and 
consumption. It can be clearly recognised that conventional system components and relationship 
of generation, distribution and consumption are kept almost the same in this future. Figure 5.3 is a 
systems map of this policy-driven future. 
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5.4.1 System components 
Based on a collective of interviewees’ commentaries and discussion, this future has four main sub-
systems: government, generation, distribution and consumption. The latter three sub-systems are 
how the industry and consumers respond to governmental policies. 
5.4.1.1 Government 
Interviewees shared the view that decarbonisation and economic growth should go together. An 
interviewee highlighted that by focusing on developing green industries, “tens of thousands of jobs 
have been created” (I28 – Government). However, some interviewees argued that the government 
pays attention on other issues (e.g. reducing consumers’ bills) at the expense of decarbonisation 
(see section 4.6.1). Here, interviewees expect that decarbonisation is embedded in energy policy. 
Therefore, the government is expected to be at the forefront of interventions and policy 
innovations. In other words, governmental initiatives and funding are seen as a key to innovation 
infrastructure which will support the market transition. As one interviewee highlighted, 
“Things like hydrogen, things like energy efficiency, things like the delivery of EV charging 
infrastructure at the sort of pace that's required. They are probably not going to happen 
just because the market is already doing it. They're going to need some sort of intervention” 
(I28 – Government). 
 
Figure 5.3:  Future 3 systems map 
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Although the government will have an important role in decarbonisation and supporting green 
industries, some interviewees highlighted that “a clear energy policy from government” is not yet 
evident (I26 – Market operator).  This interviewee suggested that energy policy and regulation 
should focus on the end state of transition or be principle-based, rather than pay significant 
attention to the detailed processes of energy transition, i.e. a focus on “more about the what and 
less about the how” (I26 – Market operator). Another interviewee suggested that energy policy and 
regulation need to be more agile, which means, 
“…being able to get the balance right between creating the right kind of environment for a 
change to happen and protecting the interests that regulator is obliged to protect” (I13 – 
Government). 
The environment for change is created by policy certainty. Policy certainty will ensure the 
appropriate amount of private investment into the industry. It is expected that more policy 
certainty is provided in the future while at present, “…it's not clear to me [an investor]… what my 
revenue stream will be because you know the kind of policies changing all the time” (I8 – Network 
company). However, government interviewees did not emphasise policy certainty but consider the 
level of profits that private investors would receive to be more salient to private investors,  
“…that doesn't mean that it's bad that they [private investors] are making profits … because 
the product of that profit and private investment invariably is pretty high investment in 
innovation” (I28 – Government). 
These two different approaches (policy certainty or profit for investors) to secure investment show 
uncertainty about how this future might be enabled.  
Energy policy also needs to take the whole-system approach, as argued by interviewees in the 
context of many different innovations happening across different sub-systems. The whole system 
approach will ensure the integration of different “technologies, services and business models in 
policy and so on … the whole value chain from generation through the consumption” (I13 – 
Government). 
The following sections detail how generation, consumption and network will look like in this future, 
in response to governmental decarbonisation energy policy.  
5.4.1.2 Generation 
Within the Generation sub-system, a mix of almost every kind of green generation such as offshore 
wind, solar and biomass is developing. The generation mix may or may not include nuclear power, 
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onshore wind, tidal power, gas power plant, but green generation is expected to be “decentralised 
more and more” (I7 – Incumbent energy supplier). The development of green generation seems to 
be taken for granted because interviewees mentioned about these generation without any 
evidence. 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is also expected to play an important role in decarbonisation in 
this future. This view is based on the recommendation the Committee on Climate Change carbon 
budget as argued by an interviewee from the government. CCS will exist together with energy 
flexibility in the decarbonisation agenda. CCS captures the carbon from the future unclean 
generation mix (e.g. gas power plant) while flexibility “manages your demand in a way which you 
can align it better with renewable generation” (I13 – Government). This combination is expected to 
help the UK achieve 2050 decarbonisation target. 
5.4.1.3 Consumption 
As described above, energy flexibility is argued to be needed in this future. Energy flexibility 
emerges from the transition of the UK model from “inflexible demand, flexible generation to the 
other way around” (I7 – Incumbent energy supplier). However, interviewees highlighted that it is 
uncertain which routes of flexibility (e.g. traditional economy 7 tariff, storage, EVs, home energy 
management with smart devices, demand side response) that the industry in general and energy 
suppliers in particular will follow. For example, an interviewee highlighted that investing in storage 
might be “risky” for some private investors (I8 – Network company) while another argued that 
storage can be developed “through Electric Vehicles” (I7 – Incumbent energy supplier). Regardless 
of which route of flexibility is adopted, it is expected that “there will be a supply chain emerged to 
support the flexibility” (I13 – Government), e.g., aggregators in terms of demand side flexibility. This 
future is expected to involve many new entrants. 
Equally, digitisation was raised by interviewees as the most important element in this future which 
can “enable transition” (I13 – Government). Digitisation brings about the “connected home” with 
smart technologies such as smart meters or smart charging for EVs (I13 – Government). Smart 
meters are argued by an interviewee from an incumbent energy supplier to allow energy suppliers 
to tailor a flexible time-of-use tariff for consumers’ electricity usage. Others, however, question the 
significance of smart meters as similar data can otherwise be collected through the internet, for 
example, 




Moreover, within the development of digitalisation, Blockchain technology can be developed to 
allow a peer-to-peer model of energy trading where a consumer can sell his/her electricity, from 
his/her fully charged EVs to his/her neighbour to get some price arbitrage. An interviewee 
considered this model as “really interesting stuff” (I28 – Government). 
Whether a flexible time-of-use tariff or peer-to peer works depends on consumers’ engagement. 
Consumers are expected to engage in controlling their electricity use, be aware of the price of 
electricity and act rationally in response to changes in price.  The majority of interviewees agree 
that consumers are “citizens” in the sense that they have more “responsible attitude to the 
resources” (I7 – Incumbent energy suppliers) and acknowledge the needs for contributing to 
decarbonise the sector. However, in this future, consumers’ behaviour may be more complex than 
what the industry expects. For example, consumers may want to charge their EVs whenever they 
want and do not care about issues that the networks may face whereas the industry hope to 
“control” consumers’ charging practices by flexible electricity time-of-use tariffs (I13 – 
Government). Adding to the complexity of judging consumers’ behaviour is the challenge of 
developing a flexible tariff for disadvantaged consumers, e.g. who do not have access to data/ 
internet. As an interviewee highlighted,  
“You [disadvantaged consumers] take a time-of-use tariffs and you don't adjust your 
demand, you will end up paying more. And we are nervous about that… This must be 
resolved with the regulator” (I7 – Incumbent energy supplier). 
This comment emphasised the role of the regulator in consumer protection in new business 
models. The regulator is also expected to create a level playing field between incumbents and new 
entrants. Incumbents highlighted that they are treated unfair because “the ability for new actors to 
cherry-pick is very significant” (I7 – Incumbent energy supplier). For example, in the case of smart 
meter, a new entrant energy supplier is allowed to take on supplying electricity to a household 
where a smart meter has been installed by an incumbent supplier. The cost of smart-meter 
installation is covered by this incumbent supplier, but the new entrant arguably can take the 
benefit.  
Despite new entrants’ cherry picking, incumbent energy suppliers are confident in their position in 
the industry because they consider themselves more credible than new entrants due to their 
longevity.  
“You would have seen a very big title this week in the media where for years, they've been 
saying leave the Big Six, they're rubbish, they're overpriced, their customer service has gone 
downhill. Now they're saying whatever you do, don't leave the Big Six because your energy 
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supply will go bust, and will leave you with a massive headache. Now, you're getting a cheap 
deal and lots of risks” (I11 – Incumbent energy supplier). 
Here, the credibility or trust issue is based on the reputation and financial stability of these 
incumbents. As a result, interviewees in this future tend to assume rational consumers.  
This future will secure places for both existing incumbents and many new entrants with good 
financial base. These new entrants are argued to be incumbents from oil and IT sectors e.g. Shell, 
Amazon and Google. These incumbents and new entrants are likely to secure their places in the 
electricity by merger and acquisition strategies. Some examples are highlighted by interviewees, 
including Engie (a French multinational utility company) acquired stakes from Kiwi power (an 
aggregator in energy flexibility) or Shell (an oil and gas major) bought First Utility (an energy 
supplier) (I12 – Energy supplier).  
5.4.1.4 Distribution (Network) 
In the Distribution (Network) sub-system, the changing roles of National Grid and DNOs are 
discussed by interviewees. With the expected development of energy flexibility, DNOs are expected 
to transform to DSOs and take over some regional system balancing from National Grid (I28 – 
Government). This role is increased partly due to the anticipated development of many local 
activities such as peer-to-peer trading model. However, another interviewee highlighted that the 
change from DNOs to DSOs is “more of a personal opinion” and in a “pivot” period (I13 – 
Government).  As such, it is uncertain if this change will materialise in this future. 
If this shift in roles materialises, National Grid as an ESO is expected to better manage the system, 
also with demand side flexibility although having some current role taken by DNOs.  National Grid 
is anticipated to manage high volume of net flows because,  
“the Southwest can pretty much manage itself broadly-ish, the Northeast can pretty much 
balance itself broadly-ish but there is, inescapably, a flow of energy from Scotland and North 
Sea into the Midlands and into London and that will always be the responsibility of National 
Grid” (I28 – Government).  
Interviewees share the view that many new markets are emerging around the operation of 
transmission and distribution grid in the future. Value is argued to flow to all participants, whether 
they are system operators, or aggregators, consumers, generator, supplier and so on, “they should 
all be valuing” (I26 – Market operator). However, the interests of these participants might be 
conflicted and it is expected to be resolved by designing whole-sale market rules, which “provide a 
level playing field” (I26 – Market operator) because,  
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“I believe if you have an efficient wholesale market, you will enable a more efficient retail 
market for you and me” (I16 – Market operator). 
While this future is characterised by uncertainty over generation mix, consumers’ behaviours, 
equality or the large numbers of new entrants, a clear boundary between traditional generation, 
consumption and distribution is maintained. 
5.4.2 System relationships 
The prevailing relationship in this future is the co-existence of environment decarbonisation and 
economic growth. This relationship resonates with ecological modernisation discourse where the 
government is expected to ensure that private investors realise the benefits of investing in green 
technologies.  
In order to fulfil government decarbonisation targets, the industry is expected to embrace and 
develop innovations in green industries such as energy flexibility time-of-use tariff (or flexible tariff). 
This innovation can only succeed with the engagement of consumers as argued in the previous 
section. Consumers are expected to be “citizens” who care about “decarbonisation”. In this case, 
the government, the industry and consumers are expected to collaborate and enhance 
relationships for a single goal of decarbonisation in the future. However, it seems that such 
collaboration is rather an expectation of the industry than a realistic future because consumers’ 
behaviour might be more complex and uncertain. For example, consumers may want to charge/ 
uncharge their EVs based on their personal needs, rather than when the system needs them to. The 
issue is that the majority of interviewees are not aware of such irrational behaviour of consumers.  
Many relationships are expected to continue, for example, between consumers and incumbents 
because consumers will not trust new entrant energy suppliers (see section 5.4.1.3). As such, in this 
future, the relationships between conventional sub-systems generation, consumption and 
distribution are expected to be largely untouched. However, in this future, interviewees do not 
realise that demand side flexibility may start connecting these conventional sub-systems. As 
highlighted in the previous section, demand side flexibility (at consumption sub-system) will help 
the system adopt more renewables (at generation sub-system) and system operators (at 
distribution sub-system) secure more value, i.e. better manage the system. 
5.4.3 Power 
With the pressure and the legally binding target from government to reduce carbon emissions, 
electricity generation continues to shift to lower carbon sources. Power is exerted by the 
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government.  The industry also has significant power in this future. It provides private investment 
for the development of technologies and innovations, especially in a domestic context.   
Equally, consumers are expected to have more control over their energy usage to enable 
cooperation with the industry. The development of energy flexibility through possibly development 
of EVs and home smart technologies will reshape consumers as more powerful actors becoming 
involved in shaping and delivering energy flexibility. Here, consumers are expected to have 
significant power in this future.  
Demand side flexibility is also expected to support the system operator (National Grid) and DSOs to 
ensure the fundamental physics of the system, i.e. “the electricity network needs to balance 
everything every second” (I13 – Government) and as a result, to participate in decarbonisation 
efforts and bring values or benefits to the system.  As such, system operators at national and local 
level are expected to have power in this future. However, the power of National Grid as a system 
operator will be shared by DSOs (see section 5.4.1.4). Here, the power of system operators and 
DSOs are constrained by the power of system’s fundamental physics, i.e. structural power.  
The existing power of incumbent energy suppliers remains because they have good financial 
foundation which can ensure security of energy supply to consumers and hence, is expected to be 
attractive to consumers. Similarly, incumbents from other sectors such as oil and IT, with their 
economic power will penetrate the electricity sector at “enormous pace” (I13 – Government). 
5.4.4 The metaphor of energy flexibility 
Energy flexibility is not the key aspect of this future but is increasingly important. Energy flexibility 
is considered as an added technology in generation to help the sector achieve decarbonisation 
targets. Similarly, on the consumption side, energy flexibility can also be achieved by adding 
technologies such as storage, EVs or home energy management with smart devices, or by adding 
an electricity tariff to consumers’ bills such as the economy 7 or flexibility tariff, or by involving the 
penetration of new entrants such as aggregators. Within the distribution subsystem, energy 
flexibility will start to effect and help the system operators at national level (National Grid) and local 
level (DSOs) better manage the system. Therefore, energy flexibility is deemed as an element of the 
distribution system in particular and of each traditional sub-system in general.  
5.5 FUTURE 4: CONSUMER-CENTRIC FUTURE 
This future is built around the discussion and commentaries of interviewees ascribing to consumer 
sovereignty discourse about a new relationship between consumers and the industry. Although 
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consumers and their power have been briefly discussed in previous futures, this future is based on 
a deeper restructuring of consumers status and behaviours’ and expected industrial responses.  
Interviewees grouped in this discourse coalition span a variety of roles in the value chain of the 
industry such as incumbents and new entrant energy suppliers, network companies and the 
regulator. These interviewees share the idea that consumers may or may not want to engage in the 
operation of the industry, but consumers always want to have control over, for example, their 
energy use. As such, consumers are going to play a more significant, central role in the operation 
of the electricity industry which, in turn, will make the industry think of different ways to satisfy 
consumers. Therefore, the consumer is sovereign in the sense that they exercise power explicitly 
or implicitly even though they do not engage. Consumers and the industry are two first components 
of this future. Regulation is the third key component of this future because interviewees also voiced 
their opinions about the change in regulation in order to support the industry to satisfy consumers 
and enable the requisite changes in the relationships between consumers and the industry. All 
three components (1) consumers (2) industry and (3) regulation are shown in Figure 5.4. These key 
components will replace the conventional components of the system (generation, distribution and 
consumption).  
5.5.1 System components 
Consumers are expected to behave differently in the future, and, as such, the industry will develop 
different strategies towards consumers. The regulator also needs develop different approaches 
   
Figure 5.4:  Future 4 systems map 
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from existing regulation. The key system components of consumers, the industry and regulation in 
this future are discussed below.  
5.5.1.1 Consumers 
There are two main views on consumer’s engagement in this future. Some interviewees argued 
that consumers can potentially actively engage with the industry, for example, “they start adopting 
smart home technologies that might give them you know the way to optimise that electricity 
consumption” (I23 – Network company). Conversely, some interviewees might think that 
consumers, rather than willing to be part of a more integrated system, will be apathetic to their 
electricity use in the future.  The reason is “fundamentally energy prices are high, but people are 
willing to pay them” (I10 – Energy supplier) which means that consumers will not respond to any 
financial incentives to participate, i.e. to change their energy use.  Moreover, consumers keep “low 
engagement level” or do not want to engage because they do not trust the industry which is “over-
pricing” (I5 – Industry commentator – regulation perspective).  
Regardless of these contradictory perspectives about consumers’ engagement, interviewees share 
an agreement that consumers are expected to have more control over their energy related decision 
making than in the past. For example, an interviewee took an example of the change from “Town 
Gas to North Sea gas” in which consumers accepted Government control, whereas “people don't 
do that these days!” (I14 – Industry commentator – network perspective). In this future, consumers 
will, 
“want to control their experience. Some of that is measured in terms of controlling the price, 
but some of the consumers that we've worked with, once they understand the cost, they're 
actually willing to pay more. Others are more interested in controlling heat in their home to 
protect the house so they want to reduce darkness or whatever, and so that, what they like 
is the control they get over the deployment of heat in their home. Others want to be able to 
make it comfortable for their families or some like to have to be able to control the heating 
to prevent the debate and discussion about the thermostat settings” (I13 – Government).  
Consumers expectation is to have more control, rather than more engagement for financial 
incentives. Seen in this way, consumers are assumed to not follow economic rationalism behaviour. 
Although consumers might not want to actively engage in the industry, they are still going to play 
a significant role in the industry.  An interviewee from an energy supplier noted that consumers can 
“can start to play a role in” energy supplier’s businesses (I10). Another energy supplier suggested  
that DNOs should also place consumers “at the core” of their businesses (I12 – Energy supplier) or 
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“at the top” of the system, especially with “their [DNO’s] desire to become regional system 
operators” (I14 – Industry commentator – Network perspective).  
Similarly, with regards to energy flexibility, consumers are expected to get involved and play a 
bigger role in providing demand side flexibility because, “…the number of these [generation] 
technologies is inherently inflexible which basically pushes the needs of flexibility down to the 
customers” (I2 – Academic). However, some expect that consumers will not care about whether 
energy flexibility needs their engagement, they just want to have control. Hence, “flexibility is very 
much an industry challenge rather than a customer problem” (I10 – Energy supplier). The industry 
will be forced to change their business to take into account this consumer behaviour, but 
 “…the opportunity is that how we can engage with those customers in a way that doesn't 
restrict what they want because nobody wants to be restricted and you now receive 
instructions about what they can, and what they can’t do” (I23 – Network company). 
The ultimate goal of this change is meeting decarbonisation and ensuring revenues, although these 
are not explicitly mentioned by interviewees. Several approaches for (1) satisfying consumers’ need 
to have more control and (2) encouraging them to take more important roles in the sector are 
described in the following section.  
5.5.1.2 The industry 
Considering a greater role of consumers in businesses in this future, the industry will approach 
consumers by (1) choices or (2) consumers-centric innovations (both technology and business 
models).  
5.5.1.2.1 Choices 
Firstly, organisations are expected to offer consumers more “choices” to get them engaged. 
“…we want to offer choice to customers but at the same time we are trying to integrate 
them and get them to help us” (I23 – Network companies). 
By offering more choices for consumers, the industry expects to not only accommodate various 
consumers’ expectations but also let consumers exercise their decision making.  
Some choices have been adopted by different organisations across the value chain. For example, 
different choices of smart thermostats to suit customers’ different needs (I10 – Energy supplier); or 
enabling the “concept of flexible connection” (I23 – Network company) where consumers are 
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offered choices of having a 100% capacity connection or less than 100% capacity connection with 
some discount. 
The opportunity to offer more choices for consumers depends on how an organisation understands 
consumers’ needs which in turn is facilitated by the availability of consumers’ data.  This future 
relies on customers allowing “businesses to understand consumers much better and target” (I2 – 
Academia), particularly actual use rather than their profile class (I10 - Energy supplier). This requires 
new relationships with consumers to get “real-life” data (I10 – Energy supplier). Various ways to 
build relationships in the future are suggested by interviewees. For example, organisations may use 
their relationship with third parties such as “a resident liaison office…who’ll actually go in and have 
a face-to-face conversation with the customer” (I10 – Energy suppliers) in social housing projects or 
local authorities to build an understanding about consumers.  
Interviewees drew examples from many other sectors where consumers have choices to further 
explain how choices should be designed. An interviewee from academia refers to the holiday and 
leisure sector which allows consumers to “do peer to peer” or “go to a traditional website” for 
booking a hotel (I2 – Academic).  Another interviewee from an energy supplier used a transport 
example:  
“…people didn't choose their new car based on it having a connectivity with Spotify but the 
next version of the car…which they choose for their needs based on…how the car looks, how 
they're how they're going to use it as the best vehicles for them, and then it also happens 
to come with Spotify as an added plus rather than being their main purchase driver” (I10 – 
Energy supplier). 
Future development of the electricity sector will be oriented to meet different needs of consumers 
using different options. In other words, consumers’ needs decide the development of innovation, 
rather than innovation decides consumers’ decisions. Seen in this way, innovations are expected to 
be “consumer-centric” in the future.  
5.5.1.2.2 Consumer-centric innovations 
This type of innovation in both technology and business model is aimed at the consumer wanting 
more control but not wanting to engage. Interviewees agree that these innovations will potentially 
help consumers to have more control over their decision making. Some interviewees start to 
recognise that these innovations can potentially disrupt the way consumers interact with the 
industry in the future. The following sections look at different visions from interviewees about 
consumer-centric innovations and examine how these innovations help consumers take control or 
change existing consumers’ interaction with energy. 
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5.5.1.2.2.1 Technological innovations 
A key factor in the uptake of some technological innovations is the cost of technologies e.g. cost to 
replace batteries in an EV (I5 – Industry commentator). However, the majority of interviewees 
agreed that cost of consumer-centric technologies will come down in the future as the cost of EVs 
is reducing (I2 – Academic) and smart home technologies will reduce their costs in 3-4 years (I23 – 
Network company).  
Electric vehicles will be a “consumer-centric” innovation for consumers who want “fun to drive” (I2 
– Academic) and “younger generation who were more driven by environmental drivers” (I10 – 
Energy supplier) and who need to commute to work. Electric vehicles will be combined in some 
business model innovations which are described below.  
A smart home with smart technologies is also a technological innovation in the future. Smart meters 
are essential in this future because they will give consumers visible control over their decisions of 
engaging or not (I14 – Industry commentator). As one interviewee noted:  
“I've had it [smart thermostat] only for three or four months, I'm not sure that it has saved 
me money yet, however what I found is that the biggest benefit that I personally take is the 
fact that I can remotely now control and is giving me this peace of mind that you know if 
I'm running out of the house in the morning and I don't, and I forget, I can remotely you 
know switch it off” (I23 – Network company). 
Similar smart technologies are expected to help consumers to have more control (as noted in 
section 5.5.1.1). However, the benefit of the smart thermostat in this example is more about 
lifestyle and “nothing to do with energy” (I23 – Network company). A smart home is expected 
however, gradually to become “the easiest thing to do for your everyday life” (I23 – Network 
company). Seen in this way, technologies in smart home do not change the interaction of 
consumers with energy. Instead, this relies on business model innovations. 
5.5.1.2.2.2 Business model innovations 
Beside the above technological innovations, interviewees agree that business model innovations 
which are “consumer-centric” will disrupt the current electricity sector (also see section 4.2.2.2). 
For example, one interviewee anticipated business model innovation is “a bundling of products 
together with services” (I2 – Academic), such as combining broadband, mobility, heat to energy and 
all delivered by an energy service company. In this future, the consumer will stipulate: 
 
169 
“I would like my house between 18 and 21 degrees in these times of the day, it is up to you 
[energy service company] of how you deliver it. So, I pay for warm, pay for comfort, pay for 
mobility” (I2 – Academic). 
Here, this business model innovation will potentially change the interactions between consumers 
and the energy industry. Consumers will have the link with these energy services companies, rather 
than with traditional energy suppliers and they will pay for the services that they received, rather 
than pay for energy per kWh.  
Possible newcomers could be Google, Amazon or O2 (I5, I14 – Industry commentator), but all will 
offer consumers with one single bill. These organisations, instead of consumers, will “pay my 
[consumers’] broadband, my home demand electricity bill, my insurance, and it's all done through a 
smart engine” (I14 – Industry commentator). Consumers will have an overall control by asking these 
smart engines, 
“Has anything happened today?  
We've changed your energy supplier, your energy supply now with such and such. Or we've, 
through this energy company… and your energy contract … you've saved twenty-five pounds 
today” (I14 – Industry commentator with network perspective). 
As such, this model will potentially not only changes the interaction of consumers with traditional 
energy suppliers but also provides consumers with control over their life without the need to get 
deeply engaged.  
Similarly, choices will be offered to EV owners such as (1) time of use tariff and (2) contracted 
flexibility which can be considered as two business models for EV smart charging to work.  
Firstly, network companies will provide price signals to energy suppliers or whoever has a direct 
link with consumers.  These organisations can “convert them into a tariff” (I23 – Network company) 
to “provide the right signals to consumers” (I2 – Academic) and get some consumer segments 
engaged - although it is expected to be a “really small sector of the market” (I10 – Energy supplier). 
Secondly, network companies have contracts with “aggregator type companies” for specific areas 
of network where network companies “are willing to…pay consumers to turn down at specific 
times” (I23 – Network company). In this contracting model, “aggregator type companies” are 
expected to “recruit consumers” (I23 – Network companies) using options.  Examples might include 
buying a PowerVault battery from the EDF website with a discount if consumers allow EDF to use 
their battery to do “frequency response and DNO services” (I23 – Network company). As such, 
“aggregator type companies” will give consumers a fixed “payment” and will help consumers 
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manage all the other elements (I10 – Energy supplier).  Although this model is currently available 
in the market, it is expected to become widely adopted as “a winning-strategy” (I10 – Energy 
supplier) because it fits with the expectation of consumers who want more control, but not more 
engagement. 
5.5.1.3 Regulation 
Regulation is expected to move beyond its traditional roles as “give consumer protection whilst 
encouraging competition in the marketplace and secondly to enforce compliance” (I5 – Industry 
commentator).  These changes are explored below.  
5.5.1.3.1 Consumer protection 
Interviewees following consumer sovereignty discourses agreed that as more and more 
organisations enter the market offering consumer-centric products, consumers need to be further 
protected. The introduced “price-cap” of Ofgem (the regulator) is essential in the future to further 
protect consumers and is a “direct response to the trust problem” from the government and the 
regulator (I5 – Industry commentator - regulation perspective). However, another interviewee 
argued that there will be enough competition in retail in the future and regulation such as a price 
cap is unnecessary. This interviewee highlighted that “when you start to interfere in markets…you 
start to get distortions in market” (I14 – Industry commentator - network perspective). The 
disagreement among interviewees regarding the price cap contribute to the uncertainty of this 
future.  
Referring to the bundle of energy service model or the penetration of Amazon, Google or O2, this 
interviewee went on to note about a regulator for combine services, 
“I can imagine in the future there will be a consumer regulator that covers broadband, 
television, energy, shopping because the way we're interacting with these things is changing 
so much” (I14 – Industry commentator). 
5.5.1.3.2 Industrial regulation 
Interviewees agreed that the main priority of current regulation is to ensure that consumers are 
protected and are able to freely switch to different energy suppliers. However, such regulation 
focussing too much on consumer protection may pose the risk for the industry, especially energy 
suppliers’ new entrants,  
“…if you're trying to drive an investment decision based on an asset that you are looking to 
get a 20-year might value from, then if the customer might switch away in one year, that's 
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a really difficult risk profile to have. If you go and talk to regulator about kind of locking a 
customer to a five-year contract, that's completely not where they're looking to go with the 
markets” (I10 – Energy supplier). 
While this is a regulatory barrier for the industry in general and energy retailers in particular, there 
are no suggestions about how this issue will be resolved in the future. New entrants coming into 
the electricity sector will also experience this and other issues such as access and availability of 
consumers’ data. Accesses will be facilitated by smart technologies, such as a smart meter.  
However,  
“This data is in theory accessible through the DCC, but at the moment, it looks a little bit 
exclusive about who can access it, so suppliers, network companies yes, other participants 
not sure at that terms of whether they have to pay” (I2 – Academia) 
It is expected that in the future, this significant regulatory barrier will be clarified but there could 
be further concerns about data use and ownership. 
Another barrier to new entrants created by regulation is the “sheer volume and complexity” of 
regulation (I5 – Industry commentator). In order to enter and operate in the electricity market, new 
entrants who might not have the ability to employ experts on regulation need to fully understand 
such “burdensome” regulation (I5 – Industry commentator). Currently, there are some 
organisations offering regulatory consultation for these new entrants such as Utiligroup which 
offers a “Supplier in a Box” package where new entrants can get support in navigating regulation. 
This model is expected to further develop in this future.  
In contrast to the consensus that consumer regulation will be further needed, an interviewee 
highlighted that there will be “lighter regulation around monopolies, networks businesses” (I14 – 
Industry commentator with network perspective) in the anticipation that network businesses will 
follow the model of commercial businesses. It is envisaged that, 
“…utilities wait for trying to influence regulators and politicians and then react to the 
rules…whereas companies like Uber and other commercial companies look at the rules and 
then drive their business hard and wait for regulators to catch up… you'll see a much more 
aggressive investment cycle that will evolve” (I14 – Industry commentator). 
Here, becoming more aggressive commercial business, network companies may be freer in their 
investment decisions and do not need to face the current volume and complexity of regulation 
described above. The emphasis in the future of network regulation is that “we [network companies] 
are incentivised to get … more utilisation out of our [the UK’s] network” (I14 – Industry commentator 
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– network perspective). According to this interviewee, such incentivisation should be done in a 
“system approach rather than a siloed approach” (I14 – Industry commentator). In other words, 
regulation should look at the changes of the system as a whole to maximise the value of the 
network, rather than look at resolving one single arising issue. However, other interviewees do not 
realise this whole system change.  
Conversely, another interviewee within a network company anticipated that network companies 
will depend on heavy regulation in the future as they do now. This interviewee suggested that the 
current regulatory framework which “rewards good performance rather than trying to set a 
minimum bar for services” makes UK become “one of the best places” for network asset investment 
(I23 – Network company). Such regulatory frameworks with the next price control RIIO 2 (Revenue 
= Incentives + Innovation + Outputs) from 2023 is expected in future to help UK “continue [to be]” 
“the most advanced country in terms of regulatory framework” (I23 – Network company). 
5.5.2 System relationships 
In this future, traditional subsystems generation, consumption and distribution will be replaced by 
consumers and the industry subsystems. Interviewees expect consumers to help the sector by 
offering them choices, technologies or services which are consumer centric. However, the majority 
of interviewees do not realise that the materialisation of this new system boundary of consumers 
and the industry depends on whether consumers will accept these offers and if there are any other 
changes in system relationships. Hence, it is uncertain whether the relationships between 
consumers and the industry, especially between consumers and traditional energy suppliers and 
network companies will be tighter or not.  
To be able to offer choices to consumers, some interviewees argued that in order to develop 
appropriate choices for consumers, understanding them is key as mentioned in section 5.5.1.2.1. 
As such, these interviewees, among others formulating this future, start to realise that the 
relationships between consumers and the industry will be tighter. An interviewee described the 
future link between consumers and the industry as follows: 
“We will certainly see a more varied number of companies who have a direct link, direct 
relationship with the consumers, who may or may not be called suppliers” (I2 – Academic).  
This view not only suggests a closer link between consumers and the industry in this future but also 
anticipates that (1) energy suppliers might have better relationship with consumers and (2) there 
will be many new actors building relationships with consumers. In terms of the first, this presents 
a possible contradiction: energy suppliers may be unable to maintain close links with consumers 
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because in the future, consumers are anticipated to be in touch with their energy suppliers as little 
as possible (I10 – Energy supplier), which means looser relationships among them. This is because 
they do not feel the need to engage and they do not trust their energy suppliers, mainly 
incumbents, who they are “paying three hundred pounds more for nothing different” (I5 – Industry 
commentator). One option for energy suppliers could be to access consumers data via consumer-
facing organisations such as local authorities in social housing services (I10 – Energy supplier). 
However, it is uncertain if this option is useful because current energy suppliers may or may not 
have such relationships with these consumer-facing organisations, which means building another 
new form of relationships before approaching consumers.  
In terms of the second expectation of new actors, it is uncertain whether consumers in the future 
will be more willing to have a connection with untested, new entrant energy suppliers. One 
interviewee starts to realise that new actors such as energy service companies will establish direct 
relationship with consumers and also build closer relationships with actors from other sectors, e.g. 
mobility. For example, there would be “some blurring of traditional companies with even mobility 
companies, so … Nissan, Renault, Tesla are interested in different forms [of doing their business]” 
(I2 – Academic).  
New entrants from other sectors such as Amazon, Google or O2 are also envisaged, 
“Google [will] send me an energy report every month, I get more interaction from Google 
than I do from N-Power, or Scottish Power where I have my electricity from, and gas from” 
(I14 – Industry commentator).  
These new entrants are expected to take over the relationships with consumers from traditional 
energy suppliers and consumers are assumed to become more willing to interact with new entrant 
energy suppliers,  
“…if the utilities aren't careful, they will become a back office and somewhat isolated 
organisation that is basically like a second tier to Amazon or somebody else” (I14 – Industry 
commentator). 
This case also applies to network companies. Although these network companies are looking to 
promote consumers choices by providing price signals and contracted flexibility to consumers with 
EVs to participate in smart charging (see section 5.5.1.2.2) which may suggest tighter relationships 
between consumers and network companies, at least one interviewee considers the relationship 
to be “a flow of data”, not a “personal relationship” (I14 – Industry commentator). As such, network 
companies’ non-interaction with consumers remains the same in this future.   
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Regulation seems to have tighter relationship with consumers when interviewees agreed that 
consumer protection should be more focussed by the regulation. However, an interviewee worries 
about the distortion of the market, for example, when consumers protection regulation such as the 
price cap is in place or when consumers are allowed to freely switch energy suppliers (see section 
5.5.1.3). There are also contradictory views about regulation relationships with the industry, 
especially with the network companies. It is uncertain of whether heavy or lighter regulation should 
be applied in the future. 
5.5.3 Power 
This future sees consumers as the main actors. According to some interviewees mentioned in 
section 5.5.1.1, consumers overall are more aware of the importance of their decisions and will 
want to take control over their decision making, regardless of whether they want to engage in the 
sector. As a result, the industry is expected to offer consumers more choices or more consumer-
centric business models to not only satisfy consumers but also brings benefits to themselves. Here, 
power is assumed to be shared between consumers and the industry. 
Firstly, in terms of consumers’ power, interviewees highlighted that consumers have lost and will 
continue to lose their trust towards incumbent energy suppliers and the industry. As such, 
consumers will transfer their energy use to new entrant energy suppliers which then increases the 
number of actors participating at present and in future (I5 – Industry commentator).  
Secondly, the power is also in the hands of industrial actors who are able to understand consumers 
and offer consumer-centric innovations. For example, the use of smart thermostats described in 
section 5.5.1.2.2.1 is a lifestyle control choice rather than an energy choice (I23 – Network 
company). Another interviewee argued that consumers do not care about flexibility – it is an 
industrial concern rather than a domestic issue (I10 – Energy supplier). Here, consumers are quite 
passive in the transition and industrial actors are active in getting consumers involved in consumer-
centric innovations. Transitions consequently will be driven in the direction that industrial actors 
prefer and guide. 
Among industrial actors, there are different groups of actors exercising their power in relations with 
others. A key element is  
“...a very large number of companies quickly [come] into the marketplace to provide 
genuine choice and diversity for customers. And at the same time puts pressures on some 
of the established players to look carefully about their price and look carefully about their 
customer propositions” (I5 – Industry commentator). 
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These new entrants (including incumbents from other sectors such as Amazon, Google, O2) exercise 
their power in many aspects of consumers’ life in the future, “take care” of these aspects and 
become consumer-facing actors in the industry. Other actors including DNOs and energy suppliers 
(both new entrants and incumbents) will become the “back-office” and do not have direct 
relationship with consumers (I14 – Industry commentator) – losing their power and influential 
relations with consumers. Hence, power is assumed to be transferred from existing incumbents to 
new entrants.  
Regulation or the regulator will be a key factor in resisting or enabling new power relations in this 
future. There is recognition that consumers will need to be protected and such protection will be 
more important in the future where more and more industrial actors coming into play and taking 
care of many, wider aspects of consumers’ lives. Although the regulator is more and more 
important in this future, the regulator is also expected to exercise resistant power (i.e. power to 
resist changes) in transition as the “sheer volume and complexity” of regulation could create 
difficulties for new entrants to enter the electricity market (section 5.5.1.3.2).  
5.5.4 The metaphor of energy flexibility 
Energy flexibility is a metaphor in this future but not explicitly defined. It reveals various 
assumptions about changes in system relationships. When talking about the needs to get 
consumers involved in energy flexibility (section 5.5.1.1), an interviewee referred to flexibility as 
conventionally “[generation] technologies”. It assumes that current source of flexibility which is 
taken from quick start-up characteristics of some power plants in generation mix will be replaced 
by a new source - demand side flexibility. A small number of interviewees start to realise that this 
new source involves the participation to some degree of consumers (i.e. the changes in 
relationships between consumers and the industry), dependent upon consumer behaviours. Seen 
in this way, demand side flexibility is expected to disrupt system relationships and ultimately 
constitute architectural innovation. This is at odds with arguments from interviewees describing 
flexibility as a business model enabling EV’s smart charging in the future (section 5.5.1.2.2.2), e.g. 
contracted flexibility. Aggregator-type of companies will penetrate and directly help consumers 
manage their demand and incentivise them by “fixed payment”. As such, flexibility is assumed to 
be achieved by adding aggregators and some financial incentives to the system.  
5.6 FUTURE 5: PROSUMER-LED FUTURE 
This future is rooted in an energy democracy discourse in which interviewees emphasised the new 
role of consumers as “prosumers” and new ways to govern these prosumers. The change from 
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consumers to prosumers is facilitated by decentralised generation mix. The generation forms the 
first system component. The second system component is consumption which comprises the 
development of prosumer and associated elements. The third system component (distribution – 
network) involves the new arrangements for network and system governance. The final key section 
is regulation which supports these three sub-systems. These system components are mapped in 
Figure 5.5.  
In this future, the conventional boundary between generation, distribution and consumption will 
still be extant, but with overlaps in the prosumer and local authorities’ components. Generation 
and distribution sub-systems will also overlap in terms of back-up for the decentralised generation 
mix.  
5.6.1 System components 
According to interviewees, the environment (in a systems sense) is dominated by the climate 
change landscape. Climate change policy commitments will make the electricity sector decarbonise 
“fairly rapidly” (I16 – Government). Internally, this system consists of four main sub-systems (1) 
Generation, (2) Consumption, (3) Distribution – network and (4) Regulation. The following sections 
describe how this future will operate. 
5.6.1.1 Generation 
Key to this future is the generation mix.  As coal power plants are decommissioned, they will be 
replaced in response to climate change imperatives. At the same time, decentralised renewables 
 
Figure 5.5:  Future 5 systems map 
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are expected to continue to develop significantly and become the main type of generation in the 
future.  Over the long term, renewables will become more economical than fossil fuel for electricity 
generation which have low investment cost and high fuel cost. Renewables, in contrast, according 
to interviewees, have high investment cost and minimal fuel cost and, once deployed, marginal 
costs start to reduce to “nil” (I16 – Government). Renewables will then become baseload and come 
to the top of the merit order –a way of ranking primary energy sources for electricity generation 
based on the running cost of the power stations (see Chapter 2).  The result is that electricity 
generated from renewables is expected be fed into the system whenever possible.  
This expectation makes gas power plants unable to operate most of the time and only contribute 
to electricity generation when there is limited electricity generated from renewables. As a 
consequence, back-up plants or investment for back-ups are needed in the future. Gas power 
plants, although they can bid into the system when weather conditions are poor for renewables, 
may become “uneconomic” “stranded assets” (I16 – Government). Hence, it will be difficult for 
these fossil fuel/gas plants to secure finance for further development.  
Nuclear power plants, although claimed to be a decarbonised electricity generation, will not be a 
part of future generation mix in this future,  
“So the whole of the system will need to be much more flexible and dispatchable which 
means that in the end, nuclear will probably not be on the system not because it's a bad 
idea that we have nuclear, [but] because it just won't fit the rest of the system anymore” 
(I16 – Government) 
Though interviewees agreed that gas power plants and nuclear power plants might not appear in 
the future generation mix, it is uncertain which type of back-up plants:  battery storage or hydrogen 
storage or “load shift”/ demand side flexibility (I16 – Government) will be integrated into the 
system. If battery storage, for example, is integrated into the electricity system, or specifically into 
distribution grids, it means “technically distributors become generators and they are not allowed to 
do that” (I1 – Academia). Here, the boundary between traditional generation and distribution is 
blurred, which is further explored in the section about transmission and distribution. 
5.6.1.2 Consumption 
Before looking specifically into transmission and distribution in the future system, local 
consumption is a key element because it will directly impact the changes in transmission and 
distribution. The boundary between traditional generation and consumption is also blurred in that 
there is now overlap with the distribution sub-system. There are two main actors contributing to 
this blurring boundary: (1) prosumers and (2) local authorities.  
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Firstly, the potential development of prosumers, “both a producer and a consumer” (I1 – 
Interviewee) and the expected further widespread of decentralised renewables (see section 
5.6.1.1), electricity is expected to “be produced and distributed and consumed locally” (I16 – 
Government). This brings traditional centralised system to a ‘local system’ with ‘local consumption’. 
Here, the role of transmission, distribution grids and system management are all expected to 
change (see further discussion in section 5.6.1.3).  
A “do-it-yourself” (DIY) model might support the development of prosumer in this future. This 
model allows individuals to install solar panels themselves without being a certified installer. “In 
Germany, the DIY market is very strong” (I12 – Energy supplier). However, the development of 
prosumers is uncertain, as identified by the same interviewee: “it's not clear at the moment exactly 
how far prosuming is going to feed into the system overall” (I16 – Government). 
Another actor playing an important role in this local consumption system component is a “local 
authority” who is managing electricity generation and supply within a particular region. For 
example, some local authorities are expected to sell electricity generated from solar panel on 
regional school rooftops during school holidays within their local authorities, “which obviously is a 
good thing” (I9 – Network company). In this example, local authorities are argued to become a type 
of energy flexibility provider for the system operator. Controlling local electricity production also 
allows local authorities to manage electricity supply in the future. Within a region, a local energy 
company managed by a local authority is expected to be established, as an interviewee highlighted,  
“One idea which has been floated from [a city] was having a [municipal] energy company 
so people could actually buy their electricity from the local energy company. So you are 
almost moving back to municipal electricity generation. So, you know, that’s way back to 
the 1920s” (I1 - Academia). 
This comment shows that the local system in the future might have similar characteristics as the 
electricity sector in nationalisation (before privatisation). Electricity is traded within regions from 
local energy companies. Here, these local energy companies become involved in both traditional 
generation and consumption sub-systems and as a result, blur the boundaries between these sub-
systems.  
5.6.1.3 Distribution - network 




While consumers are expected to generate and consume their own electricity, there is a concern 
that consumers who are unable to pro-sume may become vulnerable, as an interviewee argued,  
“…if you've got more than a certain amount of the system covered by prosuming, then the 
costs of the system to those people who aren't prosuming starts to rise exponentially” (I16 
– Government).   
The costs refer to the current transmission system charge (TNUoS), distribution system charge 
(DUoS) and balancing charge to consumers which all “goes on consumer bills” (I16 – Government). 
As prosumers may not use electricity provided via transmission and distribution grids anymore, 
grids may become “an insurance or backup” (I16 – Government).  Prosumers are expected to be 
charged lower system charges than currently. This will mean the remaining part of system charges 
is shared by non-prosumers, i.e. an increased cost. As a result, it is expected that there will need to 
be “a different kind of arrangement” for transmission and distribution grids (I16 – Government).  
What this arrangement will be is uncertain. One interviewee argued that both TNOs and DNOs are 
expected to be “not for profit providers” or in other words, be publicly owned, because,  
 “…sitting there as a company and making money by charging for carriage is not going to 
be a viable way of floating the system or for investing in it”  
Another interviewee argued that the current transmission grid owner – National Grid could be 
“redundant” (I1 – Academia) following the move to a local system. However, another interviewee 
argued that although local system management is expected in the future, National Grid is still 
needed in “helping transmit electricity from offshore wind and interconnectors and other things” 
(I17 – Government).  
The development of decentralised renewables not only causes changes in generation mix (section 
5.6.1.1) but also in the way the electricity system is going to be managed in the future. Traditionally, 
the system is balanced by matching electricity supply to electricity demand. Currently, with the 
increase in the amount of generation, as noted by an interviewee, “[in the past] you would have 
roughly 85 points of generation to deal with whereas now [and in future] you've got about a million” 
(I16 – Government), there is a mis-management in balancing the system. Interviewees argued that 
when renewables feed into the system, the system recognised this increase in renewables 
electricity supply as a decrease in electricity demand and  
“…therefore we're [Great Britain system operator] making provision for that demand going 




With such current mis-management in balancing the system, the future electricity system is 
expected to be balanced locally.  DNOs will become “distributed system operators” (DSOs) and 
balance the system at “the local level” (I17 – Government). As such, the future sees not only 
“decentralisation of energy” but also “devolution of power within energy” (I17 – Government) as 
the embodiment of the energy democracy discourse. Such devolution of power also fits with the 
vision about the important role of local authorities described in the previous section.  
The change of DNOs to DSOs involves the change in the culture of DNOs which may present 
problems because, as a interviewee noted,  
“…as you move to energy flexibility, you move towards something which requires more 
relationship management rather than direct control and I think that could be a major 
problem” (I1 – Academia).  
The current arrangement of DNOs is to own and operate the distribution grids to ensure “reliability 
and functionality of electricity distribution” (I1 – Academia). DNOs are used to “direct control” their 
networks. However, in the future where DNOs take part in operating the system at the local level, 
it might need to integrate a higher level of flexibility, for example through storage or demand side 
flexibility. Here, the outcome of DNOs’ operation depends on how well DNOs manage their 
relationships with flexibility providers, e.g., aggregators, third parties. As such, the development of 
this new arrangement is subject to the DNOs’ abilities, expertise and skill sets.  
5.6.1.4 Regulation 
The move to local system future involves the interference between traditional generation, 
consumption and distribution, but the structure of current “privatised but highly regulated system” 
keeps the functions of these traditional elements separated.  As an interviewee explained,  
“…we do have some companies involving in retail but also involving in generation, but they 
have to relate to the regulation separately, they keep their two parts of the company very 
differently. Distribution is actually not allowed to generate and it is not allowed to sell” (I1 
– Academia). 
As such, this future requires a change in current regulatory structure. There is an agreement among 
interviewees that it is quite hard for the current regulatory structure to change and future 
arrangements remain uncertain.  The regulator is facing the need to change while ensuring that the 
changes are in “stable manner” to ensure electricity supply reliability which usually “tends to stick 
with original model [conventional regulatory structure] and only accept innovations that fit within 
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that model” (I1 – Academia). This interviewee highlighted that the change in regulatory structure, 
although is expected to occur, “hasn’t been thought through very clearly” (I1 – Academia).  
5.6.2 System relationships 
While regulation remains uncertain, in this local system future, there are overlapping relationships 
among conventional distinct generation, distribution and consumption. In line with energy 
democracy discourse, prosumers tighten generation and consumption sub-systems with 
transmission and distribution (also see section 5.6.1.2 and 5.6.1.3) although there are different 
perspectives. Some interviewees recognised the development of prosumers with the potential for 
no relationship between electricity grids and consumers. This is because prosumers are expected 
to generate and consume their own electricity to the extent that transmission and distribution grids 
are only served as a type of electricity supply insurance. Other interviewees highlighted the role of 
local authorities who will serve as an energy flexibility provider aggregating electricity generated by 
prosumers and provide these to the system operators. Via local authorities, prosumers will have 
certain relationships with transmission and distribution.  
Another change contributing to this overlapping relationship is from centralised generation mix to 
decentralised one including renewables and back-up generation e.g., battery storage. If battery 
storage is allowed to be owned by DNOs, i.e. placed in the distribution sub-system, distributors will 
become generators (see section 5.6.1.1). These overlapping relationships do not fit with the current 
regulatory structure of the sector and will require as yet undetermined changes.  
Even so, this future still sees the hierarchy of regulation over big retailers and transmission/ 
distribution grid. An interviewee argued that such hierarchy of regulation is needed to manage the 
“monopolistic powers” of existing incumbents in the current privatised sector (I1 – Academia).  
In contrast, an interviewee highlighted the need to bring electricity grids to public ownership to 
ensure transmission and distribution grid owners operate on a “not-for-profit” basis which allow 
the electricity grids to become “insurance” for consumers’ electricity supply. Here, the relationship 
between the grids and the government will change from privatised grids to publicly owned grids.  
5.6.3 Power 
This future is characterised by prosumers’ power. Prosumers’ power increases with the further 
development of renewables and the shift from centralised system management to local 
management.  The rise of prosumers and electricity grids as “insurance” will reduce the power of 
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electricity grids’ owners and the system operator. For example, National Grid may be “redundant”. 
Here, power is assumed to be transferred from the industry to prosumers.  
Within this power transfer, actors in the industry still hold some power. For example, DNOs are 
expected to become DSOs and take responsibility for operating the system locally (see section 
5.6.1.3). Local authorities with local company energy can otherwise be in charge of local generating 
and selling electricity (see section 5.6.1.2).  
In contrast, regulation or the regulator exercises resistant power to change in this future. The 
potential move to a local system with the support of some back up types for renewables-based 
generation such as storage or demand-side flexibility requires the blurring between these different 
sub-systems’ boundaries. However, the current regulatory structure does not allow this 
arrangement.  
Another resistant power to change comes from the industry actors, who have the “mind-set of the 
old system and doesn’t really want to move outside of it” (I1 – Academia). Electricity is important 
and the sector’s first priority is to ensure reliable electricity supply. Here, industrial actors (including 
the regulator) are worried about any disruptive change which may cause disruption in electricity 
supply and thus, resistant to go outside of the existing ‘safe zone’. 
5.6.4 The metaphor of energy flexibility 
Energy flexibility is not mentioned much in this future but its role cannot be denied in the 
intermittent renewables-based system and hence, can be considered as a hidden metaphor. Energy 
flexibility is assumed as a back-up in generation (see section 5.6.1.1) although this metaphor 
conveys many different types of flexibility such as storage or demand side flexibility. Seen in this 
way, energy flexibility is deemed as a technology added to decentralised generation.  
However, energy flexibility can potentially bring about architectural innovation. Energy flexibility is 
not only essential back-ups for decentralised generation but also an important element linking 
generation and transmission/distribution sub-systems in the future. With the expected new role of 
local authorities (see section 5.6.1.2), energy flexibility can be aggregated from prosumers’ 
generation within a region to help the system operators resolve system issues. Here, energy 
flexibility will also change the linkage between DNOs and the industry, from direct control the 
network to relationship management (section 5.6.1.3). 
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5.7 SUMMARISING FUTURES 
This section provides a summary for the above futures in terms of (1) Pathways to futures, i.e. how 
transitions come about, (2) Futures are messy and uncertain (3) Determinants of each future. 
5.7.1 Multiple transition pathways to futures 
How a transition to each future comes about are different, forming different pathways to the 
futures. 
Future 1 is driven by market forces and market mechanism. Future 2 is engendered by the 
regulation and the government with evidence from research and market trials. Future 3 is led by 
the government with the decarbonisation agenda. Future 4 is driven by the industry trying to satisfy 
consumers to gain benefits. Future 5 is led by prosumers and are active in generating and 
consuming electricity.  
5.7.2 Messy and uncertain futures 
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 5, interviewees do not always fit in a single discourse 
coalition. Some interviewees also do not have a clear vision about the futures of the sector and as 
a result, these futures are messy. Beside this untidy discourse coalitions, futures are messy because 
interviewees are largely uncertain about the development of specific “system components” or 
innovations identified in Chapter 5. There are also contradictions in perspectives of interviewees in 
terms of these “system components”. These uncertain and diverse views in each future are 
summarised in Table 5.2. 
5.7.3 Differences between the five futures 
This section summarises the five futures according to the four analytical components in Table 5.3. 
Key determinants of each future are revealed, including (1) technology and associated business 
models, (2) non-technological determinants (market and finance, culture, actors) and (3) 
regulation. Some technologies are highlighted in Bold, which play a key role in each future. 
In summary, this chapter articulated five futures constructing from five discourse coalitions 
identified in Chapter 4: (1) ‘Market-based’, (2) ‘Network-focussed’, (3) ‘Policy-driven’, (4) 
‘Consumer-centric’; and (5) ‘Prosumer-led’. Each future contains different sets of elements: system 
components, system relationships, power and energy flexibility. As actors do not always fit in a 
single coalition and agree upon these elements, futures are messy and uncertain. The following 
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chapter provides critical reflections on these messy futures to understand how these futures may 
be realised and the associated changes in power and energy flexibility. 
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Table 5.2: Uncertain and diverse view of interviewees in each future 
Future Uncertainty of innovations and diverse view of interviewees 
1 -  There was no clear consensus of whether market price volatile is materialised. 
- Aggregators expect the development of a technology platform which opens opportunities for the blending of different traditional value pools and traditional business models while new entrant 
energy suppliers expect the development of a "proprietary platform" providing consumers with "flexibility price signals". 
- The "blending of value pools" is supported by aggregators and DNOs but is not supported by other DNOs. 
- EVs to grid is supported by incumbent energy suppliers while it is not supported by investors. 
2 - Network companies prefer energy flexibility market trials are led by DNOs while others (e.g. from distributed business asset) prefer these trails are led by energy suppliers. 
- Interviewees from distributed asset businesses expected I&C consumers will be active in getting involve in energy flexibility while network companies argue that I&C consumers will not get 
involved directly into energy flexibility because the benefits from energy flexibility is a small revenue stream. 
- Network companies argue that domestic consumers are the one who control home technologies while interviewees from distributed asset businesses believe that domestic consumers do not 
want to control their home technologies to provide flexibility. 
- Network companies have diverse views of the role of energy suppliers. Some interviewees expect that traditional suppliers will become energy service provider while others believe that energy 
service providers will replace energy suppliers. 
- It is uncertain whether demand side flexibility or grid automation is going to be a dominant source of flexibility over long-term (Over short-term, demand side flexibility is expected to be 
dominant). 
3 - Network companies expect policy certainty from the government while the government consider the level of profits that private investors would receive to be more salient to private investors. 
- The development of green generation is taken for granted rather than being supported by strong arguments 
- It is uncertain of which routes of flexibility will be followed by the industry 
- It is uncertain of whether the change from DNOs to DSOs is materialise in the future  
- Consumers are expected to be "citizens" and embrace the changes to decarbonisation of the government and the industry but consumers' behaviour might be complex and uncertain 
4 - Contradictory views about consumer's engagement: network companies believe that consumers will actively engage in the industry (e.g. by adopting smart technologies to optimise electricity 
consumption) while others (e.g., energy supplier or the interviewee with regulation perspective) think that consumers do not want to engage into the electricity. 
- Interviewees with regulation perspective think that the electricity "price-cap" is essential to protect consumers while others (e.g. the interviewee with network perspective) think that price cap 
will distort the market; hence, is not needed. 
- It is uncertain whether consumers in the future will be willing to have a connection with untested new energy suppliers. 
- It is uncertain whether heavy or lighter regulation should be applied to network companies. Interviewees with network perspective from the industry support lighter regulation while 
interviewees from network companies think that heavy regulation should continue. 
5 - It is uncertain which type of back-up plants: battery storage or hydrogen storage or demand side flexibility will be integrated into the system. 
- New arrangements for transmission and distribution grids are uncertain. TNOs and DNOs might be publicly owned. National Grid might be redundant as argued by interviewees from academia 
or take part in interconnection for offshore winds as argued by another interviewee from the government.  The transition of DNOs to DSOs is subject to DNOs ability such as how well DNOs 
manage their relationships with flexibility providers. 
- It is uncertain how regulation will change even though there is recognition of unsuitable elements to this future such as the regulatory structure which separates conventional generation, 
consumption and distribution. 
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Table 5.3: Differences between the five futures 
Analytical components 
Determinants 










1. System components 
Key technologies (and business model 
associated with these technologies) 
Smart meters. 
Data and digitisation. 











storage and EVs 
charging assets. 
Smart meters. 















DSOs and ESOs 
cooperation. 
Smart meters. 
Data and digitisation. 
EVs. 
A mix of generation 
technologies (gas, nuclear, 
solar, wind…).  
CCS. 
Economy 7 tariff. 
Storage. 
EVs. 
Home energy management 
with smart devices. 
"Connected home" with 
smart technologies. 
Flexible ToU tariff for DSF. 





EVs and smart 
charging: ToU for 
EV owners and 
contracted 
flexibility. 










other (IT) sectors 














and local energy 
company to provide 
DSF. 









Market and finance 
Efficient price 
discovery process 
Successful market trials 
Private investment. 
Value to all market 
participants 
    
Culture   
Time and resource costs. 
DNOs skills and 
traditional mindset. 
Contract design. 
      
Actors 




energy service providers, 
energy suppliers 
DNOs to DSOs 
Government, the industry 
(mainly incumbents) and 
consumers 
Consumers and the 
industry who focus 
on consumers. 
Incumbents from 
other (IT) sectors: 

















Regulation   
Less intervention from 
regulation into the 
market. 
More intervention and 
incentivise the new way 










Principle-based and agile 
policy. 
Regulator needs to protect 
disadvantaged consumers 
and ensure a level playing 








Ensure data access 
regulation. 
Regulation changes 









Public ownership of 
the grids. 
2. System relationships 
  







businesses and new 
relationships between 
new entrants and 
energy consumers are 
established. 
The system boundary is 
redrawn around network 
companies with the 
development of DSF and 
grid automation. 
Tighter relationship 
between DNOs and the 
system operator. 
The system relationships 
remain largely unchanged. 
The industry is 









energy suppliers or 
have new 
relationships with 




systems exist but 
with some overlaps 









Power is assumed to 
be transferred from 
the regulator to 
market actors. 
Power is assumed to be 
in the hand of the 
government, regulator, 
experts and industry 
actors.  
The government uses the 
evidence from research 
and market trials to steer 
industry development. 
Power is assumed to be in 
the hand of the government 
and the industry.  
The government develops 
an industrial strategy which 
is both clean and driven by 
economic imperatives. 
Power is assumed 
to be shared by 
consumers and the 
industry who can 




Power is assumed 
to be in the hand of 
















DSOs and ESO share 
power. 
The industry provides 
private investment for 
technology development. 
4. The metaphor of energy 
flexibility (EF) 
  
EF is framed as a 
market aspect and can 
be achieved by ToU 
tariff or technology 
platform which 
connects providers 
and users of EF 
EF is considered as a 
technical issue of the 
network, i.e. 
transmission network 
balancing or local grid 
constraints 
management.  
EF is expected to be 
achieved by adding 
technologies/elements to 
the system such as storage, 
EVs, smart home 
technologies, Economy 7 
tariff, flexibility tariff and 
aggregators. 







EF is assumed to be 
achieved by adding 
aggregators and 
financial incentives 
to the system. 
EF is deemed as a 










CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the research findings presented in Chapter 4 and 5 in light of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2.  
This chapter firstly critically reflects on the futures identified in Chapter 5 in relation to the futures 
in literatures. After that, this chapter discusses how these futures may be realised which 
consequently reveals the feasibility of these futures (i.e. considers the likelihood of these futures 
based on interviewees’ comments and literature). These discussions on futures reveal key 
assumptions of the sector about the ontological nature of transitions and dominant future making 
practices in the sector. This chapter then discusses these with the literature.  
The transitions of GB’s electricity sector to these futures are embedded in transitions research. 
Here, the study uses the concepts from transitions research including the MLP, architectural 
innovation, whole system analysis, discourses and power. Critical reflections on the usefulness of 
these concepts are also discussed as a key contribution of this study to transitions research.  
This chapter closes by discussing energy flexibility and how it can be realised. 
6.2 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON FUTURES OF GB’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
This section provides critical reflections of the possible futures of GB’s electricity sector. Each future 
presented in Chapter 5 is messy which is at odds with the tidy futures in the transitions research 
and the electricity industry literature. The five futures identified in Chapter 5 are socially 
constructed and performative by the rhetorical interactions of actors, which resonates with several 
literatures concerned with futures (e.g. Urry, 2016; Oomen et al., 2021). However, empirically 
based studies of future pathways in the context of transition management (e.g. Geels et al., 2020; 
Rogge et al., 2020) tend to overlook such interactions and complexities. Thus, these reflections 
suggest a different, more nuanced understanding of futures are needed in transition management. 
These reflections are discussed below. 
The findings presented in section 5.7.1 show that there are multiple transition pathways to low 
carbon futures of GB’s electricity sector as resonating with the literatures. The notion of pathways 
has been increasingly used by a wide range of constituencies including research scholars and 
governmental bodies as a way to frame the challenges of transitions to low carbon futures 
 
190 
(Wiseman et al., 2013; Wise et al., 2014; Rosenbloom, 2017). Multiple typologies of pathways have 
been developed by different scholars (Smith et al., 2005; Geels and Schot, 2007). Moreover, 
multiple empirical transition pathways to different futures have been elaborated from both 
academia (c.f. Shackley and Green, 2007; Verbong and Geels, 2010; Foxon, 2013; Roby and Dibb, 
2019; Rogge et al., 2020) and the electricity industry (c.f. National Grid - Future Energy Scenarios 
(2019b), Energy UK - The Future of Energy (2019), Energy Networks Association - Networks Future 
Worlds (2018), Shell - Sky Scenario (2018), Committee on Climate Change - Power sector scenarios 
for the fifth carbon budget (2015a)).  
However, being at odds with the literatures from both transitions research and the industry, five 
futures identified in Chapter 5 are messy. Such messiness comes from (1) untidy discourse 
coalitions (2) the unclear vision of interviewees about specific system components/ innovations, (3) 
the contradictions in perspectives of interviewees about some system components/ innovations 
(summarised in section 5.7.2).  
In contrast, the multiple transition pathways in the literature suggest more tidy futures, i.e. do not 
feature interactions of actors. For example, Foxon (2013) neatly placed actors with the same 
interests into specific future pathways which then made these future pathways tidy. Similarly, Geels 
et al (2020) and Rogge et al (2020) elaborated future pathways of Germany’s and GB’s electricity 
sector, respectively, taking into account the interactions of actors in the past and present (not in 
the future). These interactions were then addressed in these studies to develop two neat future 
pathways: A - led by incumbents with incumbent large-scale low carbon technologies and B - led by 
new entrants with smaller-scale low carbon technologies. Here, transitions research literatures fail 
to fully capture how messy the futures are, although emphasising the uncertainty and open-
endedness of futures emerging from the interaction of multiple actors: 
“Transitions emerge through interactions among multiple actors, including businesses, 
users, scientific communities, policymakers, social movements and interest groups. They are 
evolutionary processes, meaning that they are typically based on searching, experimenting, 
reflecting and learning. They also depend critically on interpretations and social acceptance. 
Transitions are therefore fundamentally uncertain and open-ended.” (Geels et al., 2019, 
p.8) 
Similar to transitions research, the outcomes of the futures in the industry and government body 
literature are also tidy. For example, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015a) identified a 
list of technologies needed to achieve specific amounts of carbon emissions. National Grid (2019b) 
detailed the maximum potential of percentages of some technologies such as electricity generation, 
storage, gas supplies or hydrogen in its future scenarios. The futures presented in these literatures 
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are tidy and are clearly defined in the sense that each technology/ business model or component 
can be neatly fitted in a future, without any disagreement. Conversely, the futures articulated in 
Chapter 5 present some dominant system components of each future but some with diverse views 
of interviewees. It means that it is uncertain of which components will dominate in the future.  
Furthermore, the timeframe for transition in these literatures are set from 2030-2050 with an 
exceptional one with the timeframe of 2070 (Shell, 2018). In contrast, the findings (section 4.3) 
shows that there is no consistency in interviewees’ perspectives about the timeframe for 
transitions, or innovations. Rather, the timeframe depends on disruptive events or the changes in 
consumers’ behaviours, i.e. are shaped by context. In other words, the timeframe of transition is 
also subject to uncertainty.  
However, the industry literature fail to recognise such uncertainty within each scenario. These 
scenarios are tidy which reveals the industrial belief in pre-defined transition goals which can be 
managed, planned and delivered. Nevertheless, transition management should be based on 
process, rather the goal of transition (Rotmans et al., 2001). Seen in this way, setting a goal for 
transition might be needed but such goals are able to change and are replaced as transitions unfold. 
Therefore, the belief in tidy futures of the industry may hinder the effectiveness of GB’s electricity 
sector’s transition management. This insight from transition management suggests that a shift in 
the expectations of the electricity sector to a more nuanced and complex view of planning and 
transition management is needed. Rather than thinking of a pre-defined outcome (i.e. a transition 
goal) by following a transition pathway, transition of the sector should be understood as socially 
constructed rather than linear and emerging rather than pre-defined as a result of the interactions 
of different actor groups and other system components.  
The findings about the discourse coalitions in Chapter 4 and the five futures in Chapter 5 suggest 
that futures are socially constructed and performative. The five futures are socially constructed in 
the sense that they emerge from actor interactions in GB’s electricity industry (industrial actors) 
who draw on various discourses to construct and debate futures. These futures are socially 
performative because industrial actors contextualise these futures within meaningful stories, which 
ultimately shape and coordinate social actions (e.g. discourse, planning, persuasion) in the present. 
For example, Future 1 was constructed by actors holding a belief in economic rationalism. These 
actors are situated in various organisations (e.g. an aggregator, supplier, network company) but this 
study revealed that they shared the same belief in the role of market mechanism in achieving 
transitions. They rhetorically constructed Future 1 with stories about drivers for changes such as 
increasing market price volatility and complexity; about future system components, including the 
technology platform, flexibility time-of-use tariff; and about certain solutions such as an efficient 
price discovery process and less intervention from regulation. Industrial actors constructed these 
 
192 
stories about the future to persuade other actors that futures are driven and will be materialised in 
accordance with Future 1. As such, they hoped to make other actors believe in the importance of 
market and behave rationally following economic incentives and to direct other actors’ support 
towards their preferred components in Future 1. 
These findings further confirm that futures are social products emerging from the rhetorical 
interactions between industry actors. In this way, futures provide industrial social actions with 
meanings and hold potential to shape the behaviours of other industrial actors in the present. These 
findings resonate with many literatures emphasising the social constructs and performativity of 
futures (e.g. Borup et al., 2006; Adam, 2011; Urry, 2016; Tutton, 2017; Groves, 2017; Oomen et al., 
2021). However, empirical future pathways in transitions research are often neat and clearly 
delineated around dominant technologies and actors (Foxon, 2013; Geels et al., 2020; Rogge et al., 
2020) which overlooks the complexity and contingency of actor interactions. As such, these future 
pathways in literature fail to fully reflect the actual processes of transitions to futures and thus, 
they are unable to deal with the unpredictability and uncertainty of futures in transition 
management (Fuller and Loogma, 2009). 
Futures are uncertain and as a consequence, an acknowledgement of this uncertainty by the sector 
and an improved understanding on how futures are realised are needed. The following section 
looks at realising the futures. 
6.3 REALISING THE FUTURES  
The findings in Chapter 5 (summarised in section 5.7.3) shows that these futures are realised via 
similar determinants including (1) technology and associated business models, (2) other non-
technological determinants such as market, culture, consumers and (3) a regulation determinant. 
The dominant determinants of all futures in relation to the literatures are discussed next.  
6.3.1 Technology and associated business models 
Chapter 5 shows that the majority of interviewees believe that technology is a key determinant of 
all futures, although the expected specific dominant technology of each future varies. This finding 
accords with multiple literatures from the industry on the transition of electricity sector which 
argue for transition of electricity system by adding or changing key technologies, e.g. carbon 
capture and storage (Shell, 2018), electric vehicles (Energy Systems Catapult, 2020), nuclear power 
(Sepulveda, 2016). By believing that transition can proceed by adding new technology and/or 
knowledge to the existing electricity system, both interviewees and recent industry literature 
 
193 
assume that moving to low carbon futures is a technological question rather than a system 
question. Some recent transition literature from academia challenges the utility of this assumption 
(c.f. Gorissen et al., 2018; Geels, 2018b; Geels et al., 2019; McMeekin et al., 2019). Findings about 
other non-technological determinants from this study reinforce the idea that transition is systemic 
in nature because it involves the changes of innovations in not only technological aspects, but also 
in “consumer practices and needs, skills and capabilities of all actors involved, infrastructures, 
governance, regulation, industry structure and cultural meaning of the system” (Schot et al., 2018, 
p.4).  
The “technology assumption” is also at odds with a small number of interviewees who argued for a 
whole system approach of dealing with transitions, as presented in section 5.4.1.1. Here, a whole 
system in terms of an energy system involves the changes in both technology and societal aspects 
across the value chain of the sector.  Further discussion on the whole system analysis is explored in 
more detail in section 6.9. 
6.3.2 Non-technological determinants 
Non-technological determinants including market and financial, cultural and consumer 
determinants are also identified as important in realising all these futures. Although the majority 
of interviewees considered transitions to these futures involve changes in technologies, as 
discussed in section 4.4.2.1, they believe that technology itself may not present a barrier to 
transition to low carbon futures as technological change in the electricity sector may follow 
trajectories of technological change in other sectors, e.g. smart phones became dominant in 
telecommunication. This view chimes with transition literature which suggests there are no gaps in 
technology and innovation which could potentially constrain transitions to low carbon electricity 
futures (Mazur et al., 2019).  
Instead, the findings from Chapter 5 show that a majority of interviewees argued that non-
technological determinants may hinder transitions to low carbon futures, reinforcing the findings 
from Chapter 4 (section 4.4.2).  The findings from Chapter 4 show a wide range of non-technological 
barriers to transition including the cost of technology, financial incentives, subsidy, traditional 
mindset and skill sets of organisations, consumer-related barrier, the availability of information and 
market design barriers. Removing these non-technological barriers is essential for the sector to 
transition to a low carbon future. This argument accords with literature aiming to provide policy 
makers with practical recommendations (Foxon et al., 2005; Engelken et al., 2016; Ofgem, 2016; 
Energy UK, 2019; CCC, 2019). Seen in this way, transition appears as a linear process which can be 
manageable and controllable. Nevertheless, some authors challenge the utility of this assumption. 
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Mitchell (2008) argued that the current political governance of the sector considers the 
development of innovations as a linear process and hence, overlooks the actual process of 
innovation and/or transition. Building on this, literature in transitions research (Geels et al., 2019; 
Köhler et al., 2019) highlighted, as noted above, that transition processes are an open-ended, 
complex and non-linear processes which emerge through the interactions among multiple actors 
including businesses, consumers and policy makers – i.e. non-technological determinants.  
6.3.3 Regulation determinant 
Regulation is another key determinant which is identified from the findings in Chapter 4 and 5. 
Table 5.3 identified this determinant across different futures - each requiring a change in regulation 
although with different degrees of changes.  
In Future 2 and 3, regulation is part of the sub-systems and varies in scope to accommodate the 
changes of other elements (e.g. technologies) of the sector. For example, the regulator is expected 
to incentivise DNOs to opt for demand side flexibility option in Future 2, or to create a level playing 
field for incumbents and new entrants in Future 3. In Future 4, regulation plays a more important 
role in transition. It is a separate sub-system which “may experience [undergo] relatively 
autonomous distinctive change processes” (McMeekin et al., 2019). However, regulatory changes 
in Future 2, 3 and 4 do not involve changes in the structure of regulation itself, i.e. it keeps the 
relationships between the three conventional generation, network and consumption sub-systems 
largely untouched. As the regulatory structure remains untouched, it is therefore assumed as a 
barrier to transition and need to be overcome.  
Such views are inconsistent with the view of regulatory changes in Future 1 and 5, where, in the 
view of these discourse coalitions, the whole structure of regulation needs to be transformed. The 
views of regulatory structural change in Future 1 and 5 resonates with very recent literature on 
transition (Geels et al., 2019; McMeekin et al., 2019) where regulation is understood as  part of the 
system and itself needs to be transformed, not ‘overcome’. As such, recent literature has moved 
away from overcoming a single barrier, based on linear views of transition rooted in rational 
behaviour, towards addressing systemic challenges. Here, a whole system view of transition which 
realises changes in the architecture of a system is essential in transition. Further discussion on a 
whole system view is provided in section 6.9. 
However, going beyond these key determinants which the majority of interviewees consider as 
barriers for transition, the findings show that it is the interactions among actor groups and other 
components of system (such as technologies and regulation) which also determines how futures 
are realised and consequently the feasibility of these futures. 
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6.4 THE FEASIBILITY OF THE FUTURES 
Discussing the feasibility of the five futures identified in Chapter 5 is important to explore the 
practical implications of these futures for the industry. There is a variety of conditions influencing 
the feasibility of futures, such as the maturity of technologies, infrastructure, economic 
implications, social acceptance of technologies, political feasibility and interactions with other 
societal objectives (Loftus et al., 2015; Turnheim and Nykvist, 2019). Among them, social 
acceptance of technologies and political feasibility are used to discuss the feasibility of futures in 
this section. “Social acceptance” encompasses “issues, controversies, or anxieties with the expected 
deployment and use of any particular option” (Turnheim and Nykvist, 2019, p.780). In this study, 
“social acceptance” implies industrial acceptance (i.e. whether an option is accepted by the 
industry, rather than by the whole society). “Political feasibility” is “the likelihood of decisions 
supporting a particular path to become implemented” (Turnheim and Nykvist, 2019, p.781). Social 
acceptance and political feasibility are chosen because they are crucial in determining the overall 
feasibility of futures (Turnheim and Nykvist, 2019; Geels et al., 2020). They are shaped by social 
interactions (Geels et al., 2020), or more specifically by the interactions of industrial actors in the 
context of GB’s electricity sector. The feasibility of each future is discussed in turn below. 
6.4.1 Feasibility of Future 1 
This section examines the feasibility of Future 1 in terms of two main components of Future 1 which 
are (1) the “technology platform” where different value pools/ market (balancing ancillary market, 
wholesale market and local constraint management market) can be blended and (2) less 
intervention from regulation. This examination suggests that Future 1 is unlikely to be feasible. 
Firstly, Future 1 shows that with the development of the technology platform, real-time markets 
for flexibility will emerge and allow flexibility to be allocated to the users of flexibility who value it 
the most. In other words, value can be stacked in this future. These findings accord with one 
industrial report about making sense of market trends (Elexon, 2015), which identifies that the most 
beneficial option would be bringing all market actors with interests in flexibility into one “central 
market platform”. The idea of one central market platform is similar to the technology platform in 
Future 1. However, the development of the central market platform is a costly option and needs 
complex intervention (Elexon, 2015). As a result, Future 1 may not be socially feasible. 
The recommendation of one technology platform is at odds with the regulator and government 
which are supporting the development of many different platforms for energy flexibility rather than 
a single platform (Ofgem, 2015c; BEIS and Ofgem, 2018; Ofgem, 2019a). The main function for the 
single technology platform in Future 1 is dispatching while Ofgem distinguishes several kinds of 
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tasks for flexibility platforms including coordination, procurement, dispatch and control, platform 
transaction settlement, platform market services and analytics and feeding (Ofgem, 2019a, p.9). As 
such, Future 1 overlooks the importance of different types of platforms in the future and may not 
receive support from the regulator and government.  
Moreover, interviewees with a network perspective express contested views about whether DNOs 
are able to get the energy flexibility that they need by participating in this technology platform (i.e. 
depending on markets), which may threaten the reliability of the network. As a result, this future 
may not be accepted by DNOs.   
Secondly, Future 1 is also characterised by less intervention from regulation into the electricity 
market. However, the existing literature challenges the utility of this approach. The electricity 
sector is constrained by a “highly interventionist” or “regulatory state paradigm” that is difficult for 
it to change (Helm, 2014; Mitchell, 2008). Although Amber Rudd’s speech (DECC, 2015a) expressed 
the intention of the government to be less interventionist in the market, some recent reviews from 
the regulator Ofgem (e.g. Targeted charging review (Ofgem, 2019b)) do not show any change in the 
level of intervention. Consequently, the idea of less regulation in Future 1 may be politically 
infeasible. As both the social and political feasibility of this future is questioned, Future 1 is unlikely 
to be realised.   
6.4.2 Feasibility of Future 2 
The feasibility of Future 2 is dependent on two main components: (1) smart grids and (2) DNOs-led 
flexibility market. The need for smart grids is emphasised in transition literature and DNOs’ reports. 
However, the government seems not to recognise the importance of smart grids, which questions 
the political feasibility of Future 2. The likelihood of DNOs-led flexibility has also been undermined 
and challenged by diverse views of interviewees. These two points give rise to the uncertainty of 
the feasibility of Future 2. 
Firstly, the main technologies in Future 2 are smart grids. Publications from both DNOs and 
academia highlight the significance of smart grids for the future of network as well as the reliability 
of supply (c.f. McMeekin et al., 2019; Expert Group 3 - Smart grid task force, 2015; Connor et al., 
2018; Cook et al., 2015; Hall and Foxon, 2014; Hiteva and Watson, 2019; ENA, 2018). Literature also 
highlights the uncertainty and risk for smart grid development (Connor et al., 2018). However, 
government energy policy such as the Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017) and the Progress Update 
on Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan (BEIS and Ofgem, 2018) discussed the importance of smart 
meters and smart charging rather than smart grids. The lack of government support could hamper 
the industry investment in smart grids, and could therefore render Future 2 difficult to realise. 
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Secondly, one of the main features of Future 2 is the development of DNO-led demand side 
flexibility. DNOs in this future seem to be very positive about the development of flexibility, 
although acknowledging that futures will depend on technologies, providers of flexibility, 
organisational culture and the design of the contract. It is anticipated that other markets for energy 
flexibility which are not led by DNOs may be needed, e.g. the Cornwall Local Energy Market Trial 
run by Centrica - an incumbent energy supplier (2018) or real-time markets run by new entrants as 
proposed in Future 1. Led by other actors, these markets may reduce the social acceptance of DNO-
led demand side flexibility markets. Hence, the feasibility of Future 2, reliant on smart grids and a 
leading role for DNOs, is uncertain.  
6.4.3 Feasibility of Future 3 
Compared to Future 1 and 2, Future 3 is more likely to occur because (1) it conforms to the current 
existing energy policy; and (2) it may be more acceptable to a greater number of industrial actors. 
Firstly, in Future 3, changes are driven by the government decarbonisation energy policy. This is set 
out in the most recent high level policy document for Britain’s low carbon future – The Clean 
Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017). This means Future 3 is likely to be supported by the government and 
thus is more politically feasible than other futures. 
Secondly, the findings of the leading role of the government in Future 3 and of energy policy in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2) reveal the government has been criticised by some industrial actors 
despite the overall agreement about the importance of the policy. Critiques centre on the 
government’s lack of a long-term view (of the network assets needed) in the future which may 
create uncertainty, especially for the investor community. Interviewees with investor perspectives 
are also uncertain about the investment signals that they can act upon while the government seems 
to not have a clear view on the level of profits that investment may generate, e.g. in the case of 
battery storage. Moreover, the government is criticised for creating uncertainty due to sudden 
changes in policy and associated regulation, e.g. the case of the Capacity Market has been stopped 
without notice. These criticisms from industrial actors - who are expected to embrace changes from 
governmental policy in Future 3 - might hamper transitions to Future 3. However, despite these 
criticisms, it seems that the industry is following policy signals for planning. It means that the 
leading role of the government in transitions is likely to be accepted by industrial actors. For 
example, in the case of Carbon capture and storage (CCS), CCS demonstration projects run by the 
industry were suspended shortly after the government halted £1bn investment fund for CCS 
without notice in Nov 2015 (Kapetaki et al., 2017). 
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Moreover, the regulator is expected to develop a level playing field for multiple innovations and 
multiple actors in Future 3. It means that Future 3 can accommodate the interests of both 
incumbents and new entrants, compared to other futures. For example, Future 1 favours new 
entrants because incumbents without new technologies may become “losers”. Future 2 favours 
incumbents because new entrants without good financial foundation may become “losers” in 
Future 2. Therefore, Future 3 is more acceptable to a greater number of industrial actors. 
However, the architecture of the sector in Future 3 remains largely intact and energy flexibility is 
assumed to be a technological question, with technologies added to sub-systems as necessary. This 
assumption does not resonate with transitions research which recognised the needs of transitions 
at a system level (Mitchell, 2008; Geels et al., 2019; McMeekin et al., 2019). This may create 
difficulty for the sector to plan for transitioning to this future. Further discussion on the needs to 
understand transitions at a system level will be detailed in section 6.9 and 6.12.  
6.4.4 Feasibility of Future 4 
The feasibility of Future 4 hinges on two main components: (1) the emergence of consumer 
sovereignty and (2) the penetration of actors from other sectors such as Google and Amazon into 
the energy sector. Although this future is supported in the literature, the feasibility of Future 4 can 
be questioned as it is based on contested view of how consumers behave. This section examines 
these elements.  
Firstly, Future 4 can accommodate a variety of consumers behaviours and is embraced by some 
recent industrial and academic literatures (Sandys et al., 2018; Menges, 2003; Hamwi and 
Lizarralde, 2018; Quiggin and Froggatt, 2017). These literatures place consumers at the heart of 
energy system where industrial changes move towards consumer sovereignty and suggest some 
consumer-centric technologies and business models. Secondly, Future 4 is characterised by the 
penetration of technologies and business models of actors from other sectors such as Google and 
Amazon in the technology sectors which help consumers. For example, Google acquired NEST, a 
smart home company (Savenije, 2014) and Amazon launched Amazon Echo, a voice-activated 
speaker (Lorenzetti, 2014) which demonstrate their interests in smart home in energy sector. 
Google and Amazon’s move towards the energy sector is consistent with the development of 
technologies and digitisation in this future and predicted by Helm (2017). Therefore, Future 4 may 
be widely accepted by actors working on energy research. 
However, Future 4 faces controversies among industrial actors. Some interviewees assumed that 
consumers act rationally following economic incentives, while others disagreed with this 
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assumption. Such disagreement means the social acceptance and thus, the feasibility of Future 4 is 
questionable. 
6.4.5 Feasibility of Future 5 
Future 5 is unlikely to be realised because (1) the proposal for bringing grids back to public 
ownership might face industrial opposition and (2) the proposal to change the regulatory structure 
is not easy to implement given that there is no clear view about how this will be done. 
Firstly, the main feature suggested by supporters of Future 5 is the move to public ownership of 
the grids. However, this view is opposed by other interviewees such as one interviewee following 
ecological modernisation in Future 3 who argued that being in public domain may mean that there 
would be no incentives and motivation for network innovations. The vision of public ownership is 
supported by the Labour Party (2017) but it is likely to face industrial opposition (e.g. from National 
Grid which is a private company). There is also considerable uncertainty about how the move to 
public ownership would actually be achieved and at what cost  (Inman, 2019). Thus, Future 5 may 
not be socially acceptable. 
Secondly, interviewees supporting Future 5 highlighted the uncertainty in whether the regulation 
might change due to the inertia within the regulator itself as well as the uncertainty of the scope 
and format of the future regulatory framework. One concern raised in this future is about whether 
distribution grids can own storage. Future 5 requires the blurring of generation, distribution and 
consumption sub-systems in order for DNOs to generate electricity from distribution grids-
connected storage. However, Ofgem (2018) announced the decision that DNOs are unable to own 
storage, which currently further undermines the political feasibility of Future 5. 
In summary, this section reflected on futures with diverse views of interviewees and compared 
these with academic and industry literature (some at policy and regulatory level) to argue that 
Future 3 seems to be more feasible than other futures because it conforms to the current existing 
energy policy and may be more acceptable to industrial actors.  
The critical reflections on futures, how futures are realised and the feasibility of futures reveal 
established knowledge of the industry on the nature of transitions. The following section hence 




This section discusses ontology of GB’s electricity sector in terms of transition. Here, ontology refers 
to the assumptions about the nature of the world (Stainton-Rogers, 2006) (i.e. nature of transitions 
of the sector). The findings presented in Chapter 4 and 5 show that a number of interviewees in the 
sector assumed that (1) the industry (including consumers) acts rationally as summarised in section 
4.2.4 (2) transition can occur by adding technologies or knowledge to the existing system as 
discussed in section 6.3.1 (3) transition can proceed by removing barriers as discussed in section 
6.3.2 and (4) a pre-defined goal of transition is needed to steer transition as discussed in section 
6.2. These assumptions reveal that the dominant ontology of GB’s electricity is realism. These four 
assumptions are at odds with much of literature as detailed below.   
Such assumptions of the majority of interviewees are relevant to the main features of realism 
discussed in section 3.2.2. Firstly, according to the realist view, human beings are purposive actors 
who have ideas about the world and attach meanings to events. Human beings are assumed to act 
economically rationally: with an incentive in financial benefit, humans will act towards such benefit. 
This assumption of rational choice is well established in economic theory to understand individual 
decision making from a realist view  (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2015). However, Mitchell (2008, p.210) 
argued that, 
“In general, in market economies, price is the most used basis of choice. But in a complex 
world, where decisions are often made from the rational perspective of the individual (or 
irrational from the point of economics); where there are market failures; and where factors 
other than economics are important to outcomes, then other means of stimulating 
technology development or a paradigm (structural) shift to a sustainable energy future are 
not only necessary but appropriate” 
Mitchell is a reminder that human behaviour is not economically rational. Yet, the current 
governance of GB’s electricity sector while it continues to underestimate human irrational 
behaviour may be unable to effectively transition to low carbon futures.  
Realism also focusses on explaining how mechanisms and structures produce phenomena and 
events (Robson and McCartan, 2016). As such, realists pay attention to facilitating transitions by 
adding technologies or knowledge to the system (e.g. EVs, smart meters, flexibility time of use tariff) 
or removing barriers to transition (e.g. technological, financial, cultural, consumer, information, 
market and regulatory barriers). Here, innovations and transition are deemed to be linear processes 
moving towards a pre-defined goal of futures which might be, for example, lower carbon. This 
assumption reveals an engineering perspective of GB’s electricity sector which looks to engineer 
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the transitions of GB’s electricity sector. As innovations are argued to be non-linear in transitions 
research literature (i.e. the outcomes of innovations may be not as wanted), the dominant ontology 
may constrain the development of system innovations and transitions of the electricity system itself 
(Berkhout, 2002; Berkhout et al., 2004; Shove and Walker, 2007; Guy and Shove, 2000; Kern and 
Smith, 2008; Mitchell, 2008). 
Finally, with regard to pre-defined goals of futures such as decarbonisation or flexibility as argued 
by interviewees (section 4.6), the majority of interviewees assumed that a certain landscape such 
as government policy is needed to enable actors to progress towards transition. Hence, the purpose 
of a pre-defined goal for transition is to provide policy makers and planners with a clear steer on 
the direction of transitions. These findings accord with some industry literature such as the Fifth 
Carbon Budget (CCC, 2015b) and Roadmap for flexibility services to 2030 (Shakoor et al., 2017). 
Such literature provides some certainty for those operating GB’s electricity sector, but some 
interviewees argued that actors are learning to work under condition of uncertainty. This argument 
is in line with literature which suggested that the complexity and uncertainty of transitions mean 
that the futures are not simply planned (Hajer et al., 2015; Geels et al., 2019).  
Although realism is evidently the dominant narratives of GB’s electricity sector, this ontological 
position has little resonance with the transition literature. The MLP, an established framework to 
study and manage transitions, although can arguably accommodate realism, is founded from 
constructionism and structuralism (Geels, 2010; 2020). As such, realism only offers limited insights 
into transitions research (see section 2.4.1.4). Therefore, there is some inconsistency between the 
knowledge being used in the electricity sector to determine key steps of transitions with the 
ontologies of transition in literature. 
The prevalent realist ontology in the sector is also at odds with a small number of interviewees who 
claim that transitions are non-linear, and consumers do not act economically rationally. For 
example, some interviewees from various groups such as a new entrant, trade association and 
consultancy firm were of the view that there is hardly any price incentive that is able to impact 
consumers’ behaviour. As Mitchell noted, 
“…if humans consume and behave in ways which do not fit with rational economic choices, 
then curbing energy consumption and changing behaviour is much more complex than is 
recognized by economic principles and requires a greater range of more sophisticated 
policies and regulations” (Mitchell, 2008, p.5) 
Although published before the Climate Change Act (2008), this view remains relevant because since 
its publication, the realist ontology dominating the electricity sector has changed little, as 
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evidenced by interviewees’ discussion. This suggests a shift in the established knowledge of the 
sector towards a more sophisticated understanding of transition processes is needed in order to 
facilitate transitions. Rather than being linear cause and effect processes with pre-defined 
outcomes, such as decarbonisation or flexibility, transition should be understood as being socially 
constructed and emergent as a result of the interactions of actor constituencies and other system 
components in the sector. As such, futures are uncertain and require innovation at the system level 
(architectural innovation) as well as a more nuanced and complex view of transition governance. 
By following social constructionism, this study has revealed the futures of the sector which are 
uncertain and emerge through the interactions of different actor groups as well as architectural 
innovation at system level.  
This section discussed the need to develop a more nuanced and complex perspective of transitions 
in GB’s electricity sector to counter the dominant realist ontology. Such an established realist 
ontology plays a key role in how futures are currently made. The future making practices of the 
future are discussed next.  
6.6 RETHINKING FUTURE MAKING PRACTICES IN ENERGY SECTOR  
Although not asked directly, a small number of interviewees commented on how futures are made 
within the GB’s electricity sector, while the majority did not. The predominant future making 
practice identified in the findings included the use of models and economic concepts to determine 
the future cost-effectiveness of a technology or business model. In other practices, industrial actor 
inputs were sought through call for evidence, interviews and workshops to supplement modelling 
and understand energy demand in futures. Such technical exercises, which leave little room for 
uncertainty and an open discussion on power and politics, are often led by key actors. For example, 
National Grid developed Future Energy Scenarios (2019b), Energy UK elaborated The Future of 
Energy (2019), Energy Networks Association articulated Open Networks Future Worlds (2018), Shell 
endorsed Sky Scenario (2018), Committee on Climate Change published Power sector scenarios for 
the fifth carbon budget (2015a). These futures share the same characteristics including (1) Mixed 
methods based on quantitative modelling and qualitative data collection analysis for most notably 
stakeholder engagement, (2) Purposes: using future scenarios to plan for activities and (3) 
Timeframe: a pre-defined timeframe. Developed for governing and planning purposes, the futures 
in these publications are clean, clear and apparently relatively free of uncertainty.  
Some frameworks such as the MLP are also used in transitions research and by policy makers to 
develop future pathways or scenarios (c.f. Foxon, 2013; Geels et al., 2020; Rogge et al., 2020). The 
MLP visualises key socio-technical elements and interactions of actors, and consequently, render 
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transitions manageable and actionable. As such, these futures are tidy, as argued in section 2.3.2 
and 6.2,  while real-world transitions and futures are more messy and uncertain. Here, as the MLP 
cleans up these transitions and futures too much, it risks simplifying the real process of transitions 
and causing problems in managing transitions. Therefore, there is a need to rethink future making 
practices in GB’s electricity sector and understand that futures cannot be controlled by modelling 
tasks and fixed transitions frameworks. In response to calls for a more nuanced understanding of 
practices for a sustainable future (Knappe et al., 2019), this study uses key concepts from the MLP 
rather than the MLP framework itself and articulates futures by applying whole system analysis, 
discourse theory and power to enrich understanding of a socio-technical transition approach. The 
following sections provides critical reflections on several concepts in transitions research used in 
this study. 
6.7 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE MLP 
Critical reflections on the MLP show that although reconfiguration pathway of the MLP is likely to 
be dominant in transitions of GB’s electricity section, the MLP might not be relevant in investigating 
futures of GB’s electricity sector. These two critical reflections are explored below. 
Futures 2, 3 and 5 presented in Chapter 5 feature landscape pressures and niche innovations 
adopted by regimes. In Future 2, expectations are that cost-benefit analysis and market trials from 
the regimes will demonstrate the benefits of energy flexibility to the government to bring pressure 
for changes to the energy network. As a result, the grid will adopt new sources of energy flexibility 
to resolve network constraints. In Future 3, transitions also come about due to pressures to 
decarbonise. Such pressures lead to changes and innovations in many sub-systems of the sector 
and most noticeably the development of low carbon technologies, e.g. CCS in generation, energy 
efficiency in consumption, network balancing at distributed level. Similarly, in Future 5, climate 
change creates landscape pressure on the regime which leads to the development of non-
dispatchable/ intermittent renewables. Such intermittency changes the way that the system is 
balanced and leads to the development of a local energy system with the support of some 
innovations such as battery storage.  
Here, how futures come about in these Futures 2, 3 and 5 is imagined in line with a reconfiguration 
pathway developed in the well-established typology of transition pathways by Geels and Schot 
(2007). According to this typology, reconfiguration pathway occurs when landscape pressure urges 
regimes to change. In a reconfiguration pathway, innovations in niches are conceptualised as 
symbiotic innovations which may be easily adopted by regimes to resolve regime problems and 
incumbents are likely to form alliances with new entrants (Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels et al., 
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2016). This reflects the current merger and acquisition strategy in the industry where Shell bought 
First Utility (Shell, 2017) or Engie acquired stakes from Kiwi Power (Engie, 2018). This 
reconfiguration chimes well  with recent perspectives on whole system reconfiguration (Geels et 
al., 2015; Geels, 2018a). Such whole system reconfiguration has been applied in empirical works in 
transitions in the electricity sector (McMeekin et al., 2019) and mobility sector (Geels, 2018b).  
However, it seems that Future 1 and 4 in the findings in Chapter 5 focus on regime instability but 
do not recognise exogenous forces of change emanating from the landscape while all pathways in 
the MLP face landscape pressures. In Future 1, transitions are triggered by regime instability (i.e. 
market forces) created by the development of renewables and greater demand for flexibility.  Such 
instability enables the regime to move towards more dynamic real-time markets for flexibility with 
the support of a technology platform. Similarly, in Future 4, transitions also occur due to regime 
instability created by changes in consumers’ preferences and behaviours which consequently 
changes the way the industry treats consumers. This future is characterised by the development of 
some consumers-centric innovations such as the development of bundling energy services in 
domestic homes. These two futures are at odds with the transition pathways proposed by the MLP 
(Geels and Schot, 2007). This challenges the usefulness of the MLP in investigating transitions to 
futures and further reinforces the argument in section 6.6. Rather, this study used concepts from 
the MLP and architectural innovation.  
6.8 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON INNOVATION IN TRANSITIONS 
Innovations come to the fore in transition literature. This section reflects on identified technological 
and business model innovations in Chapter 4 and 5 and discusses them in light of literature to argue 
that (1) there are multiple innovations in transitions to future (2) historical innovations are modular 
and unable to change the whole electricity system and (3) interviewees do not realise that 
innovations in futures are mostly part of architectural innovation. This reflection also reveals the 
contribution of this study to transition and innovation studies as well as the industry.  
Firstly, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 show that there are a wide range of innovations which are currently 
developing or are likely to be developed in the future. For example, in future 4, many technological 
innovations and business model innovations which are consumer-focussed were described, such as 
EVs, EVs time-of-use tariff, energy service companies and their bundles. These findings reveal that 
there are likely to be multiple innovations in the future which is in line with recent transition studies 
(Geels, 2018b; McMeekin et al., 2019). By recognising that innovations are multiple, the sector 
might be more open to a different way of understanding, conceptualising and evaluating the role 
of each innovation in transitions as discussed below.  
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Secondly, Chapter 4 and 5 also show that there are a significant number of existing technologies 
(historical innovations) such as PVs, energy efficiency and EVs which have played a key role in the 
development of GB’s electricity sector. The development of PVs has brought about a significant 
increase in the number of actors involved in electricity generation which challenges the 
management of network. Energy efficient innovations reduced demand in the consumption sub-
system. The existence of EVs may increase demand at a specific time of a day and consequently 
pose a threat to the distribution grid. This finding is similar to a number of literature supporting the 
development of a single technological innovation as sufficient for transitions of the sector (Geels, 
2002; 2005a). However, these innovations are component/modular innovations in the sense that 
they only change the core concept and working of a single sub-system. By themselves, they are 
unable to bring about changes in the whole system of generation, distribution and consumption. 
This finding accord with recent transition literature which conceptualises transitions as changes in 
the whole system level (Geels, 2018b; McMeekin et al., 2019). 
Thirdly, interviewees do not realise that a large number of technological innovations identified in 
Chapter 4 and 5 and summarised in section 4.2.4 such as the further uptake of EVs and smart grids 
could create system level change, i.e. are part of architectural innovation. The further uptake of EVs 
is architectural because it can enable demand side flexibility and consequently, changes the 
relationship between consumers and the electricity network. Consumers participating in demand 
side flexibility may be able to not only help DNOs reduce network constraints but also help system 
operators balance the grid. Similarly, smart grids are part of architectural innovation which support 
the two way flows of electricity change the relationship between generation, network and 
consumption subsystems because it (1) helps DNOs and system operators to deploy flexibility from 
consumers to overcome network issues, (2) supports the development of low carbon generation 
and (3) facilitates the uptake of EVs.  
Some business model innovations at the firm level identified in Chapter 4 and 5 are also able to 
impact transitions at the system level. For example, with the case of energy service companies in 
Future 4 which manage home appliances on consumers’ behalf, the relationship between 
consumers, suppliers and network may change. The relationship with energy suppliers will change 
because consumers may receive bills directly from energy service companies, rather than their 
energy suppliers. The relationship with the network changes because consumers can participate in 
demand side flexibility, although indirectly by authorising energy service companies to manage 
their demand. As the penetration of energy service companies involve changes in the linkages 
between consumers with suppliers and the network, it is classified as an architectural innovation.  
As these technological and business model innovations can potentially involve changes in the 
linkages between traditional sub-systems (components) within GB’s electricity system and 
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consequently change GB’s electricity system architecture, they are part of architectural innovation. 
Table 6.1 summaries some architectural innovation identified in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 and their 
impacts on system architecture.  
This finding about architectural innovation reveals that the GB’s electricity sector will potentially 
experience a period of restructuring system architecture in which the linkages between three 
conventional sub-systems generation, distribution and consumption are fundamentally altered. 
This finding accords with the anticipation of recent empirical research on architectural reshaping of 
GB’s electricity sector from 2015 (McMeekin et al., 2019). However, this McMeekin et al (2019) 
research is based on the historic analysis of GB’s electricity sector from 1990 to 2015 to anticipate 
futures whereas this study investigates architectural innovation in the future.   
Despite the importance of architectural innovation, there is little comparative attention paid to 
architectural innovation, especially in GB’s electricity sector context and futures. Hence, this finding 
about architectural innovation not only contributes to transitions research but also suggest that 
further research on architectural innovation in transitions is required. 
Key issues within an organisation with regards to architectural innovation are recognising 
architectural innovation and understanding how to integrate architectural innovation as it involves 
changing the linkages between the organisation and wider system (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
Indeed, the majority of interviewees do not recognise the changes in system architecture arising 
from an innovation. By identifying architectural innovation and suggesting how system linkages 
may change and hence, engender transitions, this study shifts debate and discussion to whole 
system transition. The following section discusses this whole system change.  
Table 6.1: Architectural innovation and their impacts on linkages of traditional sub-systems 
Architectural innovation  Changes in linkages of sub-systems 
Further uptake of EVs Distribution, Consumption 
Smart grids Generation, Distribution, Consumption 
Energy service companies Distribution, Consumption 
Consortia Distribution, Consumption 
Transmission grid-battery storage 
connecting with EVs charging model  
Generation, Distribution, Consumption 
Technology platform for flexibility (new 
entrants) 
Generation, Distribution, Consumption 
Flexibility platforms (DNOs) Generation, Distribution, Consumption 
Flexibility time-of-use tariff Generation, Distribution, Consumption 
Demand side flexibility Generation, Distribution, Consumption 
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6.9 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON WHOLE SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
The findings and the discussion about technological determinants of the sector in section 6.3.1 
show that a majority of interviewees considered transitions as predominantly technological. In 
contrast, a small number of interviewees argued that transition should be at the system level, rather 
than focus on technological sub-systems. Although only a small number of interviewees 
acknowledged the vision of system level changes, Chapter 5 shows that the potential outcomes 
(whether or not preferred by the existing energy policy) of transition in Future 1, 2, 4 and 5 are, in 
fact, at systemic level. Future 1 sees the blending of different business models in one technology 
platform at real time. As a consequence, the boundary of conventional generation, network and 
consumption is blurred and replaced by one boundary of a market for different users and providers 
of flexibility. The transition to Future 1 is at systemic level in the sense that conventional sub-
systems of the sector cease to exist and the boundary of the system is changed. Similarly, the 
boundary and purpose of the system changes towards the operation of the network in Future 2, 
and towards the consumers in Future 4. In Future 5, although the boundary of generation, network 
and consumption are realised, these sub-systems are overlapped, especially in the prosumer 
element. Prosumers are able to generate, consume their own generated electricity and only use 
electricity grids as electricity supply back-ups, i.e. they disrupt the arrangement of current 
transmission, distribution grids. Such overlapping of the boundary is at systemic level because it 
changes these sub-system separation arrangements and relationships established by the current 
regulatory framework. This finding not only shows the importance of recognising the systemic 
nature and level of transition but also identifies the outcome of transitions at systemic level, i.e. 
the changes, the overlap or blending in system boundaries.  
Although recent industry publications call for a whole system analysis, they usually analyse a whole 
technological system, rather than a socio-technological system. The latter explicitly includes the 
socio aspect (e.g. actors and their interactions with other system components) as important to bring 
about transitions. It suggests that the critical review of the conceptual framing of GB’s electricity 
system and the nature of the whole system is urgently needed. 
In transitions research, recent publications recognise the needs to consider socio-technical 
transitions as a system question (Mitchell, 2008; Geels et al., 2019; McMeekin et al., 2019). 
However, these publications do not explore what the outcomes at the systemic level look like in 
the future. This finding therefore contributes to the literature on transitions research.  
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6.10 DISCOURSES IN TRANSITIONS 
This section provides critical reflections on the usefulness of (1) discourse coalition approach, (2) 
the dominant energy discourses and also briefly discusses (3) Dryzek’s (1997) discourse analysis 
framework in transitions.  
6.10.1 Critical reflections on discourse coalitions 
Actors are grouped into discourse coalitions, but it is noticeable in Chapter 4 (section 4.7) that 
interviewees do not neatly fit in one single discourse coalition. They appear in and/or support two 
or more futures regardless of their positions in GB’s electricity sector. However, it does not mean 
that discourse coalition approach is invalid. Rather, this finding suggests that actors in the sector 
hold a plurality of views on energy futures and transitions which may even be contradictory and 
associated with multiple futures. This finding is in line with the conceptualisation of discourse 
coalitions which consists of actors who from the various backgrounds and do not necessarily hold 
the same views or interests (Hajer, 1993; 1995; Kern, 2012). Ultimately, futures articulating from 
these discourse coalitions are messy which reinforces the argument in section 6.2. Therefore, 
discourse coalition is a useful conceptual and methodological approach and tool to bring new 
insights to transitions research and the industry.  
Moreover, Chapter 5 shows that each future, beside the dominant discourses used to articulate 
futures, contains the discourses of technology-focus and energy flexibility (see section 4.7.2). This 
reveals the complexity of the real-world where transitions are socially constructed and opens an 
opportunity for further analysis on the interaction of actors and their visions of energy futures.  
6.10.2 Critical reflections on existing energy discourses 
The boundaries of the discourses identified in Chapter 4 and 5 are unclear and far from obvious. 
This section draws out the overlaps of these discourse coalitions and further shows that futures are 
open-ended. 
Economic rationalism is represented by individuals or organisation with “individual interest” and 
there is “no citizen” acting towards public interests (Dryzek, 1997, p.117). However, some “public 
interests” are evidenced in Future 1, e.g. in the case of the availability of data for every half hour of 
day, both consumers and energy suppliers are expected to have benefits. Here, economic 
rationalism fulfils one of the characteristics of ecological modernisation.  
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Administrative rationalism emphasises “the role of experts rather than citizen or producer/ 
consumers in social problem solving, and which stresses social relationships of hierarchy rather than 
equality or competition” (Dryzek, 1997, p.63). The market is underestimated in administrative 
rationalism. However, in Future 2, it is evident that market is salient to some extent. Evidence 
needed for state administration in this future not only comes from research of experts but also 
from market demonstration. Market demonstration is even more important than research because 
it can evaluate the effectiveness of research according to interviewees. Moreover, one of the 
options for DNOs in Future 2 to resolve network constraints is to bring demand side flexibility to 
market (e.g. by contracting with market actors to procure demand side flexibility). Here, the 
boundary of administrative rationalism is extended and the future moves closer to economic 
rationalism. 
Furthermore, in administrative rationalism, consumers are not emphasised. However, the finding 
in Future 2 shows that some interviewees expect that consumers (including both domestic and I&C 
consumers) will have control over technologies to participate in demand side flexibility. If this 
transpires, Future 2 will move closer to consumer sovereignty and energy democracy discourses.  
Ecological modernisation advocates that the ultimate role of government is to restructure policy 
along a decarbonisation agenda (Dryzek, 1997). However, some of government decisions are 
highlighted to be based on evidence from research by interviewees in Future 3. For example, the 
government support towards CCS is recommended by the Committee on Climate Change carbon 
budget (2015b). Here, ecological modernisation and administrative rationalism are overlapped to 
some extent.  
With the identified changes and overlaps in these discourses, all of the futures are contingent and 
being more open-ended. This insight again reinforces the discussion in section 6.2 suggesting that 
the futures of the sector are going to experience a period of changes which, because of these 
overlaps in discourses, will be difficult to steer, manage and control as expected by the sector and 
actors involved.     
6.10.3 Reflections on Dryzek’s discourse analysis framework 
This study suggests Dryzek’s framework (developed in section 2.6.1) is a useful framework to 
analyse energy discourses and energy discourse coalitions. The two elements of the framework 
(basic entities and assumptions about natural relationships) are able to help elaborate futures at 
the whole system level. The last element of the framework (key metaphors and other rhetorical 
devices) emphasises the role of language in transitions – including the extent to which language is 
subject to critical review and contestation. However, the third element (agents and their motives) 
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offers less explanatory insight because it is at odds with the conceptualisation of power in 
transitions following constructionism where power is not only held by actors (Ahlborg, 2017; 
Cashmore, 2018). This suggests further development of the Dryzek’s framework and more empirical 
research might be needed to evaluate this framework. The following section offers some critical 
reflections on power.  
6.11 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POWER IN TRANSITIONS 
This section provides a critical reflection on how the notion of power can be usefully understood 
and how power engenders transition. The findings show that transitions emerge from the 
interaction and relationships of power among human and non-human elements while transitions 
literature considers power as being possessed by human actors. This suggests the notion of power 
needs to be reconceptualised and understood in transitions literature.  
The findings in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.3, 5.3.3, 5.4.3, 5.5.3, 5.6.3) show that power of actors is 
exercised in interaction with non-human elements. For example, in Future 3, a government may 
engage with the industry (i.e. market actors) to pursue its interest in decarbonisation and economic 
growth since market actors recognise decarbonisation will lead to increasing profits. However, 
market actors’ interest in profit may not be achieved if consumers’ interest is not based on 
economic rational behaviour. Such pursuit of profit may be restricted by non-human external 
factors such as infrastructure, e.g. whether network and charging infrastructure supports EVs 
development.  
Here, transitions emerge from not only the interactions and power transfer between actors but 
also from power of non-human elements (i.e. structural power). The finding in Chapter 4 (section 
4.4.1) reveals that the most powerful non-human element affecting transitions is the “fundamental 
physics” of the system (i.e. the requirement to balance the network at all times). This element is 
classified as a system stability which needs to be maintained during transition.  
There are also several other “structural powers” identified in the findings in Chapter 4. These 
structural powers are conceptualised as “barriers to overcome” by interviewees, including 
technology, finance, market, information and regulation. Among them, the power of regulation 
emerged as the most significant. The majority of interviewees across different futures highlighted 
the need for an amendment to the regulatory framework for the electricity market to, among other 
things, enable new entrants to access data, enter new markets and capture value (see section 
4.4.2.3.2, 4.4.2.5, 4.4.2.6). A further need to change the whole regulatory structure was suggested 
by a minority of interviewees.  
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This view challenges the utility of the predominant conceptualisation of power in transitions 
literature (reviewed in section 2.4.3) where the focus of actors’ capacity has been brought to the 
fore (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009) and power to orchestrate changes is held by individuals and 
society (c.f. Cashmore, 2018). Power does not lie solely in actors but is also embedded in actors’ 
relations with socio-technical structures. As such, power should be understood as a productive 
force (Cashmore, 2018). This conceptualisation takes into account the view of Foucault towards 
power in which powerful individuals do not possess power (Cashmore, 2018). Rather, power is 
expressed in the societal interactions between human, technologies and nature (Ahlborg, 2017).  
By conceptualising power as a productive force, the outcomes of transitions might be 
“contradictory and ambiguous”, i.e. messy (Ahlborg, 2017, p.6). Such messy outcome is in line with 
social constructionism and the discussion in section 6.2. This suggests transitions cannot be simply 
realised by power exchange between actors but by a range of power interactions among both 
actors and structure. 
6.12 REALISING ENERGY FLEXIBILITY 
As the term “energy flexibility” appears in the commentaries of all interviewees, this penultimate 
section briefly discusses these commentaries to understand how energy flexibility can be realised 
in the future. Energy flexibility is assumed to be a technological question by the majority of 
interviewees. However, these technologies potentially engender changes in the architecture of the 
system which is at odds with the perspectives of BEIS and Ofgem. This suggests a more sophisticated 
transition conceptualisation, implementation and management strategy is needed to realise energy 
flexibility. 
In terms of new sources of energy flexibility, including demand side flexibility, storage and 
interconnection, the findings reveal that the focus has been on demand side flexibility, while 
storage and interconnection receive comparatively little attention from interviewees. Even so, 
energy flexibility has been conceptualised very differently by interviewees. Energy flexibility is that 
which “holds the system together” or  which drives “market volatility for technologies and market 
entrants” or about “understanding network capacity and energy throughput rather than maximum 
demand” or to “manage your demand in a way which you can align it better with renewable 
generation” or “a consumer flexibility to replace inflexible generation technology”. Here, energy 
flexibility can be considered as a system aspect, a market aspect, a demand aspect or a grid aspect, 
depending on the perspective of the interviewees talking about energy flexibility. 
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Despite different ways of conceptualisation of energy flexibility, the finding shows that the majority 
of interviewees do not critically review their own or others’ conceptualisations but consider futures’ 
energy flexibility in general terms and demand side flexibility in particular as a technological 
question. In other words, energy flexibility can, for interviewees, be easily achieved by adding 
technologies or knowledge into the system. For example, a technology platform or a flexibility time 
of use tariff in Future 1, smart grids in Future 2, or consumer-centric innovations in Future 4.  
This finding resonates with BEIS and Ofgem perspectives in energy flexibility who assume that a 
smart and more flexible energy system (2017, p.4; 2018, p.3) can be achieved by,  
“- removing barriers to smart technologies, including storage; 
- enabling smart homes and businesses; and 
- making markets work for flexibility”. 
Transition is assumed to occur by (1) removing barriers, (2) incentivising consumers with financial 
rewards and (3) ensuring value of flexibility by transparent price signals. In other words, BEIS and 
Ofgem assume that consumers and the industry act rationally following economic incentives and 
transitions can be easily achieved by removing barriers, thus, unaware of and/or undermining the 
importance of systemic changes. As discussed in section 6.5, this view is embedded in realism 
ontology which may prevent energy flexibility from being realised in futures.  
In contrast, as argued in the finding relating to “the metaphor of energy flexibility” in Chapter 5, 
some interviewees recognised that these technologies potentially involve changes in the 
boundaries between conventional sub-systems. The technology platform in Future 1 may allow 
different market actors from traditional market and sub-systems to participate and consequently, 
alter the traditional market structure and system architecture. Similarly, smart grids in Future 2 
facilitate network companies to understand and procure demand side flexibility from the market, 
which involves market entrance of new actors and as a consequence, alter system architecture. 
These technologies can be considered as or constitute architectural innovation which engender 
changes in the architecture of the whole system. Ultimately, the finding suggests that the 
transitions to energy flexibility can be achieved by architectural innovation, rather than modular 
innovation, and is a system-level question, rather than a technology question.  
6.13 SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter reveals the uncertainty and messiness of futures of the sector which is at 
odds with tidy futures envisaged in transitions research and industry literature. This insight sheds 
light on a different understanding of transition management which contains a more nuanced and 
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complex view. Rather than thinking of a pre-defined outcome (i.e. a transition goal) by following a 
transition pathway, transition of the sector should be understood as being socially constructed and 
emerge as a result of the interactions of different actor groups and other system components. 
Such interactions determine the feasibility of identified futures of the sector. Future 3 is most likely 
compared to other futures because it is supported by the most recent energy policy and able to 
accommodate the interests of the largest number of actor groups. 
This chapter also discussed the determinants of identified futures. Via similar determinants 
including technologies, non-technological determinants (market, culture, consumers) and 
regulation, the predominant assumption of the industry towards transitions is revealed. Transition 
is assumed to proceed by adding technologies and/or knowledge to the existing system and by 
removing barriers.  
The discussion about the determinants of the five identified futures also leads to further insights 
on the inconsistencies in ontology (i.e. the way industrial actors realise transitions) and the 
approaches taken in academic literature. The sector view is embedded in realism where economic 
rational choice is advocated to bring about a linear transition. This mostly involves the process of 
adding technologies and/or knowledge to the system. It also advocates that a pre-defined goal of 
transitions is essential in order to plan actions. However, established transition approaches detailed 
in academic literature share the view that transitions of the GB’s electricity sector advocate a 
constructionist view of transitions and their management. Accordingly, transitions are complex and 
uncertain and cannot be simply planned. Transitions need to occur at the system level with 
architectural innovation playing a key role. This view suggests a shift in the established knowledge 
of the sector towards a more sophisticated understanding of transitions and human behaviour, the 
need for systemic management of the energy system and a rethinking of future making practices. 
Future making practice in industry literature is dominated with modelling exercises which, while 
important, remain highly technical and leave little room for uncertainty. Moreover, transitions 
frameworks including the MLP also clean up the actual processes of transitions in order to make 
transitions governable and as a consequence, are not able to represent or capture the complexity 
of transitions. This finding calls into question the usefulness of current future making practices 
based on modelling tasks and fixed transitions frameworks.   
This chapter also reflected on some key concepts of transitions research such as the MLP and 
architectural innovation in order to understand the needs for the whole system analysis of 
transitions. Currently, transition is mainly conceptualised as a technological change where 
symbiotic innovations are likely to supplement existing incumbent technologies and bring about 
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system reconfiguration. These added innovations in technologies and business models are part of 
architectural innovation which involve more fundamental changes in the relationships between the 
sub-systems. However, interviewees do not realise these changes. Therefore, this study provides a 
critical shift in our understanding of transitions. Transition needs to be understood at system level, 
rather than at technological level. This study contributes to the literatures in transitions research 
by identifying not only the needs of system transition involving the interaction of system 
components (including actors) but also the outcome of transition comprising of the overlaps of 
different sub-systems. 
This chapter has also discussed discourse theory in transitions research in light of industry literature 
to understand the usefulness of the discourse coalition approach in identifying different 
perspectives of actors within a future. Interviewees do not neatly fit in one single discourse coalition 
which suggests that actors in the sector hold a plurality of views and interests. As such, the futures 
articulated by these actors are messy which reinforces the discussion about actors’ interactions. 
Indeed, discourse coalition approach offer significant scope for capturing the messiness of futures.  
Beside the usefulness of discourse theory in transition, reflecting on the notion of power deepens 
our understanding of power in the industry and transitions research. The majority of interviewees 
assumes power as being possessed or held by human actors. Similarly, in the literature, transition 
is predominantly understood as emerging through the interaction of actors. However, this 
understanding undermines the power of structure which is evidenced in the findings as an 
important type of power to engender transitions. Hence, instead of being held by individuals, power 
should be re-conceptualised as a productive force which comprises a range of power interactions 
among human and non-human elements. This conceptualisation broadens the understandings of 
whole system transitions and leaves rooms for, and indeed helps to explain, messy futures. 
This chapter concludes with the discussion about realising energy flexibility in futures. Energy 
flexibility involves changes in the architecture of the whole system. However, the dominant 
perspective and metaphor of government and the regulator in planning for a smart and more 
flexible future is based in realist ontology, which undermines the importance of systemic changes. 
This perspective challenges how energy flexibility is conceptualised and may be realised. Transition 
to energy flexibility is not just about technological additions but requires a systemic understanding 
of transitions.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises the key findings, conclusions and corresponding recommendations of this 
study as follows. It begins with a review of the research aim and objectives. This chapter then 
reflects on the methods selected and adopted in this study. After that, both the key findings and 
the conclusions of the study are set out. Limitations of the study are then considered. Finally, 
implications for the industry and recommendations for further research are detailed. 
7.2 REVIEWING RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
GB’s electricity sector is transitioning to low carbon futures in response to climate change and 
associated legally binding targets. Most of the UK research on transitions to futures of the sector 
focuses on technologies, while some other research has started to steer the focus onto actors and 
their power. However, such research fails to capture (1) the mess of futures emerging from the 
interactions of actors and (2) the whole system spanning generation, distribution and consumption 
sub-system of GB’s electricity sector. A third gap in knowledge identified in Chapter 2 centres on 
the lack of attention on how transitions to new sources of energy flexibility may be achieved. With 
these in mind, the following research aim was identified:  
To critically investigate whole system transitions to low carbon futures and new sources of 
energy flexibility in GB’s electricity sector. 
In order to meet this aim, three objectives were developed. 
Research objective 1: 
To identify dominant energy discourse coalitions within GB’s electricity sector. 
The beginning of Chapter 4 presented a thematic coding analysis of data to reveal diverse 
assumptions of interviewees about the transitions of the sector. The last section of Chapter 4 (4.6) 
drew on these assumptions and main characteristics of contemporary energy discourses in 
literature (presented in Chapter 2 – section 2.6.2) to group actors into discourse coalitions. Actors 
in a discourse coalition share a set of assumptions. Seven dominant energy discourse coalitions 
were identified: (1) economic rationalism, (2) administrative rationalism, (3) ecological 
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modernisation, (4) consumerism, (5) energy democracy, (6) technology focus and (7) energy 
flexibility.  
Research objective 2: 
To identify futures of GB’s electricity sector, focussing on the whole system analysis. 
These discourse coalitions act as a bridge from thematic coding analysis to discourse analysis in 
Chapter 5. These discourse coalitions form the basis of futures of the sector in this study and thus 
help to meet this second research objective. 
This objective of identifying futures was then met by discourse analysis following Dryzek’s (1997) 
analytical framework presented in Chapter 2, section 2.6.1 (Table 2.4) which includes four 
elements: (1) System components; (2) System relationships; (3) Power; and (4) Metaphors of energy 
flexibility. Five futures were articulated: (1) a ‘Market-based’ future, (2) a ‘Network-focussed’ 
future, (3) a ‘Policy-driven’ future, (4)  a ‘Consumer-centric’ future; and (5) a ‘Prosumer-led’ future. 
The focus on whole system analysis was achieved by (1) mapping the imagined future of each 
discourse coalition, (2) identifying and investigating architectural innovation and (3) exploring the 
notion of power in transitions. Firstly, each future was mapped in a systems map to represent the 
researchers’ interpretation of each future. Although all interviewees may not agree with or endorse 
these system maps, they clearly show whether and how the conventional sub-systems: generation, 
distribution and consumption feature in any futures.  
Secondly, Chapter 2 (section 2.4.2) explored how architectural innovation may engender changes 
in system architectures (i.e. changes in the relationships between subsystems), and consequently, 
give rise to transitions in the whole sector. The findings in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 and the 
discussion in Chapter 6 (section 6.8 and 6.9) identified some innovations (e.g. energy service 
companies, smart grids, platforms for flexibility) and showed that these innovations not only 
influence a part of the system where they are situated but also potentially transform the traditional 
linkages between various sub-systems and thus, bring about or themselves constitute architectural 
innovation.  
Thirdly, Chapter 2 (section 2.4.3) highlighted the need to conceptualise power not as something 
held by actors but as the power of actors exercised within contexts (structures) in the whole system 
analysis. Chapter 5 (section 5.2.3, 5.3.3, 5.4.3 and 5.5.3) and Chapter 6 (section 6.11) explored how 
power is conceptualised and identified in energy futures, not only in relation to human actors but 
also in relation to technology and regulation (structural power). This whole system analysis to 
identify futures informed and helped to meet the third research objective. 
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Research objective 3:  
To identify how transitions to new sources of energy flexibility may be achieved in each 
future. 
The findings presented in Chapter 5 (sections 5.2.4, 5.3.4, 5.4.4 and 5.5.4) showed that the majority 
of interviewees considered energy flexibility as a technology added to the system, for example a 
technology platform or a flexibility time of use tariff in Future 1, smart grids in Future 2, or 
consumer-centric innovations in Future 4. However, the discussion presented in Chapter 6 (sections 
6.8 and 6.12) showed that the sector and policy makers do not realise that these technologies are 
architectural innovation which can create system level changes. As a consequence, these suggest a 
system level-response is required to achieve transitions to new sources of energy flexibility, but 
such response has yet to materialise.  
All three research objectives have been met and this study has completed an exploratory research. 
The following section sets out some critical reflections on the method chosen and applied in this 
study to achieve the research aim and objectives.  
7.3 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
This section provides a critical reflection on the research method in terms of (1) data collection and 
analysis and (2) research quality. 
7.3.1 Data collection and analysis  
In order to meet the research aim and objectives, qualitative data were collected from various 
sources including most notably via semi structured interviews with senior figures in GB’s electricity 
sector. Such insights were used to identify and explore GB’s electricity sector futures and associated 
transitions. It should be noted that it was far from easy to access these senior figures, even with 
the assistance of the researcher’s industrial supervisor. Indeed, there is a paucity of research 
founded on such insights and this study offers a unique and privileged view into how transitions in 
GB’s electricity sector are envisaged by sector leaders.   
The study is founded in the constructionist perspective. Data were analysed using a thematic coding 
analysis and discourse analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. “Thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) 
were developed from the qualitative data collected. Such an approach to data collection and 
analysis provides a powerful way of exploring transitions of GB’s electricity sector and how they 
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actually unfold rather than focussing on historical transitions via documentary analysis as adopted 
by much current research (c.f. Geels et al., 2016; McMeekin et al., 2019). 
This study explores how transitions emerge from the interactions of actors and other system 
components. As such, focus groups or workshops are effective and efficient way to gather a large 
amount of data and attain knowledge about power relationships through interactive discussion 
(Robson and McCartan, 2016). However, such data collection approaches were not used as it would 
have been very difficult to organise focus groups or workshops with senior figures who are busy 
and difficult to access. Moreover, due to Covid-19 and its associated lock-down and online working, 
it was unfeasible to do so. 
7.3.2 Research quality 
As identified in section 3.2.9, a flexible research design produces credible and transferable results 
and conclusions. 
Credibility is achieved in this study from “prolonged involvement”’ and a transparent audit trail over 
the 4 years of this study.  During this period, the researcher was thoroughly immersed in the GB’s 
electricity sector and attended industry conferences and workshops and conducted interviews. The 
research design set out in section 3.3 forms an audit trail which provides the readers with a step-
by-step overview of the research process and contains the following documentation of: 
• the researcher’s prior understanding and perspective which influences the 
expectations of the study and consequently the research aim and objectives. 
• sampling strategy. 
• research data collection methods and context which impact the choice of data 
collection strategy. 
• data via transcripts and records. 
• methods of analysis.  
• the criteria which this study needs to satisfy. 
This study satisfies transferability in terms of “analytical generalisation” as it adopted the concepts 
from the MLP, architectural innovation, power and discourses in transition with an analytical 
framework of discourse analysis and discourse coalitions which may spread outside the boundary 
of GB’s electricity sector. 
Conclusions drawn from this study are provided in the following section. 
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7.4 KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
This section draws out three main conclusions of the study, based on the findings and discussions 
presented in Chapters 4 to 6, namely:  
• Futures are messy which highlights the multiplicity, contingency and open-endedness 
of energy transitions. 
• Energy transitions can be usefully understood as socially constructed and 
conceptualised as whole system analysis. 
• The dominant engineering perspective of GB’s electricity sector, the continuing belief 
in rational choice behaviour and the preponderance of short-term view of futures are 
highlighted as key issues in managing transitions. 
7.4.1 Open-endedness, multiplicity and contingency of energy transitions to futures 
This study identified five futures articulated by actor coalitions who ascribed to five dominant 
energy discourses. However, this study shows that actors cannot be easily marshalled into actor 
coalitions associated with one future because they hold a plurality of views about futures, which 
are sometimes contradictory and unclear. Hence, futures are messy and uncertain. Such messiness 
and uncertainty of futures in the findings underpin the complexity of the actual process of 
transitions. Indeed, this study suggests the multiplicity, contingency and open-endedness of energy 
transitions.  
• Multiplicity: This study shows that there are multiple innovations in the future and it is 
uncertain which one(s) will dominate. There are multiple transition pathways to 
futures, shaped by multiple discourses. In each future, multiple human and non-human 
elements interact and give rise to transitions.  
• Contingency: Futures are contingent upon both human and non-human elements such 
as actors, regulation, technologies, infrastructures and business models. 
• Open-endedness: This study shows that the outcome of transitions is uncertain and 
open-ended. Transition objectives may be set in advance, but are likely to change. In 
turn, the outcomes of transitions may be surprising and unexpected.   
This study shows that the futures are much messier and more complex than currently represented 
in much academic and industry literature. Futures elaborated in these literatures are neat and 
clearly delineated. Transition frameworks such as the MLP to govern transitions to these futures 
provide a simplified view of transitions in order to visualise key socio-technical elements and 
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consequently, render transitions manageable and actionable. As such, these frameworks far from 
fully account for the messiness and complexity of energy transitions and futures. 
7.4.2 Whole system analysis of transitions  
This study shows that energy transitions should be understood as being socially constructed from 
the power of relations/ interactions between actors and other system components and require 
architectural innovation.  
• Power: This study shows that power in energy transitions should be understood as a 
productive force following Cashmore (2018), rather than the capacity of actors to take 
action (i.e. agency) as conceptualised in much recent transitions research (c.f. Avelino 
and Rotmans, 2009). Power, hence, is not possessed by actors, but the outcomes of 
social interaction of actors embedded in societal structures. 
• Architectural innovation: This study recognises the key role of architectural innovation 
in energy transitions which is paid comparatively little attention in transitions research. 
This study shows that these innovations involve changes in the architecture of the 
whole system and as a consequence, engender transitions. 
With insights from the notion of power and architectural innovation, this study suggests that energy 
transitions will occur at the system level. Transitions research, hence, should not only focus on 
technologically focussed modular innovations but also whole system analysis. It means that the 
whole system should also be considered as the unit of analysis. This allows a fuller account of the 
interactions of system components and their linkages. However, the industry does not embrace 
such a perspective or indeed, system change, instead preferring to envisage and manage a 
technological change. Having highlighted this key issue of GB’s electricity sector, the following 
section looks at key issues of transition management in the sector.  
7.4.3 The key issues of transition management in GB’s electricity sector 
This study investigated what is actually, and expected to be, happening in transitions of GB’s 
electricity sector and found that key actors in the sector follow a realist ontology. This established 
ontology creates difficulty for the sector in general and policy makers in particular to manage 
transitions. Key issues are related to the dominant engineering perspective of actors including 
policy makers, the continuing belief in rational choice behaviour and the preponderance of short-
term view of futures.  
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The first key issue of transition management is the engineering perspective of the sector towards 
transitions. The sector does not see that transition is a system question. Rather, transition is 
assumed as linear processes of adding technologies and/or knowledge to the system, i.e. a 
technology question. This assumption, however, simplifies the actual process of energy transitions. 
This study shows that changes in a system component can give rise to changes at a system level 
which the sector may not expect. Consequently, the sector, while not foreseeing how a technology 
might reshape other system components and the system architecture, might face an unexpected 
outcome and ultimately, transition to a different future than envisaged. 
The engineering perspective widely held in the sector is also revealed in the neat and clearly 
delineated futures articulated by the industry such as National Grid - Future Energy Scenarios 
(2019b), Energy UK - The Future of Energy (2019), Energy Networks Association - Networks Future 
Worlds (2018), Shell - Sky Scenario (2018) and Committee on Climate Change - Power sector 
scenarios for the fifth carbon budget (2015a). Transitions to the futures are assumed to be 
manageable and controllable by setting a predefined objective and proceed linearly towards such 
objective. However, this study shows that transition objectives can change over time and 
transitions involve unintended outcomes. This insight questions the reliance and utility of neat and 
clearly delineated futures in literature. 
Policy makers also accept and embrace the engineering perspective as illustrated in key policy 
documents from the government and the regulator (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017; 2018). Policy makers 
assume that transitions can be achieved by removing barriers (mostly non-technological barriers). 
As such, transitions are deemed to be easily controlled and delivered which do not fully account for 
the actual process of energy transitions. Transitions cannot be easily achieved by removing barriers 
but involve changes at a system level.  
The second key transitions management issue revealed by this study is the predominance of the 
rational choice perspective in the sector. The sector assumes that humans act rationally in response 
to economic incentives. Choices associated with innovations and how they might work in the future 
are based on this viewpoint. Decisions are often made using cost-benefit analysis of technologies. 
A technological choice is then articulated, rather than a system choice. However, this technical 
practice overlooks the real relationship between technologies and other system components as 
well as the whole system. Moreover, both academic literature and this study show that consumers 
do not follow economic benefits. There is, hence, an inconsistency between the framing and 
expectations of consumers in the sector and how consumers actually behave. As consumers can 
potentially form a key aspect of transitions, this inconsistency creates difficulty for developing 
appropriate transition management strategies.  
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Thirdly, this study shows that actors mostly have unclear visions about the development of the 
sector. Indeed, these visions seem to be short-term. This suggests the sector is expecting to see a 
small amount of changes and reveals the inertia of the sector in dealing with innovation. The sector 
expects transitions to be ‘in control’. Thus, such short-term vision does not aid planning purposes.   
Although the research aim and objectives are all met, which can subsequently provide a practical 
implication for the industry (to be described in section 7.6), this study is not without limitation. The 
following section discusses these limitations. 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There are some limitations of the study in terms of methods and the scope of the study. 
Firstly, this study’s semi-structured interview approach to data collection might be a limitation as 
interviewees may provide information on the basis of what he or she thinks the researcher would 
like to hear (Silverman and Marvasti, 2008). As such, collected data might be filled with platitudes 
which are not be useful in this study. To counter this, observation of industry-based conferences 
was adopted which was helpful in aiding the researcher’s sense making.  
Secondly, another limitation lies in the possibility of researcher bias while approaching thematic 
coding analysis. The interpretation of codes and themes may reflect the researcher’s interest which 
would be a threat to credibility. However, as mentioned in section 3.2.3, this should be considered 
as the subjectivity of the researcher, rather than bias – deliberate attempts by the researcher to 
condition the results of the research. In this study, subjectivity is explicitly addressed because the 
researcher was reflexive and followed the progressive funnel approach where the researcher 
gradually and iteratively refined the literature review, data collection and data analysis. The 
researcher also provided transparent audit trails of documents and analysis.  
Thirdly, this study is founded on constructionism to investigate transitions to futures of GB’s 
electricity sector. As such, this study does not offer a clean description of what these futures look 
like and therefore, does not articulate clear actionable solutions for transitions management. In 
contrast, this study frames the vision of different actor constituencies and acknowledges the 
contradictory and messy outcomes of transitions. Hence, the contribution of this study is not theory 
testing or theory building of socio-technical transitions. This study rather develops an interpretation 
of future expectations of different actor constituencies to aid those interested in open-ended 
research investigating how transitions actually unfold. 
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Fourthly, this study only investigated electricity sector’s transitions in a GB context. The findings 
hence might not be representative to apply generally (Bryman and Bell, 2011). It means that the 
findings might not represent other sectors in Britain and other electricity sectors in other countries. 
However, “statistic generalisation” is not the goal of a qualitative case study research. Rather, this 
study developed a deep understanding of expected transitions in GB’s electricity sector and 
confirmed the uniqueness of this case study.  
Finally, data were not collected from actor constituencies such as consumers, prosumers, 
community energy groups and local authorities. These actor constituencies may become increasing 
important in GB’s electricity sector (highlighted in Future 5). However, as mentioned above, 
generalisation or representation is not a goal of this study.  
7.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRY AND POLICY 
The implications of this study hinge on the issue that the system architecture of Future 3 (Policy-
driven future), which is preferred by the current existing energy policy, remains largely intact (see 
section 6.4). This suggests both the sector and policy makers do not foresee the changes at the 
system level, which is incompatible with the actual energy transition processes. Therefore, it will 
be difficult for the sector and policy makers to develop appropriate transition management 
strategies and will hinder this “policy-driven” transition of the sector. This incompatibility 
underlines a need for a shift to a more sophisticated understanding of energy transitions within the 
industry and the government. Key points are: 
• Recognise that incentivising consumers through price mechanism might not work. 
• Understand that changes in one part of the system can engender changes in the whole 
system.  
• Greater attention is needed on architectural innovation which involves changes in 
system architecture. 
• Embrace the multiplicity of transitions which involve multiple pathways, multiple actors 
and innovations. 
• Articulate system choices, rather than just technology choices of transitions. 
• Embrace the notion that transition goals or objectives can change overtime although 
the overarching aim of transition is decarbonisation. 
This study also suggests that future making practices in the electricity sector which are dominated 
by quantitative modelling analyses should be challenged as a basis for management and decision 
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making. Modelling might be too technical and limited to fully capture the uncertainty of futures 
and the system change that a transition may involve; thus, need to be complemented by whole 
system analysis.  
More generally, the sector and policy makers can draw on the conclusions and the insights from 
this study to reflect on their own sense of transitions and act in their own context to review and re-
make futures, plan and manage transitions. Without the greater understanding of energy 
transitions and the change in energy future making practices suggested in this study, the sector will 
be unable to deliver the required energy flexibility in the future and ultimately unable to transition 
to low carbon futures. This study hence contributes to one of the ways in which the sector and 
policy makers can position themselves to effectively transition and achieve the Net Zero target.  
7.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As this study is exploratory, it implies that new insights on low carbon transitions and energy futures 
are needed. Recommendations for methods used in subsequent research are as follows:  
• Constructionism research ontology: This ontology can be further adopted in 
exploratory research in transitions. Transition is future-oriented and futures are 
produced through the interactions of actors in particular contexts. This ontology opens 
opportunities for understanding how different elements interact and give rise to 
transitions. 
• Abductive logic of enquiry: this logic of enquiry can be useful because it allows the 
researcher to gain insights into a phenomenon, rather than to test theory or build 
theory. The researcher is able to use concepts and ideas from some theoretical 
frameworks to inform the research questions and then amend research questions 
when the research proceeds.  
• A holistic case study: This research strategy is useful as it steers the focus of the 
research onto a whole system analysis. Here, the whole system is the unit of analysis.  
• Semi-structured interview with observation: Semi-structured interviews with senior 
figures and observation in industry-based conferences are useful in gaining insights and 
prevailing discussions of actors in the sector, and indeed, to capture their 
contemporary discourses. However, gaining access to these interviewees and 
conferences should not be under-estimated. 
• Purposive and snowball sampling: Adopting purposive sampling strategy is useful for 
the researcher to take control of developing samples to meet the research aim and 
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objectives. It is noticeable that it is not necessary to choose samples from all groups 
from the chosen context because representativeness is not the primary goal of a 
qualitative case study research. Including some element of snowball sampling is also 
useful because interviewees can shed light on context and are able to suggest other 
appropriate candidates for interviewing. However, these candidates may speak to the 
same narratives as the one who introduced them. As a consequence, the researcher 
may face the risk of not having enough rich data. Therefore, to counter this, the 
combination of purposive and snowball sampling is required. 
• Thematic coding analysis and discourse analysis: Analysing data by themes is useful. 
However, the chosen themes can be different from this study and be dependent upon 
the research context. Discourse analysis is also useful after thematic coding analysis. 
Discourses focus on collective meanings and sense-making of actors about transitions, 
which involve multiple actors, multiple issues in a context; and enable exploration of 
the interactions between actors and structure. 
This study also highlights several phenomena which require further investigation. 
This study responds well to the call in applying whole system analysis to investigate transitions of 
GB’s electricity sector. Such transitions are underlined by multiplicity and messiness, and far more 
complex than both certain academic literature on transitions and the industry claim. To start 
dealing with complexity, this study suggests a change to a more sophisticated understanding of 
energy transition processes from a whole system perspective. Further research is needed to find 
ways to better attend to the multiple and messy aspects of such processes. 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the whole GB’s electricity sector comprising generation, 
distribution and consumption. Insights of changes in all these three sub-systems come from actors 
operating and working in the electricity sector including the government, the regulator, system 
operator, network companies, energy suppliers, aggregators, consultant companies and so on. 
However, data were not collected from consumers, prosumers, community energy groups and local 
authorities. These actors become increasingly important in a consumption sub-system in the future. 
Therefore, in order to address this, further research could focus on consumers, prosumers, 
community energy groups and local authorities to investigate energy transitions.  
This study also touched lightly on the ethical implications of transition which might be further 
substantiated with insights from consumers, e.g. in terms of concern over 
disadvantaged/vulnerable consumers who do not have access to the internet or do not have 
sufficient demand capacity to shift from one time to another. Further research is needed to 
understand the implications of transitions for these groups.  
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A whole system can be broader than a sector, i.e. a socio-technical system which fulfils societal 
functions. There is a call from both the industry and academia to understand whole system 
transitions of the energy sector which may include electricity, transport and heat sub-systems (c.f. 
Energy UK, 2016). These three systems are closely connected. Actions in one sub-system may 
engender changes in another sub-system. For example, decarbonisation of heat through 
electrification might place an increased burden on the transition of the electricity sub-system. 
However, research in response to this call mainly focusses on technologies and continues to pay 
limited attention to the role of actors (McMeekin et al., 2019). This study, while adopting a whole 
system analysis which takes into account the role of actors, has drawn the boundary around the 
electricity sector in GB. Therefore, broadening this boundary beyond the electricity sector will be 
an engaging future research agenda. 
This study also identified that more attention should be paid to architectural innovation to 
complement technologically focussed studies concerned with modular innovation, and hence 
whole system analysis. There is limited empirical based research exploring architectural innovation, 
futures and transitions. Nevertheless, this study only focussed on architectural innovation in GB’s 
electricity sector. Hence, further research is needed on architectural innovation in other countries 
(e.g. German electricity sector, The Netherlands electricity sector) or different sectors (e.g. mobility, 
food) and subsequent system changes. Studies are also needed on how architectural innovation 
interact with modular innovation processes. 
This study also touched on the notion of power and suggested that power can also be understood 
as a productive force involving interactions between human and non-human elements. This 
enriches the conventional understanding of transitions which only focusses on actors and how 
power is transferred between these actors (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009). However, this study did 
not examine in-depth how these interactions of actors/ elements are exercised or develop a 
framework to study power in transitions. Hence, future research could fruitfully consider these.  
Finally, on 18 November 2020, just prior to thesis submission, the UK Prime Minister announced 
the Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution (Prime Minister’s Office, 2020). This plan sets 
out the ambition of the UK to reach Net Zero climate emission target in terms of different 
technologies such as offshore wind, hydrogen, nuclear, electric vehicles and CCUS. This plan again 
reinforces the key findings and conclusions of this study. Policy makers continue to see changes in 
GB’s electricity sector as a technology question/ issue. It is framed as a question of getting the 
technology right, rather than thinking about or changing the system as highlighted in this study. 
Situated in a broader transitions research literature and providing a critical investigation into energy 
transitions to low carbon futures, this study offers new insights into the mess and complexities of 
 
227 





ABERNATHY, W.J. and K.B. CLARK. Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative destruction. Research 
Policy, 1985, 14(1), 3–22.  
ACKOFF, R.L. The systems revolution. Long range planning, 1974, 7(6), 2–20.  
ADAM, B. Wendell Bell and the sociology of the future: Challenges past, present and future. Futures, 
2011, 43(6), 590–595.  
AHLBORG, H. Towards a conceptualization of power in energy transitions. Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions, 2017, 25, 122–141.  
ALANNE, K. and A. SAARI. Distributed energy generation and sustainable development. Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2006, 10(6), 539–558.  
AMBROSE, J. UK to power industrial strategy with battery funding ‘revolution.’ The Telegraph, 24 
July 2017. Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/23/uk-power-industrial-
strategy-battery-funding-revolution/ 
ASKEW, M. and D. SINCLAIR. Future World Impact Assessment. London: Baringa Partners, 2019.  
AULD, G.W., A. DIKER, M.A. BOCK, C.J. BOUSHEY, C.M. BRUHN, M. CLUSKEY, M. EDLEFSEN, D.L. 
GOLDBERG, S.L. MISNER, B.H. OLSON, M. REICKS, C. WANG and S. ZAGHLOUL. Development of a 
Decision Tree to Determine Appropriateness of NVivo in Analyzing Qualitative Data Sets. Journal of 
Nutrition Education and Behavior, 2007, 39(1), 37–47.  
AVELINO, F. Power in Transition: Empowering Discourses on Sustainability Transitions. PhD thesis, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2011.  
AVELINO, F. Power in Sustainability Transitions: Analysing power and (dis)empowerment in 
transformative change towards sustainability. Environmental Policy and Governance, 2017, 27(6), 
505–520.  
AVELINO, F. and J. ROTMANS. Power in Transition: An Interdisciplinary Framework to Study Power 
in Relation to Structural Change. European Journal of Social Theory, 2009, 12(4), 543–569.  
BEIS. The Clean Growth Strategy: Leading the way to a low carbon future. London: Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2017.  
BEIS. Letter from the Minister of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy: Net Zero 
Government inquiry. 2019a. Available from: https://old.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/environmental-audit/correspondence/191105-Kwasi-Kwarteng-to-Chair-Net-Zero-
Government.pdf 
BEIS. UK becomes first major economy to pass Net Zero emissions law. [online]. 2019b Available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-becomes-first-major-economy-to-pass-net-zero-
emissions-law 
BEIS. Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) Chapter 6: renewable sources of energy. London: 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2020a.  





BEIS and OFGEM. Smart, Flexible Energy System - a call for evidence. London: Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2016.  
BEIS and OFGEM. Upgrading our energy system: smart systems and flexibility plan. London: 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 
2017.  
BEIS and OFGEM. Upgrading our energy system: smart systems and flexibility plan: Progress update. 
London: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets, 2018.  
BERKERS, E. and F.W. GEELS. System innovation through stepwise reconfiguration: the case of 
technological transitions in Dutch greenhouse horticulture (1930–1980). Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 2011, 23(3), 227–247.  
BERKHOUT, F. Technological regimes, path dependency and the environment. Global 
Environmental Change, 2002, 12(1), 1–4.  
BERKHOUT, F., A. SMITH and A. STIRLING. Socio-technological Regimes and Transition Contexts. In: 
ELZEN, B., F.W. GEELS and K. GREEN, eds. System Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability 
Theory, Evidence and Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004, pp. 48–75.  
BERTSCH, J., C. GROWITSCH, S. LORENCZIK and S. NAGL. Flexibility options in European electricity 
markets in high RES-E scenarios. Germany: The University of Cologne, 2012.  
BEVERIDGE, R. and S. GUY. The rise of the eco-preneur and the messy world of environmental 
innovation. Local Environment, 2005, 10(6), 665–676.  
BOCKEN, N.M.P., S.W. SHORT, P. RANA and S. EVANS. A literature and practice review to develop 
sustainable business model archetypes. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2014, 65, 42–56.  
BOONS, F., C. MONTALVO, J. QUIST and M. WAGNER. Sustainable innovation, business models and 
economic performance: an overview. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2013, 45, 1–8.  
BORUP, M., N. BROWN, K. KONRAD and H.V. LENTE. The sociology of expectations in science and 
technology. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 2006, 18(3–4), 285–298.  
BOYLE, G. Renewable Electricity and the Grid: The Challenge of Variability. London: Earthscan, 2007.  
BOYLE, G. Renewable Energy: Power for a Sustainable Future. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  
BRAUN, V. and V. CLARKE. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 2006, 3(2), 77–101.  
BREEZE, R. Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics. Pragmatics, 2011, 21(4), 493–525.  
BRESNEN, M., A. GOUSSEVSKAIA and J. SWAN. Embedding New Management Knowledge in Project-
based Organizations: the interplay between structural conditions, agency and knowledge 
ambiguity. In: the proceedings of the Fifth European Conference on Organizational Knowledge, 
Learning, and Capabilities. Innsbruck, Austria, 2004, pp. 36.  
BRITISH INSTITUTE OF ENERGY ECONOMICS. Oxford 2018 Research Conference: Consumers at the 




BROADBENT, J. and R. LAUGHLIN. Developing empirical research: an example informed by a 
Habermasian approach. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 1997, 10(5), 622–648.  
BROWN, N., B. RAPPERT and A. WEBSTER. Contested futures: A sociology of prospective techno-
science. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.  
BRYMAN, A. and E. BELL. Business Research Methods. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
CASHMORE, M. Governing radical societal change. In: JENSEN, J.S., M. CASHMORE and P. SPÄTH, 
eds. The Politics of Urban Sustainability Transitions: Knowledge, Power and Governance. London: 
Routledge, 2018, Chapter 2, pp. 17–32.  
CCC. Power sector scenarios for the fifth carbon budget. London: Committee on Climate Change, 
2015a.  
CCC. The Fifth Carbon Budget - The next step towards a low-carbon economy. London: Committee 
on Climate Change, 2015b.  
CCC. 2017 Report to Parliament - Meeting Carbon Budgets: Closing the policy gap. London: 
Committee on Climate Change, 2017.  
CCC. Net Zero - The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming. London: Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019.  
CCC. Reducing UK emissions: 2020 Progress Report to Parliament. London: Committee on Climate 
Change, 2020.  
CENTRICA. Cornwall Local Energy Market. Centrica Plc [online]. 2018 Available from: 
https://www.centrica.com/stories/2018/cornwall-local-energy-market/ 
CGI and UTILITY WEEK. Energy Flexibility: Transforming the Power System by 2030. London, 2016.  
CHATHAM HOUSE. Chatham House Rule. Chatham House [online]. 2002 Available from: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule 
CONNOR, P.M., C.J. AXON, D. XENIAS and N. BALTA-OZKAN. Sources of risk and uncertainty in UK 
smart grid deployment: An expert stakeholder analysis. Energy, 2018, 161, 1–9.  
COOK, M., P. STEPHEN, L. PER-ANDERS, H. ROBY, T. COLLINS and D. TAYLOR. Exploring the role of 
intermediaries in smart grid developments. In: Sustainable Innovation. Epsom, 2015, pp. 6.  
DECC. Planning our electric future: a white paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity. 
London: The Stationery Office, 2011.  
DECC. Amber Rudd’s speech on a new direction for UK energy policy. [online]. 2015a Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/amber-rudds-speech-on-a-new-direction-for-uk-
energy-policy 
DECC. Electricity Market Reform: Contracts for Difference. [online]. 2015b Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-market-reform-contracts-for-difference 
DECC. UK progress towards GHG emissions reduction targets. London: Official Statistics, 2015c.  
DFT and BEIS. Government takes historic step towards net-zero with end of sale of new petrol and 





DRUCE, R., A. CARMEL, K. BORKOWSKI, G. STRBAC and M. AUNEDI. System Integration Costs for 
Alternative Low Carbon Generation Technologies – Policy Implications: Prepared for Committee on 
Climate Change. London, UK: NERA Economic Consulting and Imperial College London, 2015.  
DRYZEK, J.S. The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997.  
DTI. Energy White Paper 2003: Our Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon Economy. London: The 
Stationery Office, 2003.  
DTI. Meeting the energy challenge: a White Paper on energy. London: The Stationery Office, 2007.  
DUBOIS, A. and L.-E. GADDE. Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research. 
Journal of Business Research, 2002, 55(7), 553–560.  
ELEXON. Maximising the value from Demand Side response. London, 2015.  
ELEXON. Load profiles and their use in Electricity Settlement. London, 2018.  
ELEXON. BSC Procedures (BSCPs) - Elexon. [online]. [no date] Available from: 
https://www.elexon.co.uk/bsc-and-codes/bsc-related-documents/bscps/ 
ELEXON. Glossary Term: British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements. [online]. [no 
date] Available from: https://www.elexon.co.uk/glossary/british-electricity-trading-and-
transmission-arrangements/ 
EMIRBAYER, M. and A. MISCHE. What Is Agency? American Journal of Sociology, 1998, 103(4), 962–
1023.  
ENA. Open Networks Future Worlds: Developing change options to facilitate energy 
decarbonisation, digitisation and decentralisation. London: Energy Networks Association, 2018.  
ENERGY SYSTEMS CATAPULT. Energising our Transition to Electric Vehicles. London, 2020.  
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES INSTITUTE. A whole energy systems approach can help deliver the Clean 
Growth Strategy. [online]. 2017 Available from: https://www.eti.co.uk/news/a-whole-energy-
systems-approach-can-help-deliver-the-clean-growth-strategyhttps://www.eti.co.uk/ 
ENERGY TRANSITIONS COMMISSION. Mission Possible: Reaching net-zero carbon emissions from 
harder-to-abate sectors by mid-century. 2018.  
ENERGY UK. Pathways for the GB Electricity Sector to 2030. London, 2016.  
ENERGY UK. The Future of Energy - Summary Report. London, 2019.  
ENGELKEN, M., B. RÖMER, M. DRESCHER, I.M. WELPE and A. PICOT. Comparing drivers, barriers, 
and opportunities of business models for renewable energies: A review. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 2016, 60, 795–809.  





EURELECTRIC. Flexibility and Aggregation - Requirements for Their Interaction in the Market. 
Belgium: Union of the Electricity Industry, 2014.  
EVANS, S. Analysis: Record-low price for UK offshore wind cheaper than existing gas plants by 2023. 
Carbon Brief [online]. 2019 Available from: https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-record-low-uk-
offshore-wind-cheaper-than-existing-gas-plants-by-2023 
EVERETT, B., G. BOYLE, S. PEAKE and J. RAMAGE. Energy Systems and Sustainability: Power for a 
Sustainable Future. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
EXPERT GROUP 3 - SMART GRID TASK FORCE. Regulatory Recommendations for the Deployment of 
Flexibility. Brussels: European Commission, 2015.  
FAIRCLOUGH, N. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.  
FAIRCLOUGH, N. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: Routledge, 
2003.  
FAIRCLOUGH, N. and R. WODAK. Critical Discourse Analysis. In: VAN DIJK, T., ed. Discourse Studies: 
A Multidisciplinary Introduction. 1st ed. London: SAGE Publications, 1997, pp. 352–371.  
FEINDT, P.H. and A. OELS. Does discourse matter? Discourse analysis in environmental policy 
making. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 2005, 7(3), 161–173.  
FINLAY, L. Reflexivity: An Essential Component for All Research? British Journal of Occupational 
Therapy, 1998, 61(10), 453–456.  
FLYVBERG, B. Case Study. In: NORMAN, K.D. and S.L. YVONNA, eds. The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. 4th ed. SAGE Publications, 2011, pp. 301–316.  
FOUCAULT, M. Power: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984. 3rd ed., vol. 3. London: 
Penguin, 2002.  
FOXON, T.J. Transition pathways for a UK low carbon electricity future. Energy Policy, 2013, 52, 10–
24.  
FOXON, T.J., R. GROSS, A. CHASE, J. HOWES, A. ARNALL and D. ANDERSON. UK innovation systems 
for new and renewable energy technologies: drivers, barriers and systems failures. Energy Policy, 
2005, 33(16), 2123–2137.  
FOXON, T.J., G.P. HAMMOND and P.J.G. PEARSON. Developing transition pathways for a low carbon 
electricity system in the UK. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2010, 77(8), 1203–1213.  
FULLER, T. and K. LOOGMA. Constructing futures: A social constructionist perspective on foresight 
methodology. Futures, 2009, 41(2), 71–79.  
FUNCKE, S. and D. BAUKNECHT. Typology of centralised and decentralised visions for electricity 
infrastructure. Utilities Policy, 2016, 40, 67–74.  
GEELS, F.W. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a multi-level 
perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 2002, 31(8), 1257–1274.  
GEELS, F.W. From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: Insights about 




GEELS, F.W. Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: Refining the co-
evolutionary multi-level perspective. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2005a, 72(6), 
681–696.  
GEELS, F.W. Technological Transitions and System Innovations: A Co-evolutionary and Socio-
technical Analysis. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005b.  
GEELS, F.W. The dynamics of transitions in socio-technical systems: A multi-level analysis of the 
transition pathway from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (1860–1930). Technology Analysis 
& Strategic Management, 2005c, 17(4), 445–476.  
GEELS, F.W. Feelings of Discontent and the Promise of Middle Range Theory for STS: Examples from 
Technology Dynamics. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 2007, 32(6), 627–651.  
GEELS, F.W. Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the multi-level 
perspective. Research Policy, 2010, 39(4), 495–510.  
GEELS, F.W. The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses to seven criticisms. 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 2011, 1(1), 24–40.  
GEELS, F.W. Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: Progress and new challenges in 
socio-technical transitions research and the Multi-Level Perspective. Energy Research & Social 
Science, 2018a, 37, 224–231.  
GEELS, F.W. Low-carbon transition via system reconfiguration? A socio-technical whole system 
analysis of passenger mobility in Great Britain (1990–2016). Energy Research & Social Science, 
2018b, 46, 86–102.  
GEELS, F.W. Micro-foundations of the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions: 
Developing a multi-dimensional model of agency through crossovers between social 
constructivism, evolutionary economics and neo-institutional theory. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 2020, 152, 119894.  
GEELS, F.W., F. KERN, G. FUCHS, N. HINDERER, G. KUNGL, J. MYLAN, M. NEUKIRCH and S. 
WASSERMANN. The enactment of socio-technical transition pathways: a reformulated typology 
and a comparative multi-level analysis of the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions 
(1990–2014). Research Policy, 2016, 45(4), 896–913.  
GEELS, F.W., A. MCMEEKIN, J. MYLAN and D. SOUTHERTON. A critical appraisal of Sustainable 
Consumption and Production research: The reformist, revolutionary and reconfiguration positions. 
Global Environmental Change, 2015, 34, 1–12.  
GEELS, F.W., A. MCMEEKIN and B. PFLUGER. Socio-technical scenarios as a methodological tool to 
explore social and political feasibility in low-carbon transitions: Bridging computer models and the 
multi-level perspective in UK electricity generation (2010–2050). Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 2020, 151, 119258.  
GEELS, F.W. and J. SCHOT. Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research Policy, 2007, 
36(3), 399–417.  
GEELS, F.W. and J. SCHOT. The dynamics of transitions: a socio-technical perspective. In: GRIN, J., J. 
ROTMANS and J. SCHOT, eds. Transitions to sustainable development: new directions in the study 
of long term transformative change. Routledge, 2010, pp. 11–104.  
GEELS, F.W., B. TURNHEIM, M. ASQUITH, F. KERN and P. KIVIMAA. Sustainability transitions: policy 
and practice. Luxembourg: European Environment Agency, 2019.  
 
234 
GEELS, F.W., D. TYFIELD and J. URRY. Regime Resistance against Low-Carbon Transitions: 
Introducing Politics and Power into the Multi-Level Perspective. Theory, Culture & Society, 2014, 
31(5), 21–40.  
GEELS, F.W. and B. VERHEES. Cultural legitimacy and framing struggles in innovation journeys: A 
cultural-performative perspective and a case study of Dutch nuclear energy (1945–1986). 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2011, 78(6), 910–930.  
GEERTZ, C. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.  
GENUS, A. and A.-M. COLES. Rethinking the multi-level perspective of technological transitions. 
Research Policy, 2008, 37(9), 1436–1445.  
GIDDENS, A. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Oakland, CA: 
University of California Press, 1984.  
GILL, R. Discourse analysis. In: BAUER, M.W. and G. GASKELL, eds. Qualitative Researching With 
Image, Sound and Text. London: SAGE Publications, 2000, pp. 172–190.  
GIVEN, L. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand 
Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008.  
GOLDIE-SCOT, L. A Behind the Scenes Take on Lithium-ion Battery Prices. BloombergNEF [online]. 
2019 Available from: https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/ 
GORDON, K. and W.P. OLSON. Consumer Sovereignty, Branding, and Standards of Competitive 
Practice. The Electricity Journal, 2000, 13(4), 76–84.  
GORISSEN, L., F. SPIRA, E. MAYNAERTS, P. VALKERING and N. FRANTZESKAKI. Moving towards 
systemic change? Investigating acceleration dynamics of urban sustainability transitions in the 
Belgian City of Genk. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2018, 173, 171–185.  
GOSDEN, E. UK scraps £1bn carbon capture and storage competition. [online]. 2015 Available from: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/12016882/autumn-statement-2015-
UK-scraps-1bn-carbon-capture-and-storage-competition.html 
GRAHAM, L.J. The Product of Text and “Other” Statements: Discourse Analysis and the Critical Use 
of Foucault. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2011, 43(6), 663–674.  
GROVES, C. Emptying the future: On the environmental politics of anticipation. Futures, 2017, 92, 
29–38.  
GUY, S. and E. SHOVE. The Sociology of Energy, Buildings and the Environment: Constructing 
Knowledge, Designing Practice. London: Routledge, 2000.  
HAJER, M., M. NILSSON, K. RAWORTH, P. BAKKER, F. BERKHOUT, Y. DE BOER, J. ROCKSTRÖM, K. 
LUDWIG and M. KOK. Beyond Cockpit-ism: Four Insights to Enhance the Transformative Potential 
of the Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainability, 2015, 7(2), 1651–1660.  
HAJER, M. and J. UITERMARK. Performing Authority: Discursive Politics After the Assassination of 
Theo Van Gogh. Public Administration, 2008, 86(1), 5–19.  
HAJER, M.A. Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in 
Great Britain. In: FISCHER, F. and J. FORESTER, eds. The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and 
Planning. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 34.  
 
235 
HAJER, M.A. The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy 
Process. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
HAKIM, C. Research Design: Successful Designs for Social and Economic Research. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000.  
HALL, S. and T.J. FOXON. Values in the Smart Grid: The co-evolving political economy of smart 
distribution. Energy Policy, 2014, 74, 600–609.  
HAMMERSLEY, M. and P. ATKINSON. Ethnography: Principles in Practice. 3rd edition. London, New 
York: Routledge, 2007.  
HAMWI, M. and I. LIZARRALDE. Energy entrepreneurship business model innovation: insights from 
European emerging firms. In: BIEE Oxford 2018 Research Conference. Oxford, 2018, pp. 21.  
HARRÉ, R., J. BROCKMEIER and P. MÜHLHÄUSER. Greenspeak: a study of environmental discourse. 
California and London: SAGE Publications, 1999.  
HELM, D. Energy, the State, and the Market: British Energy Policy since 1979. Revised Edition. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.  
HELM, D. The Return of the CEGB? - Britain’s central buyer model - Dieter Helm. HELM. 2014. 
Available from: http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/energy/energy/the-return-of-the-
cegb/?url=/node/1381 
HELM, D. Burn Out: The Endgame for Fossil Fuels. Revised edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2017.  
HENDERSON, R. and K. CLARK. Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product 
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1990, 1(35), 9–
30.  
HITEVA, R. and J. WATSON. Governance of interactions between infrastructure sectors: The making 
of smart grids in the UK. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 2019, 32, 140–152.  
HUBBLE, S. Visions of domestic electricity use in a changing sociotechnical system. PhD thesis, 
Cardiff University, 2015.  
HUGHES, N. Towards improving the relevance of scenarios for public policy questions: A proposed 
methodological framework for policy relevant low carbon scenarios. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 2013, 80(4), 687–698.  
HUTT, W.H. Plan For Reconstruction A Project For Victory In War And Peace. London: Butler and 
Tanner, 1943.  
IEA. Distributed Generation in Liberalised Electricity Markets. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2002.  
IEA. Empowering Variable Renewables - Options for Flexible Electricity Systems. Paris: International 
Energy Agency, 2008.  
IEA. IEA examines critical interplay between digital and energy systems. [online]. 2017 Available 
from: http://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/april/iea-examines-critical-interplay-between-
digital-and-energy-systems.html 
IEA. Global EV Outlook 2020. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2020.  
 
236 
INMAN, P. How does Labour plan to pay for its energy nationalisation policy? The Guardian, 16 May 
2019. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/may/16/how-does-labour-
plan-to-pay-for-its-energy-nationalisation-policy 
INTERGOVERMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE. Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special 
Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Geneva, 
Switzerland: The Intergovernment Panel on Climate Change, 2018.  
ISOAHO, K. and K. KARHUNMAA. A critical review of discursive approaches in energy transitions. 
Energy Policy, 2019, 128, 930–942.  
JONES, L. Renewable Energy Integration - Practical Management of Variability, Uncertainty, and 
Flexibility in Power Grids. Australia: Academic Press, 2014.  
KAPETAKI, Z., J. HETLAND, T. LE GUENAN, T. MIKUNDA and J. SCOWCROFT. Highlights and Lessons 
from the EU CCS Demonstration Project Network. Energy Procedia, 2017, 114, 5562–5569.  
KEMP, R., J. SCHOT and R. HOOGMA. Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of niche 
formation: The approach of strategic niche management. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 1998, 10(2), 175–198.  
KERN, F. The discursive politics of governing transitions towards sustainability: the UK Carbon Trust. 
International Journal of Sustainable Development, 2012, 15(1/2), 90–106.  
KERN, F. and A. SMITH. Restructuring energy systems for sustainability? Energy transition policy in 
the Netherlands. Energy Policy, 2008, 36(11), 4093–4103.  
KERN, F., A. SMITH, C. SHAW, R. RAVEN and B. VERHEES. From laggard to leader: Explaining offshore 
wind developments in the UK. Energy Policy, 2014, 69, 635–646.  
KNAPPE, H., A.-K. HOLFELDER, D. LÖW BEER and P. NANZ. The politics of making and unmaking 
(sustainable) futures: introduction to the special feature. Sustainability Science, 2019, 14(4), 891–
898.  
KÖHLER, J., F.W. GEELS, F. KERN, J. MARKARD, E. ONSONGO, A. WIECZOREK, F. ALKEMADE, F. 
AVELINO, A. BERGEK, F. BOONS, L. FÜNFSCHILLING, D. HESS, G. HOLTZ, S. HYYSALO, K. JENKINS, P. 
KIVIMAA, M. MARTISKAINEN, A. MCMEEKIN, M.S. MÜHLEMEIER, B. NYKVIST, B. PEL, R. RAVEN, H. 
ROHRACHER, B. SANDÉN, J. SCHOT, B. SOVACOOL, B. TURNHEIM, D. WELCH and P. WELLS. An 
agenda for sustainability transitions research: State of the art and future directions. Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions, 2019, 31, 1–32.  
KÖHLER, J., B. TURNHEIM and M. HODSON. Low carbon transitions pathways in mobility: Applying 
the MLP in a combined case study and simulation bridging analysis of passenger transport in the 
Netherlands. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2020, 151, 119314.  
LACHMAN, D.A. A survey and review of approaches to study transitions. Energy Policy, 2013, 58, 
269–276.  
LANGENDAHL, P.-A., M. COOK, S. POTTER, H. ROBY and T. COLLINS. Governing effective and 
legitimate smart grid developments. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Energy, 2016, 
169(3), 102–109.  
LANGENDAHL, P.-A.A. Exploring environmental innovation journeys: an ethnographic study in a firm 
from the UK food and farming sector. PhD thesis, Open University, 2012.  
 
237 
LAW, J. After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.  
LEIPPRAND, A., C. FLACHSLAND and M. PAHLE. Energy transition on the rise: discourses on energy 
future in the German parliament. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 
2017, 30(3), 283–305.  
LINCOLN, Y.S. and E.G. GUBA. Naturalistic Inquiry. London: SAGE Publications, 1985.  
LIPSEY, R. and K.A. CHRYSTAL. Economics. 13th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.  
LITFIN, K.T. Ozone Discourse: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994.  
LOFTUS, P.J., A.M. COHEN, J.C.S. LONG and J.D. JENKINS. A critical review of global decarbonization 
scenarios: what do they tell us about feasibility? WIREs Climate Change, 2015, 6(1), 93–112.  
LOORBACH, D. Transition Management for Sustainable Development: A Prescriptive, Complexity-
Based Governance Framework. Governance, 2010, 23(1), 161–183.  
LORENZETTI, L. Forget Siri, Amazon now brings you Alexa. Fortune, November 2014. Available from: 
https://fortune.com/2014/11/06/forget-siri-amazon-now-brings-you-alexa/ 
MANKIW, N.G. Principles of Microeconomics. 5th edition. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2008.  
MARKARD, J., R. RAVEN and B. TRUFFER. Sustainability transitions: An emerging field of research 
and its prospects. Research Policy, 2012, 41(6), 955–967.  
MARLETTO, G. Car and the city: Socio-technical transition pathways to 2030. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 2014, 87, 164–178.  
MARSHALL, C. and G.B. ROSSMAN. Designing Qualitative Research. USA: SAGE Publications, 2016.  
MAZUR, C., S. HALL, J. HARDY and M. WORKMAN. Technology is not a Barrier: A Survey of Energy 
System Technologies Required for Innovative Electricity Business Models Driving the Low Carbon 
Energy Revolution. Energies, 2019, 12(3), 1–13.  
MCMEEKIN, A., F.W. GEELS and M. HODSON. Mapping the winds of whole system reconfiguration: 
Analysing low-carbon transformations across production, distribution and consumption in the UK 
electricity system (1990–2016). Research Policy, 2019, 48(5), 1216–1231.  
MENGES, R. Supporting renewable energy on liberalised markets: green electricity between 
additionality and consumer sovereignty. Energy Policy, 2003, 31(7), 583–596.  
MERTON, R.K. On theoretical sociology: five essays, old and new. New York: Free Press, 1967.  
MIDTTUN, A. and P.B. PICCINI. Facing the climate and digital challenge: European energy industry 
from boom to crisis and transformation. Energy Policy, 2017, 108, 330–343.  
MITCHELL, C. The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008.  
MODELSKI, G. and G. PERRY. Democratization in long perspective. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, 1991, 39(1), 23–34.  
MORRIS, C. and A. JUNGJOHANN. Energy Democracy: Germany’s Energiewende to Renewables. 1st 
ed. 2016 edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.  
 
238 
MORSE, J.M. Myth #93: Reliability and Validity Are Not Relevant to Qualitative Inquiry. Qualitative 
Health Research, 1999, 9(6), 717–718.  
NATIONAL GRID. National Grid Media Centre - National Grid confirms summer 2017 as “greenest 
ever” and launches “world’s first” green energy forecast. [online]. 2017 Available from: 
http://media.nationalgrid.com/press-releases/uk-press-releases/corporate-news/national-grid-
confirms-summer-2017-as-greenest-ever-and-launches-world-s-first-green-energy-forecast/ 
NATIONAL GRID. Future Energy Scenarios. London: National Grid Electricity System Operator, 2018.  
NATIONAL GRID. Britain’s clean energy system achieves historic milestone in 2019. [online]. 2019a 
Available from: https://www.nationalgrid.com/stories/journey-to-net-zero/britains-clean-energy-
system-achieves-historic-milestone-2019 
NATIONAL GRID. Future Energy Scenarios. London: National Grid Electricity System Operator, 
2019b.  
NATIONAL GRID. Separating the Electricity System Operator (ESO) from Electricity Transmission (ET) 
| National Grid ET. [online]. 2019c Available from: https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity-
transmission/about-us/we-are-changing/separating-electricity-system-operator-electricity-
transmission 
NATIONAL GRID. Winter Outlook 2019/2020. London: National Grid Electricity System Operator, 
2019d.  
NATIONAL GRID. Information about the 9 August power cut and the ESO | National Grid ESO. 
[online]. 2020 Available from: https://www.nationalgrideso.com/information-about-great-
britains-energy-system-and-electricity-system-operator-eso 
NELSON, R.R. and S.G. WINTER. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982.  
NIC. Smart power. London: National Infrastructure Commission, 2016.  
NIC. National Infrastructure Assessment. London: National Infrastructure Commission, 2018.  
OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION. Review of electricity trading arrangements - Background 
Paper 1. London: Office of Electricity Regulation, 1998.  
OFGEM. New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) – One Year Review. London: Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets, 2002.  
OFGEM. Distributed Energy - Initial Proposals for More Flexible Market and Licensing 
Arrangements. [online]. 2007 Available from: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/58127/decon-supplementary-appendices.pdf 
OFGEM. RIIO - a new way to regulate energy networks (Factsheet 93). [online]. 2010 Available from: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/64031/re-wiringbritainfspdf 
OFGEM. The GB electricity wholesale market. [online]. 2013 Available from: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/gb-electricity-wholesale-market 
OFGEM. Non-traditional business models: Supporting transformative change in the energy market. 
London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2015a.  
 
239 
OFGEM. Open letter: facilitating efficient use of flexibility sources in the GB electricity system. 
[online]. 2015b Available from: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/open-letter-
facilitating-efficient-use-flexibility-sources-gb-electricity-system 
OFGEM. Position Paper: Making the electricity system more flexible and delivering the benefits for 
consumers. [online]. 2015c Available from: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-
updates/position-paper-making-electricity-system-more-flexible-and-delivering-benefits-
consumers 
OFGEM. Aggregators: Barriers and External Impacts: a report by PA Consulting. [online]. 2016 
Available from: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/aggregators-barriers-and-
external-impacts-report-pa-consulting 
OFGEM. Guide to the RIIO-ED1 electricity distribution price control. London: Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets, 2017.  
OFGEM. Enabling the competitive deployment of storage in a flexible energy system: decision on 
changes to the electricity distribution licence. London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2018.  
OFGEM. Ofgem’s Future Insights Paper 6 - Flexibility Platforms in electricity markets. London: Office 
of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2019a.  
OFGEM. Targeted Charging Review: Decision and Impact Assessment. London: Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets, 2019b.  
OFGEM. Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regulatory Authorities Reports 2020. London: Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets, 2020a.  
OFGEM. Open letter: Notification to interested stakeholders of our interconnector policy review. 
[online]. 2020b Available from: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2020/08/open_letter_-
_interconnector_policy_review.pdf 
OFGEM and DTI. BETTA User guide. London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2005.  
OOMEN, J., J. HOFFMAN and M.A. HAJER. Techniques of futuring: On how imagined futures become 
socially performative. European Journal of Social Theory, 2021, , 1–19.  
PADGETT, D. Qualitative methods in social work research: Challenges and rewards. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, 1998.  
PARKER, I. Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology. London: 
Routledge, 1992.  
PARSONS, T. Sociological theory and modern society. New York: Free Press, 1967.  
PATTON, M.Q. Qualitative evaluation and research methods. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 1990.  
PEPERMANS, G., J. DRIESEN, D. HAESELDONCKX, R. BELMANS and W. D’HAESELEER. Distributed 
generation: definition, benefits and issues. Energy Policy, 2005, 33(6), 787–798.  
PORTER, M.E. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. 2nd ed. New 
York: Free Press, 2008.  
 
240 
PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE. PM outlines his Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution for 
250,000 jobs. [online]. 2020 Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-outlines-
his-ten-point-plan-for-a-green-industrial-revolution-for-250000-jobs 
QUIGGIN, D. and A. FROGGATT. The role of utilities in enabling prosumers and flexible distributed 
energy resources. In: BIEE’s Oxford Research Conference- Consumers at the heart of energy system. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 24.  
RAVEN, R.P.J.M. and G.P.J. VERBONG. Boundary crossing innovations: Case studies from the energy 
domain. Technology in Society, 2009, 31(1), 85–93.  
RIESSMAN, C.K. Narrative analysis. In: Narrative, Memory and Everyday Life. Huddersfield: 
University of Huddersfield, 2005, pp. 1–7.  
RIP, A., R.P.M. KEMP and R. KEMP. Technological change. In: RAYNER, S. and E.L. MALONE, eds. 
Human Choice and Climate Change. vol. II. Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Press, 1998, Resources and 
Technology, pp. 327–399.  
ROBSON, C. and K. MCCARTAN. Real World Research. 4th ed. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 
2016.  
ROBY, H. and S. DIBB. Future pathways to mainstreaming community energy. Energy Policy, 2019, 
135, 111020.  
ROGGE, K.S., B. PFLUGER and F.W. GEELS. Transformative policy mixes in socio-technical scenarios: 
The case of the low-carbon transition of the German electricity system (2010–2050). Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 2020, 151, 119259.  
ROSENBLOOM, D. Pathways: An emerging concept for the theory and governance of low-carbon 
transitions. Global Environmental Change, 2017, 43, 37–50.  
ROSENBLOOM, D., H. BERTON and J. MEADOWCROFT. Framing the sun: A discursive approach to 
understanding multi-dimensional interactions within socio-technical transitions through the case 
of solar electricity in Ontario, Canada. Research Policy, 2016, 45(6), 1275–1290.  
ROTMANS, J., R. KEMP and M. van ASSELT. More evolution than revolution: transition management 
in public policy. Foresight, 2001, 3(1), 15–31.  
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION. Energy - The Changing Climate. London: 
The Stationery Office, 2000.  
RYDIN, Y., P. DEVINE-WRIGHT, C.I. GOODIER, S. GUY, L. HUNT and J. WATSON. Challenging Lock-in 
through Urban Energy System (CLUES). London: University College London, 2012.  
SADLER, D.R. Intuitive Data Processing as a Potential Source of Bias in Naturalistic Evaluations. 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 1981, 3(4), 25–31.  
SANDYS, L., J. HARDY, A. RHODES and R. GREEN. ReDESIGNING REGULATION – Powering from the 
future. London: Imperial College London, 2018.  
SAVENIJE, D. Is Google becoming an energy company? [online]. 2014 Available from: 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/is-google-becoming-an-energy-company/216848/ 
SCHOT, J., A. BONI, M. RAMIREZ and F. STEWARD. Addressing the Sustainable Development Goals 
through Transformative Innovation Policy. Transformative Innovation Policy Consortium, 2018.  
 
241 
SCRASE, J.I. and D.G. OCKWELL. The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining 
high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction. Energy Policy, 2010, 38(5), 2225–2233.  
SEALE, C. The Quality of Qualitative Research. London: SAGE Publications, 1999.  
SEPULVEDA, N.A. Decarbonization of power systems: analyzing different technological pathways. 
MSc Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016.  
SHACKLEY, S. and K. GREEN. A conceptual framework for exploring transitions to decarbonised 
energy systems in the United Kingdom. Energy, 2007, 32(3), 221–236.  
SHAKOOR, A.A., G. DAVIES, G. STRBAC, D. PUDJIANTO, F. TENG, D. PAPADASKALOPOULOS and M. 
AUNEDI. Roadmap for flexibility services to 2030. Helsinki, London: Poyry Management Consulting, 
Imperial College London, 2017.  
SHANK, G. The Extraordinary Ordinary Powers of Abductive Reasoning. Theory & Psychology, 1998, 
8(6), 841–860.  
SHELL. Shell agrees to buy First Utility, a leading independent UK energy provider. [online]. 2017 
Available from: https://www.shell.co.uk/media/2017-media-releases/shell-agrees-to-buy-first-
utility.html 
SHELL. Sky: Meeting the goals of the Paris agreement. The Netherlands: Shell International, 2018.  
SHOVE, E. and G. WALKER. Caution! Transitions Ahead: Politics, Practice, and Sustainable Transition 
Management. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 2007, 39(4), 763–770.  
SILVEIRA, A. The nature of transitions: Implications for the transition to a low carbon economy. 
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL), 2016.  
SILVERMAN, D. and A. MARVASTI. Doing Qualitative Research: A Comprehensive Guide. London: 
SAGE Publications, 2008.  
SIMON, H.A. The Organization of Complex Systems. In: PATTEE, ed. Models of Discovery. Boston 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science. vol. 54. Dordrecht: Springer, 1977, Boston Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, pp. 245–261.  
SMITH, A., F. KERN, R. RAVEN and B. VERHEES. Spaces for sustainable innovation: Solar photovoltaic 
electricity in the UK. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2014, 81, 115–130.  
SMITH, A., A. STIRLING and F. BERKHOUT. The governance of sustainable socio-technical transitions. 
Research Policy, 2005, 34(10), 1491–1510.  
SMITH, L. Carbon Capture and Storage: additional background. House of Common Library, 2011,  
SORRELL, S. Explaining sociotechnical transitions: A critical realist perspective. Research Policy, 
2018, 47(7), 1267–1282.  
SOUTAR, I. and C. MITCHELL. Towards pragmatic narratives of societal engagement in the UK energy 
system. Energy Research & Social Science, 2018, 35, 132–139.  
STAINTON-ROGERS, W. Logics of Enquiry. In: POTTER, S., ed. Doing Postgraduate Research. London: 
SAGE Publications, 2006, pp. 71–91.  
STEINKE, I. Quality Criteria in Qualitative Research. In: FLICK, U., E. von KARDOFF and I. STEINKE, 
eds. A Companion to Qualitative Research. London: SAGE Publications, 2004, pp. 184–190.  
 
242 
STERN, N. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.  
STRBAC, G., M. AUNEDI, D. PUDJIANTO, D. SANDERS, A. HART, M. RAVISHANKAR and J. BRUNERT. 
An analysis of electricity system flexibility for Great Britain. London: Imperial College London, 
Carbon Trust, 2016a.  
STRBAC, G., M. AUNEDI, D. PUDJIANTO, F. TENG, R. DRUCE, A. CARMEL and K. BORKOWSKI. Value 
of flexibility in a decarbonised grid and system externalities of low-carbon generation technologies 
(Imperial College London). London: Imperial College London, NERA Economic Consulting, 2015.  
STRBAC, G., I. KONSTANTELOS, M. AUNEDI, M. POLLITT and R. GREEN. Delivering future-proof 
energy infrastructure - Report for National Infrastructure Commission. United Kingdom: University 
of Cambridge, Imperial College London, 2016b.  
SUAREZ, F. and R. OLIVA. Environmental Change and Organization Transformation. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 2005, 14(6), 1017–1041.  
SUSTAINABILITY FIRST. Call for Evidence - National Infrastructure Commission: Future of Regulation 
Study. [online]. 2019 Available from: 
https://www.sustainabilityfirst.org.uk/images/publications/consultations/Sustainability_First_NIC
_Future_of_Regulation_Call_for_Evidence_FINAL_12.4.19.pdf 
SWEENEY, S. RESIST, RECLAIM, RESTRUCTURE. Discussion document was prepared for the Energy 
Emergency: Developing Trade Union Strategies for a Global Transition trade union roundtable, 
2013.  
TAYLOR, S. Researching educational policy and change in ‘new times’: using critical discourse 
analysis. Journal of Education Policy, 2004, 19(4), 433–451.  
THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY COOPERATIVES - RESCOOP. The Energy 
Transition to Energy Democracy. Belgium: De Wrikker, 2015.  
THE LABOUR PARTY. Labour Manifesto. London: The Labour Party, 2017.  
THE UK PARLIAMENT. Climate Change Convention: Paris - Question for Department for Energy and 
Climate Change - UIN 34423. [online]. 2016 Available from: https://questions-
statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2016-04-18/34423 
TOMAIN, J. The Democratization of Energy. Journal of Transnational Law, Vanderbilt University, 
2015, 48.  
TUCKETT, A.G. Applying thematic analysis theory to practice: A researcher’s experience. 
Contemporary Nurse, 2005, 19(1–2), 75–87.  
TURNHEIM, B., F. BERKHOUT, F.W. GEELS, A. HOF, A. MCMEEKIN, B. NYKVIST and D. VAN VUUREN. 
Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address 
governance challenges. Global Environmental Change, 2015, 35, 239–253.  
TURNHEIM, B. and B. NYKVIST. Opening up the feasibility of sustainability transitions pathways 
(STPs): Representations, potentials, and conditions. Research Policy, 2019, 48(3), 775–788.  
TUTTON, R. Wicked futures: Meaning, matter and the sociology of the future. The Sociological 
Review, 2017, 65(3), 478–492.  
 
243 
TWIDELL, J. and A.D. WEIR. Renewable Energy Resources. London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 
1986.  
UK GOVERNMENT. Climate Change Act 2008. Statute Law Database. 2008. Available from: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents 
UKERC. The UK energy system in 2050: Comparing Low-Carbon, Resilient Scenarios. London: UKERC 
publication, 2013.  
UNFCCC. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Kyoto: 
United Nations, 1997.  
UNRUH, G.C. Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 2000, 28(12), 817–830.  
URRY, J. What is the future. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.  
VALENTINE, S.V., B.K. SOVACOOL and M.A. BROWN. Frame envy in energy policy ideology: A social 
constructivist framework for wicked energy problems. Energy Policy, 2017, 109, 623–630.  
VAN DIJK, T. Critical discourse analysis. In: SCHIFFRIN, D., D. TANNEN and H.E. HAMILTON, eds. The 
Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2005, pp. 349–371.  
VAN LENTE, H. Promising technology: the dynamics of expectations in technological developments. 
PhD thesis, Eburon, 1993.  
VAN LENTE, H. Navigating foresight in a sea of expectations: lessons from the sociology of 
expectations. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 2012, 24(8), 769–782.  
VERBONG, G.P.J. and F.W. GEELS. Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector with 
socio-technical pathways. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2010, 77(8), 1214–1221.  
VICTOR, D., F.W. GEELS and S. SHARP. Accelerating the low carbon transition - The case for stronger, 
more targeted and coordinated international action. London: Energy Transitions Commission, 2019.  
WALKER, S. and M. COOK. The contested concept of sustainable aviation. Sustainable Development, 
2009, 17(6), 378–390.  
WATSON, J. and P. DEVINE-WRIGHT. Centralisation, decentralisation and the scales in between. In: 
POLLITT, M. and T. JAMASB, eds. The Future of Electricity Demand: Customers, Citizens and Loads. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 542–577.  
WEINRUB, A. Expressions of Energy Democracy: Perspectives on an Emerging Movement. Local 
Clean Energy Alliance, 2014.  
WISE, R.M., I. FAZEY, M. STAFFORD SMITH, S.E. PARK, H.C. EAKIN, E.R.M. ARCHER VAN GARDEREN 
and B. CAMPBELL. Reconceptualising adaptation to climate change as part of pathways of change 
and response. Global Environmental Change, 2014, 28, 325–336.  
WISEMAN, J., T. EDWARDS and K. LUCKINS. Post carbon pathways: A meta-analysis of 18 large-scale 
post carbon economy transition strategies. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 
2013, 8, 76–93.  
WODAK, R. and M. MEYER. Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE Publications, 
2009.  
WOLCOTT, H. Transforming Qualitative Data. California and London: SAGE Publications, 1994.  
 
244 
WOLFE, P. The implications of an increasingly decentralised energy system. Energy Policy, 2008, 
36(12), 4509–4513.  
WOODMAN, B. and P. BAKER. Regulatory frameworks for decentralised energy. Energy Policy, 2008, 
36(12), 4527–4531.  
WORLD BANK. Decentralization: Rethinking Government. In: World Development Report 
1999/2000. The World Bank, 1998, World Development Report, pp. 107–124.  







Appendix A. APPROACH TO TRANSITION STUDIES AND ONTOLOGICAL ROOTS 








Appendix B. INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
Information sheet for persons participating in a research project  
PROJECT TITLE: EXPLORING THE CHANGING NATURE OF ENERGY FLEXIBILITY IN THE TRANSITION TO A LOW 
CARBON FUTURE OF GREAT BRITAIN’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRY 
My name is Mai Ngoc Nguyen. I am a Research Student at The Open University. I am carrying out research to 
explore the future of Great Britain’s electricity sector. In the transition to a low carbon future of the sector, I 
am particularly interested in the changing nature of energy flexibility and the implications of this change for 
the industry. The research is funded by The Open University and CGI. 
What is the research about? 
I would like to find out how you see GB’s electricity sector developing in the future and the role of energy 
flexibility in the future. I would also like to hear about your organisation and your ideas to identify business 
opportunities arising from the transition to low carbon futures. 
What you and other people tell me will help me to build a picture of a GB’s electricity sector’s low carbon 
future. This information will also help Great Britain in general and the electricity sector in particular to prepare 
for the future. I will use the information you provide for educational and research purposes, including 
publication. 
When will the research be conducted? 
The interviews will start from 1 January 2018 and are expected to complete by April 2019.  
What will happen during and after the interview? 
It would be helpful if you could allow an hour or more so we have time to talk. We can take a break and/or 
stop the interview whenever you like. If we don’t manage to cover everything in one conversation, I will ask 
if we can meet once more if you don’t mind.  
Refusal 
You can refuse to participate at any point by simply saying so. Participation is voluntary and you can withdraw 
from the research up until 3 months after the date of interview. You can refuse to answer any question. 
Anonymity 
What you tell me in the interview will be anonymised. I will not identify you and your organisation when I 




I would find it very helpful to audio-record our conversations and then use that to transcribe what you say so 
I can analyse it. But I will only record the conversation if you agree to this. 
How will my data be used? 
You will be asked if you consent to the use of your data (including audio recordings) in the research project 
(e.g. extracts of data, in academic conferences and in published results of the research).  
 
Data used in this way will be analysed by me and discussed with my supervision team.  
Data storage 
What you tell me in the interview will be stored securely and transcribed (if you allow me to audio-record our 
conversations). Only the researchers conducting this research will have access to these data. These data will 
be destroyed after 10 years following the completion of the project, which is estimated to be 31/01/2030. 
What if I have other questions? 
If you have any queries about the project or your participation in it, please contact me via email: 
mai.nguyen@open.ac.uk or telephone 01908 858889. 
 





Consent form for persons participating in a research project  
PROJECT TITLE: EXPLORING THE CHANGING NATURE OF ENERGY FLEXIBILITY IN THE TRANSITION TO A LOW 
CARBON FUTURE OF GREAT BRITAIN’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRY 
Agreement to participate 
 
I, (print name) 
Agree to be interviewed as part of this research project. 
 1. I have had the purposes of the research project explained to me. 
 2. I have been informed that I may refuse to participate at any point by simply saying so. Participation is 
voluntary and I am free to withdraw from the research up until 3 months after today’s date. I am free to 
refuse to answer questions. 
 3. I have been assured that my anonymity and that of my organisation will be protected. Neither I nor my 
organisation will be identified in any outputs of this research. 
 4. I agree that the information that I provide can be used for educational or research purposes, including 
publication. 
 5. The interview will be audio-recorded. However, I have the option to decline the recording. I can request 
destruction of the recording up to two weeks after it is made. 
 6. I understand that if I have any concerns or difficulties I can contact Prof. Matthew Cook at 01908 
655964. If I wish talk to someone else about this project, I can contact Dr Kevin Collins at 01908 655095. 
 7. I assign the copyright for my contribution to the researcher for use in education, research and 
publication (e.g. an unattributed quote for illustrative purposes). 
 8. I have been informed that with my consent the data generated will be stored securely and transcribed 
(if you allow me to audio-record our conversations). They will be destroyed after 10 years following the 
completion of the project, which is estimated to be 31/01/2030.       
 




Researcher signature    Date: 
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Appendix C. INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Phase 1 – Interview 
WARM UP: 
1.1. Tell me about the organisation you work for? 
1.2. Tell me about your role in your organisation? What do you do? 
1.3. Tell me about the role of your organisation in the electricity sector? 
CURRENT ORGANISATION AND ENERGY FLEXIBILITY 
1.4. Tell me about your business model and energy flexibility in this business model? 
- How do you make use of energy flexibility in your business model? 
- What value does energy flexibility create in our business model?  
- What are the main challenges for your organisation when using energy flexibility? 
 
The first theme that I want to talk about is: 
1. CURRENT SITATUTION OF GB’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND ENERGY FLEXIBILITY IN THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM. 
1.1. Tell me about the current GB’s electricity sector. 
- How does it work? 
- Who are key players? 
- What are the main challenges currently faced by the sector? 
1.2. Tell me about energy flexibility in our current system. 
- How is it achieved? 
- What is it used for? 
- What value does it create? 
- Who are key players? 
- What are main challenges for energy flexibility? 
I am going to move on to the next theme: 
2. CHANGES IN ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND ENERGY FLEXIBILITY IN THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
2.1. What changes to the electricity sector do you anticipate? 
- How will it change? 
- Which aspects of the sector need to change most? 
- When will these changes be initiated? 
- What time horizon do you expect this to happen? 
2.2. What changes in energy flexibility do you anticipate in futures? 
- How will energy flexibility change? 
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- Which aspects of energy flexibility need to change most? 
- How soon will these anticipated changes happen? 
- What time horizon do you expect this to happen? 
The final theme that I want to talk about is: 
3. FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY SECTOR, FUTURE OF ENERGY FLEXIBILITY AND BUSINESS MODEL 
INNOVATION 
3.1. How will anticipated changes in energy flexibility affect the electricity system? 
- Which aspects of the system will be affected? 
- How will it be affected? 
- How soon will it be affected? 
3.2. What is the electricity sector like in futures? 
- How will it work? 
- Who will be key players? 
- What time horizon do you expect this to happen? 
3.3. How will the anticipated change of energy flexibility affect your business model? 
- Which aspects of your business model will be affected? 
- How will it be affected? 
- How soon will it be affected? 
3.4. How will you make use of energy flexibility in the future? 
- Which aspects of energy flexibility will be useful to your organisation? 
- How will you integrate this aspect into your business model? 
- What value does energy flexibility add to your business model? 
- What outcomes do you expect? 
CONCLUSION: Is there anything else you want to say or you would like to ask me? 
 
Phase 2 – Interview 
ENERGY FLEXIBILITY INTERVIEW GUIDE 19/11/18 
WARM UP: Can you tell me a little bit about yourself and your organisation?   
CHANGE 
- Can you tell me about the changes happening in the electricity sector? 
- Can you tell me about the main challenges that the electricity sector and your organisation will face 
over the next 5 - 10y? 
- What opportunities might these challenges present for your organisation?  
- Can you tell me about any specific innovations that are impacting your businesses? 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
- Can you tell me about the technological innovations that you are developing? (ask DNOs, 
Incumbents, New entrants - NE) 
- What are the time scales for these? 
 
253 
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATIONS 
- In parallel with these technological innovations, can you tell me about business model innovations 
that you are developing? (BMI means changes in the way your organisation creates and captures 
value) (to DNOs, incumbents, NE) 
- Prompt: what is the role of this/these BMI in flexibility? 
STABILITY 
- What are the main barriers for these innovations (specific one)? (to DNOs, incumbents, new 
entrants) 
- We have talked a bit about the things that are changing both technologically or as a business model, 
what about the things that aren’t changing for your organisation and the sector? (to DNOs, 
incumbents) 
POLICY, REGULATION AND MARKET (INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT) 
- What is the role of policy and regulation in this process of change? (Recap of what is changing) 
- How does the regulator stimulate innovation? (to regulator) 
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE  
- How about internal barriers to develop these innovations/ to change? 
- What are new skills and knowledge that are needed for these innovations (specific one)? (to DNOs, 
incumbents, NE) 
- What are the main barriers for developing these skills and knowledge in the future? 
INVESTMENT  
- How do you see the direction of investment/ investment strategy changing to adopt these 
innovations? External or internal? 
- With these innovations (specific one), what are your main sources of finance? (to new entrants) 
CONSUMERS 
- How do you see the roles of consumers (both domestic and business consumers) in the electricity 
sector changing? 
- How do you see the relationship with consumers changing? 
- Prompt: What is consumers’ role in flexibility? 
POWER 
- Who is driving change in the sector at the moment?  
- How will this change in futures? 
DISRUPTION 
- What may be the major disruptive changes or events in the sector going forward? (to Incumbents, 
new entrants) 
- When is that? 
TIME FRAME 
- What are the timeframes for these changes (specific one)? 
- What will the electricity look like in 2030?  
- Prompt: What is the value of flexibility in the futures that you have just described to me? 
CONCLUSION: Is there anything else you would like to comment upon now about the future of the sector?  
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Appendix D. INTERVIEWEES 
Phase 1  
Interviewees Interviewees’ perspectives Dates of interviews 
I1 Academia 09/02/2018 
I2 Academia/ Regulation 26/02/2018 
I3 Industry commentator/ Investor 09/04/2018 
I4 Distributed asset business/  
Transmission and distribution companies 
30/04/2018 
I5 Industry commentator/ Regulation 23/05/2018 
I6 Industry commentator/ Whole-sale 
market 
23/05/2018 
I7 Incumbent energy supplier/ Academia 11/06/2018 
Phase 2  
Interviewees Interviewees’ perspectives Dates of interviews 
I8 
Transmission and distribution 
companies/ Whole sector 
12/11/2018 
I9 
Transmission and distribution 
companies/ Market 
12/11/2018 
I10 New entrant energy supplier/ Home 04/12/2018 
I11 Incumbent energy supplier/ Trader 13/12/2018 
I12 Energy supplier 21/12/2018 
I13 Government/ Government agency 10/01/2019 
I14 Industry commentator/ Network 15/02/2019 
I15 Transmission and distribution companies 27/02/2019 
I16 Government 06/03/2019 
I17 Government 06/03/2019 
I18 New entrant energy supplier 07/03/2019 
I19 Trade association  18/03/2019 
I20 Industry commentator 19/03/2019 
I21 Technological innovator/ Investor 04/04/2019 
I22 Trade association 05/04/2019 
I23 Transmission and distribution companies 08/04/2019 
I24 Transmission and distribution companies 07/05/2019 
I25 Incumbent from other sectors 08/05/2019 
I26 Code administrator 09/05/2019 
I27 Aggregator/ Technological innovator 13/05/2019 





Appendix E. INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS 
 
Apr 2017  Energy UK Parliamentary Reception 
   Westminster Energy Forum – Smart Energy Systems 
Jul 2017 Challenging Ideas – Reshaping Regulation – Laura Sandys and Dr Jeff 
Hardy’s workshop 
Westminster Energy Forum – Annual Review of UK Energy Policy, 
Regulation and Industrial Delivery. 
Sep 2017 Energy UK Breakfast Briefing - The road to a smart, flexible energy system 
- Accessing the value of new sources of flexibility 
Oct 2017 Westminster Energy Forum – Annual Review of UK Energy Infrastructure, 
Innovation and Investment. 
Nov 2017 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) – Smart 
Meter Data conference 
Dec 2017 Westminster Energy Forum – Smart Power Transitions 
Jan 2018 Westminster Energy Forum – Delivering the UK’s integrated Low Carbon 
Power and Transport Future 
Mar 2018 The Network of Early Career Researchers in Sustainability Transitions 
(NEST) 3rd conference – New Frontiers in Sustainability Transitions 
Apr 2018 Westminster Energy Forum – Smart Cities 
May 2018 CGI Central Market Debate – Unlocking flexibility through market 
facilitation 
Jul 2018 Annual BSC Meeting and Elexon Seminar 2018 – Supporting Change and 
Innovation. 
Sep 2018 Energy UK Breakfast Briefing - Realising the consumer value of flexibility 
 British Institute of Energy Economics (BIEE)’s 2018 research conference – 
Consumers at the heart of energy system 
Oct 2018 Westminster Energy Forum – Annual UK PowerGen and Network review; 
and the context of the energy transition. 
 Energy UK Annual Conference  
Nov 2018 Westminster Energy Forum – With Oil and Gas UK - The Future of the 
UKCS: Vision 2035 and the context of the UK’s Clean Growth Transition 
 Introducing Elexon workshop  
Dec 2018 Launch event – Redesigning the regulation – Laura Sandys 
Jan 2019 Westminster Energy Forum - Annual Review of UK Nuclear Policy, 
Regulation & Markets 
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Mar 2019 Westminster Energy Forum – An Integrated Approach to Energy, 
Sustainability & Climate Resilience 
Apr 2019 Westminster Energy Forum – Evaluating the Potential of the UK’s 
Renewable Energy Sectors in pursuit of UK Carbon Targets and key UN 
Sustainable Development Goals 
May 2019 British Institute of Energy Economics (BIEE)’s Lecture – Future of Energy – 
Shell 
Jul 2019 Westminster Energy Forum – Annual Review of UK Energy, Climate & 
Sustainability Policy 
Oct 2019 Westminster Energy Forum - Energy and Climate Strategies for Cities 
Jan 2020 Westminster Energy Forum - Annual post-COP Review - Climate 
Uncertainties & Strategic Risks 
 
